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ABSTRACT
This study, concerned with perceptions of relatedness, is partly 
based on tape-recorded, semi-structured discussions with ninety-seven 
English women. Except in the case of my principal informant, these
discussions took place in a London family planning clinic over two, six-
month fieldwork periods during 1985 and 1987. Discussions with my 
principal informant, who was recruited through an ante-natal clinic, 
took place over a four and a half year period. The study also analyses
eighty drawings of the body made by sixteen of the informants.
The study suggests that the expressions 'blood' and 'flesh and 
blood' which are used by informants to describe 'kinship' relationships 
denote the recognition of a common identity, but do not consistently 
refer to a biological relationship. Instead, these expressions appear 
to indicate a complex model of procreation which incorporates both 
social and biomedical knowledge. This model appears to inform a view of 
relatedness which includes understandings of biomedical genetics and 
certain notions of 'openness', 'closeness' and 'sameness' which can be 
interpreted in either physical or metaphysical terms. These notions 
have implications for the way in which the body and individuality are 
perceived, It is suggested, for example, that in certain circumstances, 
the 'person* and the 'body* are not isometric for those of the same 
'flesh and blood'.
The study is thus particularly concerned with the cultural 
construction of the body and the way in which the relationships between 
such constructed bodies are understood. It aims to contribute towards 
an understanding of the little-examined ontological basis of western 
'kinship', particularly in the context of new reproductive technologies 
which stress genetic relatedness.
- 3 -
TABLEJQF- CQHTEflTS.
CHAPTER Q3TE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES (6)
1.1) The problem
1.2) Summary of argument
1.3) Location within anthropology
1.4) Methodological considerations
1.5) Principal informant
1.6) Details of informants
1.7) Details of method
1.8) The research relationship
CHAPTER TVQ; THE HfEMEEC.E..Q£....QH£ISTIAUITY (60)
2. Introduction
2. 1) The importance of cosmology
2.2) Informants
2.3) The creation of the world
2.4) God as male
2.5) God as male creator
2.6) The Virgin Birth
2.7) The Virgin Birth and sexuality
2.8) The integrity of the feminine body
2.9) Asexual reproduction and asceticism
2. 10) The human condition as 'flesh1
2. 11) The ideal of the asexual parent
2. 12) Conclusion
CHAPTER THREE: THE PHENOMENAL BODY. (96)
3. Introduction
3. 1) The question of dualism
3.2) The 'person'
3. 3) The 'soul*
3.4) Abortion and embryo research
3.5) The location of 'soul'
3.6) The body: property or being
3.7) 'Flesh' as ambiguous substance
3.8) Inside the ark
3.9) The open body
3. 10) Conclusion
_ 4 -
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOCIAL BODY
4. Introduction
4. 1) The social body
4.2) Boundaries
4.3) Body products
4.4) The blood of others
4.5) Menstruation
4.6) Breastfeeding
4.7) The milk of others
4.8) Moral relationships
4.9) 'Openness'
4. 10) Understandings of gender
4. 11) Conclusion
4. 12) Embodied knowledge
CHAPTER FIVE: 1BLQQD* . 'FLESH.AND BLQQD' AND RELATEDNESS (195)
5. Introduction
5. 1) Relatedness versus kinship
5.2) 'Family'
5.3) 'Closeness' versus biogenetic distance
5. 4) Consubstantition
5.5) 'Blood'
5.6) 'Flesh and blood'
5.7) Generation without penetration
5.8) Incest
5.9) 'Flesh and blood' .as extended self
5. 10) Conclusion
CHAPTER SIX: REPRODUCTIONAMD PROCREATION (247)
6. Introduction
6.1) Reproduction and procreation
6.2) The social relations of reproduction
6.3) Procreation
6.4) Motherhood
6.5) Children and childhood
6.6) Infertility
6.7) New reproductive technologies
6.8) Artificial insemination
6.9) In vitro fertilisation
6. 10) Adoption
6. 11) Surrogate motherhood
6.12) Surrogacy, motherhood and relatedness
6. 13) Reproductive technologies and relatedness: a wider view
6.14) Conclusion
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION (341)
7.1) The ontological basis of relatedness
7.2) The relation between lay and biomedical knowledge
§§§§§
(361)
(384)
Appendix A:
Appendix B 
Appendix C 
Appendix 
Appendix 
Appendix 
Appendix
Terminology associated with the new reproductive 
technologies.
Details of Family Planning Clinic.
Procedure for recruitment of secondary informants. 
Other 'principal' informants.
The nature of interviews with secondary informants, 
Details of secondary informants.
The open body.
DRAWINGS (395)
Series A 
Series B 
Series C 
Series D 
Series E
Inside the body.
The female reproductive body 
The male reproductive body. 
The masculine body.
The feminine body.
FIGURES (477)
Figure A: 
Figure B:
Katy: 'Blood' and 
'Flesh and blood'
flesh and blood'
REFERENCES, (481)
§§§§§
- 6 -
C.HAP.XEIL.QBE.
INTRQDUCTI ON AND_.METHDD.QLQG Y
- 7 -
1.1) The problem
This dissertation is concerned with, perceptions of procreation and 
relatedness among a number of young English women. Fieldwork conducted 
in London between 1985 and 1987 was originally concerned with 
identifying the symbolic importance which informants attached to 
reproductive structures and functions. Various debates accompanying the 
development of new reproductive technologies* such as in vitro 
fertilisation CIVF),1 initially provided no more than an interesting 
backdrop to the research. However, through the difference in content 
between these debates and my informants' comments, I gradually became 
aware of a tension between two different worldviews, lay and biomedical, 
which demanded a shift of focus in the research. This tension became 
evident in a number of ways. For example, one of the most clearly 
articulated justifications for the development of the new technologies 
offered by biomedical practitioners has been the supposed importance of 
genetic links between parents and children. This stress on biological 
connection is wholly consistent with a biomedical view of reproduction, 
but the significance of such a linkage in lay perceptions of relatedness 
has remained largely assumed. Indeed, at the very time that these 
technologies were being defended on the basis of the genetic links they 
made possible, my informants were indicating that, for them, the 
biological relationship was of ambiguous, if not marginal, importance. 
This suggested the possibility of two, co-existing conceptual 'systems', 
with one informed by a biomedical understanding of reproduction, and the 
second - the focus of this study - concerned with a non-medicalised 
perception of 'procreation'.
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To clarify this distinction, the term 'procreation* is used in this 
work in accordance with Delaney's definition. She states that 
procreation
is to do with the symbols, meanings and beliefs by which life is 
thought to come into being. It provides a view of what life is, how 
and by what or whom it comes into being and for what purpose, what 
the person is (both male and female), how persons are related to 
each other, the non-human world and the cosmos, (1986: 506)
Thus procreation can be understood as a symbolic construction which
reflects or expresses categories and meanings of a specific culture;
understandings of parenthood, for example, are embedded in a system from
which they cannot be abstracted.
In contrast, there is within biomedical knowledge3 concerning 
reproduction an emphasis on the physiological processes of conception, 
pregnancy, birth and lactation. While such processes can be modified, 
for example by maternal diet or health care provision, under ideal 
conditions they will remain mare or less constant cross-culturally. The 
nature of the relation between the genetrix and the child in her womb, 
for example, is understood to be universally the same. Moreover, the 
increasing use of new reproductive technologies, such as IVF and, 
particularly, pre-natal screening, suggests that biomedical 
understandings of reproduction are increasingly informed by the science 
of genetics.3
This dissertation examines the problem of why, despite appearing to 
privilege biomedical understandings of reproduction , informants often 
downplay the significance of biological connection for the recognition 
of relatedness.4-
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1.,2) Summary nf the argument
The study addresses this problem through an analysis of tape-recorded 
discussions and drawings by ninety-six women attending a family planning 
clinic in central London. In addition, I include data from a woman I 
refer to as my principal informant, with whom I worked over a period of 
four and a half years, using a variety of research methods. I also 
incorporate additional material such as governmental reports, 
legislation, and medical texts.
The data suggest two, significant and inter-connected themes. The 
first of these refers to informants' perceptions of procreation. It 
appears that informants believe'* that male and female biological parents 
make an equal contribution towards the creation of a child, This 
contribution is understood in terms of the genetic material which is 
passed on from each parent and goes to form the substance of the child. 
The precise way in which informants perceive this genetic material 
remains unclear but it seems to share some elements with biomedical 
models of inheritance and development. Co-existing with this belief, 
however, is another in which a unique, creative power is attributed to 
the male parent who 'impregnates' a woman; in other words, the male is 
perceived to initiate pregnancy. The female parent, in turn is 
recognised to provide a unique caring role, with nurturance continuing 
not only throughout the periods of gestation and lactation, but also 
through the early years of the infant's life. This aspect of my 
informants' 'model' of procreation can be seen, not only to parallel 
cultural perceptions of gender, but to mirror Christian creation 
mythology, such as that of the Virgin Birth. Thus, informants'
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perceptions of procreation appear to incorporate a number of influences 
and to integrate seemingly contradictory premises. This complex of 
beliefs, and the first theme found within the data, I refer to as the 
'ontogenetic model' , s
The second theme suggested by the data concerns informants' 
perceptions of relatedness. In correspondance with their two-tiered 
model of procreation, informants hold a dualistic notion of relatedness 
which is partly informed by understandings of genetic inheritance and, 
additionally, by certain 'principles' which can be interpreted in either 
physical or metaphysical terms. I refer to these principles as those of 
'closeness', 'sameness' and 'openness'. It has to be emphasised, 
however, that these are not equally stressed by informants, nor always 
explicitly articulated by them. For example, 'closeness' was very much 
an integral part of informants' discourse on social relationships and 
was used to refer both to physical and emotional intimacy. 'Openness' 
was often used in describing the conditions necessary for 'close' family 
relationships, but it was also used more tentatively to describe a 
physical pre-condition for intimacy within other social relationships. 
Finally, 'sameness' was an expression that was rarely used by informants 
explicitly, but is nonetheless discernable as an ontological principle 
which underpins the way in which family relationships are perceived.
This 'sameness' was ambiguous in that it might refer to physical or 
metaphysical similarity.
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These principles were most clearly expressed in the discourse of 
relatedness concerning 'blood* and 'flesh and blood'. A 'blood' 
relationship was one in which common substance (such as shared genes) 
was recognised but, more importantly, one where a common identity and 
common interests were acknowledged.6. Additionally, 'flesh and blood' 
appeared to refer to a core group of 'blood' relationships and to 
represent the epitome of 'sameness* and 'closeness'. This group was 
largely comprised of grandparents, parents and children, who shared the 
closest approximation to 'sameness' in terms of substance, such as 
genetic material, but perhaps more significantly, shared in the 
collective and morally charged task of 'upbringing*, or the 'raising* of 
a child to full personhood.
An examination of the metaphors used by informants in referring to 
this process suggests that those of the same 'flesh and blood' not only 
'raise' a child to the physical and moral stance of uprightness but, by 
remaining 'close', provide the kind of support which helps to maintain 
this existential position.7 These 'positional* metaphors are discussed 
more fully in Chapter Seven, but attention is drawn to them as they 
occur throughout the text of this dissertation, by the use of bold 
print.
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1.3) The location of the study within anthropology 
In order to elucidate informants’ understanding of procreation, 
discussions were guided over a range of issues. These included 
perceptions of Christian cosmology; of the 'person' and the 'soul'; of' 
the phenomenal and gendered body, its integrity and its effluvia; of the 
notion of 'family'; of attitudes towards incest; of the meanings of 
'blood' and 'flesh and blood' as well as responses to the potential 
offered by the new reproductive technologies. As such, this work does 
not fall into any one theoretical field but touches on a number of 
debates within and tangential to anthropology. I shall only expand on a 
few of these here.
Epist ecology,
To begin with this study is relevant to epistemological questions within 
anthropology. It has been claimed, for example, that the modern, 
western layperson is rarely more scientific in outlook than the 
traditional African villager (Horton 1967). The views of informants can 
therefore be examined within the context of the debate about scientific 
and non-scientific thought.a I do not want to enter the debate about 
rationality;9 but agree with Turner (1979) who suggests that rationality 
is the embodiment of a particular set of cultural values and part of a 
world which esteems the achievement of goals, efficiency and control. 
Rationality would therefore seem to be an inherent part of a particular 
system of knowledge which values such achievements, rather than the 
yardstick by which all knowledge and belief systems may be judged.10 
Thus I follow Jackson who has said:
Beliefs have no reality apart from the people who make use of them,
and to try to see how beliefs correspond to some allegedly
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"objective” reality or how they cohere as a so-called 'system' seems 
to me far less edifying than trying to see what people do with 
beliefs in coping with the exigencies of life. (1989: 101)
The fallacy of representing scientific and non-scientific thought 
as if they are clearly delineated and opposed modes of thought has been 
well described. For example, the dichotomy of untamed versus 
domesticated thought proposed by Levi-Strauss (1966) is one in which 
non-scientific (or untamed) thought is characterised by intuition and 
the use of metaphorical and metonymical relations which Levi-Strauss 
thought absent from science. By combining and recombining a given 
stock of symbols, untamed thought is therefore a kind of bricolage and 
directed entirely at the concrete, in contrast to western scientific 
thought, which operates at an entirely abstract level.
Levi-Strauss's argument has been undermined in a number of 
respects. For instance, Tambiah (1973: 199) demonstrates that both 
science and what he calls 'magic' are characterised by analogical 
thought; science consists of making the known or the apprehended serve 
as a model for the incompletely known in any phenomenon. Similarly, 
Barnes (1974) finds that much scientific thought is analogical or 
metaphorical. According to Boyd (1979), there are cases where 
metaphorical expression (if only for a time) constitutes an irreplacable 
part of the linguistic aspect of scientific theory. Moreover, these 
metaphors are not only expressive but constitutive of the theories they 
express. In sum, the description of the bricoleur does not seem 
altogether inappropriate for the natural scientist, even if the 
scientist is more explicitly rule-guided than others,11
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On this basis, the model of procreation my informants hold is not 
necessarily founded on a different mode of thought to that which informs 
biomedicine. Indeed, one of the interesting apects of the ontogenetic 
model is the way in which it incorporates aspects of biomedical 
knowledge concerning reproduction. Such inter-penetrations of 'folk* 
and orthodox knowledge have been widely observed; Leach (1982) noted 
that not only do virtually all societies have more than one culture 
within their borders, but that within 'complex' societies at least, a 
further sub-division occurs in which groups acquire their own values and 
concepts. KacCormack (1982) notes how doctors and other health 
professionals may hold one working model and their patients another. 
However, she suggests that a 'folk' perspective may be maintained 
despite a more 'orthodox1 model being presented through education. 
Eisenberg (1977), among others, has noted an interplay between the 
knowledge of medical and lay communities; he claims that as new concepts 
become common property, they may merge, displace or co-exist with pre­
existing lay beliefs, despite logical incompatibilities.1 1 3  This 
suggests that it is quite possible for an individual to hold different 
types of knowledge simultaneously.1A As Morris suggests, the systematic 
nature of beliefs may, in general, have been overestimated, perhaps 
because of the coherency anthropologists feel their work should display 
(1976). Similarly, Hershman (1977), in an examination of Punjabi ideas 
of womanhood, observes that a lack of consistency within informants' 
accounts may represent a problem for the anthroplogist and not for the 
informant:
Punjabis, like all of us, have the ability to keep contradictory 
ideas separate and apart by confining them to mutually exclusive 
contexts (1977: 291).
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In this context two important points should be made about the 
nature of biomedical knowledge. The first point concerns biomedicine's 
heterogeneity. Biomedicine has been defined as "the whole medical 
complex in Western nations, which includes knowledge, practices, 
organisations and social roles" (Fabrega 1975: 969). It has been 
suggested that biomedicine emphasises the ontological primacy of 
physical existence ((Wright and Treacher 1982) and that, for example, 
biomedical understandings of disease are underpinned by a unifactorial 
view of aetiology which ignores the interaction between individuals and 
their social and material context (cf Comeroff 1982). Implicit in this 
kind of approach is an assumption of biomedicine as a homogeneity. This 
assumption ignores the range of different models within biomedicine 
(such as those variously held by endocrinologists, cardiologists or 
epidemiologists) which arise from a study of different classes of 
phenomena (for example, hormonal interaction, cardiovascular physiology 
and disease population patterns), using different research 
methodologies. Yet, despite this internal heterogeneity, these 
different models are not incommensurate,but co-exist within an 
overarching biomedical paradigm.
Second, far from being neutral enterprises, science and technology 
are value laden (cf Barnes 1974; Haraway 1989). Instead of embodying 
'pure' knowldege, the categories of the natural sciences have often been 
shown to be the product of mystification in which the social relations 
producing scientific knowledge are disguised (Crick 1982: 307). On this 
basis, and remembering the possibility that many individuals may hold 
more than one kind of knowledge at any one time (see above), it seems
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probable that even within a biomedical specialty, such as that of 
obstetrics and gynaecology, more than one 'model' may operate according 
to context. Thus there may be the model made explict in textbooks and 
journals, which expresses the official views of the discipline and, 
which in some instances, contrasts with models which Inform everyday 
practice. These models employed at the 'operational level' may be 
widely influenced by, for example, matters of convenience, institutional 
policies or personal cosmologies, that is, a highly disparate range of 
factors which have in common that "they are not typically seen as 
problematic within a purely paradigmatic account of the discipline" 
(Callan 1984; 414). These factors presumably also include popular 
representations, such as those of infertility (cf Pfeffer 1987), or the 
fetus (cf Petchesky 1987), which influence the social and cultural 
construction of reproduction for both doctors and their patients.
These two points concerning the heterogeneity within biomedicine 
and, further, within any biomedical specialty are important as in this 
dissertation I shall, on occassion, be using the expression 'the 
biomedical model of reproduction' as a form of shorthand to refer to 
understandings of the human processes of generation, fetal development, 
maternal health, birth and lactation which can, for the most part, be 
viewed as orthodox in relation to the biomedical paradigm, I am not 
suggesting, however, that there is in fact a single model of 
reproduction within biomedicine.
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Data from this research suggest that informants' knowledge of 
procreation is less systematic and founded on different principles to 
those informing the biomedical paradigm. ,fS However, informants clearly 
incorporate certain elements from biomedicine, such as the notion of 
genetic inheritance. Whether they invest such elements with the same 
meanings they are given within the biomedical frame of reference is more 
difficult to assess. At the same time, despite indications that 
informants may 'trawl' biomedical knowledge for useful elements, there 
is nothing to indicate that such acts of incorporation make the 
biomedical paradigm itself more accessible or relevant to them.
The issue arises however, that if my informants' model of 
procreation is partly influenced by a biomedical view, from where does 
the rest of their model come? This dissertation suggests that at least 
one alternative influence on informants' perceptions of procreation 
comes from the tradition of Christianity. The data presented'in Chapter 
Two was gathered on the assumption that, despite living in a largely 
secular society, the worldview of informants would nonetheless be 
influenced by a historical tradition of Christianity, and that this 
influence upon understandings of procreation might be as powerful as 
that of biomedicine. I do not wish to comment on whether 'religion' is 
flourishing in supposedly secular societies (cf Glasner 1977), nor to 
enter the debate on the definition of religion (cf Durkheim 1961; Geertz 
1973; Asad 1983). My point is not so much that my informants may be 
'religious' despite the majority's lack of participation in the 
institutionalised aspects of Christianity, but that, whether they are 
'religious' or not, the myths and the values of Christianity continue to
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inform the worldview of informants to some degree. In this I follow
Pagels, who states;
certain ideas - in particular, ideas concerning sexuality, moral 
freedom, and human value - took their definitive form during the 
first four centuries as interpretations of the Genesis creation 
stories, and .... they have continued to affect our culture and 
everyone in it, Christian or not, ever since. (1989; xxviii)
Similarly, Hirst and Woolley (1982) have suggested that we should not be
suprised if writers such as Mauss and Foucault link the modern western
concept of the subject to Christian practice (rather than the
development of capitalism or the modern state); religion was, until
recently, the primary influence on ideas concerning this world as well
as the 'next1.
On this basis, the second chapter looks at the meanings informants 
attribute to Biblical creative mythology, such as the origin of Adam and 
Eve, in terms of the ontological principles they suggest concerning 
procreation. Informants' accounts of the Virgin Birth are also examined 
in this light. In this respect, one aspect of the thesis touches on the 
anthropological debate concerning 'virgin birth', in that it considers 
the significance of procreative beliefs which appear to contradict co­
existing reproductive ones (cf. Leach 1966, Schneider 1968). The model 
of procreation held by informants thus begins to emerge in this chapter 
and suggests a correspondence between the creative power of a male god 
and the initiatory role attributed to mortal men in the creation of new 
human life.
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Knowledge and power.
Still in relation to epistemological issues, this study also contributes 
to the debate on the relationship between knowledge and power (Caplan
1988). The data collected from Informants suggest, that they have an 
understanding of the body which is largely informed by gender. Within 
this, informants indicate an ambivalence about the feminine body's 
potential 'openness'. This has a number of referents but can be partly 
understood in relation to the patriarchal, Christian tradition to which 
informants are heir, and in which asceticism (exemplified by the Virgin 
Birth) and metaphors of penetration suggest an ambiguous ideal for 
secular mothers and for the feminine body (see Chapter Two). At another 
level, looked at in the context of Ardener's (1975) work, informants' 
views can be identified as those of a 'muted' group (namely women) who 
struggle to express their worldview through the language of biomedicine 
and other dominant models, which have been developed by men and in 
accord with a male perspective. Alternatively, the ideas of informants 
can be characterised as 'commonsense' in the way that Giddens (1976) has 
outlined this; as representing both the accumulated wisdom of laypeople 
and the perspectives of 'experts*. According to Cornwell (1984), 
commonsense is a process of interaction that is quite different to the 
'medicalisation* of lay views; with medicalisation such views are 
undermined and come to be dominated by medical knowledge. In this 
study, I find evidence of views of the body and of proceation which 
diverge from more dominant models, but the status informants attribute 
to these views is not clear cut; for example, informants both defer to 
the knowledge of biomedical practitioners and retain a model which is 
only partially informed by biomedicine.
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The idea of * nature*-.
The study is also concerned with the idea of 'nature*. As such the 
dissertation touches on a number of themes within anthropology, such as 
the identification of women with nature, the meanings inscribed on the 
physical body and the understanding of 'kinship* as a matter of biology. 
The first of these themes lies within the classic 'nature/culture* 
debate in which it was proposed that women, through their association 
with reproduction, have been seen to be more closely associated with 
nature than men, who in turn are identified with culture (Ortner 1974),
The association of women with nature and men with culture has a
long history in western thought. In both Platonic and neo-Platonic
symbolism, nature and matter were female and ideas male (Lloyd 1984).
In.sixteenth-century thought, the metaphor binding the individual,
society and cosmos was that of an organism; the identification of
nature, especially the earth, as a nurturing, benevolent female who
provided for the needs of humans in an ordered universe was central to
this, although it co-existed with an image of nature as wild and
uncontrollable. With the Scientific Revolution came a mechanistic view
of the world in which nature as disorder had to be overcome (Merchant
1980). Jordanova (1980) and Easlea (1981), looking at the relationship
of science and medicine to nature, found the sciences continued the
earlier sexual metaphor by designating nature as a woman to be unveiled,
unclothed and penetrated by masculine science, According to MacCormack:
A biological determinism 'explained' women but men were defined more 
by their acts, an attitude of enquiry which persists in some present 
day literature on gender.'* (1980: 21)
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Indeed, sociobiologists persistently argue that the association of women 
with reproduction and childcare and of men with the social sphere is 
genetically pre-ordained (Sydie 1987).
Anthropology has not escaped making a dichotomy between nature and 
culture, Levi-Strauss has portrayed women as bridging the division 
between 'nature* and culture, being at the same time 'natural* because 
of their reproductive capacity and yet cultural because they speak, 
think and act as humans (1964). In an early contribution to the 
anthropology of gender, Ortner (1974) redrew the analogy of female : 
male :: nature : culture, in which men are associated with symbols and
artifacts which transcend and are therefore superior to 'nature' and, by 
implication, women. Assuming a universal subordination of women for 
which she has been much criticised, Ortner was concerned to show that 
women's 'inferiority* is not shaped by direct reference to biological 
factors but by the symbolic identification of women with 'nature' due to 
their reproductive functions. The usefulness of the nature/culture 
dichotomy has been strongly disputed; the distinctness of 'nature' and 
culture as objects of knowledge has been questioned (Callan 1978;
Hastrup 1978) and the case against associating women with 'nature' well 
argued on several grounds (MacCormack 1980; Gilllson 1980; Harris 1980).
Delaney (1986) has characterised the monogenetic basis of her 
Turkish informants’ perception of procreation in terms of "seed and 
soil"; men are associated with a transcendant creativity and women are 
understood as "ever-renewable soil utilised for the creations of men" 
(1986: 503). Thus woman is to man as the created, natural world is to
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God, However, it appears that no exclusive association of women with 
'nature' attaches to the ontogenetic model of procreation evident among 
my informants. The data suggest that although informants strongly 
identify women with nurturance, this aspect of women's procreative 
contribution is, in part, understood as a moral contribution; women 
appear to be given responsibilty for a child's upbringing, or its 
development as a social being. In this context, women's identification 
with reproduction and procreation, instead of being the location of 
their‘association with nature, is a source of their moral identity. 
Moreover, the second axis of the procreative model, which refers to 
genetic contribution, ascribes a creative role to women that is 
identical to men's.
The 'natural' body
The lack of distinction between nature and culture has been argued
within a further anthropological debate to which this dissertation is
relevant. This concerns the way in which the physical body or the
organism is perceived. In 1973 Barnes suggested
there is a real world we call nature which exists independently of 
whatever social construction of reality we adopt. The relation 
between nature and culture is contingent; some apsects of nature 
impinge more obviously and insistently on the human imagination than 
others (1973: 73).
In contrast, Collingwood (1940) has suggested that there is an 'idea of
nature* which at any one time determines the basic premises of science
but which cannot be explained by the science built upon it. Scientific
practices are the result of epistemological choices built on certain
metaphysical propositions. Biomedicine, it can be argued, is concerned
with 'natural' processes; with the body as so many functioning parts
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(Kennedy 1981) and with diseases, perceived as natural entities which 
exist prior to their isolation or detection by doctors (Good 1977). In 
emphasising the ontological primacy of physical existance, biomedicine 
largely excludes social relations, emotion, and cognition (Vright and 
Treacher 1982; Comaroff 1982). The implicit worldview of biomedicine 
can thus be characterised as one in which people are essentially seen as 
biologically-contrived individuals who live in a domain of empirical 
facts.
Paradoxically, although the individual as a natural unit remains 
the conceptual focus in most areas of biomedicine, the individual as a 
biological body represents something of a dilemma within the biomedical 
model. Within the speciality of embryology, for example, it is 
difficult to define the biological body by developmental criteria. 
Embryologists have variously suggested that the onset of biological 
individuality may occur at;
a) fertilisation, when genetic identity is established;165,
b) individuation, (at sixteen to eighteen days of development) when 
the group of cells that will constitute the embryo can be 
identified;17 or
c) 'viability' - that is, the capacity to survive independently of 
the mother.1e
Alternatively, the Individuality of offspring might be said to be laid 
down as a 'germ line' in the testes and ovaries of parents as they 
themselves develop in their mothers' wombs (Johnson 1988). In effect, 
biologists cannot define any single developmental transition at which a
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biological individual with a clear identity emerges. Instead, 
individuality is a continuous process.
Kor is there an absolute scientific distinction between the
biological body and the world it inhabits. Within the model of
immunology, for example, what constitutes an individual is again unclear
*
(Haraway 1989). According to Haraway, the organism is not born, it is 
made, and within the discourse of immunology which constructs disease as 
a misrecognition or transgression of a "strategic assemblage called 
self", individuality can be seen as problem of defence (1989: 15). 
Objects or persons come to be understood in terms of disassembly or 
reassembly:
even the most reliable western individuated bodies, the mice and men 
of a well-equipped laboratory, neither stop nor start at the skin, 
which is itself something of a teeming jungle of threatening, 
illicit fusions, especially from the perspective of a scanning 
electron microscope. (1989: 18)
Moreover, individuality depends on context; H[y]ou and I... might be an
individual for some purposes, but not for others." (1989: 20), This is
clear in the shifting status of individuality experienced by women for
whom, she suggests, such ambiguity is a normal ontological state. For
example, the bounded individuality of women is compromised by their
bodies* "troubling talent" for making other bodies whose individuality
can, in some cirumstances, be granted precedence over their own. The
special ambiguity of female individuality, Haraway notes, is also
explicit in accounts of immune function during pregnancy.13 However.it
is not clear if she is suggesting this ambiguity is a universal
experience or one peculiar to women of western culture.
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Haraway argues that the immune system can be seen as an elaborate
icon for the principal systems of symbolic and material "difference" in
late capitalism. She suggests that the immune system is
an historically specific terrain, where global aand local politics; 
Bbbel prize-winning research...clinical medical practice; venture 
capital investment strategies; world changing developments in 
business and technology, and the deepest personal and collective 
experiences of embodiment, vulnerability, power and mortality 
interact with an intensity matched perhaps only in the biopolitics 
of sex and reproduction. (1989; 4).
To summarise, the human organism, which is taken for granted within 
biomedicine as a natural entity, cannot be defined as a discrete unit 
except on the basis of social distinctions. This point appears to be 
similar to one that Ingold (1990) makes in arguing the relevance of an 
anthropological critique of biology. Ingold has argued that every human 
organism is an open system, "generated within a field that cuts across 
the interface with its environment" (1990; 220). This field includes 
the nexus of relations with other humans, indeed it is this nexus of 
social relations that constitutes him or her as a person. Hence the 
process of becoming a person is integral to the process of becoming an 
organism, and the acquisition of personhood does not, as orthodox 
anthropology suggests (cf Radcliffe-Brown 1940), entail the imposition 
of a specifically human essence upon an undifferentiated organic 
substrate. According to Ingold, personhood takes shape gradually within 
the developing organism.
This study presents data which support Ingold’s argument by 
suggesting that, for my informants, the nature of the individual is 
context dependent. For the most part, I make this argument in terms of
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personhood; the relationship between a breastfeeding mother and child is 
such that they appear to constitute a single person or an extended self 
(see Chapter Four). However, my findings on the perceived 'openness' of 
the feminine body (see Chapters Two and Three) and the way in which body 
boundary seems to shift according to different social relationships (see 
Chapter Four) also suggests that the organism is not a bounded isolate 
or given in advance of its social relations. In addition, the sense 
that personhood for informants is gradually acquired with increasing 
physical and moral maturity (see Chapter Seven) parallels Ingold's view 
that the organism and the person develop coterminously. This 
correspondence however raises the question of whether Ingold's analysis 
is quite as 'objective' as he implies, and that his argument may be 
influenced by certain models that can be found within his own culture.
Substance, and,, the '.person*
The flexible nature of the person which is implied by informants is also 
relevant to the body of theory within anthropology concerning the nature 
of the person. It has been claimed that the notion of the person in the 
Vest is of a bounded and unchangable isolate and stands in sharp 
contrast to notions held in other cultures, particularly South Aslan, in 
which the person is perceived as a malleable entity, absorbing and 
transmitting substance which can be changed by conduct (Heelas 1981; 
Marriott 1976). Schneider (1980) has offered a model for this western 
notion of the person in his work on American kinship. He claims, for 
example, that notions of substance and code define American ideas of 
'kinship' (as well as those of religion, race and nationality).
According to Schneider, this substance ('blood' or biogenetic material)
- 27 -
is understood by Americans to be shared by those who are related. 
Moreover, this substance is fixed in nature, My findings are at odds 
with Schneider's. Although informants indicate that relatedness is 
recognised in terms of a shared substance called 'blood' (or 'flesh and
blood' in some instances), this substance can be altered by code. The
biological basis of a relationship can be downplayed in the absence of 
the principles of 'openness' and 'closeness'. Conversely, shared 
substance can be recognised among those who have no biological
connection; between spouses who have children in common, between
adoptive parents and children and, apparently, in other contexts where 
nurturance occurs. It appears that some body products, such as breast 
milk, have the potential for influencing those who ingest them.
Moreover, the 'closeness' associated with breastfeeding, which refers 
both to physical and emotional intimacy, indiates a close approximation 
to being the 'same', that the breastfeeding child is considered part of 
the extended self of the mother, Hence surrogate breastfeeding prompts 
obvious unease (see Chapter Four).
Mg.tharhQ.Qd.
Finally, it may be that the new reproductive technologies will influence
the way in which relatedness will be understood in the future. However,
at this early stage of their use, they offer ways of clarifying existing
perceptions of relatedness. In this study I focus most closely on those
perceptions that refer in some way to motherhood. Barnes claimed that
cultural motherhood is a necessary interpretation in moral terms of 
a natural relation, whereas, the relation of genitor is an optional 
interpretation, in the idiom of nature, of an essentially moral 
relation. (1973: 73)
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However, new reproductive technologies such as IVF fragment the mother's 
role in parturition for the first time. Motherhood can now be 
understood in terms of 'degrees' which may defined, for example, as the 
ovular, the uterine and the social components of motherhood (Braidotti
1989).20 Informants' discussions of IVF and surrogacy indicated that 
the gestational role is generally seen to be as important in the 
definition of motherhood as the genetic role, but that both are given 
less signfificance than the social role. This confirms that, for my 
informants, motherhood is not an interpretation of a natural 
relationship as Barnes suggests, but an essentially moral relation.
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1 ■ IL-Methodological, considerations
In this section I first discuss methodological issues arising from this 
research, before giving details of my informants and of how I went about 
fieldwork.
It was not long ago that many anthropologists looked on the study 
of one's own culture with suspicion (Martin 1987). It is now regarded 
as a more relevant activity, not least because it helps to make 
anthropologists more aware of their own cultural assumptions in their 
dealings with others. My particular reasons for working within my own 
culture were mixed and partly domestic. One of the main reasons, 
however, was a long-standing concern that reproductive medicine imposed 
a particular construction upon reproductive processes which appeared to 
take no account of other cultural meanings these processes might hold.
Research within my own culture meant that I circumnavigated many of 
the problems anthropologists generally face, such as the constraints of 
working in a different language (see, for example, Overing 1985). At 
the same time, I became aware of problems I might not have experienced 
had I ventured further afield. Many of these problems have been 
referred to elsewhere. For example, Southwold has observed the tension 
between participating as a fellow human, and retaining a vantage point 
as an analyst, remarking that "lilt must be especially acute for the 
anthropologist working in his own culture." <1983: 602) As an American 
anthropologist, Martin (1987) found that during research in Taiwan she 
could periodically escape from the culture she was immersed in by 
reading a book or watching a film from home. However, she found no
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means of escape during her American fieldwork; her discoveries about 
gender, for example, haunted the most personal aspects of her life. 
Moreover, she initially understood most of what her informants had to 
say to be 'common sense' or 'obvious'; it was some time before she 
realised that what she was regarding as 'facts' were cultural 
organisations of experience which she shared with informants. In this 
sense, I also found it a struggle to maintain an appropriate vantage 
point from which to view data. Finally, even if I did not have to learn 
a new language, the issue of interpretation, if not translation, still 
remained.
I have already mentioned a shift of focus during fieldwork. More 
specifically, I had initially intended to contrast the symbolic meaning 
non-medical English people gave to reproductive structures and processes 
against the meaning English doctors attributed to these. My original 
hypothesis was that medical training and culture were sufficiently 
powerful to change the fundamental meanings that reproduction held for 
those who entered medicine. As such, English doctors would appear to 
hold a different worldview than their lay,counterparts and this 
disjunction could have a deleterious effect on patient care.
As I wished to interview doctors and people who consulted doctors 
in connection with reproductive health and to observe the interaction 
between representatives of these two groups, part of the research was to 
be based on one-off interviews with informants attending institutions of 
health care. The initial criterion for informants was that they should 
descibe themelves as 'English' (see 'Cultural identity' below) and
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should be either obstetrician/gynaecologists working within what was 
then the Bloomsbury Health Authority, or lay people attending a 
hospital, a health centre or an out-patient clinic in connection with 
their reproductive health, within this same area.21
As fieldwork progressed however, it became obvious that the 
comparison I had planned was not realistic within the timetable of the 
project. I therefore decided to work only with lay people and, to 
simplify matters further, only with women. I had already recruited 
women through a number of sources, such as ante-natal clinics, 
colposcopy clinics and gynaecology wards, but the greatest number had 
been interviewed in a family planning clinic.22 It was on this group, 
comprising ninety-six women by the end of fieldwork, that I decided to 
focus and to compare their views with those of my 'principal informant', 
who will be described shortly, (For details of the procedure I used for 
recruitment, see Appendix C, and for details of the way in which fields 
of enquiry were delineated, see Appendix E.)
At various points in this dissertation I present figures which 
indicate the number of women who support a particular view in relation 
to the overall number of women questioned on the issue. I should stress 
that these figures are in no way offered as statistical evidence of a 
wider trend.
The exclusive focus on women is not ideal. For a start, it tends 
to suggest that women are in some sense a problem; that men represent 
humanity and that it is against men as the norm that women should be
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viewed (Caplan 1988; Moore 1988). It also means that it is difficult to 
assess the extent to which my findings are gender specific. I suspect, 
for example, that the ontogenetic model of procreation that I find 
suggested by my informants is one that is also shared by at least some' 
men. However, it seems likely that the notion of the integrity of the 
body is more relevant to women. Only further research which includes 
male informants could help to clarify this.
In addition to the scaling down of the research field, a number of 
factors combined to change the actual focus of research. One of these 
was the response of informants to my request that they make drawings of 
the body. (This will be discussed further in section 1.7.) Another 
factor was the increasing level of public debate concerning the new 
reproductive technologies and the recommendations of the Warnock Report 
(1985). At the same time, in constructing the genealogical tree of my 
principal informant, I was suprised by the views of relatedness which 
emerged. Similarly, our discussions of Christian cosmology, especially 
the Virgin Birth, indicated a specific understanding of procreation 
which it seemed I should explore more widely. I therefore decided to 
see whether these views might correspond with those held by members of 
the larger group of secondary informants,
Having changed the emphasis of the research, however, the way in 
which I collected data remained strongly influenced by my initial plans. 
Ideally, I would not have chosen to conduct a large proportion of 
fieldwork concerning a layview of procreation within a medical setting. 
Although I could deny any link with the medical establishment, my very
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presence there tended to mitigate my claims to independence. I 
therefore have to acknowledge that the context of these interviews may 
have had some influence on the way my informants perceived me and the 
kind of information I was seeking and, in turn, determined the kinds of 
answers they gave. At the same time though it is quite possible that, 
without the status I acquired through my presence in a clinical 
environment, I would have been unable to have recruited anywhere near 
the same number of informants, nor have been trusted with the same kind 
of disclosure.
The change in emphasis also entailed a reduction in the range of 
methodologies employed. Initially, it had been hoped to identify a 
number of co-existing medical models through an examination of medical 
texts and lectures; the everyday behaviour of medical practitioners in 
the midst of their collegues, and the medical discourse used largely in 
discussions with patients. Additionally I had planned on identifying 
lay perceptions of procreation and concepts of health and illness, 
especially in association with reproduction and sexuality. It was 
envisaged that a number of approaches would be employed to accomplish 
these aims, including the analysis of tape-recorded medical 
consultations and of tape-recorded interviews between myself and doctors 
on the one hand and 'patients’ on the other. In addition, I hoped to 
observe the quotidian world of doctors by following them through 
different aspects of their work, and to carry out participant 
observation among those who constituted the social networks of one or 
more 'principal* informants.
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In those instances where participant observation was feasible I was 
interested in obtaining two different kinds of data. First, in addition 
to observing rituals such as weddings, christenings or ward rounds, I 
had hoped to observe mundane social interactions - such as the way touch 
was employed among different groups of people - as indications of how 
relatedness was understood. I had also planned to observe the ways in 
which doctors imparted information in different contexts, conventions 
associated with childcare, infant feeding, pregnancy, menstruation and 
so an. The second kind of data I was interested in was that which 
demonstrated something of the the relationship between bodily and moral 
domains through the 'backdoor1 of everyday practices and gestures 
(Jackson 1983), such as the movements considered appropriate for men and 
women, or expressions of an individual's boundaries, in relation to 
collectively-held views of the world. As Bourdieu (1977) has suggested, 
not only the five senses (which are always socially informed) but others 
- such as a sense of common sense, of beauty, or of honour - are all 
relatively permanent dispositions, embedded in the individual's body in 
the form.of body postures and movements and part of the 'socially 
informed body'.
An additional approach to the moral domain was to be through the 
study of metaphor. Metaphor has been seen as a way to procede from the 
known to the unknown by a flash of insight. 'Good' metaphors are those 
which are informative of and may even help to constitute the social 
context in which they occur; metaphors are part of a figurative language 
which "does not just express the pertinence of certain cultural axioms 
to given social conditions, it provides the semantic conditions through
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which actors deal with that reality" (Crocker 1977: 46 - original 
emphasis). As such, 'good' metaphors are not only 'thought' but 'felt'. 
Hence they represent something of lived experience. At the same time, 
metaphors, along with other tropes such as puns, may be used to help 
resolve ethical ambiguity by highlighting a moral tenet through semantic 
incongruities (Crocker 1977). On this basis, an examination of 
metaphors used by informants may add to knowledge of their world view in 
a way that does not priviledge the literal; as Goodman has said, a world 
can be made by a metaphorical statement (1978: 18).
However, in the course of fieldwork not only did I have to narrow 
the focus of the research, but the range of methodologies was also 
constrained. By concentrating on the informants recruited from family 
planning clinics, I became largely restricted to the analysis of tape- 
recorded, semi-structured interiews. Although it would, no doubt, have 
been valuable to enlarge the scope of data from this source by, for 
example, setting up group discussions, the time taken to clear this 
approach with the hospital's Ethics Committee and the way in which 
informants used the clinic (generally during a snatched break from work) 
prohibited this. Bearing in mind the constraints of time, I therefore 
continued gatering data from a source which I knew was productive, 
rather than attempting to try new sources at a relatively late stage of 
fieldwork. While this meant I was able to carry out only limited 
participant-observation and thus cannot provide a detailed ethnography, 
it was still possible to examine informants' use of metaphor which, it 
transpired, represented a useful approach to the 'morality of kinship' 
implicit in informant's statements.
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The change of emphasis during fieldwork had a number of additional 
effects. To begin with, it meant that much of my original literature 
search became irrelevant. One consequence of this is that the 
literature drawn upon in the dissertation represents a response to the 
data provided by informants. In this sense, my discussion of theory is 
led by the ethnography. This point helps to explain the eclecticism of 
my approach. There is, however, something of a hiatus between the 
literature and informants' comments: I cannot demonstrate clear 
connections between the two, but only draw attention to certain 
similarities and dissimilarities.
The research field also contracted in a further sense. I had 
initially envisaged working with more than one 'principal' informant. 
However, I encountered a number of problems which ultimately precluded 
this. I elaborate in section 1,8 on how I was unable to work in any 
detailed way with a group of informants traced from Katy. There were, 
though, two other 'principal' informants, 'Sheila' and 'Caroline' with 
whom I began to work but whose views are not included. The reasons for 
this are briefly explained in Appendix D.
The way that the research developed has also meant that my group of 
informants cannot be described as the kind of 'natural community* or 
group of people who share an involvement with one another's lives that 
Geertz has suggested anthropologists look for in the study of industrial 
societies (1983: 157). Nor can they be seen to constitute a group by 
virtue of the fact that they are all women; as Moore (1988: 10) has 
pointed out, there is no unitary body of women's Interests, as the
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divisions which accompany race and social class should remind us. Martin 
(1987) acknowledges that there is no community on earth which could 
represent all women, who can be found in all class strata and nearly all 
community and occupational groups. However she suggests that women in' 
western society share certain experiences. Referring to American women, 
she claims that
all (some more than others, some more aware than others) occupy 
subordinate positions to men, if not in their jobs, then in their 
families, and if not in their families, then in general cultural 
imagery and language; all have female bodies and experience common 
bodily processes such as menstruation and childbirth (however 
various the meanings such diverse groups as Black Americans or 
Jewish Americans can give these processes); all are affected in one 
way or another by medical and scientific views of female bodily 
processes. (1987: 5)
In this sense, the women in my study can be seen to be united as a
group. Not only do they share (if to varying degrees) the social
consequences of being female in the western world and the experience of
certain bodily events such as menstruation, but they are united in their
need to control their fertility and their choice to do so under medical
supervision.
Cultural identity
It is more difficult to argue that informants are united as a group on 
the basis of their cultural identity or their 1Englishness'. Cohen has 
identified a link between the recent growth of interest in the 
anthropological study of Britain and a growing awareness among 
anthropologists of a need to revise an over-simple view of the 
homogeneous nature of British culture (1982). In the context of this 
research, there were advantages in using the more specific category of 
'English' as opposed to, say, 'British* culture. For example, it seems
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relevant to a study concerned with relatedness that certain important 
differences have been observed between British cultures with respect to 
kinship and affinity; for instance, divorce was possible in Scotland for 
four hundred years before it became available in England (Wolfram 1987). 
In addition, Cohen (1982) has suggested that the more localised a 
cultural identity (in terms of descending levels of 'British',
'English', 'Southerner, 'Londoner', 'East Ender', for example), the more 
informed and complex any analysis might be. In other words, the 
category of 'Englishness' itself remains too unspecific to be helpful. 
While distinctive from other cultural identities within Britian, 
'Englishness* does not refer to a homogeneous experience; the effects of 
different locality, class, gender or ethnic identity should not be 
ovrlooked.
Cohen (1982) makes two further points of relevance here. First, he 
suggests that people become aware of their culture when they stand at 
its boundaries. Second, he argues that anthropologists should make the 
cultures they study intelligible through terms which are meaningful to 
the members of such cultures, rather than by trying to isolate the 
purely 'objective' manifestations of such cultures. In this study I 
attempt to elucidate the views of a number of urban English women who, 
perhaps because they do not stand at the boundaries of English culture, 
do not appear to find being 'English' particularly meaningful. Instead, 
particularly in the setting of the family planning clinic, informants 
appeared to give greater priority to the boundary between lay and 
medical cultures. In other words, cultural Identity may be context 
dependant; I suspect, had my informants met similar criteria but, for
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example, lived in Vales at the time of interivew, that being 'English' 
would have held more significance for them. I should therefore 
emphasise that the boundary drawn around my informants on the basis of 
their 'Englishness' should, because of the context of this research, be 
recognised as one largely imposed by myself. Moreover, the emphasis on 
'Englishness* tends to disguise the many possible cultural identities 
which cross-cut this category, such as those that may develop from being 
both English and Black, or English and middle class. In addition, only 
women's opinions were ultimately sought, and then women of a certain age 
group. As Crick (1982) has pointed out in the context of whether the 
study of categories and representations says anything about how people 
think, men and women, elders and children may understand different 
things by the same symbol. Thus, what is presented in this dissertation 
as a largely unified perspective would undoubtedly become more ambiguous 
and more nuanced once class, age, ethnicity and gender were taken more 
into account.
Nevertheless, there remains an interesting point concerning 
national identity, namely why, given the recent focus an anthropology 
'at home', is the notion of 'Englishness' apparently of little 
importance for many of my informants? One possible answer is to view 
cultural identity in terms of notions of substance and code (cf 
Schneider 1968). This approach is suggested indirectly by Strathern's 
analysis of data collected among families within the English village of 
Elmdon (1981; 1982). Strathern suggests that, for Elmdoners, notions of 
villageness are tied to notions of kinship; that ideas about families 
and relatives provide a model of English ideas about the structure of
- 40 -
the wider world, primarily 'class'. Class and status categorisations 
are brought home through the language of kinship. Conversely, notions 
of class and status feed into perceptions of relatedness, the boundaries 
drawn between relatives and the expectations of those understood to be 
related. Significantly, Strathern infers from villagers statements that 
relatedness rests on some notion of biogenetic substance (1982: 77). In 
this sense, Strathern1s argument shares features with other analyses in 
which notions of substance and code, most clearly expressed in the field 
of kinship, are also recognised to shape understandings of broader 
categories such as those of nationality and religion (Schneider 1974) or 
race (Beteille 1990).
Vhat is interesting among my informants in connection with national 
identity is that this is remarkably unstressed. In addition, there is 
comparatively little emphasis on relatedness as a matter of shared 
biogenetic substance. In other words, the apparent absence of strong 
'English' identity and, in contrast to other analyses, the lack of an 
opposition between substance and code (see 1.3: "Substance and the 
person") may be linked to my informants' rather different perceptions of 
substance as 'matter' which can be influenced by code (see Chapter 4:7, 
for example). This suggests, despite the differences beween Schneider's 
findings and my own, that further work arising from this research might 
usefully follow Schneider's lead and take notions of substance as a 
point of departure in the study of cultural identity. Such nations 
might also be useful in analysing indigenous rather than sociological 
categories of 'class'.
~ 41 -
In this study, information concerning Informants' sociological 
class was gathered on the basis that women should be consistently 
attributed social class according to their own occupations, rather than 
those of the men with whom they might reside or be otherwise associated 
(such as fathers or spouses), Delphy (1981) for example, has argued 
that taking a woman's paid work into acount in the case of single but 
not married women reveals a double standard obtains in the conventional 
means of classification. Occupation, a classic measure of an 
individual's social class is, in the case of women - and only women - 
replaced by the heterogeneous criterion of marriage. Roberts (1987) 
points out that the conventional means of attributing class make no 
distinction between full and part-time work, nor do they recognise 
unpaid labour such as housework. She suggests that, instead of trying 
to squeeze women into pre-existing categories derived from the world of 
men, a serious classification of women should take the realities of 
women's lives as its starting place.
Asking my informants about their occupation (and education) 
represented a rather crude attempt to make the realities of their lives 
central within any kind of classification scheme. However, knowledge of 
their occupation alone means that the picture I draw of informants in 
terms of social class is a limited one. Occupation has been described 
as an arbitrary referent and does not necessarily give any indication of 
educational acheivement, residence, wealth, or income (Young and 
Wil1mott 1973; Marshall et al 1988). More comprehensive schemes of 
social classification have been suggested, such as those which define 
class according to economic power and assign women on the same
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individual basis as men (cf Runciman 1990) or, alternatively, take into 
account the position of all household members in the working world (cf 
Leiulfrud and Woodward 1988). However, faced with the time constraints 
imposed by clinic-based interviews, the collection of data necessary for 
this this kind of analysis was not passible. Any further work on this 
subject would involve finding a suitable, alternative research setting 
(as suggested in the concluding chapter) which would allow the 
collection of more complex background information.
A more detailed enquiry would also allow identification of the 
social class which informants assigned to themselves, particularly where 
the research relationship was well established. The question of class 
identity was one I shied away from with secondary informants as I felt 
it might be a source of embarrassment which could influence the nature 
of any subsequent discussion. There was little problem in this respect 
with Katy. Although class difference did on occassion cause some 
unease,23 the different nature of our relationship made it passible to
a) discuss class and b) gain a much broader understanding of Katy's 
class position. It was significant, for example, that on the basis of 
income, home ownership, and Katy's occupational potential (indicated by 
her previous employment as a secretary), Katy and other members of her 
household might be viewed as middle class. Yet in terms of Barry's 
occupation, the household's economic security and both partners' 
educational achievement and class identity, Katy and Barry can be 
described as working class. In this instance, I would suggest that 
self-identification of class becomes decisive.
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Finally in relation to class, where I quote informants' in the 
fallowing chapters, I generally include minor details concerning the 
informant's age, occupation or, in some instances, religious persuasion. 
These details, by identifying specific informants, enable the reader to 
make cross-references between different statements made by the same 
informant. They also allow a more accurate reading of statements in as 
much as what is said, for example, on the subject of children by a woman 
in her early forties without children may hold different nuances to 
those implicit in the statement of a much younger woman without 
children. Moreover, making reference to an informant's occupation, 
while not intended to indicate social class, may help to suggest 
something of her social world. Thus these details of informants, where 
they occur, are intended to add interest but should not be granted 
sociological significance.
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1,5) My principal informant
My principal informant is someone whom I shall call Katy Macey.2* Her 
different status in the research arises from the fact that, in addition 
to the criteria described above, I wanted to work with one or more 
informants who came from large, local families, with a view to 
incorporating members of their kinship network. Katy was recruited to 
the study while attending an ante-natal appointment at a North London 
health centre when she was ten weeks pregnant.
Katy lives on the borders of a prosperous part of Kentish Town2H in
North London. When I first met her, the maisonette where she lived was 
owned by Camden Council, but Katy and her husband are now in the process 
of buying the property. At the beginning of the fieldwork period, Katy 
was 27 years old, the mother of two boys, Sam (aged 5) and William (aged 
2), and ten weeks pregnant. Katy's husband Barry worked for a firm 
specialising in the treatment of damp, but he later went into 
partnership with a friend who has a fruit and vegetable stall in a local 
street market. Before the birth of her children, Katy was employed as a 
secretary and, more recently, worked as a part-time cook.
Katy was an only child, born in Kentish Town. Her parents were
born and educated in England, her mother also in Kentish Town. Katy's 
grandparents (on her mother's side) moved from Wales to Kentish Town 
shortly after their marriage, but there is little knowledge of Katy's 
other grandparents. Katy's parents divorced when she was three. Katy 
went to live with her grandparents (Tom and Heulwen Davis) until her 
mother, Sybil, managed to rent the top three rooms of a house also
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inhabited by Sybil's brother (Tim), sister (Maisie) and their respective 
families. Both of these moves were within Kentish Town. Indeed the 
grandparents and all their offspring lived within a few hundred yards of 
each other. Katy's father moved out of the area after the divorce and 
she had little contact with him for many years. Her mother remarried 
when Katy was 17 years old, but this marriage ended in divorce after 
seven years. Sybil's ex-husband, Graham, continues to live locally and 
to see members of Katy's family. Tom and Heulwen Davis, Tim, Maisie and 
members of their families still live in the same area, although Sybil 
has moved slightly further afield. Barry's parents, on the other hand, 
together with one of their four sons, lived on the opposite side of the 
street to Katy and Barry. During the period of this research, however, 
Barry's parents (Pat and Sid) have divorced.
Katy initially agreed to become a regular informant for the 
duration of her pregnancy although we have now worked together for four 
and a half y e a r s . •22 My initial discussions with Katy helped to shape 
the questions I was to.ask of other informants while, in turn, much of 
what I learnt from informants at the clinic was to influence later 
discussions with Katy.
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1.6) Details of principal and secondary,!nformants.
All ninety—seven informants were "English" on the grounds that either:
a) they and their parents were born and educated in England and
the informants called themselves "English"
b) they and their parents were born and educated in England and
the informants called themselves "British" or
c) the informants were born and educated in England, one parent
was either not born or not educated in England but the informants 
called themselves "English".
On this basis, the study includes women of different ethnic backgrounds, 
Ages of informants (including Katy) ranged from 20 to 43 years, with a 
mean of 28.5 years and median of 27. In addition to Katy, a further 
twenty-nine informants had left school at 16 years of age or before; 
thirty six had ended their education between 16 and 18 years of age; 
sixteen were educated to 21 years; four were in post-basic education at 
the time of the study and eleven had received education beyond 21 years 
of age (although this does not necessarily refer to continuous 
education).
The clinic where I recruited my secondary informants, because of 
its location and its reputation, attracted a high proportion of women 
employed in what may be loosely understood as 'middle class* 
occupations. Among my informants occupational class (according to the 
Registrar General's scheme of classification) can be presented as 
follows:
Group I (Professional) 4 informants
Group II (Intermediate) 44 informants
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Group IIIN (Skilled non-manual) 38 informants 
Group IIIM (Skilled manual) 1 Informant
Group IV (Partly skilled) 2 informants
Group V (Unskilled) 0 informants
According to this scheme of classification, eight women (four 
'housewives’ and four students) remain unclassifiable (see the 
discussion of class under 'cultural identity, above). For further 
details of informants, such as occupations, length of education, and 
religious background, see Appendix E.
In terms of religious belief, thirty-two informants had no 
religious belief; fourteen were agnostic; ten described themselves as 
"Christian" without specifying any denomination; twenty-three belonged 
to the Church of England, ten, including Katy, to the Roman Catholic 
Church and one to the Pentecostal Church. One informant was a Buddhist 
and one a non-orthodox Jew. (Five informants interviewed at the 
beginning of the study were not asked about religious belief,)
Sixty-six informants were, by self-definition, 'single', This 
meant that informants were not co-habiting, although it did not 
necessarily mean the absence of a long-term relationship. Of the other 
informants, twenty-two, including Katy, were married; three were 
divorced, two were 'separated', that is, not co-habiting with their 
husbands but not divorced, three were co-habiting but not married and 
one was engaged to be married.
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Four informants, including Katy, had children. This suprisingly 
low number is, I believe, linked to the age, marital status and the 
social class of many informants; a large proportion may be described as 
relatively young, unmarried and middle class. A number of additional 
women, however, disclosed that they had been pregnant, but these had 
either been ectopic pregnancies, or resulted in miscarriage or abortion. 
These findings should be considered in the light of recent statistics 
for England and Wales which show the mean age at childbirth to be 27.3 
years (and 29.9 years for women in social classes I and II) and the mean 
age at first birth to be 25.3 years. Moreover, 20% of all pregnancies 
are reported to end in legal abortion, with 37% of pregnancies occuring 
outside marriage being aborted (OPCS 1990).
1 ■ 7) De-tails of., method
The distinction between ’primary' and 'secondary' informants corresponds 
with a difference in the way that research proceeded. In Katy's case, 
our discussions were, on occasion, semi-structured and tape-recorded 
and, at other times, unstructured and unrecorded. They could last from 
one to five hours. In addition, I was able to observe some aspects of 
her day-to-day life, such as interactions with her husband, children, 
and some of her relatives, affines and friends. Although we mostly met 
at her home, I saw her in a number of different contexts, including her 
child's nursery, in hospital and in Church. However, the access I had 
hoped to have to other members of her family did not really 
materialise.2e■
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In contrast, interviews with secondary informants were relatively 
short, generally lasting between thirty and ninety minutes, depending on 
circumstances. With one exception they were all tape-recorded,23 
Informants were met only once; the emphasis placed on anonymity by the 
Bloomsbury Health Authority Ethics Committee meant that follow-up was 
not feasible. Interviews were semi-structured but confined to a 
particular subject area. Thus, no secondary informant covered all the 
areas discussed with Katy.30 Within interviews, I also made use of 
vignettes and drawings.
Vignettes
Three vignettes, or short stories about hypothetical characters and 
specific circumstances, were used in the study. The first posed the 
question of whether informants would, in certain circumstances, wish for 
a child of theirs to be breastfed by another woman or, in the same 
circumstances, consider breastfeeding another woman's child (see Chapter
4.7). The second vignette was concerned with surrogate pregnancy and 
asked who, in the case of ovum donation, would be regarded as the 
child's mother at birth (the genetic or the carrying 'mother').
Thirdly, in the same circumstances, with whom did .the child have a 
'blood' relationship (see Chapter 6.12).
Finch (1987) has observed that the use of vignettes is valuable as 
a research method in that it acknowledges that meanings are social and 
that morality may be situationally specific. However, she counsels 
that, while they may be useful for tapping cultural norms, it should be 
clear that responses to vignettes do not necessarily reflect the action
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informants themselves might take should they find themselves in the 
circumstances described by the vignette. I found vignettes particularly 
useful as a way of avoiding the risk of appearing to test informants an 
their knowledge of biomedical matters, by making it clear that I was 
asking for their opinion. The problem of 'testing' had become apparent 
in the attempt to use drawings as a methodological tool.
The use of.drawings
As Lewis has remarked, as we cannot see what goes on inside our bodies, 
we are, with respect to the interior of our body, like someone without a 
mirror with respect to their face: "Ve feel what it's like but we cannot 
see exactly where the feelings belong" (1989). Informants were asked to 
draw what they understood to be inside the body, on the grounds that 
verbal and visual representions offer different possibilities and that, 
as Lewis has said "Ccloncepts, percepts and images are not identical" 
(1989: 1). Through their drawings, therefore, I hoped to learn 
something that informants might not otherwise articulate, to find 
internal structures represented in a way which was signficantly 
different to the depictions of medical diagrams or the representations 
created by X-rays and other forms of medical imaging. In other words, I 
hoped the drawings would suggest something of the symbolic meaning I 
thought informants might attach to what is inside the body.
I was prompted to try this approach by the work of MacCormack and 
Draper (1987), in which semi-structured interviews were accompanied by 
the use of drawings to elicit informants' understandings of female 
reproductive structure and function. I asked sixteen informants
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(including Katy) to each make a series of five drawings, each time using 
an outline of a male or female figure as a guide. The first drawing I 
asked for was a representation of the way in which informants imagined 
the inside of the human body - that is, the general internal structures 
(see Series A). I asked most women to omit in this drawing any 
reproductive structures, as these were to be drawn separately. This 
was, I beleive, a mistake as it would have been useful, for example, to 
see how informants located reproductive structures in relation to 
others within the body. The second and third drawings by each informant 
were depictions of female and male reproductive structures (see Series B 
and C respectively). Finally, the fourth and fifth drawings in each 
informant's set show the external characteristics associated with men 
and women - what I refer to as the 'masculine and feminine bodies' (see 
Series D and E respectively).
The exercise was far more difficult than I had anticipated. On 
reflection it might have been better to have given informants a blank 
page, as the frontal orientation of the figure Immediately placed 
certain constraints on how informants could proceed. Alternatively, a 
sexually neutral figure might have been more appropriate. In the first 
series - drawings of the body's interior - I had not thought it 
significant whether a male or female outline was given as a frame; with 
hindsight, informants should have been given, if not a blank page, then 
a sexually-neutral figure to work on. One other lesson to be learnt was 
that I now doubt the wisdom of asking informants to label the structures 
they drew. The presence of such labels suggests a certain precision in
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the placement of organs and a discrimination between organs that may not 
have been otherwise evident.
In addition, I found it was inordinately difficult to convey what- I 
wanted informants to do. Because these sessions were tape recorded, I 
later established that, in describing what X wanted informants to do, I 
had slipped at times between anthropological and medical paradigms, 
referring one moment to "what is inside" and the next to "anatomical 
structures". Vhat is more, I overlooked that most of my informants were 
less accustomed to using drawing as a means of representation than they 
were used to using speech. I was asking them to free themselves from 
their knowledge of biomedicine, however partial that might be and to 
articulate their experience of the body in terms that they were clearly 
not familiar with. The majority of Informants were not confident about 
this exercise. Despite my intentions, a number clearly felt they were 
being tested on their biomedical knowledge and resented this.;s1
Some interesting points, however, did emerge from this rather 
fraught exercise. When I initially looked at informants' drawings, all 
I saw was the spectre of biomedicine as it might be found, for example, 
in family planning leaflets, but presented with varying degrees of 
accuracy. I therefore did not continue this approach. However, much 
later, when I returned to these drawings and listened to the 
accompanying tapes, I was struck by informants' dependency on an 
authorised model of knowledge, and a sense that they should have 
knowledge of this kind. For example, a 31 year-old secretary's comments 
while drawing were as follows:
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Oh my God! I should have studied before I came. This is going to 
take me a bit of time - I don't want to muck it up. I'm only doing 
it sort of....1 don't know where the tubes go! It's not to scale.
I just don't think about it; I know that's a terrible thing to say.
I know I ought to more, but to be honest I don't think about it.
Similarly, other informants commented that they were "ashamed" or were
"not very good at this".
In addition to highlighting the way informants invalidated their 
own representations, the drawings raised important questions concerning 
interpretation. Given informants' inclination for biomedical accuracy, 
if the drawings were not to be assessed in terms of their 'correctness', 
how should they be analysed? In this context, I would like to make two, 
overlapping points about interpretation which concern the expectations 
of the interpreter and the knowledge on which interpretation rests. 
First, I initially had a vague assumption that informants would portray 
the interior of the body in ways that would clearly contrast with the 
representations of biomedicine, It was disappointing when this 
specifically lay view did not materialise and, as implied above, at 
first suggested to me that informants had adopted biomedical knowledge 
to the exclusion of any alternative view. However, as fieldwork 
progressed and the interpenetration of medical and lay views became 
clearer (suggested, for example by evidence of the ontogenetic model), 
it seemed possible that the drawings might indeed indicate a specific 
kind of knowledge which co-existed with or appropriated biomedical 
knowledge (see Chapter 1.3 for a more detailed discussion of the 
relation between this lay view and biomedical knowledge).
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Second, while I have, in some instances, looked at the drawings in 
isolation from the data (for example, in terms of the organs most 
frequently represented - see Chapter 3: fn 26), the most interesting 
observations, I believe, are those prompted by a recognition of the 
priniciples underlying informants' worldviews. For example, once it was 
realised that 'openness' was meaningful in the construction of the 
gendered body and an important principle in understanding the 
relatedness between bodies, it became.important to look at informants' 
drawings in terms of the body's 'openness' (see Chapter 4.2 and Appendix 
G, referring to drawings in Series A and B). Indeed, there appeared to 
be a range of ways in which informants represented the openness or 
closure of the body. However, I have no way of accounting for this 
variance. This suggests that drawings may be of limited use as a 
research tool in the absence of a rich ethnography and detailed 
background information for each informant.
I have not, however, exhausted the drawings' possibilities. For 
example, there is among the drawings a marked omission of the brain as 
an organ within the body, which may indicate the ontological centrality 
of the body's trunk. This observation is paralleled by a finding among 
many informants that the 'soul' is centrally located in the chest or 
heart (see Chapter 3.5). This suggests it might be rewarding to look at 
the relationship between the physical and ontological organisation of 
the body in greater detail. Rather differently, the drawings may refer 
to latent humoral notions, indicated, for example, by the centrality of 
the heart in representations which otherwise aspire to medical accuracy. 
This suggestion cannot be checked against the data as the possibility of
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such notions was not explored. However, such potential interpretations 
demonstrate the usefulness of drawings in indicators of fruitful areas 
of research. The drawings exercise was also a valuable one in that it 
taught me about the delicate nature of the research relationship.
1.8) The research relationship
There has been much discussion within the social sciences about the 
relationship between researcher and researched. Crick, for example, has 
claimed
Anthropological knowledge,..is not about "the other", it is 
generated by the mutual definition of "us" and "other" and is 
therefore inherently autobiographical. Ve often speak of the social 
character of human knowledge and we ought therefore to be more alive 
to the social processes at work in the creation of our own 
professional knowledge. (1982;15-16)
Oakley (1981) has suggested that what researchers should but do not
usually comment on are the social and personal characteristics of the
researcher; the interviewee's feelings about being interviewed; the
quality of the interaction; the hospitality offered; attempts to use the
interviewer as a source of information and the development of the
research encounter into a more social relationship. The research
relationship has been referred to as potentially one of exploitation
(see for example McRobbie 1982), reciprocity (Lundberg 1968) or mutual
exploitation (Hatfield 1973). This section examines these issues in
terms of my relationship to my informants.
The relationship with Katy
During the period of research ray relationship with Katy has changed in 
certain respects. To begin with, much of Katy's perception of me was 
influenced by knowing that I had been to university and, perhaps more 
significantly, that I had trained as a nurse. In our initial 
discussions she would ask me to verify many of her statements, even 
those that referred to topics where I had no 'expertise'. Our 
differences in class, education, speech, occupation and family life were 
initially an embarrassment, I think, to both of us. In the long term, 
however, this difference has played a positive role in our working 
relationship, in that the frame I put around a subject of discussion, if 
not the subject itself, has often been challenged.
One factor which strongly influenced our relationship was that I 
discovered I was pregnant shortly after meeting Katy. We therefore went 
through our pregnancies together and were experiencing similar symptoms 
and anxieties at the same time. There is a difference of one month in 
our children's ages. While I had some medical knowledge of pregnancy, 
Katy was an experienced mother. There was therefore a reciprocity of 
different types of knowledge which helped to make the relationship a 
more equal one.
It is also significant that, despite the proximity of Katy's 
relatives, I was unable to interview members of her family in the way I 
had hoped, This was despite many requests on my part and an apparent 
willingness on Katy's to arrange this. I think these interviews did not 
materialise for two reasons. First, I believe Katy had come to enjoy
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having her own researcher and was unwilling to share this status with 
other members of her family. Second, Katy gave me much confidential 
information, and although she clearly trusted me enough to furnish this 
in the first place, I think she may, quite understandably, have been 
uneasy about someone entrusted with her views making more than casual 
contact with the very people she had discussed. When I was taken to 
meet her grandparents, for example, Katy remained present throughout the 
visit. I felt unwilling to push too heavily for greater contact with 
Katy's family in case 1 jeopardised my relationship with her.
In terms of Lundberg's (1968) point about reciprocity in the 
context of research, in my relationship with Katy I asked for a great 
deal of her time. Moreover, I asked her to think about things in a way 
that was unusual for her, to attempt to articulate unformulated thoughts 
at the risk of sounding ridiculous or ignorant. I asked her to talk 
about very intimate aspects of her life, such as her feelings' about 
sexual intercourse or body products. I hoped she would trust me with 
confidential information about her relationships with people who were 
very important to her. I often received food and drink.
On my part, I occasionally brought Katy small gifts, such as 
flowers or something she had mentioned she could not find in the shops. 
From time to time I 'baby-sat' while she picked up her other children 
from school. I was also pleased to act as character witness in a court 
case involving the family. Katy told me she enjoyed having someone to 
talk to. Once her husband took on his job on a fruit and vegetable 
stall he worked long hours and she was restricted by the children's
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varying nursery and school hours in visiting friends. It was also the 
nature of our talks that she enjoyed. She liked having to think about 
the questions I asked her and to consider the ideas that came out of our 
discussions. I also provided a source of medical information; Katy 
would ask my advice about health problems in terms of whom to go to for 
help or whether help was necessary, either on her own behalf or on 
behalf of her children, her husband or, on one occasion, her mother-in- 
law. I was asked to help explain why her father had died unexpectedly 
following surgery. Katy also wanted my opinion on various methods of 
ensuring either a female or male child. I also revealed personal and 
sometimes confidential information, either in response to direct 
questioning or, occasionally, voluntarily.
Our relationship is thus more social than many which exist between 
researcher and researched and yet it remains quite different to my other 
social relationships. This is also the case for Katy, I am not someone 
she would think of meeting socially with her husband, for example, but 
she would, she said, consider me as a blood donor if she or her children 
were in need. The significance of this remark becomes clear in Chapter 
Five.
The relationship with other informants
Despite my initial apprehension that the use of an interview method and 
the presence of a tape-recorder might limit the kind of information 
informants would impart, I found - perhaps because of the anonymity - 
that the majority of my informants were suprisingly open and expansive. 
This was despite my impression that many of the questions I was asking
- 59 -
them were rather taboo in nature. Indeed, on a number of occasions 
women told me of events such as rape, or feelings concerning the 
imminent death of a parent or of the humiliation associated with 
investigations for cervical pathology, which they said they had not 
talked of before. In this respect, I find similarities with the work of 
Martin (1987), who describes times during fieldwork in which it seemed 
as if the most profound events of someone else's life had been 
"shoehorned" into her own. Because of this role, it felt as if 
fieldwork was not an altogether exploitative enterprise (cf. Hatfield 
(1973).3:2 nonetheless, I am deeply indebted to my informants, 
particularly Katy, for what they have shown me.
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CHARTER XVQ 
THE INFLUENCE QF CHRISTIANITY
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So God created man in his own image, in the image of God 
created he him; male and female created he them. (Genesis 1:27)
Introduction
In the first part of this chapter I argue that the study of informants' 
cosmology is important in understanding aspects of the quotidian world. 
More specifically, following Delaney's (1986) suggestion of a 
consistency between cosmological and procreative beliefs, and of a link 
between monotheism and a monogenetic theory of reproduction, I examine 
the way in which God's role in Biblical creative myth is perceived among 
informants. Later in this Chapter I examine ideas within the tradition 
of Christianity concerning the asexual reproduction of the Virgin Birth 
and the 'closed' nature of the Marian body. These ideas appear to be 
consistent with informants' attitudes towards parental sexuality and 
notions of the feminine body, as later chapters will clarify.
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2,1) The importance af_ cosmo logy,
There are a number of reasons for examining cosmological issues in what 
is fundamentally a study of social and moral relationships. To begin 
with, it has been argued that, despite the decline of certain 
institutional religions, religious beliefs remain an important part of 
everyday life (for example, Glasner 1977; Pagels 1990). I was 
interested to know the extent to which informants' cosmologies were 
influenced by a ’backdrop' of Christianity, as opposed to a scientific 
or biomedical model (see Chapter 1.3).
A second reason for examining cosmology is concerned with
interpretation. In this thesis I take 'cosmology' to be a
"comprehensive view of the world, of society, of the situation of man
(sic) which informs thought, behaviour, perceptions" (Feyerabend 1975:
223). According to Searle, it is especially difficult to know how to
interpret informants' statements without sharing some of the principles
which govern their knowledge of the world (1979). In a study of Piarroa
kinship, for example, Overing (1985) found the use of kinship terms in
everyday life highly unpredictable and unresponsive to formal semantic
analysis. However she found it passible to discern certain principles
in the ordering of the mundane through the analysis of kinship
relationships of Piarroa mythical beings. Once kinship and affinity are
placed within the context of cosmology;
[they] become subsumed under broader metaphysical principles, such 
as the nature of similarity and difference, and take on ontological 
dimensions that go far beyond the distinction of kin and affine as 
we might understand such a distinction within a "normal" social 
context (1985: 157-8).1
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In addition, the apparent association between "intimate and 
ultimate concerns" (Delaney 1986: 494) raises the possibility of a 
relationship between specific procreative beliefs and the wider context 
- cosmology or world view - in which they occur (Delaney 1986).
Delaney believes that this is what is important about indigenous 
theories of procreation and not, for example, whether there is any 
association between sexual intercourse and pregnancy, as raised by the 
so-called 'Virgin Birth' debate (see, for example Leach 1966; Spiro 
1968; Douglas 1969). The analysis of motherhood and fatherhood as 
cultural concepts rather than biological facts may help to ascertain 
what procreation, in its broadest sense, is about, Similarly, Veiner 
suggests that in other societies (if not our own), the cultural domain 
of reproduction may be the very basis through which the social and the 
cosmological become integrated: "the principal features of reproduction 
may be more transcendental than biological" (1978:175).2
This relationship between procreation and cosmology means that we 
need to pursue meanings wherever they lead us and not be inhibited by 
the boundaries of domains such as 'reproduction', 'kinship' or 
'religion' (Delaney 1986:496). At the same time, biological capacities, 
such as those to do with child-bearing, may be utilised as powerful 
symbols which not only articulate religious relationships but which, 
once informed by the values of this domain, also serve to endorse 
perceptions of gender at the wider, social level (Craik 1979),
In sum, the study of metaphysical beliefs may be helpful in 
understanding what is important about sexuality and procreation, 
offering insights, for example, into ontological principles of
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similarity and difference and into mundane social relations - such as 
those between kindred and those between the sexes.
2,2) Inf or manta.
On the assumption that all informants would have at least secondhand 
knowledge of the Bible and would be familiar with elements of Judeo- 
Christian tradition, nineteen women were asked how they understood 
certain creative 'events' in the Bible, (namely God's creation of the 
world in seven days, the creation of Eve from Adam's rib and the Virgin 
Birth) in an effort to understand the procreative role attributed to 
God. This was carried out irrepective of whether or not informants 
accepted the occurrence of these events.
Katy is unrepresentative of most informants in as much as she 
converted from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism during the period of 
fieldwork. Her change in denomination was, in part, prompted by a 
desire for a more ritualised form of worship. The act of conversion 
also gave her the opportunity to discuss the many different aspects of 
Christianity which were puzzling her; she had regular sessions of 
mandatory religious instruction with a priest (Father Benedict) prior to 
her acceptance by the Church. At the same time, she was developing a 
deep friendship with a woman called Dina who was a Jehovah's Witness. 
Katy was, therefore, already thinking about many of the cosmological and 
ontological issues I was to raise with her. This was in contrast to the 
majority of my other informants who admitted they rarely thought about 
such things, However, in common with those other informants who held 
religious beliefs, Katy's mode of belief was highly personal; while
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great respect was given to the knowledge of theologians and Father 
Benedict, and while explanatory texts issued by her church were referred 
to when I asked for interpretations of certain rituals such as baptism, 
in her interpretation of biblical stories and in her ethical views, Katy 
might consciously dismiss Catholic dogma.
Eighteen other women were asked questions concerning cosmology. Of
the total of nineteen informants, the majority (eleven) had some
religious belief, although only seven of these were actively practising
their faith. Most women in this group of of eleven had some affiliation
with either Roman Catholic or Protestant denominations. Three
informants were agnostic. Five women stated that they had no religious
beliefs, but on further questioning it appeared that what this often
meant was that they did not subscribe to any specific dogma; all members
of this group believed either that each individual had a spiritual
aspect, or believed in the existence of a superhuman force. For
instance, one woman describing herself as a "lapsed Catholic" had no
belief in individual soul, but understood God in the following terms; "I
believe in a god...in the form of a force rather than a being. I think
of God as being energy and a sort of life farce." Another woman, a 25
year-old nurse, did not see this force as necessarily omnipotent:
I think there is something, somewhere, that sort of ordains people's 
lives or whatever... decides what's going to happen...whether it's 
good or bad. I think there has to be.
Alternatively, a 25 year-old secretary said that she believed there
might be "something out there that's bigger and wiser than we are ...but
I think that God is a man-made thing."
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2.3) The creation of...the. world
In describing how they understood the creation of the world, the largest
group of informants (eight) accepted exclusively scientific
explanations, such as the ‘Big Bang' theory,3 although they were
reluctant to describe such theories in any detail. The following
explanation is offered by one of the less inhibited informants, a 22
year-old chef who had a convent school education and is now a non-
practising Catholic:
Well, for a start, I probably believe our planet was...is probably 
the result of some reaction, a spin-off from the sun or something 
like that. The life form most probably came from some kind of 
sea...marine.,biological beginnings and probably just evolved from 
that, probably with sub-nuclear reactions...atmospheric...to make us 
the way we are now.
Acceptance of scientific explanations was not always wholehearted; 
some women in this group thought such theories were mare plausible than 
religious ones, but would nonetheless prefer to be able to believe in 
the story of Genesis as described in the Bible. A second group of three 
informants was unsure which explanation to accept; all women in this 
group believed in God, but found scientific explanations more credible. 
Three more women thought that scientific explanations were most probably 
valid, but the events they described were still ultimately influenced by 
God, A further four women, including Katy, thought God alone had 
created the world, and one woman replied that she had never thought 
about the issue and so could not comment.
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A sure belief in Gad as creator did not mean an informant held a
straightforward view of how creation came about. Katy, for example,
found, despite her faith, that the Creation was beyond understanding.
Sometimes - when you think about God and you think "How did He do­
it?" and "What did He do?" and "Where did He come from?" - my mind 
plays tricks. I don’t like to think about things too much because 
then my mind does go - it's just done it there - do you understand? 
It kind of somersaults when you think God has always been 
from.. . .when.
Of those who believed God created the world either exclusively or 
through His influence (seven, including Katy), only two informants 
believed this happened as stated in the Bible. The others understood 
the story of creation in Genesis as allegory. One woman, a part-time 
lay chaplain, said, for example, "certain things were created from the 
light and dark and maybe [the Bible's writers] were trying to put some 
sort of order in it." This view of the Bible's meaning as symbolic was 
particularly clear in the case of the creation of human life. Most 
informants, while recognising that humans had to originate from 
something, did not think we can all trace our origin to a specific 
couple named Adam and Eve. Nonetheless, the story of Adam and Eve was 
seen as meaningful by over half the informants, mostly as a moral tale, 
even among those who professed to have no religious beliefs, such as 
this 29 year-old chartered surveyor;
I: I do tend to feel that Adam and Eve and similar tales - perhaps this
is a little bit blasphemous - are ways in which people have managed 
to try and explain vast uncertainties in life - just so you can put 
things down to human scale and aren't really too scared about why 
we're here and what our purpose is in the world.
J: Does it help you personally? Does it explain anything at all to
you?
I: Not in terms of why I'm in the world but perhaps, as the Bible and
similar things have been around for so very long, it does help, I 
suppose, to indicate how Man has or hasn't moved forward, depending
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on how you regard civilisation and your moral code and belief and 
things.
The lay chaplain, who was in favour of the ordination of women, had 
a very different understanding of the myth of Adam and Eve compared with 
other informants. She suggested that the original Hebrew version had 
been mistranslated and that the term ha * adam refers to people or 
humanity "rather than the male and female business". Ha'adam is 
sexually undifferentiated until put into a deep sleep from which he/she 
emerges as two new beings, male and female. There is no sense of 
inequality between these until after the Fall, when the male being,
Adam, names the animals and so proclaims his lordship over them and then 
similarly names Eve.'1
In sum, understandings of the act of Creation provided little 
insight into a broader understanding of procreation. What was 
interesting was that most women were reluctant to discuss this issue or 
found it of little personal concern. While the majority of informants 
offered a picture of the creation of the world as a chain of physical 
reactions occurring without any metaphysical initiative, the nature of 
these reactions were only vaguely sketched. They were assumed to be 
scientifically known but unknowable by informants. It appeared 
therefore that scientific beliefs were allowed tremendous explanatory 
power3 at the expense of informants' personal cosmologies.
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This finding can be seen to parallel an observation made by Daly 
(1973), regarding the Fall of Adam and Eve, that this story is not given 
serious weight in 'the modern consciousness'. Theologians, she claims, 
are divided as to whether to remove the 'shell' of myth and yet retain 
some of its alleged content, or to retain the myth yet not take it 
literally. Moreover, while the meaning of the Fall has been understood 
in such terms as 'universal alienation' or 'existential estrangement', 
Daly finds that the vision of the relationship between the sexes which 
the Fall portrays is treated as if it is unimportant in both secular and 
religious domains (1973: 44-5).
The majority of informants were not questioned on their 
understanding of the Fall when they were asked about other events in 
Genesis. At this point in the research I was specifically interested in 
ideas of creation and procreation and I did not perceive the Fall, as I 
do now, to be part of a creation myth. I therefore had not considered 
its potential for indicating an overarching theory of procreation, for 
example, through the relationship between the sexes that it portrays.
As Daly suggests of many of my contemporaries, I did not give serious 
weight to the Fall. Consequently, I was slow to see its ontological 
significance. (This significance is discussed more fully in Chapter 7.)
Those informants I did question about the Fall also appeared to 
give it little significance, Katy was unfamiliar with the expression 
'the Fall'. She understood the story of the expulsion of Adam and Eve 
from the Garden of Eden to be concerned with 'self-discipline' and 
trust; because they broke the trust of God, Adam and Eve were expelled
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from the Garden of Eden and were no longer loved by God, Similarly,the 
lay chaplain said HI see the Fall as just being banished from the 
Garden, In a way, before the Fall, they're actually very close to God." 
Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden because they had disobeyed 
God and eaten the fruit of a certain tree. This particular informant 
was unsure what it was that the tree represented, but thought that it 
was probably the tree of good and evil, and that the fruit represented 
knowledge of evil. Significantly, no informant mentioned Eve's greater 
culpability in the Fall, nor of the penalties which have supposedly been 
visited on women as a result, such as pain in childbirth and submission 
to the demands of men (see Genesis 3.16-19).
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2..,. A). .Gad. as male
If Eve and, subsequently, all women have been the "primordial 
scapegoats" (Daly 1973: 47), it is hardly suprising if the predominant 
representation of God in theological and everyday discourses is as male. 
It has been clearly the dominant practice in the Christian tradition to
address God as 'Father'. This is despite many examples of qualities and
actions that might be regarded as 'motherly' in the language of the 
Bible (King 1989:129). It has been seen to be necessary by some writers 
to challenge the identification of God as Father, largely because of the 
inherent social implications of such an association. As Daly has said, 
for example:
The biblical and popular image of God as a great patriarch in 
heaven, rewarding and punishing according to his mysterious and 
seemingly arbitrary will, has dominated the imagination of millions 
over thousands of years. The symbol of the Father God, spawned in 
the human imagination and sustained as plausible by patriarchy, has 
in turn rendered service to this type of society by making its
mechanisms for the oppression of women appear right and fitting. If
God in 'his' heaven is a father ruling 'his' people, then it is in 
the 'nature' of things and according to divine plan and the order of 
the universe that society be male-dominated. (1973:13)
However, contemporary Christians are divided over calling God 
'Mother', Some feminist theologians, for example, are against this 
trend, stating that to portray God as Mother would represent only 
trivial reforms in a patriarchal Church (Daly 1973). At the same tin®, 
calling God 'Mother' might invoke apparently immutable sex-specific 
cliches. For example, it could suggest that motherliness is implicit in 
the nature of women and independent of social conditions (Wacker 1989). 
As King has said:
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The realm of divine female imagery and symbolism is larger than the 
idea of motherhood, just as woman's experience is not coterminous 
and identical with human motherhood - it is a central but not 
exclusive aspect of her life. (1989:130)
These feminist theologians are wary of merely replacing a patriarchal
with a matriarchal model of God and of overlooking the way in which
maternal language can be oppressive or may be sentimentalised (McFague
1989).
Informants1 male God,
In contrast with the reticence of informants to discuss the events of 
Genesis, many were more expansive about how they understood God, 
particularly in terms of gender attributes, Of sixteen women 
questioned, twelve saw God as unequivocally male, two saw God as a 
sexually neutral figure, and one woman had not thought about the issue.
Of the women who understood God as male, several saw this as the
outcome of the sorts of images of God which had been presented to them
as they grew up. Furthermore, this image of God was unproblematic for
most women. For example, a 30 year-old nurse who belonged to the Church
of England said "That is something I can accept because if you go to
Church it's all written out. That's how it is and...I don't feel the
need to change that". A secretary, also belonging to the Church of
England, imagined God as a "dear old gentleman sitting on a chair in the
clouds". She nonetheless found it puzzling that God should be male:
If I want to ask for advice or say prayers or do whatever I do, I 
have to think of a being, and that [image of the old gentleman]
..it's always been the symbol presented to me. But why it is a man 
and not a woman I don't know.
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Yet, at the same time, this woman had no wish to replace the male image 
of God with a female one. She explained her acceptance of the status 
quo on the basis of not being a "woman's libber". This suggests that 
underlying God's apparent maleness is an assumption that if God has 
power and authority, God must be male.
Indeed, several informants explictly stated that it was preferable 
that God, as a figure of authority, was male. One lapsed Roman Catholic 
woman said, for example, "I think, in a way, I prefer him to be a man 
anyway. ..you .just, sort of, accept a man as being a bit more dominant, I 
suppose," Another informant who belonged to no denomination remarked "I 
think, traditionally, one always thinks of God as being masculine. In 
fact, I find it... I wouldn't say offensive but it doesn't sit right to 
think of Him as a woman."
The lay chaplain, who worked at a musician's college and was
clearly used to talking about religion viz-a-viz sexual politics, took
the following position:
I think it's very easy to [think of God having a particular gender] 
because the Church uses 'Father', but especially being with students 
and quite a lot of feminists, the idea of God being Mother is also 
very ... I don't think of God as having a sex...Whether you think of 
God as male or female actually affects the way you think about God, 
but I wouldn't really think of God as one or the other.
Having said that, this informant added that it was sometimes helpful to
thing of God as mother. In this respect she differed to Katy. On the
one hand, Katy thought that God was essentially without gender;
We imagine Him to be a male figure, like you or I in that form, 
because that's the only way we can imagine Him to be...that's as far 
as our imagination goes. But He's a spirit - in what form I don't 
know.
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On the other hand, although it was acceptable to Katy to conceptualise 
God as male in the absence of any more suitable image, it was quite 
unacceptable to represent God as female; "You know, I saw a stupid woman 
on television once who said God is a woman!"
2i5? God as male creator
God's perceived maleness becomes significant in understanding the 
creative powers attributed to God and to the masculine in general. It 
has been argued that in monotheistic religions, divinity is creativity 
and that creativity can be understood as the principle which animates 
the universe (Delaney 1986). What is more, this principle, at least in 
Christianity, is explicitly masculine, that "the male as father is 
creator of human life, as God is thought to be of life in general" 
(Delaney 1986: 504). Delaney also suggests this is unsuprising in our 
culture, where there is both a tradition of monotheism and an 
overarching system of patriarchy,s each of which exalt the father. 
Although the ultimate father in Christianity is divine, Delaney argues 
that the implicit meaning of his fatherhood remains the same in the case 
of human fathers. According tD Delaney, in the West the dominant 'folk' 
theory concerning human reproduction has, for centuries, been based on 
the notion that a child originates from only one source. While mothers 
give birth and offer nurturance, fathers provide the child's essential 
being.
Warner expands on this theory, suggesting that this western 
tradition can be traced to classical philosophy (1985: 34). In the 
Hellenistic world, the Stoics had believed that the male 'seed' which
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provided body and soul joined with the woman's soul to create the
embryo. In other words, the embryo was virtually complete before it
entered the womb and the female contribution was minimal (1985: 40).
However, it was Aristotle's ideas of generation, once given authority by
Aquinas, which became widely held among Christian writers:
After the spread of Aristotelian biological ideas in the thirteenth 
century, the overshadowing power of the Holy Spirit was closely 
identified with the operation of the male in human generation. 
(Varner 1985: 39).
According to this school of thought, woman provided the matter for the 
embryo, while man invested the matter with form and motion.'7. This model 
might be seen to give women an important role in human reproduction. 
However, due to a contempt for matter inherited from the Greeks, the 
female role was considered animal and therefore inferior. In contrast, 
the male role was understood to include the much more noble function of 
imparting life itself (Varner 1985: 40). Thus from Aristotelian 
philosophy, Varner argues, comes the traditional western view which 
perceives man as the active source of life and woman as the passive 
incubator.
The existence of this tradition helps to explain the fact that 
biological fatherhood was recognised long before empirical evidence for 
the role of spermatazoa was available (Barnes 1973). While scientific 
evidence of a male contribution to the fetus was easily incorporated 
into notions of fatherhood, observation of the ovum had little immediate 
impact on the understanding of biological motherhood; the knowledge 
that both men and women contributed essentially to a child was not 
widely assimilated until the middle of this century (Delaney 1986:508).
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Even now there remains the question posed by Delaney of why, with the 
genetic contribution of the ovum established, evidence of the folk 
theory persists, not only in everyday speech3 but in theological 
language and in the discourse of academics (including feminists).'3
My data offer one answer to this question, by suggesting that, 
although informants are aware of an equal genetic contribution towards a 
child on the part of both male and female parents, there is, in 
addition, a notion that a gender-specific contribution is made by each 
parent. Over and above a genetic contribution, the father in some sense 
instigates the pregnancy and is responsible for the provision of a new 
being which is complete in its essence. The mother then nurtures this 
being and plays the major role in its early ‘upbringing*. Thus 
informants* understandings of procreation refer to ontological as well 
as ontogenetic development, and to notions of gender as well as biology. 
For want of a better term, I shall call this the 'ontogenetic model of 
procreation'.
Evidence of this model in relation to both divine and mundane 
reproduction could clearly be glimpsed in conversations with Katy. For 
example.
J; Why dD you think people talk about God the Father?
K: Because He is the father of everybody,
J: But why don't we say 'the Mother'?
K; Because we all come from a father, don't we. It's the man that we 
all come from.
J: In what way?
K: Veil I suppose we.,.I don't know...it's the man who is..[stops]
J: When you say that fathers create, what is their contribution to
procreation that's different to mothers? What do they provide 
that's...
K: Veil the sperms are in them but then the eggs are in us, aren't
they!
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J; Do the sperms have more. . .
K: Yes the sperms are the actual being, aren't they.... I mean, the
sperms are all male and female. There's billions of males and 
females in amongst the sperms, aren't there. It's like the sperms 
are the actual being.
J: So what are the eggs then?
K: I know they have to link to make.. . I don't know, the sperms just
seem more important than the egg..although it takes the egg as well.
The sperms just seem to be the actual thing, the actual beginning of 
life,
This conversation suggests that, in reproduction, fusion between an 
ovum and sperm is necessary. In other words, there is evidence of a 
'biogenetic' model of reproduction. However, this appears .to co-exist 
with a notion that the vital essence of life is provided by the male, 
suggesting an understanding of procreation based on the amalgamation of 
scientific and religious paradigms. Other informants also appeared to 
hold this complex view of procreation, which is enlarged upon in Chapter 
Six,
Evidence of such a model does not appear to support Delaney's 
assertion of a relationship between monotheism and monogeneticism. 
However, if we allow Parsons's point (1966; xlvi), that Christianity is 
not, strictly speaking, monotheistic, as the Holy Trinity has at least 
polytheistic aspects,10 it is still possible to argue for a relationship 
between cosmological and mundane representations of procreation; the 
father is still exalted but more than one creative source is recognised. 
As one 30 year-old, Church of England nurse said, "All right, the man 
provides the sperm and the woman carries, but you do need the two of 
them. "
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2.61 The Virgin Birth.
According to Delaney, the meaning of fatherhood made explicit in 
Christianity is exemplified by the Virgin Birth (1986: 494).11 Varner 
maintains that "ideas about the Virgin Birth have always been to some 
extent dependent on knowledge about human reproduction" (1985: 39), but 
at the same time notes that the miraculous nature of the event should 
not be overlooked. She suggests that the juxtaposition of the 
'rational' and the miraculous in explanations of the Virgin Birth stem 
from the influence of two earlier traditions - Jewish and Greek ~ upon 
Christianity. These traditions are contradictory in as much as in 
Jewish belief all things are possible with God, while in the Greek view 
some things are impossible in nature. The outcome of this 
contradiction, says Varner, has been the typical Christian miracle: the 
Virgin Birth, the 'raising' from the dead and other 'unnatural' 
phenomena which demonstrate the existence and power of God. Theologians 
who wished to explain such miracles without damaging the miraculousness 
of these events came to rely on biological beliefs which, until this 
century, were such that the Virgin Birth was perceived as naturally 
possible and yet divinely instigated (Varner 1985: 40). Vith the 
discovery of genetics, the virgin birth became more improbable. Yet as 
Varner paints out, the possibility of a rational explanation for this 
event distorts the fundamentals of Christian doctrine, "Cf]or the Virgin 
Birth of Jesus, like his Resurrection, is the luminous sign of his 
divinity precisely because it suspends the natural order" (1985: 43).
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Vith this in mind, sixteen women were asked about their 
understanding of the relationship between God and Jesus in the light of 
the dogma of the Virgin Birth. Was, for example, Jesus the son of God 
and, if so, to what extent was this a biological or a spiritual 
relationship? Answers were far from straightforward and one informant 
declined to comment. Most informants believed in the existence of Jesus 
as historical fact, but regarded the issue of whether he was the son of 
God as another matter. Some informants, for example, thought of him as 
a wise man or prophet, but of entirely mundane origins. While only one 
woman positively believed in the Virgin Birth as an event, all women 
understood the story in similar terms, that is with God as the sole 
generative agent. However, the relationship between God and his son was 
seen as a spiritual rather than a biological one. Many women supported 
this view by drawing attention to the notion of the Holy Trinity in 
which Jesus and God are presented as one and the same. To transpose 
this into the language of reproductive biology, Jesus was seen as a kind 
of spiritual clone, with Mary as a mediator between heaven and earth, 
through whom 'the Word was made flesh'.
As the 22 year-old lay chaplain put it:
EJesus] was male and he was on earth, but he's actually God as well,
so in a way he's the same as God so I wouldn't think of him so much
as father and son - although of course there’s all this business 
that he came from Mary. He's like a child of God which, if you're a 
Christian, you believe you're also a child of God.
Similarly Katy states:
K God put seed into Mary.
J; How?
K: Because He's God and He can do anything. It's not..you mean how did
He get it in there? He just put it there. If you believed in a god
you'd believe he could do anything.
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J: What does that mean about ... am I right in saying you would
recognise sperm as 'seed'?
K: Yes, but it's not actually God's sperm because He isn't a man.
J; That's what I'm trying to get at.
K: God is. Always has been. He's a spirit. He's not like you and I
are. He's a spirit and that's how Mary conceived a child. That's 
why..the Father, Son and Holy Spirit is One, if you see what I 
mean. They are one.
J: The 'seed' is different then than the sperm in semen?
K: Yes, I think so. Because it was a boy child - do you see what I
mean. He put the seed of a boy child into Mary.
Katy's use of the term 'child' suggests that Mary made no substantial 
contribution towards Jesus, that God did not 'impregnate' Mary with the 
equivalent of sperm, but with a being - His being - that was pre­
conceived.
All informants who spoke of the relationship between Mary and Jesus 
understood this as a biological one. However, the nature of Mary's 
biological contribution was not always clear. There was certainly 
recognition that Mary nurtured Jesus in her womb and gave birth to him. 
Only one informant, the lay chaplain, appeared to suggest that Mary 
might have made any contribution to the substance of Christ; "He had to 
be of God - God had to.be in him like Man was in himt so he had Mary and 
God was his father" (my emphasis). However, a further statement from 
this same informant implies that Christ's humanness came from an 
emotional attachment resulting from the gestational period; "I don't 
think you can spend nine months in the womb without being bonded to the 
woman." Just as Mary appears to play no generative role in the Virgin 
Birth, the data suggests that at the mundane level, women's generative 
powers are given little stress.12 However, other aspects of motherhood 
such as nurturance, either in utero or in 'upbringing' are emphasised.1'3
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In sum, informants offered a view of the Virgin Birth in which 
God's role was predominantly as initiator and provider of being, while 
Mary's role was as nurturer. Informants also suggested a parallel 
between the single-handed creativity of God and the perceived role of 
the human father. 1d As such, the data offers some degree of support for 
Delaney's thesis. However, it cannot be assumed, as Delaney assumes, 
that maternal nurturance is of less importance than the paternal 
contribution of vital essence. Indeed, data presented in later chapters 
(see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) endorses the signficance of nurturance. 
Moreover, Delaney has suggested that, within this procreative scheme, 
God's relationship to the natural world parallels that between man and 
woman (1986: 503). However, later chapters will suggest that the 
nurturance attributed to women by informants is concerned not only with 
the bodily needs of those who are mothered, but is also associated with 
the creation of a moral being. According to this scheme, and following 
from the discussion of the nature/culture debate in Chapter 1.3, women 
cannot be straightforwardly identified with the natural world.
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2.7) The Virgin Birth, and sexuality
Additional aspects of motherhood and fatherhood can be suggested if the 
Virgin Birth is to be used as a model, concerning the ideal of asexual 
parenthood and the integrity of the feminine body. These aspects were' 
generally not referred to by informants in discussions about cosmology, 
although evidence for them emerged elsewhere.13 This chapter 
nonetheless appears an appropriate setting for a discussion of the 
possible links between cosmology and these procreative ideals. In this 
discussion, among other sources, I draw on work concerning the Greco- 
Roman and early Christian eras, on the grounds that these are thought to 
have been times of crucial importance in the establishment of present- 
day western culture (Ari&s 1985; Foucault 1985).
.Integrity of the feminine, body.
According to Varner, the Virgin Mary represents a central theme in the 
history of western attitudes towards women (1985: xxiv-v) although 
"formed and animated by different people for different reasons" (1985: 
xxii). One of the most consistent images, however, is of Mary as the 
feminine ideal by virtue of her motherhood. As Kristeva has said, 
"tudany civilisations have subsumed femininity under the maternal, but 
Christianity in its own way develops the tendency to its full (1986:
101). However, what ultimately marks Mary as the Church's female 
paragon is that in her, parturient motherhood is combined with sexual 
purity. This ideal is one that is. impossible for other women to 
attain13 and raises a point made by Maeckelberghe (1989), She suggests 
that there is a difference between the way in which institutions have
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interpreted Mary and the human experience of Mary. Moreover,
Maeckelberghe believes that:
the institution and the level of experience with regard to 'Mary' 
are much closer to each other in the case of men than in that of 
women, and that 'Mary's' virginity is especially important for men, 
whereas her motherhood is the point of contact for women (1989:122).
This apart, the dogma of the virgin birth which proclaims parturition
without sexual intercourse has to be understood as a miracle or as an
exception to everyday life.17
As a miracle, the Virgin Birth provides an example of a more 
general phenomenon described by Bloch and Parry, in which symbolic 
transformations invert what is perceived in other contexts (1982:19). 
Viewed in this light, the Virgin Birth offers insight into the concepts 
of human motherhood and fatherhood in the sense that it demonstrates 
precisely what they are not. In the Virgin Birth, God's son is none 
other than God in a different form. This therefore suggests that human 
fatherhood, as non-miraculous, is not concerned with the reproduction of 
the same being in different form. Similarly, human motherhood is 
neither concerned with the conception of a child who is totally other, 
nor with the bearing of a child by a virgin and who, for some, remains a 
virgin even after giving birth.13 The issue of sameness and difference 
in procreation is dealt with elsewhere (see Chapters 5 and 7, for 
example). Here, I want briefly to consider the importance of the 
integrity of the Virgin Mother and its implications for human 
motherhood.
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According to Varner, the Fathers of the Church attributed an
importance to virginity partly because of the image which they held of
the female body. Delaney has pointed to a widespread understanding of
the difference between the male and female body:
Men’s bodies are viewed as self-contained while women's bodily 
boundaries oscillate and shift, for example, in developing of 
breasts and the swelling of pregnancy; they leak in menstruation and 
lactation, and are permeable in intercourse and birth (1986: 499).13
What is more, according to this view, physical features take on moral
attributes, so that men become associated with penetrative insight and
firm views while women are perceived to oscillate according to the
influences they experience (1986: 499).20
This perception of women is compatible with, among many others, the 
Church Fathers' interpretation of Eve's susceptibility to temptation by 
Satan, behaviour which was punished by the specifically female role in 
reproduction.21 It has also been compatible with the metaphor of woman 
as an 'unsound vessel', of the female body as 'opened' through 
menstruation, sexual penetration and birth, which has been exploited by 
Christian tradition (Varner 1985). However, this image of woman 
condemned by the Fall is opposed by that of Mary the Virgin Mother, 
whose body is portrayed as seamless, unbroken, "an epiphany of 
integrity" even after giving birth (Varner 1985: 73), The concept that 
wholeness is equated with holiness is one that has underlain the stress 
•on virginity and asceticism which can be traced within Christian 
tradition (Varner 1985: 72).
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Mary's perpetual virginity suggests that her body is closed in a 
way that it is not possible for other, more ordinary women. Therefore, 
bearing in mind that the Virgin Birth portrays the miraculous, the 
mundane meaning of motherhood would appear to be concerned with the non­
integral feminine body, the body in which the potential for 'openness' 
is realised. This 'openness', however, need not necessarily be a 
passive receptiveness (cf Delaney 1986: 498.) For example, Craik (1979) 
notes that the concept of the feminine within Christianity is 
represented in the metaphor of the 'bride of Christ'. In the context of 
Catholicism, this term refers both to nuns, who are understood as 
virgins rejecting worldly penetration, and to the Church itself: the 
relation of Christians to Christ, "conceived in sexual and Intimate
tJ
terms (Craik 1979: 104), can be expressed in the symbolism of the bride 
and groom. Maltz has seen this relationship in the following terms:
"the purity of the bride, like the purity of receiving the Holy Spirit, 
is a status achieved by one's willingness to receive" (1978:36).22 This 
suggests that penetration and its antithesis are central metaphors 
within the discourse of- Christianity.
Such a suggestion is also supported by the symbolism of the 
Eucharist. In the Catholic Church, those who receive this sacrament are 
'feminine' in their relationship to Christ (Craik 1979), Not only are 
they made participants in the very substance of the body and blood of 
Christ,23 but "Ctlhe Host or the God-man enters man's inner flesh and 
through this Intimate contact we become one with him" (Thurian 
1981:229). The sacrament, the flesh and blood of Christ in the form of 
bread and wine, is not transformed into those who eat it, but changes
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those who eat it into itself (Camporesi 1989). This transformation 
occurs not in the mouth but in the belly; as Camporesi describes it, the 
"raw flesh of the divine" is taken into the communicant’s innermost 
aspect, In this sense, those who partake in the Eucharist can be seen 
to embrace an openness and a potential for physical/moral change.2"1
As suggested above, differences between the male and female body 
have come to be seen as indications of other, non-physical differences, 
and that physical attributes assume moral qualities (see also Bynum 
1989; Laqueur 1987). Yet even within the kind of conceptual framework 
which draws a connection between the morphology of the body and the 
morphology of different thought processes - or even of different 
moralities - it is possible to find evidence to suggest that women's 
perceived 'openness' can be viewed as positive in some respects. Such a 
view has been reported elsewhere. Hirshon (1978), for example, 
describes the female states of being 'open' and 'closed' in Greek 
culture, states which are both quasi-physiological and founded on the 
moral virtue of women. My own data, presented in Chapters Four and 
Five, similarly makes the point that 'openness' may, in some instances, 
have positive associations.
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2.9) Asexual reproductionand asceticism
Fart of the miracle of the Christian Virgin Birth is that pregnancy
occurred without sexual intercourse. Mary became pregnant through
divine will and not, as is more often the case with virgin births in
other mythologies, through "voluptuous theagamy" (Varner 1985: 35).23
Vhile, cross-culturally, it is not unusual to find that virgin birth may
assert the closeness between humans and higher orders (cf. Schneider
1968), Christianity is unusual in using the idea of a virgin birth as a
model for ascetism. For, from the second century onwards,
[tlhrough the ascetic renunciation of the flesh, a woman could 
relieve a part of her nature's particular viciousness as the Virgin 
Mary had done through her complete purity... Through virginity and 
self-inflicted hardship, the faults of female nature could be 
corrected. (Varner 1985: 68-9)
The power of virginity was seen to operate at two levels. First, 
the image of the female virgin body was the supreme image of wholeness, 
and wholeness was equated with holiness (see 2,8 above). Second, the 
Fathers of the Church taught that a virginal life helped to reduce the 
consequences of the Fall.23 Virginity was not stressed in the same way 
for men; male virginity did not imply the same kind of wholeness 
attributed to virginal women (Varner 1985). However, celibacy on the 
part of women and men, whether virgins or not, traditionally represented 
one of the principal means for restoring humanity to Paradise, the 
"Paradise of virginity" which existed before the Fall (Pagels 1990: 79).
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2.10) The human condition as 'flesh*
As a consequence of the Fall, the body became corrupt and, thus 
vitiated, came to be described as 'flesh'. The term 'flesh' has come to 
represent both the human body and its transience. It is therefore more 
than a metonym for the body, but denotes something of the human 
condition; it is "an ontological leap into a mortal condition" (Tazi 
1989: 530).
'Flesh' also has a sexual gloss. It has been suggested that, 
before Paul, 'flesh' referred merely to human mortality and not to the 
burden of original sin or the body charged with sexual knowledge (Tazi 
1989). In the Fourth Gospel, for example, the Incarnation is referred to 
in terms of the 'Word' or the Holy Spirit becoming 'flesh', Yet Christ 
as the divine taking on human form and mortality is never tainted with 
original sin - he is conceived without sex and remains celibate. By 
such means Christ, as God enfleshed, retains a distance from the human 
condition. From Paul onwards, however, "the conflict between the things 
of God and the things of man, between heaven and the world, is perceived 
in sexual terms, and a Hellenistic fear of reason's overthrow by 
passion" (Varner 1985: 56).27 Augustine found it significant that, 
after eating the forbidden fruit, Adam and Eve covered their genitals 
rather than, say, their mouths which had consumed the fruit. From this 
gesture Augustine reasoned that the knowledge acquired by Adam and Eve 
was of an inner force which he called epithymia (concupiscence). This 
force affected all areas of life but particularly the passion associated 
with the sexual act. The premise for this connection between sexual 
intercourse and original sin was the Virgin Birth of Christ; thus
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Augustine linked the sinfulness of sex, the Virgin Birth and the ideal 
of virginity (Varner 1985: 54).
However, what Foucault has referred to as the 'sexual ethic' (1985: 
25) of Augustine and other Christian ascetics also has to be seen as 
part of an, albeit discontinuous, intellectual tradition concerning the 
significance of controlling bodily desires, perceptible, for example, 
within Stoic or Neo-Platonic philosophy (1985: 25), Foucault maintains 
that Greco-Roman austerity was essentially concerned with self­
domination and showed little regard for the question of purity.
Christian asceticism, on the other hand, was based on the idea that 
self-control was necessary in order to maintain purity. Moreover,
the paradigm of self-restraint becomes a feminine paradigm through 
the theme of purity and virginity, based on the model of integrity. 
Physical integrity rather than self-regulation became important. 
(Foucault 1984; 366).23
By the end of the fourth century, the contrast between mind and
body in philosophy became represented within Christianity as the
opposition between spirit and 'flesh' (Turner 1984) and Christian
asceticism came to represent the control of passion, the spirit's
conquest over the 'flesh'.
The body in Greek thought had been the focus of a struggle between 
form and desire (between Apollo and Dionysus), Christianity 
inherited this viewpoint but darkened it by seeing the flesh as the 
symbol of Fallen Man and irrational denial of God (1984; 36).
'Flesh* came to refer to an aspect of the body associated with sexuality
and sin but one that nonetheless remained ambiguous . Foucault has
described this character of 'flesh' as
a notion that refers to a single entity and allows diverse phenomena 
to be grouped together, despite the apparent loose connections
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between them, as if they were of the same nature, derived from the 
same origin, or brought the same kind of causal mechanisms into 
play: behaviours but also sensations, images, desires, instincts, 
passions (1984: 35).
In this he finds 'flesh' similar in its diversity to 'sexuality'.
However, he clearly regards them as different entities, with sexuality
making a more recent appearance: "Iwle have had sexuality since the
eighteenth century, and sex since the nineteenth. Vhat we had before
that was no doubt the flesh" (Foucault 1980: 211). Significantly, this
'flesh' has a special identity with the feminine (Varner 1985).
According to Dahlberg in her recent study of English Catholics, the link
between woman, 'flesh' and fallen nature is emphasised by women's
bathing rituals at Lourdes (1987).
Elsewhere it has been suggested that the distinction between the
body as an organism and the 'flesh* has been lost over time and that
'flesh' has been transformed into "purely corporeal matter" (Minson
1985: n227). Turner contradicts this by claiming that the Christian
tradition of the Vest which portrays the body as 'flesh' has brought
about an ambiguous understanding of the body:
The body is a material organism but also a metaphor, it is the trunk 
but also the person (as in 'somebody'). The body may also be an 
aggregate of bodies often with a legal personality, as in 
'corporation' or in 'the mystical body of Christ*. Such aggregate 
bodies may be regarded as legal fictions or as social facts which 
exist independent of the 'real' bodies which happen to constitute 
them. The body is the most proximate and immediate feature of my 
social self and at the same time an aspect of my personal alienation 
in the natural environment (1984: 8).
According to Turner, within the body, 'flesh' is the location of
corrupting appetite, of sinful desire and of private irrationality.
However, Turner also implies that the body has become secularised and is
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now, for example, viewed more as a machine controlled by scientific 
regimes. This transformation, he claims, is a complex one. I propose 
that it is not a complete one and that, to some extent, understandings 
of the body continue to be partly informed by a notion of 'flesh1. This 
claim will be considered further in Chapter Four, where informants' 
understandings of the nature of the body are examined, and in Chapter 
Five through the notion of 'flesh and blood'.
2.11) The ideal of the asexual parent.
It has been observed in a number of cultures, within the context of
ritual, that sexuality is made separate from fertility.23 Bloch and
Parry have drawn attention to the presence of this disjunction within
Judaeo-Christian tradition, in which the temptation of Eve is understood
to have brought death into the world and the expulsion from Paradise.
Eve's disobedience incurs a penalty for all women in the form of their
role in reproduction. As Bloch and Parry state:
Although sexuality (initiated by woman) results in human fertility, 
this contrasts with the divine asexual fertility of Eden, is 
■ intrinsically flawed and is accompanied by death and a decline of 
natural fertility. Human and natural fertility are thus opposed to 
each other (1982: 19).
In other instances, these authors suggest, the biological fact that
human reproduction is the consequence of human sexuality is suppressed
or denied by the way in which creativity is ritually presented. Thus
what is known of biology may be denied in ritual.30 Vhat is more, the
denial of sexuality is often effected by the use of gender symbolism;
sexuality is placed in opposition to fertility as women are opposed to
men (1982: 19). Bloch and Parry suggest that:
the negative aspects of death are commonly seen as inseparable from 
other biological phenomena (like copulation and parturition); that
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in common with other biological processes, decomposition and decay 
are often (though not always) pre-eminently associated with women; 
and that this world of biology is elaborately constructed as 
something to be got rid of so as to make way for the regeneration of 
the ideal order. (1982: 27),31
In this process, fertility is antithetically contrasted with another
order which is constructed by reference to such notions as 'biology',
'individuality', 'the body' and 'flesh'. Vhat all these have in common
is that they refer to the everyday world, but portrayed in a negative
light (Bloch and Parry 1982: 38).
Informants offered a number of examples of this separation of 
sexuality and fertility. For example, all the women I spoke to about 
the Virgin Birth were unclear as to how Christ arrived in Mary's womb 
other than that this occurred asexually. As one convent-educated 
informant put it,-"EtIhe whole thing seems to be "It's all very well for 
God to have children but don't bring sex into it", sort of thing." Vhat 
is more, the Holy Mother and the Holy Father appear to present an image 
of ideal parenthood for the secular family based on a non-sexual 
relationship.22
The signficance for informants of the asexual nature of parents 
becomes clearer in Chapters Four and Five. Meanwhile, a link between 
the Holy and the secular family is suggested by Craik, for example, who 
has said that "It]he idea of the religiosity of the family can be 
observed in many aspects, not least of which is the incorporation of the 
Holy Family as the central symbolic orientation (1979: 106). She notes 
that Durkheim in his Incest: The Nature and Origin of the Taboo (1963) 
was struck by the suppression of sexual intercourse if it did not have
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as its aim the creation of family and, even within the family, how it is 
irreconcilable with everything it has invested with a sacred quality. 
Shapiro (1988) makes a slightly different but pertinent point, that the 
ritual kinship found within the Christian Church (and most elaborated in 
the Roman Catholic Church), in which God is portrayed as Father, the
Church as Mother and the congregation as children, can be seen to encode
a denigration of carnality.
Others have written of the influence of the virginity of the Virgin 
Mother on the image of secular motherhood. Kristeva, for example,
refers to the Virgin as "that prodigious structure of maternity that the
Vest has erected" (1986: 113). Maltz states that:
The Catholic image par excellence of the bride, the perfect woman in 
general, and the Church, is the the Virgin Mary, who possesses the 
unique combination of a wife, a mother and a virgin" (1978: 33). 
Janeway also suggests that Mary was both wife and mother of Christ, and 
that such a dual role was discernable within the Victorian view of 
’wife' and is still observable today (1980: 8),33 Vhile informants 
attitudes towards incest and the sexuality of their parents are 
discussed more fully in Chapter 4.3 and Chapter 5.7 and 5.8, it seems 
pertinent here, in the light of Delaney's thesis, to draw attention to a 
point made by Douglas, that may suggest more about the culture of the 
anthropologist than it does of those she observes. Douglas suggests 
that a bias towards monogenetic models is universal, as to be born of 
one parent - that is asexually - is to avoid disturbing emotions 
(1969).3d
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2.12) Conclusion
In this chapter I have suggested that certain parallels can be drawn 
between the cosmological world of Christianity and the everyday world of 
informants living in a supposedly secular society. Some of these 
parallels are clearer than others. For example, following the work of 
Delaney (1986), I have found similarities between certain creative 
powers attributed to God as a male figure and those given to mortal men 
as fathers. In the case of motherhood however, the relationship between 
the maternal roles of the Virgin Mary and other women is less clear, but 
it appears to be inversed: 'ordinary' mothers, for example, are not 
closed vessels. At the same time, the influence of a Christian 
cosmology is not only remote, in the sense that many informants do not 
hold explicit Christian beliefs, but dilute, in that it is cross-cut by 
the influence of scientific beliefs concerning genetic inheritance.
Thus there are indications that my informants hold a more complex model 
of procreation than the monogenetic, "seed and field" model described by 
Delaney.3® My informants tend to allow both men and women an equal 
contribution to the substance of a child, but ascribe transcendental 
creation exclusively to the father and nurturance to the mother. This 
'ontogenetic' model is discussed further in Chapter Six.
The other parallels between Christian cosmology and procreation 
beliefs referred to in this chapter do not arise from my informants, for 
the most part, but are extrapolated, for example, from the Christian 
discourse on 'flesh', or studies of the cult of the Virgin. Drawing on 
these works in the light of data to be presented in later chapters,3® I 
propose that the emphasis on asceticism within the Christian tradition
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that is at its clearest in. the asexual nature of Christ's conception, 
tells us something about perceptions of parenthood at the mundane level. 
Similarly, the emphases on Mary's virginity, the equating of wholeness 
with holiness, and the centrality of metaphors concerned with the 
penetration or the 'filling' of the feminine within the discourse of 
Christianity, suggest not only an ambiguous ideal for the secular 
mother, as both virgin and wife, but for the feminine body as one which, 
of necessity, has the potential for 'openness', but should nevertheless 
retain its integrity. This equivocal 'body' - part physical, part 
metaphysical ~ is the subject of the following chapter.
- 96 -
CHARIER THREE
THE PHENOMENAL BODY
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Vhere are we to put the limit between the body and the world 
since the world is flesh? Where are we to put the seer, since 
evidently there is in the body only shadows stuffed with organs? 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968: 138)
In Western thought (but not necessarily in everyday experience) there is 
an assumption that there is one 'person' for each 'body* and that the 
person in some sense inhabits the body rather than is the body. Indeed, 
the historical tradition has been to place 'body' in opposition to 
aspects of the 'person', such as mind. There are at least two problems 
with this assumption. To begin with, the notion of the body as a self- 
evident unity of parts and processes contained by skin can be seen as 
the product of specific medical discourses rather than 'natural facts* 
(Foucault 1973). Secondly, the concept of the person (and its 
associated gestures, conduct and speech) varies not only between 
cultures but within some cultures (La Fontaine 1985).
With these issues in mind, this chapter is concerned with 
informants' understandings of the body and its relationship to 
personhood, individualty and morality. Following from Chapter Two, we 
might expect to see that women have a specific experience of the body 
arising from their potential for 'openness'. Such 'openness' might 
therefore have implications for the way 'individuality' and 'personhood' 
are perceived.
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Like Scheper-Hughes and Lock, I begin from an assumption of the
body
as' simultaneously a physical and symbolic artifact, as both 
naturally and culturally produced, and as secured in a particular 
historical moment. (1987:7)
These writers speak in terms of 'the three bodies': the individual
phenomenal body-self, the social body and the body politic. These three
bodies constitute not only three overlapping units of analysis but three
different approaches or epistemologies: phenomenology,
structuralism/symbol ism and post-structuralism. 1 shall, to some
extent, follow Scheper-Hughes* and Lock's distinctions by dividing this
examination of 'the body* into two parts: this chapter refers to the
body-self and in Chapter Four, the social and political bodies are
collapsed. At the same time, I acknowledge that, not only do the
'bodies' drawn by Scheper-Hughes and Lock overlap, but they are
arbitrary in the sense that other units of analysis (such as the body
known only by dissection) are equally applicable (Starbinski 1989).
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3.1) The question of dualism
According to Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987), the opposition between mind 
and body, spirit and matter (real and unreal) as an epistemological 
premise can be traced back to Aristotle's biological view of the human 
soul in De Anima. Others, for example Turner (1984), have seen the 
'spirit/matter' opposition beginning with the early times of 
Christianity. Whatever its origin, this dichotomy has appeared in many 
guises throughout western history, but is most generally associated with 
the views of the Catholic philosopher, Descartes. This is despite the 
fact that within Cartesianism there is an unacknowledged triad of mind, 
soul and body (Parkin 1985).
A mind/body dichotomy continues to be implicit in the work of many
social scientists - although some may priviledge the mind and others the
body in this polarisation. For example, Durkheim saw humans as
simultaneously part of 'nature' because they have bodies and 'social'
insofar as they have minds, hence his concept of homo duplex in which
the individual is composed of asocial passions and social reason;
Man is double. There are two beings in him (sic); an individual 
being which has its foundations in the organism and the circle of 
whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being 
which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral 
order that we can know by observation - I mean society. (1961:29)
For others, a rejection of biologism and an emphasis on the socially
constituted nature of humanity has led to an implicit assumption that
the body of the social actor is a largely unimportant feature of the
self in society (cf. Strauss 1964). In contrast, Foucault (1977)
suggests that the body, despite its corporeality, is a social construct
and therefore an important issue for social theorists. However, in
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denying the primacy of mind and treating the body as the focus of modern 
discourse (cf. Foucault 1981), he perpetuates a mind/body dualism.
Sartre too proposes a dichotomy (1984; 305). He argues for two 
ontological levels, two very different and incommunicable levels of 
being: the body as being-for-itself (wholly conscious) and being-for- 
others (wholly body), hence aligning 'lived experience' with the knowing 
and speaking subject and in opposition to the body as object. 
Phenomenalogists view the mind-body dichotomy as false but have been 
criticised for covertly embracing Cartesian 'dualism' by treating the 
body as an object separate to consciousness (Turner 1984:53).
This aside, it is perhaps the phenomenalogists, such as Merleau- 
Ponty, who have come closest to dealing adequately with embodiment. 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) has shown that meaning should not be reduced to a 
sign which is then of a separate domain to action. A shaken fist as an 
angry gesture does not make an individual think of anger - the gesture 
is anger itself; the act should not be confused with a cognitive 
operation (1962: 184-5).. To compensate for a widespread but narrow 
understanding of the body as an object, Merleau-Ponty introduced the 
concept of the subjective or phenomenal body. This is the habitual, 
lived body concerned with activity in the world. The boundaries of this 
body are not strictly defined but vary with person and circumstance. In 
the case of blindness, for example, the phenomenal person may include a 
white stick.
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One focus of my research was the extent to which informants 
understood the body as a phenomenological as apposed to a biological 
entity. This was gauged, for the most part, by the way in which 
informants understood body boundary, body products and the relationship 
between such quasi-physiological processes as sexual intercourse, 
menstruation or lactation and the integral feminine body. At the same 
time, informants were questioned about the nature of that entity which 
has boundary and interiority - an entity variously described, both by 
informants and literature as the 'self, the 'person', the 'individual' 
or the 'ensouled being'.
There are two points that should be made before looking at these 
understandings. These refer to i) a distinction between the notions of 
'person', 'self* and even 'soul' on the one hand and of 'individual' on 
the other; and ii) the nature of individuation. With reference to the 
first point, Dumont has described the 'individual' as two concepts in 
one; on the one hand, an object "out there.... I the] empirical subject of 
speech, thought, and will, the individual sample of mankind as found in 
all societies" and on the other, "the independent, autonomous and thus 
essentially non-social moral being" (1985:94). In order to mark this 
distinction between the empirical subject and the moral entity I shall 
refer only to the second, moral aspect Dumont describes as the 'person*.
Secondly, in terms of individuation, the description of a western 
concept of the person as bounded and unique is a familiar one, and 
portrayed as peculiar in the context of other cultures (cf. Heelas 
1981). Marriott, for example, has noted how single actors are not
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thought of In South Asia to be 'individual’, that is indivisible, 
bounded units. Instead, they are understood as 'dividual* or divisible 
and thought, through parentage, marriage or other less personal 
relationships, to change the essence of those with whom they come into" 
contact (1976).1 This understanding, which suggests that bodily 
substance can be changed by code, might be contrasted with the dualism 
of substance and code and the unchangeable nature of substance which, 
according to Schneider (1980), underlies American ideas of religion, 
race, ethnicity and nationality.2 It is not only Schneider who has 
assumed that the individual is uniquely located in a body. Radcliffe- 
Brown, for example, defines the individual as a biological organism 
(1940) and, more recently, La Fontaine uses the term 'individual' to 
refer to "the mortal human being, the object of observation" (1985: 94, 
my emphasis).
However, the assertion that in western understandings of the person 
substance is unchangeable has been challenged by Dahlberg (1987) on the 
basis of her work among English Catholics attending Lourdes. She 
maintains that according to a complex concept of the person within 
Catholicism, persons may become physically, spiritually and mentally 
changed through contact with relics, holy places and objects. Dahlberg 
finds that one level of discourse within Roman Catholicism - the 
'miracle discourse' - conveys the 'body' as a union of spirit and 
matter; for example, sin is embodied but may be eliminated by contact 
with the sacred. However, co-existing with this is a second,
'sacrifical' discourse which represents a dualistic notion of the person 
and devalues the body as the sign of humanity's 'fallen' nature.
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Dahlberg points out that it is only within the dualistic representation 
of the person in which the body is the inferior dwelling place for the 
self that we can speak of 'the body' and not mean the person.
Dahlberg shows that a dualistic view is an oversimplification of 
the concept of the person within Catholicism and "hence, within a major 
tradition in western culture" (1987: 17). Ve also saw in Chapter One 
that within some western scientific models, such as embryology and 
immunology, notions Qf individuation are complex. It should not be 
surprising therefore if my informants' understanding of the 'body' in 
relation to notions of autonomy, boundary and the nature of substance is 
at odds with the one attributed to westerners by writers such as 
Marriott (1976: 111).
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3,2) The person
The concept of 'person' has been much debated and cannot be dealt with 
at any length here,3 Instead, to indicate some of the issues involved, 
I shall briefly turn to Mauss's classic essay (1985). Mauss argued that 
categories of the 'person' exist in all societies, although few 
categories corresponded with Mauss's perception of the modern western 
notion in referring to a unique entity endowed with consciousness.
Mauss suggests a scheme of how the modern western nation developed in 
Hellenised Christian culture. The concept of personnet which initially 
referred to the legal status of a Roman citizen governed by certain 
obligations, developed into that of the 'person' as a self-governing 
agent and moral entity. Christianity later invested this agent with the 
metaphysical attribute of soul. With the Reformation, the Christian 
undertanding of the 'person* as an entity defined without reference to 
social status or social utility gave way to one in which the person was 
associated with consciousness; self-consciousness became the basis of a 
personal morality. This change, said Mauss, coincided with the 
theological challenge posed by sects such as the Puritans and Pietists 
who argued for the right to an inner God with whom communication was 
possible without the intercession of a priest.A
Mauss's account has been criticised on a number of counts, not 
least because of the way in which he transposes 'self' (i.e. the 
'universal' sense of self identified with 'personhood* (moi)), and role 
(Hollis 1985: 220-1). Hollis notes that in Mauss's account, the person 
began as a role without self and became a self without role. This 
denotes a certain ambiguity about the nature of selfhood and personhood
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which is not confined to the work of Mauss. It has been widely 
suggested that notions of personhood may be fundamentally different even 
within a particular culture. La Fontaine (1985), for example, says that 
among the Lugbara, most women and certain men may not constitute 
'persons'. Jackson (1989) notes that those Kuranko who confess to being 
witches are no longer regarded as persons. Strathern (1981) suggests 
that, for Hageners, gender (rather than sexually-based differences) 
helps to inform the ethical entity that is the ’person* and, 
accordingly, females are not perceived to be the same kind of 'persons' 
as males. La Fontaine raises the possiblity that sexual differentiation 
may correspond with different forms of 'personhood' in western culture 
(1985). Hollis (1985) and Farfitt (1984) have posited that several 
concepts of the person co-exist within the social sciences. Jaggar 
(1983) claims that, through bearing children, western women are not seen 
as 'persons' but as the raw material from which a 'product' is 
extracted. She also claims that the social relations of western 
motherhood are such that it is near impossible far a woman to see her 
child as a whole person and a part of a larger community to which she 
and the child belong (1983).
For the sake of clarity, I should state that in this work, 
particularly during fieldwork, I assumed 'person' to refer to the 
person-self, the phenomenal as opposed to biological body and a 
conscious, moral agent and not necessarily a legal entity,
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Informants' understandings of 'the person*
It might be expected, in the light of the above discussion, that the 
notion of 'the person' was inconsistent and ill-defined among 
informants. While it proved unproductive to ask direct questions (such 
as "What is a person?"), some understanding of this notion was gained 
by a more indirect approach. For example, answers to questions 
concerning the point of origin of 'personhood* carried with them 
implicit assumptions about the nature of 'personhood' itself. In 
effect, I treated 'person' (and other similarly obscure notions, such as 
'soul') as 'p-structures' - posited before being identified and 
glimpsed by the "hollow shape of (their) shadow in language" (Ardener 
1978: 108).
Sixteen informants, including Katy, were asked about the onset of 
'personhood'. Through this approach it emerged that, despite some 
variation in response, the commonest characteristic attributed to the 
'person* was the capacity for independence. The nature of this 
independence might, however, vary. It could mean, for example, an 
independence of character demonstrated by the fetus; one woman saw that 
the 'character' (and therefore the 'personhood') of the fetus could be 
sensed by its mother on the basis of how much the fetus kicked, slept 
and so on. Alternatively five women thought 'personhood' was marked by 
a degree of self-reliance referred to as "standing on your own two feet" 
or "finding your feet". For those who understood it in this way, 
'personhood' began anywhere from the age of one year or so, if 
associated with a very limited degree of self-reliance, to as late as 
four or five years Df age and signified by attending school. A further
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six women saw the onset of 'personhood' coinciding with birth. Of 
these, two informants saw that birth marked the independent existence of 
the child. The remaining four, including Katy, did not understand 
'personhood' in terms of independence - see below. In all instances 
where 'personhood' was identified with a degree of autonomy, (seven in 
all), the onset of 'personhood' could be linked with a separation of the 
child from its mother.s In addition, one woman, a 29 year-old chartered 
accountant and part-time student of garden design, appeared to 
understand 'personhood' in terms of dependence rather than independence 
as she suggested 'personhood' began in utero; "I think you do begin to 
feel it's a real person because you are feeding it internally."
However, taking nourishment is not a passive activity and, indeed, the 
fetus was sometimes referred to by informants as a parasite. This 
example therefore does not necessarily contradict the association of 
'personhood' with autonomy.
That independence was an important criterion of 'personhood' is 
also evident in understandings of 'being* at other stages in the life­
cycle. A 25 year-old secretary, for example, in answer to the 
question: "Would you see a distinction between a person and a human 
being?" replied "Well, yes I'd say someone on a life-support system with 
absolutely no hope of ever recovering is a human being, but whether or 
not you could say it was a person...." In this way, several Informants 
appeared to have an understanding of the 'person' which bears a marked 
similarity to that advocated by Farfit (1984) in his description of what 
he terms the "reductionist view". According to this view, it is 
possible to deny that a fertilised ovum is a person or a human being in
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the same kind of way that it is possible to argue that an acorn is not 
an oak tree,s
Other informants in this study - the minority - appeared to hold a 
different notion of 'the person'. For example, four women thought 
'personhood' existed at conception and was linked in some way to genetic 
identity. One 22 year-old chef, for instance, said "A person? I think 
you're born with that. I believe...is it DNA molecules and things like 
that? I think you have definitely a personality pattern within you 
right from conception." The fourth informant in this group, a 30 year- 
old secretary of Church of England denomination, suggested personhood 
existed in the prenatal period and was linked to having spirit and 
'form' : "Ve know now that they are fully developed from such an early
stage". T
Of the four women who saw 'personhood* coming into being at birth 
and yet being unrelated to questions of independence, three were unable 
to give any clear account of what such 'personhood' concerned, although 
one informant - a 42 year-old 'housewife' without children - implied it 
denoted personality. The fourth informant, Katy, thought that a baby 
becomes a person when it first takes in air and becomes 'alive'. She 
said, for example, "When the baby's inside you, it's got your spirit, 
because it's you. And then I think that, when the baby is born, then it 
becomes its own person and develops a spirit." In other words, the 
taking in of air was the point at which the 'soul' and 'the person' came 
into being, but although both were initiated by the first breath, this 
did not mean 'soul' and 'personhood' were precisely the same thing.
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There was, however, a suggestion from some other informants that 
’personhood' was associated with an inner being. As one informant, the 
42 year-old 'housewife' referred to above, said "I suppose when you say 
somebody's a good person, it's the inner quality or being that you're 
talking about." This inner being, in turn, was frequently associated 
with the notion of 'soul'.
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3.3) The 'soul*
In western philosophical thought, there has been a lack of consensus 
about the nature of the ’soul' and its relation to the physical body. 
From Homer down to the classical period, the Greeks understood there was 
a body (.soma) and psyche (not necessarily 'soul'), which was liberated 
from the body upon its death. By the time of Socrates, the concept of 
an immortal 'soul* which survived a mortal body was established (Loraux 
1989), Plato had two models of the relationship between the 'soul' and 
the body, and wavered between the view of the 'soul* as the prisoner of 
the body and the 'soul' as the. source of motion. On the one hand he saw 
body and 'soul' as different in nature, and, on the other, he understood 
the 'soul' to have control over the body, celebrating the grace (charis)
brought about by the union of the two (Alliez and Feher 1989). Plato
considered the human 'soul* to be an immaterial agent, superior to and 
somewhat hindered by the body and consisting of a number of parts. The 
highest of these he saw as concerned with the government of the 
psychological organism. Hext in importance was that part of the 'soul' 
representing the source of action, virtue and courage. The lowest part 
of the 'soul' was that element associated with desire which could be
controlled by the virtue of temperance (Bourke 1962).
By contrast, Aristotle understood the 'soul' as the essence of an
organic body. The period between the first century B.C. and the second
century A.D., saw the development of the precept referred to as
epileleia neauton or 'taking care of one's self' which corresponded with
a view that the 'soul' controlled the body (Foucault 1986b). Saint 
Paul referred to the body as "a temple of the Holy Spirit"
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(1.Corinthians 6.19). In the early Middle Ages, following St Augustine, 
the body was understood as a substance to which 'soul' was added. As 
Aristotelean ideas were revived, the 'soul' became more integral; for 
theologians of the Middle Ages there was no straightforward distinction 
between the 'soul' and the body (Bynum 1989). For example, in 
reproduction, semen was matter which could transmit spirit and, while 
the 'soul' left the body on death, it was rejoined by the resurrected 
body at the end of time (Bynum 1989). Dualism was characteristic of 
groups such as the Cathars, but their views were considered as heresy by 
the late Medieval Church; it was God as 'flesh' that had redeemed 
humankind, God incarnate who was present in the Eucharist and offering a 
resurrection of the body (Bynum 1987).
The contemporary Christian understanding of 'soul' appears to stem 
from the 17th century (Barrett 1986), With the birth of scientific 
materialism, the ultimate facts of nature became understood as bits of 
matter in space and all experience explicable as the movement and 
configuration of matter, but for the Christian believer there was always 
a special exception for the 'soul' which was left "perched precariously 
on the edge of matter in strange conjunction with the body" (Barrett 
1987: 7).
In sum, there is no clear western tradition of dualism concerning 
the body-soul; Parry has even suggested that, in the hope of retaining 
the body for eternity that is characteristic of Catholicism, "we are 
heirs to a conceptual monism more marked than that of South Asians"
<1989: 513).
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There has been a similar variety of understandings concerning the 
'soul' in relation to the body in the social sciences. Durkheim (1961), 
for example, thought the 'soul' to be that part of consciousness which 
is both moral sense and conceptual awareness. In contrast to the 
profanity of the body, he portrays the 'soul' as sacred because of its 
immortality and its link with the the continuity of society beyond the 
death of its individual members. More recently however, body and 'soul' 
have been seen as more entwined. Carrithers sees the Christian notion 
of 'soul' (which includes its relation to the body, to its encompassing 
spiritual universe and to other 'souls') as part of mai or self. This 
he defines as
a conception of i) the physical and mental individuality of human 
beings within ii) a natural or spiritual cosmos and iii) interacting 
with each other as moral agents (1985:236)
suggesting that the 'soul* is concerned with a mind-body.'a Similarly,
Merleau-Ponty (1962) sees body and 'soul' as farming an indivisible
whole. At the same time he suggests that 'soul' is the same as 'self.'
His notion of ' being-in-the-world' emphasises that the 'self' is
inseparable from its physical body. Barrett also identifies 'soul' with
'self' (1987:16). As psyche in Greek means 'soul', Barrett suggests
psychoanalysis is the treatment that deals with the individual 'soul'.
Psychoanalysts do not deal with physical troubles but with troubles of
the psyche which may have physical consequences. Moreover,
the ego cogitans> the rational thinking ego that Descartes made the 
very centre and essence of the human soul, has in the psychonalytic 
process discovered that it is contained and invaded by forces 
unknown to itself. The psyche or soul turns out to be very much 
more than reason. (Barrett 1987: 19)®'10
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In the context of the numerous understandings of 'soul' and its 
relation to the body within western theological, philosophical and 
sociological thought, it should not be suprising if such understandings 
are variable and ill-defined among my informants.
Informants' concept of, soul
nineteen women, including Katy, were asked about their understanding of
'soul'. These informants were of the same group who were asked
questions concerning cosmology (see Chapter 2.2 for background details). 
Of this group, one woman did not think there was such a thing as 'soul'. 
The others referred to the 'soul* by a number of terms including 
'spirit', 'essence', 'personality', 'psyche' and 'self. Six women, for 
example, saw it as 'inner being' (including one's 'inner self' or 'inner 
person'). Very often it was suggested that 'soul' had a strong 
connection with 'personhood'. For example, four women explictly stated 
'soul' was about 'personhood' and five thought the 'soul' represented 
what was unique about a person, A further two informants considered
that the 'soul' developed as the 'person' developed.
Among those who saw 'soul' as a spiritual aspect of an individual, 
there were some informants who nonetheless understood it to be 
associated with emotion. One informant, a member of the Church of 
England and a computer operator said "Without soul you'd be hard 
wouldn't you? You'd be emotionless, cold, no compassion". Indeed, 
several women suggested 'soul' becomes evident through a person's 
emotions. For example, the chartered surveyor referred to earlier - a 
woman who stated she had no religion - said:
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I think one has to assume that everyone has some sort of spirit or 
whatever just to make them individual, to sum up what they've got, 
but you would really only notice it in people you knew well - and 
that would be their emotions.
The link between soul and emotion was borne out by the way in which 
informants understood the term "to bare one’s soul". This expression 
was one that I had heard elsewhere and I asked informants in this group 
what it meant to them, as an attempt to make the topic of 'soul' easier 
to discuss. "To bare one's soul" was thought to mean "to let out your 
feelings" or as the chartered surveyor said "to be completely frank 
and. . . . lay open your emotions and feelings - perhaps secrets you
wouldn't tell anyone else ....(but) a close friend or husband or
something." For one woman, a 32 year-old journalist with no religious 
beliefs, to "bare one's soul" also implied "that someone is looking into 
your soul or whatever, I interpret that as being your inner being 
rather than some kind of mystical thing." This inner aspect could be 
glimpsed not only through the emotions (described by one informant as 
"one's heart"), but also through the eyes ("the window on the soul") or, 
according to one 29 year-old student with no religious beliefs, by an 
aura emanating from the individual.
The 'soul' was also linked to moral agency, as a repository for
goad and evil actions and representing inner strength or weakness. A
non-practising Catholic with a convent school education said, for 
example,
...One's soul is definitely where one keeps one's ethics and moral 
rights and wrongs....you seem to sort of collect black marks on your 
soul and, according to how many of those you've got, you spend your 
time in purgatory and after that you go to heaven.
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'Saul' also constituted "awareness" without which, for example, it was 
not possible to have a relationship with things referred to as "outside" 
or beyond the person. However, it did not appear to be 'soul' which 
distinguished humans from animals. A number of informants thought 
animals also had 'soul'. Moreover, of sixteen women questioned on what 
made humans different to animals, none referred to 'soul' as the 
defining feature. Instead they spoke of intelligence and the capacity 
for language (ten), emotion (three), awareness (one), a sense of 
morality (one) and the huge imprint we leave on the world (one) as 
specifically human characteristics.11
The sQul__in relation to life and death
Many informants stated that the body was merely a shell for the 'soul*
and that upon death, the shell became 'empty1. For those who had
witnessed death, one remarkable aspect of it was the absence of spirit
or 'soul'. For example, a 30 year-old woman of Church of England
denomination said:
I lost my mother-in-law and it's the only person I've ever been to 
see dead. And it wasn't just because she wasn't breathing; it just 
wasn't her because her spirit wasn't there. It just wasn't her. It 
was an empty shell. Her spirit had gone - I don't know where.
The majority of women questioned (ten out of twelve) saw the 'soul' 
as surviving the death of the body. However, what happened to the 
'soul' then was less clear. Only one informant specifically stated the 
'soul' went to 'heaven'. Two informants thought 'souls' were 
reincarnated in other bodies. One woman, a lapsed Roman Catholic and a 
warden for those in sheltered housing, thought disembodied souls could
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exist in a kind of limbo. This view was the result of an experience she
shared with her twin sister, an occasion when they were physically
assaulted by a phenomenon she referred to as 'people':
Ve were on holiday one time and some people used to come to our room 
and woke us up every night....Ve never actually saw them but it was 
always,..you'd just about drift off to sleep and they'd hit us or 
pull us. One night I was actually lifted up out of my bed. It's 
hard to believe but it happened to the pair of us.
Later this informant suggested that she and her twin were more
susceptible to this kind of occurrence because they were twins, but she
had no explanation as to why these ’people' were in limbo. Katy also
thought that disembodied souls could be in a state of limbo and
potentially malevolent. She stated she would like to visit a
spiritualist, as several of her friends had, but she was too frightened.
She had also been dissuaded by her priest: "he said there's no guarantee
that the spirit you want to contact is the one you're going to get
because some spirits are just devilment".
Although the body was 'empty* without the 'soul', not all 
informants saw the presence of 'soul' as entirely synonymous with the 
presence of life. This could be glimpsed in a number of ways. Katy, 
for example, was asked if she had ever seen anyone dead. She answered 
that she had seen two people and the difference between her perceptions 
of the two bodies demonstrated, among other things, something of her 
understanding of the nature of 'soul'. One body had been that of her 
grandmother's mother, who had died a day or so earlier: "When she died 
they had' her in a bloody coffin in the lounge. The lid was off and I 
can still smell that funny smell ...and she looked so white." Katy saw 
no resemblance between the corpse and her great-grandmother, that
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essentially nothing of her remained. The second body was that of Katy's 
father who had died an hour or so before Katy arrived. In contrast to 
her previous experience of death, Katy recalled that when she looked at 
her father's body she wondered "whether he was still in there or not dr 
whether he'd gone already before I got there". From this it appears 
that Katy does not believe the 'soul' to depart on the instant of death 
as medically defined.
Another informant, a housewife and a member of the Church of 
England suggested that 'soul' can depart temporarily from the body even 
during life.
I believe in soul only because about five years ago I had a car 
crash into a bus and, although I wasn't actually hurt, I was knocked 
out. Yet I saw myself, it was obviously me, I saw me in that car, 
over the wheel. I wasn't dead, but for that split second something 
came out and I saw me. I do believe there's something only because 
I saw it myself as such. 1:2
The origin of soul
The absence of any consistent association between the presence of soul 
and the presence of life was clearest in beliefs about when the 'soul' 
came into existence. Eleven women were asked about the point at which 
'soul' might first be present. Four informants thought that the 'soul' 
existed from the moment of conception, while two women did not specify 
the 'soul's' point of origin but stressed the way in which 'soul' 
develops throughout an individual's life.13 A further five women, 
including Katy, suggested that the embryo can be human but without soul, 
with one of these informants stating that 'soul' comes into being at a
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point during gestation and the other four seeing ’soul1 becoming present
at birth. Katy, for example, said:
I know the baby inside you is alive but it's still part of you and 
it's living from you, off you. So really, I feel it's dormant. I 
know it's a baby...Even though it's a live baby that's inside, it 
feels sort of dormant. Like, I don't think of it as a person as 
such. But then, once the baby's born and it breathes air, you see 
it and it's a being. For me, that's when your soul comes alive.
In contrast, for Katy, the onset of life occurs at about two months 
of gestation and is linked to having form. Without form, the conceptus 
is merely a mass of cells and not 'a baby'. Of seventeen other women 
asked about the point at which they understood life to begin, the 
majority (ten) saw this to occur at conception, a view clearly 
compatible with a model of procreation which recognises a biogenetic 
view of generation. Of the others, one woman thought it began with the 
implantation of the conceptus; three felt human life began once the 
fetus had a recognisable overall form or an identifiable heart or brain; 
one thought life began when the mother could feel fetal movement and one 
woman thought life began at birth. Clearly, with this question, much 
depended on the way in which the concept of 'life' was interpreted and 
whether this referred to any level of existence, such as simple, 
cellular life, or a kind of existence that was perceptably human, if not 
sacred. However, the range of opinions as to when life in some form 
begins, or the point from which soul is present, will have implications 
for the way in which the ethics of abortion, for example, or research on 
embryos will be perceived.
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3.4) Abortion and embryo research
The inconsistent distinction between the onset of life and the point at 
which life becomes meaningful is evident in informants' views on 
abortion. However, the issue is made complex by the fact that views of 
abortion often take into account both a concern for the well-being of 
the embryo/fetus1A and a respect for women's autonomy. Research took 
place at a time when legal abortion had, at least theoretically, been 
available in certain circumstances for eighteen years. Prior to the 
fieldwork period there had been a number of attempts to reduce the time 
limit (until twenty eight weeks of pregnancy) and availability of 
abortion.1®’ In addition, a number of informants who discussed the issue 
had undergone abortion themselves. For one reason or another, 
therefore, the majority of informants who spoke on this topic (twelve in 
all) had given it some thought and were aware of many of the arguments 
which might be made both for and against abortion.
In contrast, the debate about embryo research was comparatively 
new. Although the ethics of embryo research had been discussed by 
members of the Varnock Committee16' and, consequently, might have been 
assumed to be a focus of fairly widespread public debate, a number of 
informants were not aware at the begining of our discussions that embryo 
research was possible, either technically or legally. It should be 
remembered, therefore, that answers to questions on this topic may be 
less considered than those concerning abortion.
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Broadly speaking, the majority of women I spoke tD thought,
although they might never choose abortion themselves, that the option
for abortion should be available for all women and that the decision was
one which should ultimately rest with the woman concerned. For example,
one woman, a 31 year-old journalist with no religious beliefs, referred
to the status of the pregnant woman and her offspring in the following
terms: "I suppose I feel in a sense, while the baby's in the womb it's
up to the mother what she does. After birth it's a completely different
matter". However, most informants qualified the 'rights' of the mother
in relation to the fetus/embryo by putting a limit on the stage at which
abortion could be performed. Katy for example said
I do believe in abortion. I think it should be there. What I think 
is... when [the pregnancy] first begins, it's just a mass of cells.
I suppose I'm like most people, I think it begins to become a baby 
at about two months and starts to form. I mean, before that it's so 
minute, isn't it. I know there are people like LIFE1"7 who believe 
that life begins at conception. So does the Church really. But 
personally I don't feel at that stage that that is a baby. I think 
when women have terminations and they're early on, it seems you're 
just bringing a period on. But then you can have a termination up 
to twenty weeks! I think that's terrible because you're terminating 
a fully-formed tiny baby.
Several other informants spoke of the significance of the form of the
embryo/fetus in deciding appropriate limits for embryo research (see
below).
One woman, the 22 year-old chef and an ex-Roman Catholic, made it 
clear that the upper time limit for abortion should be set by doctors. 
This was on the grounds that "I can only know what I read in a 
scientific book or whatever, so how can I say it's wrong to terminate a 
pregnancy after twenty-two weeks or eighteen weeks?" At the same time, 
this informant also stated that, in her opinion, regardless of the stage
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of pregnancy, if a woman decides on abortion, she has to face the fact 
that abortion represents "killing".
Two points emerge from this. First, it appears that there is no
necessary link between the view of seeing abortion as the killing of a
living being and a rejection of abortion. This is also evident in the
statements of a number of other informants, one of whom had an abortion
herself, suggesting that in terminating a pregnancy, a woman has to face
up to the fact that she is killing a living being, that she has
prioritised her own life (and perhaps those of existing children) over
and above this being. As one 39 year-old vision mixer with uncertain
religious views said:
I don't believe that the moment you have put a sperm with an ovum 
you have a new life with an individual right of its own,... it's a 
human when it's capable of being born alive and living on its own 
resources. It's actually a formed little being from quite early 
on...but I'm not sure that something of four months could be said to 
have a legal status of its own over and above that of the carrying 
mother, (my emphasis)
Secondly, the statement made by the chef - that abortion represents
"killing" - implies that she has a complex understanding of the issues .
surrounding abortion. It suggests that, on the one hand, she has an
ontological understanding in which a pregnancy from "even before the
second week" represents human life. On the other hand, however, she
sees it as unproblematic for this view to be overridden by the views of
those with a scientific background. The credibility allowed to medical
discourse was also evident at more than one level in the way informants
viewed the ethics of embryo research.
- 122 -
Embryo research
Fieldwork took place soon after the considerations of the Varnock 
Committee were announced. The Varnock Committee was established to 
examine the issues arising from the new reproductive technologies. One 
of the most taxing problems, their chairperson revealed, had been how to 
regard the human embryo for the purposes of research. ■ Vithout research 
on human embryos, new reproductive techniques would not have come into 
being. Once established, these techniques, in turn, allowed the in 
vitro creation of embryos which could then be used as research subjects, 
either with a view to improving fertility services or for other 
purposes. The majority of committee members concluded that embryo 
research should be allowed under strict supervision until fourteen days 
after fertilisation. The rationale for this cut-off point was that it 
corresponded with the development of the 'primitive streak* which "marks 
the begining of individual development of the embryo" (Varnock 1985: 
11.21).13 This stage of development and the alternatives from which it 
was chosen (such as the development of a neural system or the stage at 
which implantation occurs) were clearly scientifically recognised ones 
and are significant in demonstrating that the committee members began 
their deliberations from a biological undertanding of the embryo rather 
than, for example, a theological or philosophical stance. Moreover, the 
largest single group among the committee members was composed by 
doctors.13
Although the extent to which informants would be directly informed 
of the findings of this committee is uncertain, the committee's work was 
widely publicised and, to some extent, set the agenda for more general
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discussions within media such as the 'quality' daily newspapers. 
Certainly a number of informants perceived research on embryos as a 
medical matter insofar as they believed doctors alone should regulate 
research. For example, a 22 year-old, Church of England, computer 
operator said:
[the doctors] created [the embryos], so it's really down to them. I 
mean, they wouldn't be there had doctors not created them so it's 
not for anybody to say [that doctors] have got no right to be doing 
it. Ve'll all be better for it probably.30
A further informant, a 30 year-old nurse who described herself as a
"Christian", saw that guidelines concerning the use of embryos should be
drawn up but, significantly, she thought these should be formulated and
policed by doctors rather than civil servants or lay people.
At another level, embryo research was seen as acceptable as it led
to 'progress'. This progress however was one predominantly shaped by
the aims of biomedicine;31 embryo research was seen as necessary to
reduce congenital abnormalities and inherited disease or to improve
techniques such as in vitro fertilisation.3:2 Only one woman, a 31 year-
old journalist with no religion, was totally against embryo research.
She found the idea "appalling" and added:
I think you've got to have respect for natural processes without it 
being made into any kind of religious feeling. And I feel, if 
anything's sacrosanct, (if there is a secular word for sacrosanct) 
it is the mechanism of birth.
According to this informant, once life starts "you don't mess around
with it".
Despite the acceptance of medical authority among most informants, 
research on embryos was, nonetheless, often viewed with ambivalence and,
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as with abortion, only acceptable until a certain stage of development. 
The point at which research became clearly unacceptable varied but very 
often appeared linked to the form of the fetus. For one woman, a 39 
year-old, Church of England, clerical officer, "the early embryo is 
still a non-entity. If it can be made use of - fine." However, for 
this informant the embryo became an entity at about four weeks of 
gestation when she thought it took some kind of form. For a 25 year- 
old, agnostic typist, research was acceptable only before the fetus had 
form and thus appeared human. This link between the form of the embryo 
and its status as a meaningful entity may be an important one and brings 
us back to the question of whether matter or spirit, body or soul can be 
understood to be prior. It is a question which is explored further 
through understandings of the location of the soul in relation to the 
body, and through attitudes towards looking within the body.
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3,5? The location of soul
For six out of twelve women questioned, the soul could not be located in
any one specific place but was diffused within and throughout the body.
As one woman, the 30 year-old nurse mentioned above, said:
It isn't just in the mind, it's that person as a whole. You know, 
like in science fiction films if you put a light on, you see people 
just glowing - that is just part of their soul, all that person.
It's just something that's within them,... part of that person's 
well being.
One informant described the location of soul as analogous to the blood 
stream. Another woman described it as a "shadow".33
Three informants thought that if 'soul' could be located in any one 
place this was the head, or more specifically the brain, because of 
links between the soul and personality, Alteratively, Katy thought 
'soul' resided in the area of the chest, a view compatible with her 
statement that soul was present with the first breath. Several others 
thought the soul to be associated with the heart. Among this group, one 
woman <the warden in sheltered housing and an ex-nurse) understood 
'soul' in concrete terms - "I think it's part of you like your liver or 
kidneys" - while others saw this as a metaphorical statement. For 
example, one managing director of a recording studio who was ambivalent 
in her belief in God, said that the soul dwelt in the heart "in 
philosophical terms, not physical terms."
In sum, many informants implicitly suggested that the essence of a 
person, be this called 'soul' or 'self', had an integral relationship 
with the body. Katy provided a clear example of this in her distress 
over the cremation of her father's body, saying "if you're cremated,
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where are you?" Informants' drawings of the inside of the body (see 
Appendix: Drawings Series A) were remarkable in that informants (with 
only one exception, a woman who included the brain) concentrated their 
attention entirely within the trunk of the body, suggesting this to be 
of special significance.3"1
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3,..6L_Ihe body; property or being
Informants* ideas about the location of 'soul* and their drawings of the 
body are, to a certain extent, compatible with the common notion that 
the 'truth* of human existence lies hidden within the body and is 
generally beyond the reach of the individual (Comaroff 1982). As Rawson 
has put it
Those things we identify and call 'atoms' and those we call 
'chemical compounds' are cycled from what we call an inorganic 
cosmos into those bodies of ours, within which 'knowledge' is 
somehow secreted, like a pearl in the unconscious flesh of the 
oyster" (1975:271).
As the physical location of metaphysical knowledge, the inside of the
body becomes an awesome and sacred place, a region of "secrets and
betrayals"" with the body's surface the "limits of the known self"
(Young 1976:19). This understanding of the special knowledge or 'soul'
within the body is perhaps one reason why the practice of dissection has
been viewed with fear and why 'next of kin' are reluctant to allow this
practice on the dead (see Richardson 1987; Minerva 1987). Katy
demonstrated this fear of dissection in our discussion of her father's
autopsy, requested because he died unexpectedly after surgery. Katy
initially refused permission for autopsy because:
I knew my dad and he'd say - I could hear him saying to me - "Don't 
you let them bloody people pull me about and cut me up". I knew it 
and I said no...I mean, it was his body and he wouldn't have wanted 
that. But as I say, by that time I didn't really feel it was him... 
I felt he'd gone...It's just I know he wouldn't have...funny isn't 
it?
Here Katy appeared to be suggesting that her father would resent the 
intrusion of autopsy, but that she finally came to terms with the 
doctor's decision to perform this once she realised that her father was 
no longer "in there" to suffer or object.
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Sartre (1984) has suggested that the body is lived and not known. 
The vast majority of people never see how their bodies are constructed; 
only because individuals have seen models of anatomy and physiology can 
they assume that their bodies are constituted in a similar way to 
others. Moreover, a glimpse of the body's constituents would be a 
glimpse of the individual's property rather than his or her being. 
According to this argument, as the scope of biotechnology increases and 
the body's constituents become increasingly accessible, so may the 
tendency to treat the body as property increase. Indeed, for the past 
twenty years or more parts of the body (such as hormones, derivatives 
from human milk, placental tissue and blood) have been treated as being 
of either intrinsic or commercial value (Young 1988) and the range of 
tisues, organs and secretions put to use is expanding.33
Organ transplantation is one area where legislation is now thought 
necessary to prohibit commerce in the body's organs (New Scientist 1987; 
Brahams 1989). Whether these parts are donated or sold, however, the 
possibility of transplantation means the body has increased in intrinsic 
value (Scott 1981). This assertion is supported first, by the way in 
which medical definitions of human death have changed in order to make 
the transplantation of undamaged organs possible, and second, by a new 
interest in the uses to which the corpse may be put. The improvement of 
techniques for transplantation is now attended by the issue of how to 
increase the 'harvest' of organs available for transplant. More often 
than not this issue is debated with a tone of indignation: that either 
doctors are too reticent in their dealings with the families of 
potential donors, or the public at large is apathetic in its response to
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the call for everyone to carry a donor card expressing their wishes (cf. 
Gore et al 1989; Taylor and Salaman (1988); Newstead 1989).3,5 Scott 
(1981) foresaw that the potential lying within the cadaver may become 
sufficiently significant that pressure is put on individuals to make 
available their dead body (or that of their next-of-kin) for the use of 
the sick, Writing only some six years later, some scientists were 
redefining the cadaver as primarily of practical value to society. The 
biologist Emson (1987), for example, argues that the physical body 
belongs to the "planetary biomass" rather than any individual: organ 
transplanation should therefore be an event of neutral values, so long 
as people are informed that the removal of organs from the dead neither 
disfigures the body nor delays its release for funeral to any 
significant degree.
It has been suggested that it is now possible to divide the body 
between different persons, and that the body without the integrity of 
its parts is bound to lead to many readjustments in the way that the 
self is conceptualised (Corea 1986). Illich believes that major 
readjustments have already occurred, that medical concepts and concerns 
have determined our experience of the body and the self, in what he 
refers to as the "iatrogenesis of the body" (1986: 1325). As 
biomedicine has "reached towards a monopoly over the social construction 
of bodily reality" (1986: 1327), it has supressed, not only the 
ontological meanings of opening the corpse, but also of moving an organ 
from one body to another. Similarly, I would argue, there has been 
little consideration of what it means to open the living body, or how to 
take into account the relationship between the physical and the
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phenomenal body. It Is this relationship which will be focused on in 
the following section.
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3.7) 'Flesh' as ambiguous substance
According to Illich (1986), bodies exist only in contexts and, as such, 
represent the incarnation of particular historical moments (1986). He 
goes on to argue that, with the birth of selfhood, the western body can 
be seen as a progressive embodiment of self.37" Thus, "the western self 
is experienced as flesh and blood" (Illich 1986: 1326), 'Flesh', in 
this view, would appear to share some of the properties ascribed to 
'substance' by Burke, who proposed that, although the 'substance' of a 
thing is generally taken to be what it ultimately is - its inner being 
or essence - the term is ambiguous (1969). The essence of a thing can 
be its sub-stance, that which stands under the thing and keeps it in its 
state of being. In other words, the substance of something is 'other' 
to the thing itself. Substance is therefore a conflation of inner and 
outer, subject and object. In this it appears to share some similarity, 
not only to the 'flesh and blood' referred to by Illich, but also, for 
example, to the Dinka notion of 'Flesh' that Lienhardt reports (1985). 
For the Dinka, 'Flesh' is the archetypal clan divinity represented by 
the flesh of sacrificed oxen and held to be immanent at times in the 
bodies of its clansfolk but also transcendant; it is both within those 
who inherit it and outside and above them.
Merleau-Fonty describes a notion of 'flesh' that is similarly 
ambiguous. For him,
The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To 
designate it we should need the old term "element" in the sense it 
was used to speak of water, air, earth and fire, that is in the 
sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal 
individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a 
style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh in 
this sense is an "element" of Being. (1968:139)
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In Merleau-Ponty*s concept of 'flesh' there is no dualism of subject and 
object, but a never-finished differentiation, an openness ever to be 
reopened, a "possiblitity, a latency", "ever gaping open" (Merleau-Ponty 
1968: 153,132). As such, the concept of 'flesh' refers to a certain'
"intercorporeality".
We saw in Chapter Two (2.10) that the Christian notion of 'flesh' 
was one associated with mortality, 'human nature', sexuality and 
concupiscence. Purity of the 'self' was possible only if the desires of 
the 'flesh' were overcome through a chastity that involved both moral 
and physical integrity (Foucault 1984:366), However, Foucault also 
suggests that, from the seventeenth century, the meeting place of the 
body and the 'soul' has been located in the discourse of 'flesh', 
notably confession concerning 'sins of the flesh' or illicit sexual acts 
and desires which represent the root of all evil (1981: 20).313 Many of 
my informants were unfamiliar with the expression 'sins of the flesh'. 
Those who were, however, all perceived these to be of a sexual nature. 
Katy, for example, thought that 'sins of the flesh' referred to "impure 
thoughts about someone who's not your husband or wife...sexual thoughts 
or actually doing it." However, the 'soul* that Foucault refers to here 
is not that of Christian theology (born in sin and subject to 
punishment), but born out of punishment and surveillance; "the soul is 
the effect and the instrument of a political anatomy" (1977: 30).
'Flesh* in this instance, therefore, is a political field.
Most informants spake in terms of 'flesh and blood* and rarely of 
'flesh' alone. Several women were asked questions such as "What does it
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mean to be of the same flesh?" but virtually all answered as if they had 
been asked about 1 flesh and blood'. One woman of 26 years with no 
religious beliefs said that "to be of the same flesh" conjured up 
religious images that meant nothing to her. Another informant, a 31 
year-old secretary of Church of England denomination, commenting on 
whether 'flesh' refers to a physical thing, said: "I think it's more a 
question of having been brought up together, like with my sister, by my 
parents. I think it's more that sort of relationship than actual 
flesh". One woman, a 29 year-old television producer, drew attention to 
the complex nature of 'flesh' in saying "Flesh is the meat that covers 
the bones and there's also the emotional meaning of the word; 'flesh' is 
the people you're related to".
In Chapter Five we see how 'flesh and blood' predominantly refers 
for informants to a specific group of kin who are associated with 
support, upbringing and, for some, common substance. In addition, a 
minority of informants are shown to associate 'flesh and blood' with 
continuity or coming into being. In this chapter and its predecessor, 
other aspects of 'flesh' have emerged, referring to equivocal substance, 
selfhood and sexuality, indicating that far from simply referring to the 
"meat that covers the bones", 'flesh' is polysemic and suggests both 
physical and metaphysical substance.
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3i8?. Inside the ark
If the western self is experienced as 'flesh and blood' or, as Merleau- 
Ponty suggests "the body interposed is not itself a thing, an 
interstitial matter, a connective tissue, but a sensible for itself' 
(1969: 135), what is the relationship between "interstitial matter" and 
'flesh'? What, for example, does it mean to look within the physical 
body?
Most women questioned about the body (a total of eighteen) rarely 
thought about the inside of their bodies. Whatever knowledge that they 
felt they had about the body's interior was seen to have come from 
school education and, to a lesser extent, from health workers. The 
body's interior was generally taken for granted, but might be brought 
into focus by a number of events, such as illness, pregnancy or the use 
of drugs, such as the oral contraceptive. Three nurses in the study 
were exceptional in that they had thought about, and seen inside, the 
bodies of others. In addition, because of cervical pathology, one woman 
was trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to avoid thinking of inside her body 
at all.
Seventeen women were asked how they might feel about looking inside 
their own bodies (for example, during surgery) and how they felt about 
other people looking inside them (for instance, when a cervical smear 
was taken). Roughly half the women questioned were not at all 
interested in watching surgery, such as a caesarian section, as it took 
place on their own bodies. Some of these women thought the sight of 
blood would be difficult to handle, but the majority of women were
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principally uneasy about seeing themselves cut or seeing themselves 
open. I asked Katy, for example, whether she would she want to be awake 
and watch, if she had a caesarian operation. This led to the following 
discussion:
K: Yes, I think so....Not see, no. I wouldn't want to see it.
J: What, you'd want to see the birth rather than...?
K: Yes, I'd want one of those shields across me. I'd want to be awake
but I wouldn't want to look and see them cutting me and stitching 
me.
J: But supposing they'd cut... and you could just look Inside and see?
K: No! Because I'd pass out!
J: Now why?
K: I don't know, it makes me go all cold thinking of it. ..I don't
think I could handle it, I mean seeing my stomach all open.33
This was not so much because Katy did not want to see inside herself as
such. Rather she did not want to see "a great, big, whopping hole" in
herself. In contrast, she had no objection to looking at her internal
anatomy through the eyepiece of a laparoscope. She explained:
K: ...because there's nothing open. You're not damaging anything.
Everything's in its place. It's seeing myself cut open I wouldn't 
like.
J: Because that's damaging? I mean, is it the sight of blood or....?
K: Yes, the sight of blood but more the kind of feeling that I couldn't 
get up and walk away, walk out,.,It's being in control.
For other women too, the interior of the body did not, in itelf, 
pose a problem. Several of those who objected to the idea of seeing 
themselves cut open were nonetheless interested in seeing within 
themselves if this was achieved by other methods, such as techniques of 
imaging (for example, sonography or laparoscopy) which did not involve 
them being 'open'. A 27 year-old sales representative said, for 
example,
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X; I wouldn't mind looking down [a laparoscope], but if I was open I 
wouldn't want to see.
J: How much of that is not wanting to see blood?
I: I don't mind blood.
Significantly, for one 43 year-old television producer, a cut in the
skin was a reminder of the fragility of the body, as if the mortality of
the 1 flesh' was made tangible by the laceration:
I saw my own knee sort of half open and it was pretty awful..it was 
frightening because it made me...it reminded me how fragile the 
body is. It's covered by a fairly thin layer of skin and that's 
about all that's holding it together.
For many informants, the inside of the body did not seem to be a
necessarily closed, private space; as we have seen, there was a degree
of interest in looking within the torso of the body at least. This
interest may be influenced by the way in which the interior of the body
is made publicly accessible by the medical sciences,30 but the interest
seems fundamentally different in kind, As Braidotti (1989) has
observed, the minutiae of the body have been made visible by the
biosciences to the point that it loses all reference to human shape (see
also Jewson 1976; Foucault 1973). As a result, "[Hiving material that
comes under the scrutiny of the medical gaze is beyond death and time -
it's 'living' in the most abstract possible way" (Braidotti 1989: 153).
Braidotti calls this "the 'triumph' of visual representation"; the
ability to visualise the inside of the body has been accompanied by what
she calls "the scopic drive", a new paradigm of knowledge in which the
image is priviledged in relation to what it represents. In this way the
body becomes more visible and yet somehow more remote;
ttlhe bodily surface, and the complex montage of organs that
composes it, is thus reduced to pure surface, exteriority without 
depth, a moveable theatre of the self. (1989: 154)31
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Furthermore, what Braidotti has referred to as "representing even 
the irrepresentable" has apparently become part of lay people's 
experience. The propensity for photographic images to "slice up reality 
into tiny bits wrenched out of real space and time" applies no less to 
medical images of the fetus (Fetchesky 1987).33 However, it has been 
observed that many pregnant women report that the first time they felt 
pregnant was when they saw the ultrasound scan of the fetus (Thomas 
1985). In a study by Klein et al (1985), of 4,226 respondents, the 
greatest number of pregnant women first thought of the baby as 'real' 
when they had a scan (1,591), in comparison with the next largest group 
of 951 women who stated that this realisation corresponded with the 
fetus's first movements. Thus there is a sense in which the lay public 
may be appropriating fetal imaging for its own ends in re-embodying the 
fetus and restructuring personal ontologies.33
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3.9) The open body..
Although my (non-pregnant) informants showed a qualified interest in 
seeing inside the trunk of the body, there was little interest in seeing 
a comparatively accessible part, the cervix. Many of the women I spoke 
to were attending the clinic to have a cervical smear taken. The cervix 
was therefore going to be visualised by someone else and could, if 
desired, be viewed by the informant with the aid of a mirror. However, 
most women I asked about viewing their cervix could not imagine why this 
should be of any interest to them. As Katy said, "I'm not bothered one 
way or the other. I don't really see much point in seeing it. What 
would I gain from it?" This is not simply a difference of interest 
between seeing personal internal anatomy and the representation of a new 
being inside oneself. As suggested above, there was some interest among 
non-pregnant informants in seeing within themselves. Instead, a 
reluctance to view the cervix may be associated with the taboo nature of 
the vagina and/or the fact that vaginal examination requires an openness 
of the body (unlike scanning, for example).
A dislike of being 'open' was certainly evident in some women's 
attitudes towards vaginal examination. For example, a 27 year-old telex 
operator said "It's the most personal, private part of the body and 
you're just laying there wide open for someone to probe about" (my 
emphasis). As suggested here, the corollary of being open is being 
invaded or penetrated. This is clear in other statements about vaginal 
examination. For example, one woman of 20 years who worked as a clerk 
said:
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I I find it a close kind of thing,
J: Close? Do you mean intimate?
I Not intimate intimate. No, I just don't like the idea of someone 
like that going...inside me.
The genitalia have been described as the frontiers par excellence 
of the self and raising questions of identity; what issues from the 
urethra, anus or vagina is and is not perceived as part of the self 
(Loudon 1977: 165). This association between the self and the genitals 
suggests that penetrative sexual intercourse and non-sexual encounters 
involving genital contact both have consequences for self-identity.3A 
Moreover, women's attitudes towards penetrative sex and medical 
examination, especially vaginal examination, may help to indicate the 
location of their body boundary and the meanings of any breach of 
boundary.33 It was found earlier that 'openness' for informants was 
associated with a loss of control. This suggests that it is only 
appropriate with those who are known and trusted, particularly those who 
are deemed 'close'.33 Yet vaginal examination, like other medical and 
surgical procedures demand 'openness* to the medical gaze (if not the 
medical finger) of those who are, almost by definition, strangers. Loss 
of body integrity in this context, referred to by Martin (1987) as a 
fragmentation of the self, has something of a sexual undertone, and even 
those informants who professed to be undisturbed by the prospect of a 
vaginal examination stated a preference for a female doctor. Several 
women were unconvinced that a male doctor could entirely divorce a 
medical exploration from a sexual one. As a 24 year-old, advertising 
executive put it:
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Just because they happen to be doctors doesn't mean they're 
necessarily different to any other male person. I don't think they 
can necessarily just switch off and I therefore find [a vaginal 
examination] embarrassing and humiliating.
Similarly, a market researcher of 26 years said of her doctor:
I just don't see him as a doctor. I'm sure maybe he sees it like
that but I don't see it like that. I still see him as a man looking
at my body amnd I just feel...I would feel embarrassed whereas with 
a woman I wouldn't feel embarrassed.
Two issues emerge from discussions concerning the inside of the 
body. The first relates to informants unease about the open body. The
second is that a lack of control that is sometimes associated with being
'open' can be more of a problem than 'openness' itself. Medical 
encounters are one domain where such a lack of control may be 
experienced. In this context there is something reminiscent, if not 
quite of Sartre's shamed voyeur who has been caught unawares looking 
through a keyhole, then of the one unknowingly or unwillingly spied on, 
who is reduced to a state of "being the Other as an object" (1984: 257). 
As Merleau-Ponty described it, "insofar as I have a body, I may be 
reduced to the status -of an object beneath the gaze of another person, 
and no longer count as a person for him" (1962:107).
Manning and Fabrega (1973) have suggested that the practice of 
objectifying the body, a practice characteristic of biomedicine, 
contributes towards a denial of the integrity of body and self. 
Similarly, Espeland (1984), has found that loss of control of the body, 
as experienced during the intrusive medical procedure of venepuncture, 
results in an objective perception of the body that is at odds with the 
patient's subjective notion of self. It is possible that, for my
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informants, 'openness’ is ultimately concerned with, the integrity of 
body and self, that is, an integrity which is bath physical and moral,
3,10) Conclusion
Part of this chapter has been concerned with informants' perceptions of 
the relation between the physical body and the 'soul', and finds that 
'soul' is apparently often identified with the physical body once it has 
form. Discussions with informants on the significance of looking within 
this ensouled body indicate, not so much that what is inside is regarded 
with awe, but that the 'openness' associated with looking inside can be 
problematic. For many of the women I spoke to, 'openness' appears to 
refer to a gender-specific concern with physical/moral integrity which,
I suggest, bears some association with the ideal of the integral 
feminine body that is explicit within Christian tradition.
This chapter has also looked at informants’ perceptions of the 
'person' in terms of its relation to the physical body. In this respect 
it. seems that 'personhood', for many informants, does not necessarily or 
consistently relate to a single human body or organism; a young child, 
for example, is not deemed a 'person' until he or she acquires a degree 
of independence. This finding marks the beginning of an argument which 
challenges the assumption of 'one person : one body'. The possibility 
that the person is not always isometric with the body also has 
implications for the way in which relatedness is understood. These 
points will be developed in the following chapters.
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GHAP.XEK-EQHB.
THE SOCIAL, AND._r_QLI£I_CAL_--BQD-Y
Same thirty inches from my nose, the frontier of my person goes.
<V. H. Auden)
Introduction
Aspects of the physical body, or the relationship of its parts, may be 
used to make statements about the social world in which that body 
exists; for example, perceptions or experience of the body may be 
informed by relations of power. In this chapter I examine the way in 
which informants define the frontiers of the body and the relationship 
of these frontiers to personhood or self. This is done through an 
analysis of informants' attitudes towards body products, and through 
studying informants' perceptions of the female reproductive processes 
of menstruation and lactation. I find indications that, for my 
informants, the feminine body-self is characterised by a potential 
'openness' and shifting boundary. The ambiguous and context-dependant 
nature of this body-self has particular ontological implications for the 
relationship between a mother and her infant, and, to a lesser extent, 
for others regarded as 'close'.
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4,1) . The social .body.
Hertz (1973) and Mauss (1973) were among the first to recognise the 
social significance of the body. On the basis of Durkheim's model (cf 
1950) they assumed that a society constitutes a whole that is greater 
than the sum of its individual members, in as much as those individuals 
share a collective consciousness. From this follows another assumption 
that the members of a particular society will jointly hold certain 
attitudes and understandings about the human body. This body becomes of 
interest because it is both acted upon by its social environment and 
pregnant with social meaning.
In 1909, Hertz noted that
Society and the whole universe have a side which is sacred, noble, 
and precious, and another which is profane and common; a male side, 
strong and active, and another, female, weak and passive; or in two 
words, a right side and a left side (1973:10).
An important addition to this statement has been made by Needham (1973).
He recognised the ubiquity of this dualism, but emphasised that the
opposition of right and left, and all that is associated with each side,
is not a 'natural' relationship but a political one used to support that
which is of the 'right'. Mauss (1973) similarly focused on the way in
which use of the body is related to a particular social environment and
the kinds of relationships we have with others. Moreover, the
'techniques of the body' are "assembled by and for social authority"
(Mauss 1973:85).1
The work of Douglas (1973) continues this tradition. While 
acknowledging that the analogy between body and society is not a simple
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one, she states that society constrains the way in which the physical 
body is understood. Moreover, the physical experience of the body, 
itself influenced by the social domain, helps in turn to perpetuate a 
particular view of society; society and the physical body each reinforce 
the categories of the other.
One way in which this is evident is where there is an assumed link 
within a society between the health of an individual and society in 
general.3 Alternatively, the body and its products (such as faeces, 
urine, blood, milk, tears etc.) may be used as a way of representing 
supernatural, social or spatial relations (Douglas 1973). The dangers 
or powers believed to exist in the social structure can be represented 
in miniature through the human body. For example, the danger expressed 
in pollution beliefs may be inherent in those phenomena which are seen 
to be disordered or marginal (Douglas 1966). Similarly, Leach (1964; 
1976) explains the pollution attributed to bodily emissions as the 
result of these products' liminal status - not fully of the body and yet 
not separate from it; -they are "both me and not-me" (Leach 1964: 38). 
Consequently, an examination of informants' attitudes to the body, its 
boundary and its products should tell us something of their 
understandings of their relationship to that other body - their society.
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4.2) Boundaries
Douglas (1966) suggests that when a community is under apparent threat 
it will respond by tightening control of its boundaries and expelling 
those who are seen as disruptive. At the same time, individual hygiene 
may include greater attention to what is ingested and greater measures 
to control body products: social control and self-control are
intensified simultaneously. Scheper-Hughes (1979) offers one example of 
this. She found that, in rural Ireland, villagers whose way of life was 
under threat were wary both of what they took into the body through 
sexual intercourse and food, and of "being taken in" or deceived by 
outsiders. Concern with the penetration of the body was matched by a 
concern with social integrity, focused on such material symbols of the 
body such as the home and its paints of entrance, such as doors, windows 
and gates.
The association in English language of 'being taken in' with being 
physically engulfed or ingested shows something of the way that bodily 
practice and ethical ideas can be entwined, that "bodily practice and 
moral domains are fused" (Jackson 1983: 336). It should therefore not 
be suprising if there is a correlation between pollution rules and 
morality, as Douglas suggests (1966). This correlation is apparent at 
the level of everyday English discourse. For example 'to shit on 
someone' is to morally abuse that person.
Similarly, the appearance of the Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) has been regarded by many in the West as the legacy of 
'anti-social behaviour'. In line with Douglas's theory, two of the
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clearest responses to AIDS have been the promotion of non-penetrative 
sex for those at greatest risk of contracting the disease and a 
heightened attention to the control of body products in general. While 
there is some medical rationale for the control of body fluids and body 
integrity to prevent the spread of the virus responsible, it would seem 
this injunction has been understood to imply that the perceived moral 
disorders identified with AIDS such as wide sexual experience, 
homosexuality or the social use of drugs can be contained through a 
tightening of the body's physical integrity. As Mort has said, AIDS "is 
not just of the body, it is about the signs and meanings we attach to 
bodily functions" (1987:219). It also reminds us of the necessity to 
locate any analysis of the body and its expressions within historical, 
political and ethical contexts (Poole 1975).
Boundary and self
The analysis of concepts such as body boundary and body image, and 
attitudes to body products may be one way to understand a 'world view' 
or ethos within a particular culture (Postal 1965). Yet understandings 
of the body such as body image and body boundary are essentially located 
within the individual (Fisher and Cleveland 1958). Similarly, Blacking 
(1977) notes that techniques of the body are not so much learnt from 
others as discovered through others, and that the consensus which makes 
the social body possible is not always apparent. Moreover, there is 
often a tension between an individual's 'training' in the techniques of 
the body and his or her personal proclivities. Nonetheless, various 
anthropological studies have shown that individuals' attitudes towards 
body products and the body help to make cultural ideas of the self more
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tangible (cf. Comaroff 1982; Gell 1979; Gillison 1980). Western culture 
has not been so closely observed, but there are indications of a similar 
relationship between body products and the self (cf. Leach 1964).3
Bearing these issues in mind, informants were asked what lay inside 
the body and what constituted the outside of the body, in other words, 
where did body boundary lie? They were also asked about their attitudes 
to body products, with particular attention given to blood, menstrual 
blood and breast milk.
Inside the body
Sixteen women were asked to draw the 1 inside' of the body (see Drawings 
Series A). While they have done this very much on the basis of 
biomedical anatomy,"1 these women's drawings are interesting in that they 
also suggest something about the 'openness' of the body. For example, 
some women drew either the 'windpipe' (trachea) or the 'gullet' 
(oesophagus) as opening out into a general bodily space (cf. Series A: 
figures 2, 18 or 20).-In one drawing (Series A: Figure 12) the two 
passages are drawn as one, but again lead to a common space.
Not all drawings suggest 'openness'. Indeed, informants' drawings 
can be divided into four groups: those which depict the open body; the 
locally open body; the doubly open body, and the closed body (see 
Appendix G), The majority of women (7) drew the trunk of the body to be 
open both via the mouth (and structures described as the "oesophagus", 
"trachea", "bronchial passages" or "windpipe") and via the vagina (or, 
on one occasion, the urethra). A further two women showed the body as
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open from only one aspect (the oesophagus). Five women depicted the 
body as locally open; that is, with either the oesophagus or the vagina 
opening only into the respiratory or reproductive system and not into 
the body more generally. Finally, two women drew the body as closed, 
with any organs shown as isolated and non-communicating.
The drawings in Series B show the same informants' undertandings of 
the female reproductive body. Six women drew this aspect of the body as 
'closed'. Ten informants drew the reproductive body as 'open' in some 
way, for example by drawing the vagina as a tube, by representing it as 
a single line or, in three cases, labelling but not drawing the vagina,
A total of nine women included the cervix in one form or another and 
eight of these were among the group of ten women who had drawn the 
reproductive body as 'open'. At the same time, these women's drawings 
in Series A place them in the first three groups referred to in Appendix 
G. In other words, as in their drawings of the female reproductive 
body, their drawings of the body's interior all refer to the 'openness' 
of the body in some degree. This might suggest that the cervix plays 
some role in 'openness'.5 The exception was Katy, who drew the cervix at 
the anatomical boundary of the body (the 'introitus'), looking very much 
like the contraceptive diaphragm.
One explanation as to why women might have different 
interpretations of the body's integrity is that informants' perceptions 
are not static, that the body has the potential for openness that is 
realised only under certain circumstances. There was nothing in what I 
knew of these informants' circumstances to account for why they might
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understand the body as 'closed' or 'open' at the time that I interviewed 
them; Appendix G shows the known details of informants and the lack of 
any obvious common features among group members. (This lack of any 
obvious common feature is discussed more fully in Chapter 1.4 and 1.7.') 
However, I think it might be fruitful to look into this in more detail 
in future research, particularly whether it is class, educational or 
religious background which influence perceptions of the 'openness' of 
the body, or whether these are more context dependant and related, for 
example, to sexual practices or the experiences of pregnancy and birth.a
Inside/outside the body
Understanding what it means to be 'open' raises the question of what 
constitutes the inside of the body. Fifteen women were asked what it was 
that distinguished the inside of the body from the outside. The answers 
were varied but can be divided into two main groups. In one group of 
eight informants, the distinction was understood in terms of the 
physical properties of the body itself; either the skin (six women), the 
layer of tissue under the skin (one woman) or the body's orifices (one 
woman) marked the boundary between the inside and outside. The second 
group of seven informants saw accessibility as the determining factor, 
with the outside either that which is may be touched, by finger or by 
air for instance, (three women), or that which is visible (four women).
Eighteen women (that is, including three additional women) were 
asked whether specific places such as the mouth or vagina were inside or 
outside the body (the answers of the extra three informants all 
correspond with those in the second group mentioned above). Vith only
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one exception, women in the first group regarded places such as the
mouth or vagina as inside the body. However, the majority of women in
the second group tended.to have different understandings of such places,
which were described as neither inside nor out, as partially inside and
partially out or more or less inside and relative to other, similarly
ambiguous places. For example, I asked a 26 year-old nurse
J: Vhat about your vagina - do you see that as inside or...
I: I think that's inside.
J; But not in a clear way?
I; No. Particularly if..I mean the vagina is open to the air, it's not 
totally enclosed.
J: Is that different to the rectum?
I: Possibly more inside - but not a lot more!
J: Vhich is?
I: The rectum. I suppose also you put things into the vagina -
particularly women - more than they would into the rectum so its
mare accessible I suppose to the outside.
Vhat came out from inside the body was often initially described as 
'waste', but on further discussion it became clear that not all body 
products were thought of in the same terms. Moreover, their nature was 
seen to vary, not only according to which orifice they came from, but 
also according to the person from whom they came.
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4,.-3) Body products
'External1
Out of thirteen informants questioned, only two had anything remotely 
positive to say about external body products such as fallen hair and 
nail clippings, whether these originated from themselves or from others. 
Of the rest, a number of informants felt less negatively towards their 
own body products, especially hair, than towards the products of others. 
Three women felt that their attitude towards the body products of others 
depended on their relationship to that person. For example, stray nail 
clippings and hairs from family members were treated with greater 
tolerance than those of non-family members. One woman tolerated the 
nail clippings of her husband, but of no-one else, Nail clippings and, 
to a lesser extent, stray hairs were almost always described as 'dirty' 
and occasionally 'messy', with toenails always perceived as 'dirtier'
than fingernails. Hair became more objectionable if it had to be
touched (for example, pulled out of a plug hole) or if it was found in 
food.
Pubic hair prompted more unease than head hair and, according to
one informant, a married woman of twenty-five who worked as a personal
secretary, this was especially the case when it came from someone in the
family and acted as a reminder of their sexuality;
I: It all depends on the hair. If it's pubic hair, no, because you
think of that side of somebody you don't necessarily want to think
about. But hair from the head -not so much.
J; If it was pubic hair you wouldn't accept it in the way you would to 
nail clippings?
I: That's right - because it reminds you of a side of them you don't
really want to have any part of.
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Finally, it appeared that at least one woman, a designer and a
Buddhist, saw other people's nail clippings, not only as matter out of
place, but as self out of place, giving the term 'personal hygiene'
special meaning:
I don't particularly like it if someone leaves their toenail 
clippings in my bathroom or something like that. I think that's 
disgusting.... I've got no idea why....but those sorts of things seem 
to be really annoying. I've been brought up with quite a strict
personal hygiene so you don't go round doing that sort of thing.
And associated with that are all the other things to do with keeping 
yourself to yourself, (my emphasis)
1 I ntemal' body pr.Qdu_ct.a
Of those body products originating from within the body, most informants 
made a distinction between, on the one hand, blood, menstrual blood and 
breast milk and, on the other, all other body products. However, 
certain body products were not referred to at all, such as breath or 
semen. Moreover the nature of the distinction that informants drew was 
not always clear. For some it appeared to rest on the notion that 
blood, menstrual blood and breast milk were not waste products of the 
body, whereas products-such as urine and faeces were. For all but one 
of the informants who referred to the relative cleanliness or dirtiness
of body products, menstrual blood was 'cleaner' than urine or faeces,
All informants with the exception of Katy (that is, seventeen) stated 
that they were not upset by touching their own menstrual blood, although 
some would go to greater lengths than others to avoid doing so. This 
was in contrast to seven informants (out of fifteen questioned) who 
strongly disliked touching their own urine. In contrast, only two women 
would consider tasting their own menstrual blood, seeing this as little 
different to tasting venous blood. One of these informants was alone in
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her attitude of mild curiosity towards tasting her own urine, Among 
other informants, reactions to the question of whether they would taste 
their own body products ranged from repulsion to disinterest.
Fewer informants were asked about their attitude to the body
products of others. One informant replied she did not mind touching the
effluvia of someone 'close* to her. Two informants referred only to the
menstrual blood of other women, stating they would not wish to touch
this. For example, the personal secretary said:
I just wouldn't like that...you feel if it's your own, you know its 
you, part of you, but with somebody else's, although there's no 
reason.... I don't know, it's just not part of you and it would seem 
more logical not to want to than to want to [touch it].
One informant would not mind touching the body products of another if
this were "in a natural setting" and not part of "a perversion". One
informant saw no difference between her body products and others'. The
three nurses involved in this part of the study did not mind touching
other people's body products, suggesting that a range Df factors (such
as the perceived dependency of others) may influence attitudes towards
body products.
Significantly, Katy stated that she would wash her hands
immediately if she touched the faeces or urine of her children. She
felt almost as uncomfortable touching, or even seeing, other bodily 
substances from her children, such as nasal discharge. However, when I 
asked her "Vhy is it that those things are so disgusting, do you think?" 
she replied "They're not disgusting. I wouldn't say that was the right 
word to use...'disgusting'. I just wouldn't want to touch it. Who
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would?". Moreover, she was less bothered about touching these kinds of
body products when they had issued from her children than if they had
come from herself.
I touch the kids' because I have to, but I mean I don't like it. 
Because they're kids I could touch theirs' more than mine or 
Barry's; I'd say to Barry "Oh you dirty bugger, do it yourself."
However, this was not because the nature of children's excrement in
general was different to adults'; Katy's children's body products were
more acceptable to her precisely because they were her children,
suggesting something about the nature of the mother-child relationship:'7'
K: It's less horrible because they're mine. They're from me, they're
mine so, urn. . .
J: So it's almost ..a bit like it's yours?
K: Yes. More so. (My emphasis) I mean, I've been in places like
playgroups and things and someone's child has vomited and I've just 
had to walk away. I mean I couldn't help to clean it up, whereas if 
it was one of my kids', I would. Do you know what it is - this is 
going to sound awful - it's more like I know I'm not going to catch 
anything from mine. I suppose it's kind of...just because they're 
mine.
This would appear to suggest that other people's body products are 
in some sense 'polluting', but that one's own body substances and those 
of one's young children are polluting to a lesser extent. The unease 
produced by incontinence or by an ill-disposed body product has been 
explained by Douglas as matter out of place (1966:5). My data suggest 
that the unease associated with body products comes from the sense that 
they still retain something of the identity of the person they have 
issued from, part of the self.® It appears that body products express 
the violation of integrity as they indicate the potential openness of 
the body and that what is inside can come out. On this basis, 'personal
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hygiene' can be seen as a concern to keep the self from fragmenting and 
the embarrassment of incontinence, the result of self (rather than 
simply of matter) out of place. However, although it appears that the 
body should be a closed space and that control should be maintained over 
the body to protect its integrity, the body (or the female body at 
least) nonetheless retains a potential for openness (as in childbirth or 
penetrative sexual intercourse). Moreover, the acceptance of a child's 
body products as one's own and the unity of the nursing mother and child 
described in Chapter 4.6 suggest that informants have a concept of the 
person which does not always correspond with the boundary of an 
individual body.
Data presented in this section indicates that the extent to which 
contact with another's body products is seen as 'out of place' is linked 
to the nature of the relationship. This scale of acceptability is 
looked at more closely in the next section where it is reported, for 
example, that attitudes towards others' blood varies for some 
informants, according to the 'closeness' existing in the relationship.
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4.4) The blood of others
Most informants stated that they would accept a blood transfusion if
necessary from an anonymous donor, although several women did add that
they were more ambivalent about this since they had learnt about AIDS.
Katy was exceptional in her attitude. Her initial response to blood
transfusion was expressed as follows:
Someone else's blood swishing about inside? I don't think I'd be 
very happy about that!...You know what I'd think if I had to have 
someone else's blood - that it might start something off in me...it 
might make something go wrong.... it might mess something of my 
metabolism up.
It transpired however that she found the idea of blood from those she 
was 'close' to quite acceptable. Those regarded as 'close' included 
friends as well as 'family'. Although she would, she says, have 
rejected the blood of strangers anyway, the advent of AIDS had 
reinforced her views. Her concept of the ideal donor was also 
influenced by health promotion material in that she would countenance 
only the blood of those she felt 'close' to who had not had numerous
sexual partners and who did not smoke or drink excessively.
Questions concerning the ingestion of blood invoked more strength 
of feeling among informants. Nine out of thirteen women said that they 
would taste their own venous blood in response to being asked whether, 
if they had cut their finger, they would put the wound to their mouth 
and swallow the blood.3 Among the four who stated they would not do so, 
there was no suggestion that this was because they did not wish to 
ingest their own blood per se but because, for example, they did not
like the taste or they felt that sucking a cut finger served no
practical purpose.
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Ingesting the blood of others was a different matter; of ten women 
questioned, three stated that they would never suck another person's 
wound, while seven women said they generally would not do so, but might 
make certain exceptions. These were on the basis of knowing someone 
extremely well or on the basis of their 'closeness' to this person. For 
instance, a 39 year-old, married accountant said she might suck the cut 
of someone who was "close family". A 25 year-old woman, married and 
working as a personal secretary ruminated "I don't know, if it were your 
child you probably would, because a child is so close to you anyway." 
Many informants would, in fact, only suck the wound of a child. Again, 
the risk of contracting AIDS appeared to play only a part in any 
aversion to the blood of (distant) others; informants claimed they would 
have responded in a similar way before the AIDS era.
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4,5). Menstruation 
Me, nat r.u a.l bljaod
As suggested earlier, menstrual blood was perceived by many informants
as different in nature to the rest of the blood in the body. One way in
which I tried to ascertain the constitution of menstrual blood and more 
general understandings of menstruation was to ask informants how they 
would explain menstruation to any daughter they might have. Answers 
fell into two broad groups. In one, women would speak mainly of the 
biological events, explaining the process as one in which "the body's 
lining breakts] down every month", "you bleed a little bit once a month"
or "when you don't have a baby you have a little clear out". The other
group referred mainly to the experience of menstruation.
The existence of two groups is interesting in the light of Martin's
(1987) work on menstruation. In a study of American women she found
that descriptions of menstruation fell into two categories. In the
first, explanations were, to a varying extent, versions of the medical
view which Martin characterises as a model of a private, productive
system which has failed to produce, or gone awry. When women menstruate
they are, in some sense, out of control:
not producing ,not continuing the species, not preparing to stay at 
home with the baby, not providing a safe, warm womb to nurture a 
man's sperm (1987: 47 - my emphasis).
Martin shows how, within this model, the physiology of menstruation is
seen in pathological terms; the lining of the uterus is seen to
'degenerate', 'weaken' or 'deteriorate'.10 This view of failed
production is also found among the first group of my informants.
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By contrast, informants in Martin's second group did not refer to 
the biomedical model of menstruation, even though they had been exposed 
to this view at school. For example, only two women saw that 
menstruation would "clean out your insides". Instead, these women 
accounted for menstruation in terms of becoming a woman. They spoke 
only of what they saw or felt or about the signficance of menstruation 
for their lives.
Martin notes a correlation between the members of each group and 
their social class, as determined by the pooled resources within a 
household; it is middle-class women who offered her a medical and 
pathological view of menstruation, and working-class women who described 
this event in terms of their experience. Martin accepts that there are 
a number of reasons why there might be contrasting views on the basis of 
class, but favours the suggestion that working-class women resist the 
scientific model of women's bodies because it is not meaningful to them: 
"Working class women, perhaps, because they have less to gain from 
productive labour in the society, have rejected the application of 
models of production to their bodies" <1987: 110).
In my study, although there is a clear distinction between two 
types of explanation with members of one group referring to menstruation 
in terms of failed production, social class plays no obvious role.11 
Future research might usefully look in more detail at the reasons for 
differences between these groups. However, what clearly characterised 
informants in the second group (that is, women who described their 
experience) was that the majority had painful periods themselves and
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their explanations to possible daughters revolved around the extent to 
which they should warn them about the possibility of such pain.
Women's perceptions of menstruation and its symptoms have been 
linked to concepts of female role and femininity by anthropologists, 
doctors and psychologists.1^  13 Skultans (1970), for example, in a 
study of Welsh women, also found her informants were divided on the 
basis of their attitudes towards menstruation. In one group were women 
who viewed menstruation as a cleansing process dependant on a heavy flow 
of blood and who, correspondingly, associated the menopause with a 
decline in health. In the other group were women who found menstruation 
a source of annoyance and discomfort, and who welcomed the menopause or 
hysterectomy. Women in the first group were thought to accept their 
social role and to be in fairly stable marriages. Alternatively, those 
who wished for an end to menstruation were understood as rejecting their 
feminine identity and sex role. They were thought to be either in 
unhappy marriages or sexually unfulfilled.1,4
I do not intend to compare my findings with Skultans in any detail.
For one thing, her informants (eighteen) were of a different age group
to mine. Moreover, I have doubts about the feasibility of assessing the
nature of informants' relationships in any useful way within this kind
of study. What was apparent among my informants was that there was
little explicit stress on menstruation as an essential aspect of
femininity. Moreover, those who spoke about the pain of menstruation
appeared, if anything, to reject stereotypical female roles. For
example, a 26 year-old sales director said in relation to her menstrual
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symptoms, "Sometimes I wish I was a bloke". Another woman, a 28 year- 
old nurse, described periods as "A bore, a bloody bore" and in 
instructing any future daughter about menstruation would feel it 
necessary to warn her of its problems: "I wouldn't say it was a bowl of 
cherries". If any analogy can be drawn between informants' attitudes 
towards their periods and to their lives in general, those who stress 
the pain of menstruation would seem to be referring, not to their 
acceptance of female roles, but to their dissatisfaction.11'
Whether or not Skultans' study is helpful in ascertaining the 
relationship between attitudes to menstruation and female roles, it 
helps to highlight how relatively few of my informants expressed a 
preference for heavy bleeding. Fifteen women were asked whether they 
objected to less blood loss as a possible side effect of contraception 
and all replied they would be pleased to have lighter periods. This has 
some bearing on the extent to which menstruation is understood as 
necessary for health or concerned with the disposal of waste or 'dirt'.
In several studies of menstrual beliefs among western women, 
menstruation is thought to be concerned with a woman's health as it 
removes 'impurities', 'waste' or 'dirt' from a woman's body (see, for 
example Wisnant and Zegans 1975, Snow and Johnson 1977, Martin 1987). 
However, among my informants, only three women out of a total of twenty- 
five who discussed this topic referred to it in any way as a cleansing 
process. Katy, for example, described menstrual blood as "waste" and 
one other informant, a 35 year-old married woman with no strong 
religious beliefs said "I've always seen periods as an important part
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that needs to come away. Its a badness in you that needs to be got rid 
of". Other informants referred to menstrual blood as something that had 
'built up1 during the normal cycle, or as the disposal of an 
unfertilised egg, but in these explanations what was 'lost' was 
redundant rather than unclean.
It has been suggested that, in western culture, menstruation not 
only plays a role in the definition of a woman, but is thought to be 
associated with youth and fertility.165-17 Among informants there were 
mixed feelings about the the complete absence of menstruation as the 
consequence of contraceptive methods, such as the progestogen-only oral 
contraceptive pill. However, several of my informants felt amenorrhoea 
was quite acceptable, provided they received medical reassurance that 
they were "all right inside". Most of those who felt they would be 
disconcerted by amenorrhoea were not so much concerned that an absence 
of bleeding would undermine their sense of womanhood or femininity, but 
rather that something they had become used to, a routine or cycle, had 
been disrupted. Finally, one woman thought she would object to pill- 
induced amenorrhoea because it would be yet another sign that 
contraception was interfering with her body and making it go wrong, so 
suggesting that amenorrhoea, although a pathological state for this 
young woman, was of small concern in relation to a number of changes 
overall.
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Martin notes how menstruation, despite being experienced differently 
among women, nonetheless helps to provide a common identity, notably at 
menarche (1987), Among my informants, the majority spoke in positive or
neutral terms about their menarche; it was either something they had
looked forward to and found 'exciting', or an event of little
significance. Only two women referred to the onset of menstruation in a
negative way (as 'devastating' or prompting tears). Among those who 
took a positive view, it transpired that menarche held no single 
meaning. Four women saw it as a step towards womanhood but, 
nonetheless, as only one of a number of such steps and less important 
than, say, losing one's virginity or having children.13 The menarche 
was, however, an indication of 'growing up' without the specific 
connotation of attaining womanhood. The most consistent element within 
women's responses was that menarche appeared to be viewed less in terms 
of solidarity with peers, but as a mark of competition. Those who began 
menstruating comparatively early spoke of how they were 'delighted' or 
'chuffed'. It seemed they were more delighted to be among the first of. 
their peer group to begin menstruating than to menstruate per se. In
comparison, women who had been amongst the last in their class to
menstruate spoke not of their delight, but of their relief or
reassurance; the menarche was viewed very much in relation to that of
other girls and less in terms of its meaning as a personal, private 
experience.
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Informants gave very different responses as to whether menstruation 
was discussed with others. It has been said that, in contrast to other 
cultures where a girl's menarche is met with celebration and public 
activity, the onset of menstruation in western culture is marked by 
nothing but secrecy (Delaney et al 1976). Weidegger (1978) provides 
examples of how a girl’s father, living in the same household, is often 
not told of this event. From my informants' accounts it was clear that 
girls spoke among themselves about the menarche. Several indicated 
that they did not discuss the arrival of their first period with 
'family' members or male friends. Two women stated that they did not 
even tell their mothers initially.13 Katy, for example, was on holiday 
with 'relatives' at the time of her first period and indicated her 
reaction to me by saying "I just went to the chemist", She did not tell 
her mother until they returned to London, fearing that somehow the other 
members of their group would get to know that she had 'started', and 
that this would be embarrassing. This suggests secrecy about 
menstruation is not total.
It has been observed that this secrecy, such as it is, continues 
after menarche, at least in certain contexts. For instance, women are 
thought to only rarely discuss menstruation with men (Delaney et al: 
1976). It might be argued that menstruation is becoming increasingly 
visible with, for example, the widespread advertising of sanitary 
products, first in women's magazines and now on television. Yet, as 
Craik (1979) has noted, the theme of most of these advertisements still 
concerns secrecy; there is no mention of 'periods', 'blood' or 
'menstruation' and products are promoted on the grounds of discreteness
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(the towel that will not show under clothes, the applicator that will 
'flush away') and their effectiveness in keeping menstruation invisible.
Clearly some of my informants found it very easy to talk about 
menstruation, at least with peers. Others said that they avoided the 
topic, finding it 'unpleasant' to talk of even with friends. Several 
informants stressed how 'natural' and 'normal' menstruation was but, at 
the same time, implied it was not something to talk about. Katy, for 
example, stated that menstruation was a normal, healthy event, "just a 
bodily function", but it would embarrass her to mention to her friends
or 'family' that she was menstruating. This constituted making 'a
fuss'.
K I’d feel a burke saying "Oh by the way everyone, I've just had my 
period", so I wouldn't.
J Vhat about boyfriends? Vould you. . , ,?
K No! Oh God, no! Definitely not.
J Vhat about Barry then?
K No, not for a long time. I mean I wouldn't have dreamt of saying
anything to Barry like that.
J Vhy?
K Veil now I would, But then, when I was just going out with him. . . I
wouldn't tell him what was going on with my body. It's got nothing
to do with him. It's personal isn’t it? I would have been 
embarrassed to say that to him.. . I don't even tell friends. Even 
with a girlfriend I just wouldn't mention it.
One reason why Katy did eventually mention menstruation to Barry was
that she avoided sexual intercourse while menstruating, except perhaps
towards the end of a period, when the flow was lighter. Sex was avoided
mostly because it would be 'very messy' although a reluctance to touch
menstrual blood also existed both for Katy and her husband.
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Vhile menstrual blood, as part of a physiological process, does not 
in itself seem to be understood as 'dirty* by many informants, the 
secrecy surrounding it suggests that there is, nonetheless, something 
shameful about menstruation. There is a long tradition in Jewish and 
Christian cultures in which, as another form of expiation of Eve's sin, 
menstruation "heralds public denial and public shame" (Craik 
1979: 130).';° From this, it might be expected that menstruation and 
sexual intercourse are kept separate, and studies do suggest that this 
is the case for many heterosexual couples. For example, Snowden and 
Christian (1983) show in an international study of attitudes, that of 
those women interviewed in the United Kingdom, over half felt that 
people should avoid sexual intercourse during menstruation. From this 
the researchers extrapolated that many more of the women they questioned 
would themselves avoid sex during the time of their period, as it was 
not uncommon for women who rejected the normative statement about sex 
during menstruation to say that, as a matter of choice, they did not 
have sexual intercourse at this time (1983; 55-56). Among the reasons 
for avoidance of sex at this time Snowden and Christian found not only 
objections to 'messiness', but fears that this could in some way cause 
sterility, cancer or sexually transmitted disease. The secrecy and 
suggestion of shame that accompanies menstruation may indicate that 
menstrual blood is perceived as polluting. However, as Gottlieb (1982) 
reminds us, despite its original use by Douglas to imply a wide range of 
moral states and things out of place, 'pollution' has come to be 
narrowly understood as having only pejorative connotations (1982).21
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The work of Powers (1980) provides one example where the ambiguity
or changing status which accompanies women in their reproductive years
is viewed in positive terms. She suggests that among the Qglala,
The female's entire reproductive stage is. ..sacred, because during 
this time the woman is in a continuous state of ambiguity; if she 
does not reproduce, she menstruates, if she does not menstruate, she 
reproduces. (1980;65)
Vhile I do not suggest that my informants perceive menstruation as
sacred, there are indications that the ambiguous, cyclical status of
women is valued in some way.^2 The periodicity of women has been seen
as analogous to the changing of the seasons and thus to indicate the
proximity of women with 'nature' (cf. MacRae 1975). However, the
nature of women's periodicity is not a universal, but subject to many
cultural influences. As Harrell has pointed out, women in their
'reproductive stage' do not merely reproduce or menstruate; they also
lactate (1981). She observes that the cyclic nature of menstruation
taken as axiomatic by biomedical science is really only characteristic
among western women. The model Harrell constructs of the reproductive
cycle of women living in non-industrial societies depicts that, on
average, over a period of twenty-five months, four of these will be
menstrual months, pregnancy will account for nine months and the
remaining twelve will be months in which the woman lactates. However,
despite the reduced emphasis on lactation in western culture, it may
still remain a biological event available for symbolic manipulation.
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4.6) Breastfeeding
In western culture, despite a concern with good nutrition for infants,
breastfeeding appears to arouse little interest for the majority of
people. As Short has put it
In developed countries breastfeeding is generally viewed as an 
aftermath of human reproduction, an optional extra tacked on at the 
end, like the credits for a motion picture. (1984:23).
Short points out, for example, that breast feeding is largely ignored by
the medical profession and that no specific medical speciality takes
responsibility for it. As a consequence, breastfeeding attracts little
attention in medical textbooks and classrooms, and there is subsequently
little research interest (1984).
Breastfeeding in the Vest is 'invisible' in the sense that it is 
not a common practice, at least in public. In 1985, 65% of women in 
Great Britain initially breastfed their babies. Of these women only 51% 
nursed for as long as two weeks, and only 26% breastfed for four months 
or more ((Martin and White 1988).23 The most common reason given by 
respondents for why they had stopped nursing before they had originally 
intended was the fear of insufficient milk. However, many women also 
indicated that a factor contributing towards early weaning was the 
difficulty of feeding in public due to a lack of proper 'facilities*.
The reference to facilities suggests that breastfeeding in 'public', 
that is outside the home, entails finding a private place far nursing 
babies.According to a Department of Health and Social Security 
report (DHSS 1988), breastfeeding does not have complete social 
acceptance as the usual way of feeding babies. This statement coincides 
with anecdotal evidence arising during my period of fieldwork, of women
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being asked to leave restaurants and public places such as swimming 
pools on account of openly breastfeeding their babies, Even the 
literature of groups aiming to encourge breastfeeding gives tacit 
acceptance to the nation that breastfeeding should occur invisibly, by 
giving informantion to mothers on appropriate clothing and positioning 
of the child so that no one will realise what they are doing.2®
One factor underlying the wish for discreet breast feeding must be 
the ambiguity concerning the breast in western culture; one moment it is 
a sexual object, the next a portable kitchen. A study of teenagers in 
Liverpool, for example, shows that although the majority of respondents 
thought breastfeeding was healthier than bottlefeeding, 15% agreed that 
it made them think of "page three girls"23 and made them feel 
embarrassed (Gregg 1988). The girls in this group felt that this 
association meant that they would be less likely to choose the breast as 
a method of infant feeding. Eleven per cent of teenagers questioned 
thought breasts were 'rude' and 8% thought that breastfeeding was 
'rude'. The vast majority considered that breastfeeding was something 
that should take place in private. Gregg is cautious about 
extrapolating from her findings as her informants' views may be 
influenced by the fact that Liverpool has a particularly low incidence 
of breast feeding (30-35%), and that these schoolchildren were 
interviewed at an age when they were probably struggling to come to 
terms with issues of sexuality. Nonetheless she suggests that infant 
feeding should be a topic in health education for both sexes from the 
earliest school years:
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More open discussion on breast feeding and its merits might reduce 
embarassment and modify society's acceptance of the breast as a 
purely sexual organ. (1988: 148)
Breast f eeding and anthropology
In contrast to the attention given by anthropologists to menstruation, 
the socio-cultural parameters of breastfeeding have been given scant 
attention (Harrell 1981; Raphael 1972). Breastfeeding is not even 
postulated, or refuted, as an indication of woman's proximity to nature 
in the nature/culture debate (see Chapter One). It has, however, been 
observed as a physiological function which tends to limit the social 
movement of women to the context of the domestic group and thereby 
reinforces the association of women with nature in the form of children 
(Ortner 1974), Lactation is often seen as analogous to nurturance but 
the meanings given to nurturance are generally unexplored.
Perceptions of breastfeeding may indicate more general 
understandings of procreation. The Berti of Darfur, for example, 
perceive milk, through its association with the exclusively female 
aspect of nurturance, as the symbol of women's creative power and as 
such, one of the most appropriate symbols for the difference between men 
and women (Holy 1988). In western culture, as elsewhere, breast feeding 
is symbolic of the nurture that sustains the baby and toddler until it 
attains some degree of autonomy and moral responsibility (Reissland and 
Burghart 1988). Such nurturance may be premised on the nutritional 
content of mothers' milk but, perhaps more centrally, on a specific and 
highly intense relationship between the mother and her pre-social child. 
For example, in a study by Auerbach and Avery (1981) American women
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wishing to induce lactation in order to feed their adapted babies mostly 
stressed how the mother-child relationship could be enhanced by the 
practice of breastfeeding, rather than simply the nutritional value of 
human milk.
Repeatedly, the women wrote of wanting the child to know his or her 
mother in a manner unrelated to biological kinship. They suggested 
that nurturance at the breast was every infant's birthright, 
regardless of parentage or amount of milk produced. (1981: 343)
This specific and intimate relationship may be of particular importance
to those women who adopt, but it is also referred to by other mothers,
In Martin and White's study (1988), in comparison with 78% of women who
thought they would breastfeed because this was "best for the baby" and
33% who thought it more convenient, 22% of women said they would
breastfeed because it established a closer bond between a mother and
child than bottlefeeding.27
The 'close' relationship referred to here has been described by 
psychologists as 'bonding'.23 The concept of 'bonding' is also implicit 
in the literature of 'self-help' organisations that promote the practice 
of breastfeeding (cf. La Leche League 1981) in which it is suggested 
that the later the onset of breastfeeding, the more difficult it will be
for the mother and child to 'bond'. Indeed, the mother is encouraged to
put the baby to the breast as soon as possible after the moment of 
birth, although the baby has no physiological need for nutritional 
intake for some time.
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Little attention has been given to the culturally-specific nature ' 
of 'bonding' yet practices which place less emphasis on the mother-child 
relationship can be found outside western culture. Reissland and 
Burghart (1988), for example, describe how among the people of Mithila 
in Eastern Nepal, the first food of sweetened water is given to a baby 
by women of his or her patrilineal family. The first milk is ideally 
goat's milk and, if this is not available, the child is initially 
suckled by a woman of the courtyard, a relative or, in the last resort, 
a neighbour, until the mother's colostrum has been replaced by 'real' 
milk. The authors suggest that what at first sight appears to be a 
preoccupation with the 'staleness' or even pus-like nature of colostrum, 
has to be viewed as part of a pattern of minimal contact between the 
mother and baby at this early stage of the child's life.23
Why breastfeeding should be thought in the West to bring a mother 
and baby 'closer', or what this 'closeness' entails, has been given 
little consideration by anthropologists. For example, are breastfed 
babies 'closer' to their mothers because they are, for a while, 
exclusively fed by their mothers, because they are held next to their 
mothers' skin during feeding, because they take part of their mothers' 
bodies into their mouths or because they take part of their mothers' 
substance into themselves?
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Shy-hceagt feed?
Among my informants, of eighteen women asked, fourteen said that they 
either had breastfed their children or intended to do so. The reasons 
they gave for choosing this method of infant feeding varied, with 
several women giving more than one reason. Six women thought that 
breastfeeding was 'better' for the baby. Vithin this group, there were 
a number of interpretations as to why it was better - it was hygienic, 
it provided some immunity to disease or because it was nutritionally 
superior - but all were concerned with the baby's health or physiology.
A further four women referred to the fact that breastfeeding was 
'natural', although they did not expand upon this, One woman suggested 
that breastfeeding had a life-long effect on a child and helped to make 
him or her a 'warmer' character. Another woman said she would 
breastfeed because she thought men preferred it, and a further woman 
said it would "help bring your figure back". However, the reason given 
most frequently (by nine women) was that breastfeeding helped to 
establish a bond or a 'close' relationship between a mother and her 
child.
The'closeness' of breastfeeding
The way in which breastfeeding promoted 'closeness' was viewed 
differently among informants. The physical proximity that breast 
feeding generally entails30 was seen to be at least partially 
responsible for 'closeness'. Some informants referred to breast milk as 
if it had a special quality responsible for 'closeness', saying, for 
example, "it's to do with the milk". Some women were more specific and 
stated that a mother and child became closer because the child was
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taking something from the mother and the mother was 'giving' to the 
child. The mother's role in this was described as 'giving part of 
herself' to the child. As one informant, a cleaning manager without 
children, said: "[The baby] is actually taking something from you.
You're actually giving it part of you."
The wish to induce lactation on the part of an adopting woman was
also understood by informants within the context of 'closeness'. If a
woman managed to stimulate lactation and hence feed the child at the
breast, this was presumed to bring about greater 'closeness' between
herself and her adopted child, to some extent because of the physical
contact, but predominantly because "the baby is taking in her
substance". As the 29 year-old nurse said of induced lactation:
I think that has to be natural because the child is becoming part of 
her, isn't it?...I would imagine if you're going to adopt a child, 
to be able to breastfeed must be a marvellous way of becoming more 
your child.
Thus there is the suggestion that breast milk is a substance which can, 
to some extent, confer common identity, with 'closeness' perhaps 
implying 'close to the same thing1.
In non-western cultures, breast milk often appears to signify 
sameness or difference. For example, Ngubane shows how for the Nyuswa 
Zulu, breast milk is "a manifestation of the dependency of the descent 
group on the affinal relation" (1977:96), with lactating women viewed as 
antithetical to the general fertility of the patrician. Forth (1983), 
in a study of the Rhindi of Indonesia, provides another example of how 
breastmilk represents affinity but, at the same time, symbolises the
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connection with the child's forebears and hence, continuity. 
Alternatively, lactation may signify common substance among endogamous 
groups. Schefold (1982) describes how for the Khmir of north-west 
Tunisia, even a scorpion who drinks mother's milk becomes the sibling of 
the child she suckles. Holy (1988) claims that, like other Muslims, the 
Berti of Darfur prohibit marriage between children who have suckled at 
the same breast, even though there is no geneological relationship 
between them, and sees in this prohibition a notion of shared 
substance.31
If breast milk is understood by my informants as potentially 
conferring common identity, this raises two important points. First, it 
would seem that in denoting common substance, breast milk bears 
similarities to the notion of 'blood' held by informants. This notion 
is examined in greater detail in Chapter Five. For the moment it is 
sufficient to say that 'blood' is also associated with 'closeness'. 
Moreover, attitudes towards breastmilk and the body product of blood 
(that is, venous blood) are remarkably similar, and both stand in 
opposition to the way in which most other body products are viewed. 
Breastmilk and venous blood are viewed as 'clean', while most other 
products are thought of as 'old', 'unclean' or 'waste'. For most 
informants they are the only body substances (with the exception, 
presumably, of semen which was not generally discussed with informants) 
that may, in certain circumstances, be taken into the bodies of others 
without some degree of concern or disgust.33
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Second, attitudes towards breastfeeding may help to clarify the 
notions held by informants as to the location of personal boundary. If 
the ingestion of breastmilk can make the child more like the mother, 
what does this tell us about the status of the child who is breast 
feeding, or the woman who suckles?
4.7) The mi 1 k of others
With these points in mind, twenty-eight women were given the following 
vignette to consider: "If, while you were still breastfeeding, you were 
to leave your baby for a period of time with another woman who was also 
breastfeeding, would you object if she breastfed your child because 
he/she appeared hungry or upset?"
Many of the women interviewed did not have children and prefaced 
their answers with the proviso that their feelings might well change 
when the issue was no longer hypothetical. Indeed, two women could not 
answer on these grounds. Of the remainder, eleven women felt they would 
not object to certain women breastfeeding their child. Of these, nine 
women qualified their answer by saying that the surrogate feeder would 
have tD be a 'close' friend or 'family'. Within this group of nine, 
three women were nonetheless concerned that, even with the milk from 
someone 'close', something 'unclean' might be passed on by the milk of 
another woman. As the 30 year-old public relations director said, "My 
only thought would be if she had something wrong with her it would go 
through the milk, that's all". In addition, a further three women in 
this group thought that there might be a possibility of the different 
mothers' milk being incompatible. For instance, a 31 year-old medical
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secretary pondered, "You can't mix other formulas, can you?", again 
suggesting parallels between breastmilk and blood. Finally, one woman 
in this group said that she would seek medical advice before allowing 
another woman to feed her child. Despite such reservations however, 
these nine women gave the impression that women who where 'family' or 
'close' friends were more likely to have similar milk than other women.
Fifteen women were opposed to the idea of surrogate feeding and 
their responses varied from strong opposition to mild unenthusiasm.
Katy, for example, found the idea "revolting". On the whole, the 
problem with surrogate feeding was that it was thought to disrupt the 
'closeness' or intimacy which ideally should exist between a mother and 
her child. As the 26 year-old sales director put it, "It would be like 
jumping into bed with someone else watching! Sharing one's husband or 
something like that." This quote is interesting in that it implies a 
parallel between the intimacy associated with sexual intercourse and 
with breastfeeding. It suggests an analogy between the penis and the 
breast or nipple, between the vagina and the baby's mouth, and between 
semen and breast milk which has certainly been reported in other, non- 
western cultures (see, for example Herdt 1981). It also suggests an 
association between eating and sexual intercourse, as suggested by Leach 
(1964: 43), which would be interesting to explore but unfortunately goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Intimacy was seen to be fostered through breastfeeding by one or
other (or for some women, by both) of two factors; i) the physical
closeness between a mother and child while the baby is on the breast and
ii) the taking of substance/self by the child from the mother. For
example, Katy said about the milk of other women: "You see, it's come
out of their body and that's what I don't like." Three other informants
explicitly stated that they would not like their children fed by another
woman because breastfeeding involved giving a part of oneself, as
demonstrated by this 26 year-old nurse;
I think, because it is so intimate and you are giving part of 
yourself to the child, I wouldn't want another woman to be in that 
position with the child at that stage.
The stage that this woman refers to was described by another woman, a 29
year-old nurse, as the most important years for a child (that is, from
birth to age two). During this period the child "soaks up most of its
education".
Significantly, some informants suggested that, while breastfeeding,
children were a part of oneself. Katy, for example, said "Especially
when you're breastfeeding them, it's like they are you." Similarly, a
24 year-old manager stated that she could not contemplate breastfeeding
another woman's child
because it's not part of me, that's why, It's that simple. I 
certainly couldn't get that close to it because it wasn't mine. I'd 
probably think I don't want something that isn't mine to become so 
close and so much a part of me, which obviously it must do when you 
breastfeed a child.
From this it would seem that, for informants, the 'closeness' that 
should ideally exist between a nursing mother and her child was the
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Inverse of the idea of 'personal hygiene' which was made explicit in
discussions about body products other than milk (see this chapter,
section 3). According to this scheme, "keeping oneself to oneself"
involved keeping personal body products out of sight or contact with
other people. Vhile such personal hygiene appears to remain important
in the relationship between nursing infants and most others, in the
relationship with their mothers, the opposite is held important. A
mother's milk is taken into the baby's body in a way that suggests there
is no separation of selves. Breastfeeding seemed to represent a stage
in which the child and mother were supremely 'close', if not in some
sense indivisible, suggesting that the nursing mother and child form a
unity and not a dyad. This point is signficant not only in relation to
understandng the mother-infant relationship, but in that it suggests
that the boundary of the person is a flexible one and may not always
refer to the physical organism. This suggestion is consistent with
earlier indications that a child only really becomes a person when he or
she attains a degree of independence from the mother (see Chapter 3.2).
Katy, for example, says quite explicitly that children stop being part
of their mother when they become more independent.33 Finally, it was
suggested by one informant that breastfeeding, in promoting
'togetherness', was incompatible with growing up:
Breast feeding is something I associate with small babies and it 
seems to me you're not letting them grow up...it's as if they're not 
progressing at all if they're still breastfeeding when they're two 
or three.
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In Chapter Seven it will be suggested that 'growing up' refers not 
only to the attainment of physical maturity, but also of full 
personhood, and that 'upbringing' is undertaken by those who are 'close' 
and includes training towards moral 'uprightness'. It is in this 
context, and in the context of a presumed association between morality 
and notions of pollution (Douglas 1966), that the perception of milk as 
'clean' or 'unclean' should be located.
Breastmilk as unclean
Among informants, breastmilk was seen as healthy and clean, at least 
when issuing from one's own body. This was in contrast to perceptions 
of other body products which (with the exception of venous blood and, 
for a few, menstrual blood) were regarded either as waste, unclean or 
'old'. Only one out of eight informants questioned would object to 
tasting their own breastmilk although a further informant commented on 
how she would dislike being 'covered' by leaked breastmilk, something 
that a friend of hers had described in talking about the experience of 
breastfeeding. It appeared there was something shameful about the 
uncontrolled loss of milk, just as with other forms of incontinence. '3>a-
While a woman might regard her own breast milk as 'clean' and 
appropriate for her child's ingestion, the milk of others was very often 
not, as responses to the vignette (described above) show. Such 
breastmilk might, for example, pass on illness or certain personal 
characteristics. This is indicated by one informant, a 30 year-old 
clerk, who also suggests an analogy between breastmilk and blood:
I wouldn't suggest that [the surrogate feeder] is not as clean or
whatever but - it’s something to da with your child possibly having
- 182 -
the same physical characteristics as you, maybe the same blood type 
and anything that goes with it, and I therefore wouldn't want to 
risk my child at another woman’s breast.
Milk may be 'unclean', not only because it carried illness or
unwanted characteristics (physical or psychological), but because of
what the lactating woman might have eaten or drunk. For example, Katy
was fearful that any milk other than her own might be unclean, even when
it came from 'family*.
I'll tell you, when Jo was five months old I went down Kentish Town, 
and left him with my Man. Val [Katy's aunt by marriage] lived a 
couple of doors away, Val - earth mother - is still breastfeeding 
at eighteen months. She's like that. She could just lay around all 
day with her boobs out, letting Jane suck - it drives me crazy! And 
Jo was screaming. He couldn't settle and my nan got a bit afraid, 
so she wrapped him up in a little blanket and ran down to Val. And 
Val said to me "Oh, I gave him a little bit of bread and butter".
She said "I was going to let him suck but I know what you're like". 
The thought of it - I would have gone mad!... I wouldn't want him to 
have anyone else's milk. You don't know what they eat, what they 
drink - even though it's Val.
Katy also said that her concern about the milk from another woman would
include the fact that she wouldn't know "how they washed themselves."
This mistrust of others' milk extends to the human milk in hospital
"milk banks": Katy would prefer her baby to be bottlefed than to use
donated mother's milk, a view paralleled by her attitude towards blood
donated by non-'family'. 3S However, while she might refuse the milk of
other mothers, Katy would donate milk herself, saying: "And yet I'd give
my milk for them to give to other babies! But then it's only my milk
and I know what I eat and that I'm good and clean" (my emphasis). So
saying, Katy implies that the cleanliness of breast milk, at least in
part, is dependent on moral actions as well as diet.361
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4.8) Moral relationships
It was suggested earlier (Chapter 3:2) that personhood is a moral 
category. The data suggests that the relationship of this moral 
category to the body is not a straightforward one; it would seem that 
the nursing mother and her baby, despite having two bodies, are part of 
the same person until the child achieves some measure of autonomy. The 
mother's milk is thus the child's milk, in much the same way that the 
mother's blood is understood to be shared with the child during 
pregnancy. This milk is acceptable while that of other women is not.
The passible exceptions to this scheme - 'close' friends and 'family' - 
suggest that the boundary of the 'person* may shift in certain 
circumstances (as, perhaps, with sexual intercourse). As suggested in 
Chapter 1.2, this moral category of the person appears to be premised on 
three, differently-stressed, cross-cutting axes; those of sameness (and 
difference), 'closeness' (and distance) and 'openness' (and closedness). 
'Sameness' and 'closeness' will be looked at in more detail in the 
following chapter but this is an appropriate moment to examine the 
notion of 'openness'. •
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4.9) 1 Openness*
'Openness* would appear to be multifaceted. There is the 'openness' 
refered to by Merleau-Ponty (see Chapter 3:7). Through his notion of 
'flesh', Merleau-Ponty suggests that the human body offers access to an 
'openness-to-Being'. 'Openness' as a general term also implies 
something moral - allowing thoughts and emotions to be apprehended. 
'Openness* also refers to a physical state of the body such as breaches 
in its boundary.
These different kinds of 'openness', however, appear to run 
together; the expression "to welcome with open arms" implies that the 
arms are outstretched, but that this is accompanied by a receptiveness 
that is more than physical. Similarly, the term 'an open face' refers 
to a collection of facial features, but that also suggests the face's 
bearer is honest and straightforward. There is, it seems, something 
about the notion of 'openness' that defies a mind-body dichotomy. In 
addition, the 'openness' my informants refer to is inconstant; it is 
appropriate only in certain contexts. This is demonstrated by the 
unease women feel about vaginal examinations carried out by men. The 
relationship between a mother and child in which, apparently, bodily 
integrity increases as the child beomes less 'close' and more 
independent, provides another example. The way in which this 'openness' 
is experienced, moreover, may be gender specific; 'openness', and the 
vulnerability associated with it, may be less important for men in the 
construction of the person than it is for women.33
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'Openness' and the gendered body
It has been argued that men and women experience the body differently, 
that there are two kinds of body with different meanings and cultural 
inscriptions (Hodge 1988), and that some aspects of physical and 
emotional being are different enough for women and men to have different 
ways of 'knowing' (Code 1988). Social practice, such as images of women 
and men in the media or in medical discourse, can change people's 
experience of their bodies and their possibilities (Bordo 1988). 
Merleau-Ponty, in dealing with embodied experience, discusses 'the body' 
as if it is a universal (Butler 1989), but others (such as de Beauvoir) 
have noted that what is 'universal' is often equated with what is 
masculine and that, for women, the body may be different: woman is not a 
completed reality but a becoming (de Beauvoir 1972). However, what is 
regarded as masculine or feminine is not a given; this study for example 
looks at the feminine as it is understood by women in a particular 
culture and at a particular historical moment.
Similarly, the category of 'woman' can be understood as a political 
one, that power is inscribed upon the female body on the basis of its 
sexual characteristics and that this in turn influences bodily 
experience (Butler 1 9 8 9 ) . Foucault (1977) has suggested that, in the 
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a 'political 
anatomy' was born; an unprecedented discipline was directed against the 
body and processes of bodily activity to produce what he calls 'docile 
bodies'. Foucault's analysis can be criticised for taking insufficient 
account of gender (Diamond and Quinby 1988), although others have argued 
within the framework of Foucault's approach that the most docile of
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bodies must be the feminine one (cf Bartky 1988). Bartky (1988) posits
that the disciplinary power that inscribes 'femininity' in the female
body is everywhere - and nowhere; as in Foucault's image of the
Panoptican, knowing that she might be observed at any moment, a woman
takes over the task of policing herself:
The disciplinary techniques through which the "docile bodies" of 
women are constructed aim at a regulation that is perpetual and 
exhaustive - a regulation of the body's size and contours, its 
appetite, pasture, gestures and general comportment in space, and 
the appearance of each of its visible parts. (1988: 80)
Thus 1 femininity* becomes something in which every woman is required to
partake. Vhat is more, according to Bartky, the norm of femininity is
less concerned with maternity than it was in the past, but is
increasingly focused on a woman's body and its presumed heterosexuality.
Yet, as the standards of female bodily acceptability are virtually
impossible to realise, Bartky suggests women spend most of their lives
with a pervasive sense of bodily deficiency.
The potential 'openness' of women must be seen in this context.
For example, the view that Sartre appears to hold of the 'feminine' as 
'holes and slime' (1984) expresses a long tradition in western thought. 
According to the Pythagoreans, femaleness was linked to the unbounded 
and was inferior to that which was identified with form, such as 
'maleness' (Lloyd 1984). It was seen in Chapter Two that, within 
Christian asceticism, the ideal of purity and the disavowal of the flesh 
were to be attained through a ' feminine paradigm' of self-restraint and 
most perfectly expressed in virginity. The ultimate model within this 
paradigm has been seen as the Virgin Mary, whose perpetual virginity
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stands in contrast to other women's potential for 'openness' (see 
Chapter 2.8).
The ideal of containment and the conflation of bodily and moral
integrity can be glimpsed in the everyday bodily practice of western
women. Young (1989) suggests that
[t]he situation of women within a given socio-historical set of 
circumstances, despite the individual-variation in each woman's 
experience, opportunities and possibilities, has a unity which can 
be described and made intelligible (1989:52-3).
One such 'unity* is a certain style of bodily comportment typical of
Western, feminine existence in which women are not as 'open' with their
bodies in style and gait as men. Vex (1979) has recorded, for example,
how women in public sit with arms close to the body, hands in their laps
and legs pressed together. This contrasts with men who sit with arms at
some distance from the body, legs spread wide and crotch visible.*3
According to Young (1989), women's posture arises, in part, from the
threat of invasion that they constantly experience, The most extreme
form of this invasion is rape, but it may be experienced in other, more
subtle ways.*'3 As a result, Young finds, women tend to project an
existential barrier around themselves to keep the other at a distance, a
barrier constructed by a particular bodily stance and comportment.
Women are reluctant to extend the body beyond the closure within which
they have confined themselves. Indeed, it is the 'loose' woman who
violates these norms; her 'looseness* being manifest not only in her
morals but in her way of speech and the easy way in which she moves
(Bartky 1988).
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My data suggest women's bodies are not always closed and that the 
barrier Young refers to is dismantled under certain conditions. Certain 
relationships and events demand openness and, in such instances as 
birth, breastfeeding and penetrative sexual intercourse, (and unlike 
rape and medical examination), being 'open' takes on a positive value. 
The ideal state for the self is therefore not necessarily a closed 
system (as may be the case in some cultures - see Gell (1979) for 
example). At the same time, a view of the 'feminine' as something that 
sucks in masculine matter from outside (cf. Sartre 1958; Gillison 1980), 
or of the 'flesh' as dehiscent (Merleau-Ponty 1968) may not be 
consistent with the phenomenological experience of modern, English 
women.
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4.10) Understandings of gender
Informants were not questioned directly on 'openness* because, at this 
stage of the research, this notion was not one that I was aware of. 
However, data on gender does suggest that 'openness* imbues much of my 
informants' thinking. Views of what constituted 'womanhood* and what it 
meant to be ' feminine' varied, but overlapped in that both, to some 
extent, implied a degree of 'openness'.
'Womanhood' by and large was associated with physiological and
emotional maturity. It might have some association with when a woman
first had a period or when she first had sexual intercourse, but most
strikingly (and in contrast to Bartky's suggestion) it was linked to
when a woman had a child. As one informant, a thirty year-old,
unmarried woman in advertising research speculated:
I think that [having a child] will be a very profound event and 
change one's life dramatically in terms of how you see virtually 
everything. Your whole focus of life has to change and physically 
you must be conscious of things happening to your body in a much 
greater way than, I think, making love or having a period. I think 
it's quite a daunting prospect really.
One woman was exceptional in that, rather than understanding womanhood
in terms of maturity she saw it to be concerned with "privacy".
Understandings of 'femininity' were contradictory in that most women
offered two meanings, one of which was the way in which this term was
thought to be widely understood and the other was their own personal
interpretation. The 'public' meaning of 'femininity* was seen to a be
negative one and conjured up images of pretty, dainty creatures who
'wafted around' in lace dresses and where in need of masculine
protection. The 'feminine' woman was thoughtless, helpless, passive,
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weak, without a mind of her own and generally subordinate to men. In 
contrast, personal understandings of 'femininity' were more positive and 
linked women to maturity, emotional independence, fertility and 
nurturance. Running through both levels of understandings - either 
explicitly or implicitly - was an association between 'femininity' and 
'openness'. For some informants, the 'feminine* woman was concerned 
with being sexually available and having the potential to conceive. For 
others, she was emotionally 'open*. Others again perceived her as 
malleable ('soft') and without fixed views. Significantly, while 
'femininity' was linked by some to the potential to conceive, most 
informants felt that it was unaffected by the use of contraception.
As with 'femininity', 'masculinity' was interpreted at two levels. 
Informants thought most people understood 'masculinity' to imply 
toughness, hardness, large physical size and particular (assured) 
movements. In addition, masculine men were controlling or dominating. 
Young men were thought to perceive themselves as 'masculine' if they had 
sexual intercourse frequently. As a 37 year-old department store buyer 
said
When I was younger, seventeen year-old boys...all they wanted is to 
get their leg over; they feel that's a masculine thing to do, and 
you're indoctrinated to feel it is. In fact, when I met my husband 
he took me short because he was the first man I'd met who didn't put 
sex first on the list, and it was very refreshing.
This woman was not alone in expressing a personal understanding of
'masculinity' which referred to sensitivity, caring and being loving.
These characteristics however were associated with older men for whom
sexual intercourse had become less important as a means of demonstrating
'masculinity'. What apparently remained important was reproductive
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capacity. All informants thought that a man's sense of 'masculinity' 
was undermined by their use of contraception, that to 'father a child' 
was a very 'masculine' achievement.**
Drawings by sixteen informants of the masculine and feminine body 
(See Drawings Series D and E, and the discussion of these drawings in 
Chapter 1.7) showed a further distinction. The masculine body was 
perceived as exclusively defined by the genitals (including pubic hair) 
by four informants, while all sixteen women included the penis and 
scrotum (or testicles) in their drawings. Eleven women represented the 
hirsutism they associated with the male body - predominantly of the 
face, chest, legs and, less often, of the pubic area. Greater size, 
especially of the chest and muscles, was referred to by five informants. 
Finally two women included the nipples and one, the 'adam's apple'.
In contrast, all sixteen women Included the breasts in their 
drawings of the feminine body. No women defined the feminine body 
exclusively by the female genitals but one informant referred only to 
the breasts. Thirteen women represented pubic hair and five indicated 
the vulva (also labelled the vagina or labia). Four women thought that 
the female body was, in part, defined by its overall shape (referring to 
'waist' and 'hips'), two mentioned the 'womb', one the clitoris and 
(internal) vagina, while one woman made specific reference to the 
nipples.
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What is interesting about these drawings is that the masculine body 
appears to be defined by most women by the genitals and is understood as 
a sexual/reproductive body. Alternatively, the feminine body is defined 
primarily by the breasts which way, depending on context, be identified 
by women with female sexuality, but equally, may represent the nurturant 
nature of the feminine body.*-' One interpretation of these drawings 
therefore is to see them as offering support for the existence of the 
ontogenetic model of procreation, in which the male plays an initiating 
role and the female, one of nurturance.
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4.11) Conclusion
In this chapter it is suggested that, for my women informants, the 
feminine body is ambiguous, both in terms of its boundary and its 
substance. The potential 'openness' of women is attended by the threat 
of personal invasion, but it also provides the basis for certain moral 
relationships, exemplified by that of the breastfeeding mother and 
child, in which there is 'openness', 'closeness' and an exchange of 
substance. <A similar example might be offered by certain sexual 
relationships.) Such moral relationships, in which an 'extension of 
self' appears to occur, serve to question the assumption that 
perceptions of the 'person' in the West are always based on a notion of 
a bounded and substantially unchangable individual. As the following 
chapter will show, the perception of the person as a moral and a 
phenomenological entity helps to explain, for example, attitudes towards 
incest, where part of the extended self, or what is the 'same', is
treated as if other, or different.
4.12) Embodied knowledge
The possibility of different experience of the body arising from gender 
is reminiscent of Bourdieu's observation that the use of the human body 
is informed by habitus resulting from a shared environment. What he 
sees as 'transposable dispositions' arise in the context of everyday 
practical activities or 'habitus' (1977:72). Mauss (1973) also stresses 
that habits are interactional and related to a particular social 
environment, that forms of bodily use are conditioned by our
relationships with others. For example, he sees that movements which
are seen as typically 'masculine* or 'feminine' are encouraged or
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discouraged according to what is contextually appropriate. More 
generally, Mauss posits that collective representations such as those of 
gender or class are always correlated with patterns of bodily use 
generated through the habitus.
This leads Jackson to suggest that
within the unitary field of mind-body habitus it is possible to 
intervene and effect changes from any one of these points. By 
approaching cognition in this manner we are able to enter the 
domains of words and symbols by the back door, so to speak.
(1983:336)
Jackson goes on to argue that what participants say about ritual can be
correlated with what they do with their bodies in ritual, that
what is done with the body is the ground of what is said and 
thought. From an existentialist point of view we could say that the 
bodily practices mediate a personal realisation of social values, an
immediate grasp of general precepts as sensible truths. Such a view
is consistent with the tendency to effect understanding through 
bodily techniques, to proceed through bodily awareness to verbal 
skills and ethical views. (1983: 337)
Notably, when Jackson's informants, the Kuranko, do supply a verbal
exegesis it tends to centre on root metaphors which refer to the
practical, bodily activity of everyday life, What I want to suggest
here is not only that bodily practices may represent embodied knowledge
of the social domain, but that such embodied knowledge may be expressed
verbally through the use of metaphors which refer to bodily activity and
stance. Because of the conflation of bodily and moral domains, these
'postural' metaphors (referring, for example, to 'standing' or
'falling') may refer also to moral stance. They are discussed more
fully in Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
1BLQQD*. 'FLESH AND BLQQD1 AND RELATEDNESS
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, . in the realm of kinship theory we are dealing with what we can 
call 'personal kind' terms that are, like concepts of 'natural 
kinds', highly abstract, philosophically important concepts, which 
defy definition, and which share the openendedness and 
inexplicitness typical of all theoretical terms that refer to 
'kinds’ comprised of complex relational properties and networks of 
similarities and differences, rather than of particular internal 
constitutional properties, (Overing 1985a: 772-73).
Introduction
One of the main issues this dissertation is concerned with is the way in 
which 'relatedness' is understood. To what extent, for instance, is it 
a matter of 'biological' connection?1 The previous chapter showed how 
the moral person suggested by informants is based at least in part on 
the nations of 'openness', 'sameness' and 'closeness'. These refer to 
the person's relationship to others, to the extent of his or her 
autonomy. This chapter looks more closely at the nations of 'sameness' 
and 'closeness' and their connection with 'relatedness'. In what sense, 
for example, are people judged to be the same? Is 'sameness' predicated 
on an understanding of consubstantiality and, if so, what form does 
this take? Is the possession of common substance, in fact, the basis of 
relatedness? Similarly, if 'closeness' signifies a particular type of 
relationship between people, does closeness refer to the extent to which 
these people are biologically 'the same' (for instance, sharing a close 
approximation of common substance)? Alternatively, does closeness refer 
to some sort of metaphysical similarity, a mapping out of the moral 
domain?
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5.1) Relatedness versus kinship
It was assumed at the beginning of fieldwork that, for my informants, 
relationships of 'relatedness' would exist principally in the private 
rather than the public domain3 and would be founded, for the most part, 
on a procreative model. At the same time, I did not wish to assume that 
'relatedness' was synonymous with the ties that arise out of the 
biological facts of reproduction, just as others (such as Schneider 
1972) have been reluctant to see kinship in these terms. Indeed, it 
might be argued that, in its association with procreation and the 
private sphere, 'relatedness' is simply another way of referring to 
kinship. It has also been claimed that it is the underlying notion of 
shared substance which sets kinship systems apart from other social 
systems (Cucchiari 1981). Yet, as Needham (1971) has noted, the term 
'kinship' is what Wittgenstein calls 'an odd-job word'; it subsumes a 
large number of topics and therefore has no distinct or concrete 
identity. Southwold (1971) has similarly claimed that the meaning of 
'kinship' in anthropological usage is not only ambiguous, but that the 
term has a surfeit of meaning. The lack of an adequate definition of 
kinship (suggested by Barnard and Good (1984) as the outcome of 
socialisation in our own kinship system), has led to a confusion which 
allows anthropologists to trace relationships among informants rather 
than observe the relationships informants themselves might trace.3 
Indeed, others have gone further and stated that there is no such thing 
as kinship - consequently there can be no such thing as kinship theory 
(Needham 1971), or that kinship is little more than an analytical 
category constructed by anthropologists (Schneider 1972).
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This possibility gives rise to a dilemma; how to ask questions 
which refer to issues traditionally located within the kinship domain 
without asking informants to explain what is perhaps only an 
anthropological construct. In other words, is it possible to go beyond 
the traditional anthropological paradigm concerning kinship?* In the 
end I assumed that, in studying relatedness, I was not necessarily 
dealing with kinship. As a part of this strategy I deliberately 
avoided the collection of genealogies, with the exception of Katy (see 
Figure A),B and instead asked informants about their families and 
friends while leaving open the question of who ideally constitutes a 
family.
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5.2) 1 Family1
The term ’family' presents certain lexical difficulties; it is a 
polyseme suggesting both individuals and relationships (Segalen 1986), 
Although 'the family' commonly refers to a narrow, domestic group 
composed of parents and children (La Fontaine 1988) and the principal 
unit of production, reproduction and consumption (Goody 1972), the term 
may also be used to refer to a wider group, a selected assortment of 
grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins and so on who, generally speaking, 
do not co-reside (Rapp 1982). While 'the family' is usually taken to 
imply a nuclear group, this arrangement does not have the universal 
significance that the term suggests (Harris 1981), Within Western 
culture the nuclear family prevails as the norm: "the modern nuclear 
family, with a particular sexual division of labour, has been writ large 
as The Family and elevated as the only desirable and legitimate form" 
(Thorne 1982:4). The ideal of the nuclear family, Thorne adds, is 
deeply embedded in government policies, in the organisation of the 
economy and in cultural ideas. Nonetheless, the structure of families 
ma.y be different in practice; it is thought that only one third, or 
less, of British households are currently organised on the basis of this 
model (Barrett and McIntosh 1982; OPCS 1990). Furthermore, where the 
nuclear family occurs, its members may have important ties with kin 
beyond this group. Failure to recognise this has often led to confusion 
within the social sciences between household and family (Stivens 1981: 
Rapp 1982). The dominant ideology of the post-war years - that of 
individualism and freedom - has encouraged social scientists to regard 
each western family cell as unique and impervious to cultural, economic 
or historical influence (Goode 1963; Segalen 1986).15
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The polysemy of ’family* within western culture is paralleled by the 
variety of ways it has been understood by historians. Some have argued 
that the norm of the nuclear family is a relatively recent phenonenon in 
the West. According to Flandrin (1979), for example, the notion of 
family as co-residing kin did not exist prior to the nineteenth century; 
it was the bourgeoisie who first had the kind of domestic life 
characterised by the term. Others (cf Goldthorpe 1987) deny that the 
Industrial Revolution decimated the extended family previously typical 
of Britain. Alternatively, Stone (1979) has suggested that, 
historically, there has been no one ideal family type but a plurality of 
overlapping family styles and values corresponding to the plurality of 
cultural worlds existing in England. This view is supported by the 
suggestion that 'the family* is not a concrete 'thing', but an 
ideological construct with moral implications (Collier et al 1982), "7
Besides implying different groups of people, the term 'family' also 
suggests certain affective relationships. The nuclear family is assumed 
within western culture (including the social sciences) to be the 
appropriate domain for the expression of emotion, a "haven in a 
heartless world" (Lasch 1977). One of the central notions concerning 
the construct of the 'the family' is that of nurturance, that is, care 
which goes beyond the requirements for biological survival and entailing 
affection that is enduring and noncontingent (Collier et al, 1982). In 
this respect, 'the family' stands in contrast to other aspects of social 
life:
The family as we know it is not a 'natural' group related by the 
claims of 'blood' but a sphere of human relationships shaped by a 
state that recognises Families as units that hold property, provide 
for care and welfare, and attend particularly to the young - a
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sphere conceptualised as a realm of love and intimacy in apposition 
to the more impersonal norms that dominate modern economics and 
politics, (original emphasis) (Collier et al 1982: 33)
However, as these same authors point out, the widespread association of
'the family' with nurturance and altruism glosses over instances in
which family members appear entirely self-interested. There is, for
example, historical evidence for the abuse and neglect of children (see
Aries 1973, Stone 1979) just as there is today (Campbell 1988; La
Fontaine 1988; Meadows 1989). Moreover, studies such as that of Young
and Willmott (1957) suggest people often find intimacy and emotional
support from those beyond the domestic group. Despite the evidence of
such studies, relationships within 'the family' continue to be idealised
and put in contrast with those beyond its boundary (Collier et al,
1982).
Families are structured around gender and age; women and men, girls 
and boys have a different experience of the family (Thorne 1982). While 
generation has, as yet, been given little attention, the relation 
between gender and the family has recently come under the scrutiny of 
feminist anthropologists. It has been argued by some that gender and 
kinship are mutually constructed; neither can be treated as if 
analytically prior to the other (see the volume edited by Collier and 
Yanagisako 1987). These authors point out that, although a dichotomy 
between domestic and politico-economic spheres should not be assumed3 
there is nonetheless a tendency in western culture to associate men with 
the outside world and women with the family environment or 'the home' 
(Yanagisako 1977). Spiegel suggests that women with children are
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identified with the domestic domain to such an extent that " family is a
code for "mother" (1982:95).3 Moreover,
Much of the ideology surrounding kin relations is closely linked to 
the creation and recreation of women as ideological objects, the 
ideological construction of the feminine (Stivens 1981:115).
The sexual division of labour within the western family is such that 
women are seen as the principal carers, with the model for affective 
relationships provided most cogently by the mother-child relationship 
(Comer 1974).10 Within this framework, fathers are virtually non­
existent. According to Collier et al (1982), even contemporary 
anthroplogists have removed the father from 'the family' by positing the 
mother-child dyad as the irreducible core of 'the family'.
This chapter reports that the plurality of family style referred to 
in this section is found among my informants. The term 'family'
(usually used in preference to 'the family') was widely used to refer 
not only to those who co-resided and had genealogical links, but also to 
certain others who did not.
Who is ' family'?
Thirty-three women (groups 2 and 5 in Appendix F, plus Katy) were asked 
a range of questions about their concept of 'family'. The vast majority 
(25) were single women. Of the rest, five were married, one was co­
habiting, one was divorced and one was engaged to be married. Only two 
women, including Katy, had children although at least one other woman 
had been pregnant (an ectopic and therefore non-viable pregnancy).
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Because I was interested in women's own experience of family life 
rather than understandings of the norm, I asked all thirty-three 
informants who they thought of when the word 'family' was suggested to 
them. Less than half the women interviewed <12) felt that, for them, 
the expression 'family' referred exclusively to members of the nuclear 
family,11 One woman in this group, for example, did not include a 
grandmother living in the same household in the category of 'family'.
For the other twenty-one informants, including Katy, 'family' referred 
to a wider group than the nuclear family. As a category, it included a 
variety of people such as grandparents (very commonly), uncles, aunts, 
nieces, nephews, cousins, affines and, in one case, a 'best friend'. 
Moreover, while the term was generally used for a range of people who 
had some geneological or affinal relationship with the informant,
'family' did not refer to all those who could claim such links.
Relatively close encounters
There was no abjective way of understanding or predicting who would be 
included under the rubric of 'family'. Nonetheless, at a personal 
level, informants had a clear sense of their family's boundary. For 
example, when Katy went away once with her alder boys, she could not 
leave her youngest child with her mother, the ideal choice. Instead he 
was taken care of by her aunt by marriage, Val, who already had to care 
for two very small children. Katy, her mother, grandmother and Val 
nonetheless thought this a better arrangement than if he went to someone 
'outside* the family. At the same time, 'family' boundaries appear to 
vary for its members; Katy perceives her husband's family as part of her 
own, but Katy's mother, Sybil, does not see them as such. Alternatively,
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Sybil’s ex-partner Graham was still regarded by Katy as 'family', 
although her mother's new partner was not.
Whether or not someone was included as 'family' appeared to depend 
on a subjective reckoning of how 'close' they were. This closeness, in 
turn, depended on the degree of social intimacy that existed and not, 
for example, on the similarity of genetic constitution. (See also the 
discussion of 'closeness' and genetics in section 3). The relative 
unimportance of genealogical links was demonstrated by one informant who 
excluded parents or siblings from the category of 'family' but, at the 
same time, included half-brothers and sisters who had 'grown up* in the 
same household. In short, there appeared to be a distinction for many 
informants between different family-type relationships, but the 
distinction was not drawn on biological criteria. Those who might 
appear to be related on the grounds of genealogical connections, but 
were not granted 'family' membership because they were insufficiently 
'close', can generally be subsumed under the overall category of 
'relative'. Informants used this term, by and large, to refer to those, 
objectively connected either through 'birth' or, less often, marriage. 
Such individuals did not constitute a clear, peripheral group, however, 
in that those termed 'relatives' might, in a different context, be 
included as 'family'. For example, Katy describes her husband as 
'family' but not as a 'relative', while in most contexts she sees his 
parents and brothers as her relatives but not 'family'. However, when 
it came to identifying potential blood donors, Barry’s family became 
Katy's. Like 'family', the term 'relative' was ambiguous, and, in its 
use, informants slipped between its different meanings. Yet while the
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term was frequently used to refer to those on the periphery of 
'family1, the fact that it might also refer to those who were 'family' 
suggests that people are not necessarily 'family' in the same way or to 
the same extent. This was highlighted by discussions with informants on 
whether a spouse could, in principle, become 'family'.
Becoming, family.
Of twelve informants who discussed this issue, ten thought that spouses 
could become ' family' , although two of these women qualified their 
answer and one informant thought the spouse became a special sub­
category of family, "a relative by marriage". One respondent was 
uncertain as to whether a spouse became family, and a further informant 
thought that spouses definitely could not.
For most of the women interviewed, the question of whether their 
own spouse would become family was hypothetical; the majority of 
informants were single and without children. The answers they gave were 
therefore based on the way a sibling's spouse had been incorporated into 
their family, the way in which any long-term 'boyfriend' of their own 
had been treated, or how such boyfriends' families had responded to 
them. It emerged that, on the whole, marriage was not perceived as the 
key to inclusion within the family. Instead, frequency of contact, 
interest in family affairs and the potential for 'closeness' seemed 
especially important for acquiring family approval and membership. For 
example, an unmarried, 27 year-old research scientist said:
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My brother's got a girlfriend and she's almost become part of the 
family. They probably will get married, so.... And because she 
lives round there, all the rest of the family look on her as a 
relative - and I do when I go down. It comes to a stage - it's a 
gradual change - I think she's got to be what I consider 'close'.
'Closeness', in turn, depends partly upon 'getting on', talking 
freely or being 'open' and allowing oneself to be vulnerable. 
Interestingly, according to one informant, a spouse can become "more 
family than family" because it is with a spouse that an individual is 
most open and vulnerable. Another single woman, a recruitment manager 
said:
I think you tend to tell them possibly more than you tell your 
parents really. That relationship with them is even deeper in some 
respects than that relationship with your parents is because you're 
laying yourself completely open and vulnerable to them, whereas 
possibly the relationship with a parent is always protected and 
always stable and secure. With a relationship - with even a husband 
- you're not necessarily positive of security there.
Ailines-aa 1 family..
Opinion was more divided in terms of the status of the spouse's 
'family'. Only one'woman stated unequivocally that a spouse's 'family' 
became 'family*. Two women said they did not, three were unsure and one 
woman suggested they became 'family' for some members of the family but 
not for all. One informant thought that affines could become 'family*, 
but only to a certain degree. The others saw incorporation into the 
family depended on how well they were known, how they all got on and the 
potential that existed for 'closeness'. A single, 21 year-old 
administrative assistant remarked:
I: My family would welcome anyone - unless they didn't like them -
that's happened. If they like someone and I'm happy and he's happy, 
then he's just sort of one of the family.
J; His family too?
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I: Yes, if we all get on. If we all see eye-to-eye there's no reason
why we shouldn't all be close.
But, for most, a spouse's 'family' did not hold quite the same family
status as the spouse. A single, 28 year-old fingerprint officer said
for example:
I: When I'm married, then I think, once you know the parents, you've
obviously got another set of parents - but I wouldn't look on them 
as much as relations as I would my own family.
J: So there are different degrees....?
I: It's a different type of relationship in a way 'cos you haven't
known them all your life. I wouldn't be able to open up to them as 
much as I can my own parents. But my boyfriend, that's a different 
relationship, obviously. We've got a relationship again where we 
can discuss any problem that we've got.
Despite the general willingness to include affines, especially 
spouses, under the rubric of 'family', it is interesting that, of those 
informants in this group who were married (six in all), only two 
spontaneously mentioned their husbands as family members. Three women 
included their husband's family as 'family' (two without mentioning 
their husbands) and one woman referred to her 'own' family - although 
whether this term included her husband as well as her children was not 
ascertained. One married woman without children made no mention of her 
husband or affines in describing her family. Also in the non-single 
group were women who were engaged and or co-habiting. None of these 
made any mention of their partners or partners' families in their 
initial elaboration of the term 'family'. It appeared that, for women 
in this group, the term 'family' primarily referred to the family in 
which they were 'raised'. This may in part be linked to the fact that 
most women did not have children of their own. It appears a married or 
cohabiting couple does not, of itself, represent a family; one "starts
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a family" by becoming pregnant. Yet Katy also seems to overlook her 
own nuclear family of husband and three children when describing her 
'family' despite including her husband's family in this category. It 
was only with further questioning ~ as with other informants - that it 
became clear that her husband had some form of family membership. This 
points to a further distinction within the family, between 'family' and 
'blood'.
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5. 3).__l_ClQsenessl versus biogenetic distance.
A number of nations have emerged (such as 'closeness' and 'blood') which 
will be looked at in more detail later. At this point I should stress 
that, for many informants', family' relationships are not predicated on 
biological relationships, nor does 'closeness' refer to the degree of 
biological substance held in common between two family members. As 
such, it is quite different to the notion of 'distance' Schneider has 
observed in 'American kinship' (1980). Schneider argued that, for his 
informants, 'kinship' consisted in sharing natural genetic substance.
He says:
Two blood relatives are 'related' because they share in some degree 
the same stuff of a particular heredity. Each has a portion of the 
natural genetic substance. (1980: 24)
Moreover, with each reproductive step away from a given ancestor, the
sum of common substance is subdivided and hence the degree of
relatedness existing between two people can be calculated in terms of
'distance'. However, 'distance' appears to be similar to my informants'
concept of 'closeness' in that a) both can additionally be used to
describe other (for example geographical) relationships among family
members, and b) both terms have a moral connotation. For example,
Schneider says:
'Distance' is simply the statement of kinship in quantitative tern®. 
That is, on the one hand, it is a measure of the degree to which two 
persons share common biogenetic substance, and on the other hand it 
is a statement of the magnitude of the claim on diffuse, enduring 
solidarity. If diffuse, enduring solidarity obtains, distance is 
the statement of 'just how much'. A relationship which is 'close' 
is one where the claim will be high; one which is 'distant' or 'far 
away' is one where the claim is smaller. (1980: 65)
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1 Closeness1
At the beginning of fieldwork I did not specifically ask informants 
about 'closeness'; it was a notion which I took so much for granted 
that, as with 'openness', I failed to identify its relevance. It was’ 
only when I repeatedly found informants using the term spontaneously 
that I began to look at 'closeness' more critically and started to ask 
women to elaborate its meaning. This meant that I specifically asked 
women about 'close' family relationships if they initially made no 
obvious reference to these.
As Segalen (1986) has cautioned, 'family closeness', when it refers
to affect, is a vague expression. It is clearly not measurable in the
way that the 'distance' Schneider refers to can be quantified. For a
small minority of informants, 'closeness' appeared to be associated with
geographical proximity and therefore, at first impression, potentially
amenable to quantitative analysis. Yet as the statement by this 29
year-old graphic designer highlights, geographical closeness is only one
influence on 'closeness':
I've got aunts and uncles and things but I don't see them very often 
so I don't look on them as close. Ve'd probably be a lot closer if 
we lived closer.
Frequency of contact was partly important in order to know people well. 
However, for the majority, 'closeness' was less dependent on 
geographical proximity than unconditional support, although it was often 
recognised that this was easier to provide at close range. A 20 year- 
old, unmarried woman working in retail management thought, for example, 
that 'closeness* meant:
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People you care about deeply, that you know will always be there and
if you have any problems - whether minor or personal - they'll
always back you up.
'Closeness' often came from being 'brought up* together, (as with 
siblings, or possibly half-siblings or cousins), or otherwise from a 
long association over time. For instance, I asked a 28 year-old 
fingerprint officer if the closeness she descibed with her parents was 
to do with the biological link they shared. She replied: "I personally 
think it's the way you've been brought up - if you can talk about your 
problems."
As mentioned before (see 5.2), 'closeness' also required 'openness'
or being able to talk freely about emotional issues. The importance of
'openness' was suggested, for example, by one 24 year-old manager who
was explaining the distinction she made between 'close' family and
friends. She said:
I think it's that your parents know you and your family's known you 
since you were born, so they've seen all the good times and the bad 
times and they virtually know you inside-out, whereas your friends 
only know you for however long you've been going out with them, [my 
emphasis]
The precondition of 'openness' for 'closeness' was also made clear by 
the finger print officer, who described her expectations of 'close kin' 
as:
Total openness. I'm very lucky because I have a very personal and 
strong relationship with my parents. Anything I want to talk about, 
they're there and I can talk to them about it. So we are a very 
close family. Some people might think we are too close but they are 
always there if I need them.
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¥hat "too close" might mean was not pursued, but it was clear from 
several informants that while openness was crucial, it was not always 
desirable on all topics, sex being a case in point. On the whole it 
seemed informants preferred to talk to those they were less close to 
about sexual matters, with the exception of spouses, and in some 
instances, sisters. (This will be discussed in greater depth in section 
7. )
For the moment, I prefer not to elaborate the meaning that 
'closeness* held for informants, other than saying that it appears to be 
represented by the receptiveness of kindred (their openness to 
discussion, for example) and based on the assumption of a shared code 
rather than a shared substance. 'Closeness' was, for example, one factor 
in determining the sorts of claims that informants could make of 
1 family' .
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Expectations of 'close family*
Irrespective of any biological relationship, acceptance as 'family' carried with 
it higher expectations of behaviour, but also greater tolerance of non- 
compliance than existed for non-'family', as the following discussion with Katy 
demonstrates:
K: I take a lot more off family than I would anybody else. And, I mean, I do
more for family ....I'd give more for family because they're family. I mean 
if I was out 'til two o'clock in the morning and the car broke down, I 
could ring Barry's brother or my mum or Barry's mum and they'd get up. 
They'd say "Oh you're a bloody nuisance you are" but they would come. 
Vhereas if I rang you and I said "Come and get us" you'd probably hang up!
Most women agreed that they could challenge 'family' more than friends if 
they did not like their behaviour, and because of this, a number saw themselves 
as more intolerant of family than friends. However, most also thought that ties 
of friendship were fragile in comparison with those of family, suggesting that 
tolerance was more necessary to maintain the relationship.
Most of the informants who spoke about their expectations of 'family' felt
they could rely on 'family' for either practical or emotional help. It was
suggested that 'family' wouldn't "let you down" or that "they're always there".
In addition, women preferred to accept help from 'family'. One informant, a
single, 32 year-old film extra thought this was so in her case because her
family asked for nothing in return from her:
It's not so much an effort as friendship because they [friends] ask a 
certain amount from you, but [my father] asks far nothing in return. Just 
the fact that he's my father and he's there if I need him....I like to 
think I don't, but you can take [your family] for granted and they're still 
there.
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Another woman, a 37 year-old housewife/company director, thought it was
passible to make more demands on family than friends because there was less
risk of jeopardising the relationship:
Obviously I think you'd hope your family would help you out more than had 
you called on a friend, because you don't want to make the friendship wear 
out very thinly if you have to keep asking them!
In some respects, expectations of 'close' kin were similar to those 
attending relationships of 'generalised reciprocity' (Sahlins 1974), insofar as 
an imbalance of input was tolerated, at least in the short term. Certainly an 
acceptable delay in reciprocity helps to indicate the moral nature of my 
informants 'family' relationships and the expectation that these relationships 
will endure.12 The following discussion with Katy indicates something of the 
kind of expectations she has of family, including the way in which 'the family' 
ensures reciprocity:
K: You'd lend a sum of money to family whereas you wouldn't to other people.
You'd let your family drive your car, whereas you wouldn't to other people. 
Ydu know, I'll tell you why that is. Because Cif 1 you let somebody else 
drive your car and they crashed it, you don't know what you're going to 
get. You know they might just....there's no actual duty there. Whereas if 
one of Barry's brothers bashed the car up, we know that we'd get paid back 
■ because either Barry's mum and dad would pay it for them or....you just . 
know they wouldn't let you down. An example: we lent Jim some money once
and he said he'd pay it back in a month, and about six months later he 
still hadn't paid it back. Barry's mum and dad got onto him. Like you 
can tell one another...and they'd all gang up on that person! That's what 
it's like really.
However, most informants did not so much expect instrumental help (such 
as assistance with household tasks or financial aid) as emotional support and 
advice (see also Firth 1956; Young and Willmott 1957). This is significant in
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the light of studies of western families which have stressed the pooling of the 
more tangible resources of childcare, food and the loan of money.13 Cornwell, 
for example, in a study of working class families in East London, notes that in 
the mutual exchange of services between mothers and daughters, the most 
'positive' relationships were not necessarily the ones involving the greatest 
degree of tangible support and that "the most dependant [were] not necessarily 
the most emotionally close" (1984:112). Here, in this study, we see evidence of 
'sharing without reckoning' (Fortes 1969) associated with enduring, moral 
relationships that are premised on 'closeness*.
Finally on this point, the recruitment manager referred to earlier said 
that she expected less of friends because "I don't think they care as much, to 
be honest, because they're not really as much part of yott'. This suggests that 
those understood as 'family' hold something in common which is of mutual 
concern. It was suggested earlier that those who are 'family' are perceived as 
more dependable than those who are not. Such dependability was frequently 
expressed by informants as the maxim "blood is thicker than water". The 
notion of blood is a paradoxical one but, very generally, appears to refer to 
something held in common. This, as the next section will show, is not 
necessarily shared physical substance, as the term might suggest.
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6.4) CpnsubstantiatiQH
Pitt-Rivers has claimed that "like breeds like in every system of thought"; 
children everywhere are thought to be of the same substance as their parents 
<1973:92), Yet the substance passed on from parents to children and the way in 
which it is transmitted varies cross-culturally. In lineally organised societies, 
for example, a different substance may be passed on by the mother and father.
Cucchiari <1981) notes that the notion of consubstantiality may be based
on one of two models. In what he describes as a "procreative model", the
substances of semen or menstrual blood act as mediums for consubstantiality.
Alternatively, in a "nurturant model", breast milk or food may be stressed.
However, whichever model informs notions of consubstantiation, there will be
procreative referents. As Cucchhlari puts it:
even where parents are defined more as the people who protect, feed and 
raise the child, the relationship is still expressed in geneological idiom. 
Note, for example, that although the idea of Navajo motherhood can be 
either the woman who bore or who raised the child, a mother can only be a 
woman - a person at least theoretically capable of bearing the child. One 
would expect that a completely nurturing model of the mother-child 
relationship would be capable of including bath men and women. (1981: 35)
We saw in the previous chapter that, among my informants, breast milk is 
often viewed as a substance associated with 'sameness' and 'closeness' (see 
section 7). However, it cannot be claimed that breast milk is emphasised in 
this culture or, in Cucchiari's terms, that we have a nurturant model of 
consubstantiation. Breastfeeding is apparently seen by English mothers as the 
expected norm, and battle feeding as a deviation requiring explanation (Voollett 
1987). Nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter 4.6, breastfeeding is discouraged in
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public places and the number of mothers who breastfeed for longer than four 
months is small (Martin and White 1988). Nor can it be claimed that our 
concept of shared substance is based on a procreative model; semen and 
menstrual blood are given little emphasis. Instead what is stressed are 
notions, for example, of 'blood' and 'flesh' which, on the one hand conform to 
Cucchiari's thesis as 'substances' which help to map out the social universe but 
which, on the other hand, do not physically exist.
This notion of substance has been observed elsewhere; Pitt-Rivers (1973) 
has suggested that the likeness-in-being referred to by consubstantiation 
provides a medium for what he calls 'an extension of self'. Along with others 
(such as Marriott 1976) he has noted that, in many cultures, the self is not an 
individual self alone, but includes those with whom the self is solidary.
Physical reproduction provides a model for such an extension of self but the 
substance on which consubstantiality is based is "the notion of substance only, 
a notion far divorced from the physical scientist's concept as that of Christian 
consubstantiality" (Pitt-Rivers 1973: 25). From this it would seem that Pitt- 
Rivers is suggesting that a moral condition (such as solidarity) can determine 
whether common substance exists, instead of an exclusively physical connection 
through 'birth'. This view is supported by the possibility of establishing 
consubstantiality by means other than birth. Pitt-Rivers (1973) and Wolfram 
(1987) claim, for example, that consubstantiality is particularly explicit in 
Christian marriage where sexual intercourse makes the spouses 'of one flesh'. 
Consubstatiality can also occur through the ingestion of sacred substance (such 
as the Eucharist which makes members of the Christian Church one body). It
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is this connection between morality and common substance that may underlie 
informants understanding of 'blood', rather than, for example, a perception of 
blood as the locus of genetic information and thus, of similar substance.
5.5) 'Blood'
'Blood' and anthropology
In anthropological debates on kinship, as elsewhere,'1 A the meaning of 'blood' is 
often taken to be self-evident. As Fortes has said 'blood' is 'a technically 
slipshod term' (1969: 221). The notion of 'blood' is one which anthropologists 
have often failed to regard as a cultural construct, as Morgan's understanding 
demonstrates:
In the systems of relationship of the great families of mankind, some of 
the oldest memorials of human thought and experience are deposited and 
preserved. They have been handed down as transmitted systems through the 
channels of the blood <1871: vi).
According to Schneider, Morgan's concept of 'blood' is the same as that of 
contemporary anthropologists, who see it as a matter of genetics and biology 
(1972: 32). Fox offers a clear example of this assumption. He is at pains to 
stress that consanguinity cannot be understood as a genetic relationship, but 
presumes a genetic relationship is always one of 'blood'. (1967:34). Yet a 
glance at everyday usage of the term suggests that the meaning of 'blood' is 
not a unitary one. Certainly, blood was regarded as the substance responsible 
for the transmission of hereditary features long before the blood groups and 
their genetics were known.1 s However, even within the scientific paradigm, 
blood as a substance is not isomorphic with genetic material; the genetic
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material found in blood can also be found elsewhere in the body. In addition, 
blood appears to be what Turner (1974) has referred to as a multivocal symbol, 
as suggested by its association with emotion (as in 'hot-blooded', 'cold­
blooded'); with life ('life's blood'); with death ('bloodshed*, 'bloodbath'); social 
class ('blue blood', 'good blood') and with social relationships (as 'bad blood1 
existing between people). Therefore, we must be wary of conflating blood as 
physical substance and 'blood' as a concept.
Informants' understandings of 'blood'
The notion of 'blood' was one that I was well aware of within my own culture 
although, prior to fieldwork, I had assumed it to refer to genealogical 
relationships. During interviews, informants often spoke spontaneously about 
'blood' and 'blood ties'. In those instances where they did not, I introduced 
the subject, often through asking them to explain the expression "blood is 
thicker than water". The nation of 'blood' emerges as a very powerful one for 
informants. It is, nonetheless, difficult to pin down as the term, on the one 
hand, holds a number of different meanings but, on the other, is used without 
any qualification. For example, apart from referring to a bodily fluid, 'blood' 
may be used to stand for 'genetics'. However, most informants additionally use 
the term to refer to something that is neither of these things.
Of thirty-one women, including Katy, who talked about 'blood', the majority 
appeared to see it as something that is held in common among family members. 
However what was held in common was perceived rather differently among 
informants, Four women thought that being of the same 'blood' involved having
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some common genetic material but, even for these women, 'blood* was not simply 
a question of genetics. For example, one informant thought that blood might 
refer to common physical substance in the form of shared genetic material, but 
the term 'flesh and blood' referred to those who 'brought up' children or the 
children they 'brought up', whatever their biological relationship (see also 
section 6).
Other informants drew a much clearer distinction between genetics as 
common substance and 'blood' as a way of describing the bond that existed 
between certain people. For the majority (19), those with blood ties 
represented a loose group of individuals perceived as 'family' who were also 
regarded as 'close. 'Blood' had a physical referent in that those people 
designated 'blood relatives' usually shared a common ancestry or that, in some 
sense, they shared 'birth' (for example as half-sisters). However, not all those 
who shared 'blood' were described as 'blood relatives'; common ancestry was not 
the defining feature of 'blood ties', as the data on 'blood' and spouses 
indicates (see below). In addition, a relationship based on shared birth or 
common physical substance could be ignored or played down where there was no 
emotional content, where there was no shared experience and no 'closeness'. For 
example, a 25 year-old, unmarried secretary stated that her 'blood relatives' 
were her mother and her brother; her aunt and uncles were not "because I'm not 
close and therefore I don't make the connection." Generally speaking, it seemed 
that the recognition of a blood tie implied that the parties knew each other 
fairly well and shared an emotional bond. Far example, Katy classified her 
relationships with two of her mother's father's sisters as ones of 'blood', but
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denied the same relationship with other siblings of her grandfather, on the 
grounds that she never knew them. Subjectivity in the recognition of blood ties 
did not extend, however, to whether or not Katy liked or disliked the person.
For instance, asked whether her second cousins, once removed (on her mother's 
side) were 'blood', Katy responded "Yes, they are - more's the pity!" 
Alternatively, a blood tie was recognised by some informants between a child
and his or her adoptive parents. The research scientist, for example, understood 
'blood' as:
the people who brought you up, I wouldn't say it was any different if you 
were adopted, it's the people who've been there, brought you up and gone
through it all with you. It doesn't mean blood literally.1 s
Katy proved an exception in that, at one level, she understood 'blood'
literally. For example, asked what it meant to share 'blood', she replied:
K: Veil, we've got the same blood. I mean, I love my Nan and Grandad because
they're my Mum's mum and dad. I love Tim and Aunty Maisie because they're
her brother and sister. I love Emma and Jane because they're Tim's 
children. It's just there.
J: Vhat does blood refer to? Is it literally blood, like the blood in your
veins?
K: Yes, I think so.
J: And that's the same in some way and different to other people's?
K: Oh yes, I mean definitely. If I was ill and I needed some blood or one of
our kids needed blood, I'd rather it come from one of the family than the
hospital give just any blood. I would rather one of our own give it, and 
when I say "one of our own" I mean Barry's brother, Barry's mum and dad, 
my mum and dad, my aunt and uncle. I'd rather it come from our own than 
just anyone.
J: Do you think there's something special about blood?
K: Yes, because you're the same.
Katy recognises 'blood' as indicating 'sameness' despite an awareness of the
scientific concepts of blood groups and rhesus factor. At the same time, there
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is no obvious biological criterion defining 'sameness', as the way she maps out 
those with a 'blood' tie demonstrates (see Figure A).
The emphasis on 'blood' as an indication of 'sameness' is also important in 
distinguishing 'blood' from genetics. The science of genetics is concerned with 
the study of heredity and variation (Berry 1972). In other words, genetics is 
concerned with explaining similarities and differences. This is at odds with 
my informants' understandings of 'blood' which refer to the way in which 
individuals are in some sense the same; the notion of 'blood' does not explain 
differences between individuals. Moreover, genetics may refer to biological 
heredity but, at the same time, the nature of what is passed on is transmutable. 
17 Yet, with 'blood', what is held in common is apparently consistent and the 
same for all those who stand in a blood relationship, 'Blood' and genetics 
therefore do not appear to be of the same order of things, This conclusion is 
consistent with the statements by informants who may claim a 'blood' 
relationship where there is no known genetic material held in common, as with 
spouses,
BJLo.od and the spouse
Ve saw earlier that spouses could be incorporated into the family with varying 
ease. For most informants they could become 'family', perhaps relatives, but 
they did not usually have full 'blood' status, Informants were well aware of 
the various and confusing shifts in meaning of the term 'blood' made evident by 
the position of the spouse. For instance, a single, 32 year-old administrator 
was asked if 'blood' was the same thing as 'genetics'. She replied:
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Yes I suppose, in a way, although even so, saying that, when people say 
'blood' they tend to mean it for all the family, so that's even a married 
couple which aren't going to be related by blood to the mother and father. 
So it's a bit contradictory.
Several informants agreed that one way in which a spouse could become 
'blood' was after the birth of a child. For example, asked "Is it possible to 
have a blood relationship with a husband?" the 24 year-old recruitment manager 
replied:
That's difficult, actually. I'm not sure. My first instinct would be to 
say no, but on the other hand I think possibly it would become more of a 
blood relationship once you have children. Because it's almost then as if 
something between you is actually combining.
Katy explained the 'blood bond' between herself and Barry as the outcome of
'love' and having children in common:
It's like a feeling that, whatever happened, they're still from bath of us 
and that kind of makes us more together, more one because of them.... 
[Children] have picked up all the ends and knitted [us] all together.
In other words, there is a suggestion from Katy and others that the nature of
the relationship between spouses is reclassified through procreation; parents
, become closer to being 'one' or being the 'same' through conceiving and 'raising'
children together. This 'sameness', represented by 'blood', is, I believe,
different in nature to the similarities (such as likeness of appearance or even
temperament) which informants believed to be transmitted by genes.
This is very different to Schneider's findings. His American informants'
understood the 'blood' relationship as
a belief in common biological constitution and aspects like temperament, 
build, physiognomy and habits are noted as signs of this shared biological 
make-up, this special identity of relatives with each other (1980: 25).
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Furthermore, according to Schneider, this identity as a biological community is 
expressed by the term "being of the same flesh and blood". That is to say, 
among his American informants 'blood' and 'flesh and blood' are synonymous. In 
contrast, my data suggests that, although each cannot be understood without 
reference to the other, 'blood' and 'flesh and blood' are two different if 
overlapping categories. For most informants, 'blood' refers to a metaphysical 
'sameness' and the expression 'flesh and blood' describes a specific form of 
this.
5.6) 'Flesh and blood'
There is a common idea within and without anthropology that, as with 'blood', 
the term 'flesh and blood' can be loosely used as an alternative expression for 
genealogical relationships. Craig, for example, attributes Gellner with the view 
of kinship as "merely a matter of flesh and blood" (1979: 94). However, 'flesh 
and blood' was not a straightforward concept among my informants. I began to 
specifically ask what was understood by the term after one or two women 
indicated that 'flesh and blood' had a slightly different gloss to that of 
'blood'. It should be said, however, that informants used the term less often 
than 'blood' in any spontaneous way. Twelve women discussed this topic, 
including Katy. On the basis of their answers as to whether or not they 
understood 'flesh and blood' as a category distinct from 'blood', these 
informants can be divided into two groups.
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Group Qne
Eight informants understood 'flesh and blood' as a discrete category. To begin 
with, for all but one of these women, 'blood' ties extended both vertically (that 
is, to preceding and succeeding generations) and laterally (for example, to 
siblings, cousins, aunts or uncles etc). In contrast, 'flesh and blood' referred 
to vertical ties (grandparents, parents, children), with the exception of 
siblings and sibling's children (and in the case of one informant, her spouse). 
Katy was the exception to this scheme; she drew a clear distinction between 
those of 'blood' and 'flesh and blood' but, for her, 'flesh and blood* included 
her mother's sister and mother's brother. This aunt and uncle were closely 
involved in Katy's 'upbringing' and perhaps give some indication to the role of 
flesh and blood for other informants.
The importance of involvement in 'upbringing' for those deemed 'flesh and 
blood' was also referred to by other informants. For instance, a 34 year-old 
divorcee said;
I suppose my brother and sister fall into that definition ['flesh and 
blood'] because we grew up together and were brought up by the same 
' parents.
Significantly, one married informant, a 27 year-old legal secretary, suggested 
'flesh and blood' relationships were protective ones. She thought first of her 
parents when questioned on this category because, she said, she was looking 
after them now they were alder.
- 226 -
Overall, the Informants in this group seemed to regard 'flesh and blood' as
a core group within the wider one of 'family'. Most commonly, this was
represented by known, living members who were directly linked by sex and
reproduction. One woman, for instance, (a married, 31 year-old secretary with
no children), understood 'flesh and blood':
with relation to my mother because she bore me. I would count that as a
flesh and blood relationship. My children - from me to them. My sister
less so, because she was also born of my mother.
Seven of these nine women, however, understood 'flesh and blood' less in terms
of the genealogical ties this statement might suggest, and more as the
'closeness' that they identified with such relationships. Three women stated
that in implying 'closeness', 'flesh and blood' was a very similar category to
'blood', but 'flesh and blood' suggested greater 'closeness' than might be found
in 'blood' relationships.
Figure B represents the distinctions made between 'blood' and 'flesh and 
blood' made by twelve informants during discussions. Interestingly, those whom 
I thought might have been classed as 'flesh and blood' but had died, although
not excluded from mention, were not referred to either as 'blood' or 'flesh and
blood' (Katy provides an exception). Yet one woman, an unmarried 21 year-old 
chaperone for child actors, commented that she would have classified her father 
as 'flesh and blood' if he were still alive. She would also include any children 
she might have in the future. Firth (1956) and Bott (1971), in studies of 
'kinship' in London, noted that approximately 15% of informants' genealogies 
were constituted by dead kin. Firth points out that
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"Cmleraory of dead kin is part of the social personality of an informant; 
the dead tend to serve as a focus for sentiment; they are the links of 
justification for social activities with other kin" (1956:38).
If we assume that my Informants and Firth's have similar attitudes towards dead
kin, why do women in my study exclude the dead from their categories of 'blood'
and 'flesh and blood'? I would suggest the answer has to do with the way these
categories are founded on 'closeness' (and, as we see later, 'upbringing'). To
put it crudely, it is difficult to be 'close' to someone who is dead.
There is yet another aspect to the category of 'flesh and blood' which
should be noted. This is the way in which being of the same 'flesh and blood'
indicates being part of the same thing. One woman, a 32 year-old barmaid, in
an earlier stage of the research, had said of 'flesh and blood* "I thought that
meant being of their (family's) flesh and their blood, being born of them or
being part of their entire body". This sense of 'flesh and blood' was also
found among this group of informants. Far example, the child chaperone
referred only to her mother as 'flesh and blood', "because I came from my mother
and the other people [other 'family] had nothing to do with it really". The
notion of 'flesh and blood' as consubstantiality was also held by Katy:
My mum had me and Auntie Maisie is part of my mum. Tim is part of my 
mum and Nan and Grandad are part of my mum so that makes them part of 
me because my mum had me.
However, sharing substance was not always sufficient in itself; what might be
expected to be a 'flesh and blood' relationship could be played down where there
was an absence of 'closeness' between relevant family members,
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Group Two
Four informants in this group made no apparent distinction between categories
of 'blood' and 'flesh and blood'. They nonetheless offer some insight into the
meaning of these classifications. For example, one rather sad single, 37 year-
old woman understood 'blood' as the defining feature of a relative. A 'blood'
relationship, or one of 'flesh and blood', was a fact of life, a biological given
and, as such, devoid of emotion. However, later in the discussion this
informant volunteered that she felt very isolated, having no siblings and no
'family' to speak of on her mother's side. Her father had died when she was
young and her mother had become an alcoholic. While her father had many
relatives, my informant was not 'close' to any of these, and did not include
them amongst those she described as 'blood' (even though by her previous
definition they would consititute 'blood'). Because of her mother's alcoholism
she had been 'brought up' for the most part by neighbours:
I turned to neighbours who became surrogate parents in my formative years 
so, if you like, I could almost count them [as 'flesh and blood']. I'm 
closer to them with whom I have no blood tie than I am with genuine 
family.
It appears then that despite apparently conflating 'blood' and 'flesh and blood', 
this informant nonetheless implies that, on the one hand, 'blood' describes 
relationships that are both 'close' and based on genealogical links while, on 
the other hand, 'flesh and blood' should ideally refer to those who are 'close' 
and who play a supportive role in 'upbringing'.
"  2 2 9 "
Of the other women in this group, one made further reference to the
importance of 'upbringing' in the definition of 'flesh and blood' relationhships.
For example, a 25 year-old secretary said:
My father.. .obviously he was there to bring me into the world,133 but 
because we didn't have a very close relationship and he didn't participate 
in my upbringing....yes, he is flesh and blood, therefore he is family, but 
as far as I'm concerned, he didn't take any responsibility in bringing me 
up, so therefore I don't think of him in the same way - you know, as being 
flesh and blood, a close family relative.
Reference was also made by women in this group to the role of 'flesh and blood'
in coming into being. A 23 year-old personal assistant said, for example;
We all come from the same person really. If it wasn't for my Nan, none of 
us would be here. The same with my other grandmother - my dad wouldn't 
be here and all his family.
What is interesting in the light of the discussion of the ontogenetic model of
procreation (see Chapters One, Two and Six) is that this informant only refers
to the grandmother's role and ignores the grandfather's contribution. Finally,
for the fourth woman in this group, a 26 year-old secretary, categories of
'blood' and 'flesh and blood' are often represented by the same people.
Nonetheless what these categories denote is not genealogical ties (her
grandfather, aunt and uncle are excluded, for example) but 'closeness'.
In sum, the notion of 'flesh and blood' is, far mast informants, a distinct 
category referring to a core group of individuals within the wider category of 
'blood'. What links these individuals is, perhaps, a sense of collective history, 
more frequently of collective identity, but, most importantly, a sense of 
'closeness'.
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5.7) Generation without penetration
Returning to an earlier point that, for many informants, 'openness' was 
regarded as a precondition for being 'close', it can be seen that there 
were notable exceptions to this scheme. It was deemed inappropriate to 
be 'open' to discussions concerning personal sexual behaviour with those 
who were 'close' (other than with friends or spouses); or to be 'open* 
to sexual behaviour with members of this group. Sex was, for the most 
part, taboo with those of the same 'flesh and blood' in word and deed. 
The sanction on sex, however, did not appear to affect the sense of 
'closeness' overall. This was made clear, for example, by a 24 year-old 
recruitment manager, who described her reluctance to indicate to her 
parents the precise nature of her relationship with her 'boyfriend' 
saying:
I'd love to tell them but I just don't see the point. Sometimes it 
amazes me how na'ive they can be; surely they think there must be 
something going on!- I think it's basically they don't want to know. 
It certainly doesn't spoil the closeness, not being able to tell 
them.
The same informant was able to discuss other, intimate matters with her 
mother, such as instructing her mother on how to insert vaginal 
pessaries. It would appear therefore to be sex rather than, say, 
modesty that is at issue.
In all, eleven informants were questioned on the attitudes within 
their families towards sexual matters. The majority (8) said that sex 
was not a topic for family discussion, particularly if it was discussed 
at a personal rather than abstract level. Conversations with parents 
about sex were, for most women, more taboo than other potentially 
contentious issues such as religion or politics. The remaining
- 231 -
informants could discuss sexual matters with their mothers but not their 
fathers (or in the case of one woman, her step-father). All informants 
were more likely to speak to siblings about sex, particularly sisters.
It appeared sexuality was a more difficult topic between members of 
different generations than for those of different sexes within one 
generation, although this distinction was modified by gender.13
Embarrassment was one reason suggested by informants for avoiding
the topic of sex. For example, a single, 32 year-old, health service
administrator said:
I don't actually remember going to my parents to ask them anything 
about it really. I'm sure they would have answered me. I didn't 
feel easy about it. I think also, you know...you can feel that, as 
they haven’t spoken to you, they are probably going to be 
embarrassed and you can sense you're going to be embarrassed asking 
them.
This embarrassment seemingly arose from some sense of inappropriateness 
about parents or offspring as sexual beings. Informants thought, for 
example, that their parents would be 'disillusioned' about their 
offspring if they knew them to be sexually active, particularly if 
unmarried.
Katy was more than reluctant to view her own mother as a sexual 
b e i n g . T h e  idea of a sexual relationship between her mother and Don, 
the man she lived with, appalled Katy:
K: I don't like to think of them having sex! I like to think it's just
compani onshi p.
J: Vhy is that though?
K: I don't know. It's just awful to think of my mum,...But Barry's the
same. He can't bear to think of my mum with him [Don]. He hates
it.
J: He feels this about your mum?
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K: Yes, he doesn't like it either... because she's, like, 'Nanny' and we
don't like to think of her like that. She's their grandmother and 
she's...1 don't know. My Nan and Grandad don't like to think of it 
either.
Subsequently, Katy told me that she and Barry felt very similarly 
about Pat (Barry's mother), who had filed for divorce from Sid and had 
begun a relationship with a younger man. This disapproval again seemed 
associated with the concept of what a grandmother was and how she shioyLd 
behave, Barry and his brothers were embarrassed by the way in which 
their mother had apparently changed. She had always been an attractive 
woman, Katy said, but in a 'motherly' way, being rather plump and using 
few cosmetics. Now she wore expensive, tailored suits, high-heeled 
shoes, 'off-the-shoulder' dresses and a great deal of 'make-up'. This 
was viewed by the rest of the family as inappropriate, not so much 
because she had four sons, but because she had seven grandchildren.
This disapproval, however, was not exclusively linked to Pat's age. For 
example, Barry did not altogether disapprove when his father, the 
grandfather of seven children, began to dress differently and began an 
affair with a young woman. It appeared that, as men, Barry and his 
three brothers encouraged this but, as 'family', they were made 
uncomfortable by their father's behaviour.
Katy also implied that, as a parent, she herself was unwilling to 
be regarded as a sexual being. Although her sense of humour included 
sexual innuendo, Katy did not like to talk about sexual matters at a 
personal level. There was a parallel between this and her attitude 
towards menstruation; both were normal, healthy events which were quite
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inappropriate to discuss. Informing her children about "the facts of 
life" therefore posed a dilemma. Sam, her second son, had already asked 
questions in this respect.
K: He asked how the baby got in my tummy.
Sam: They put seed in there!
K: And I said to Barry "Shall I tell him how the seed got there?"
and he said "No of course you don't. Not yet!". And he said "Oh
God put it there". I mean, it's a bit complicated - how would I go 
about explaining how it got there? Plus I don't know if he really 
wants to know. Would he, at five? But when he's ten and he asks, 
I'll be too embarrassed to tell him!
In sum, the ideal parents are asexual ones. There is an apparent
disjunction between sex and 'blood', resulting in the paradox that those
whose relationships can be seen as the outcome of sex cannot speak of
sex.
The paradox of 'flesh'
It was noted in Chapter Three, that the term 'flesh* has a double 
entendre, referring both to substance (and non-substance) and 
concupiscence. Sins of the 'flesh' are, traditionally, sexual sins.
What is interesting about the category of 'flesh and blood' predominant 
among informants is that, with certain exceptions such as adoption, it 
refers to those people who share 'substance' and are linked by sexual 
intercourse (a becoming 'as one') in the preceding generation.
Although it may be argued that genetic information is generally 
transmitted by sexual intercourse, it is possible that sex is more 
important in understanding 'sameness' than genetics. The paradox of the 
asexual family certainly indicates this.
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Several informants suggested that 'blood* and 'flesh and blood1
have a temporal dimension, offering links to the past and to the future.
Historically, according to Foucault, 'blood' has provided one of the
fundmental values for western society because of
its instrumental role (the ability to shed blood)... the way it 
functioned in the order of signs (to have a certain blood, to be of 
the same blood, to be prepared to risk one's own blood), and 
also...its precariousness (easily spilled, subject to drying up, too 
readily mixed, capable of being corrupted) (1981: 147).
'Blood* was "a reality with a symbolic function" (1981: 147). Moreover,
the aristocracy claimed a special character for its body in the nation
of blood, notably what had gone before - its ancestry - while the
bourgeoisie, once emerged, was concerned with what was to follow - its
progeny. Thus "ttlhe concern with genealogy became a preoccupation with
heredity" (1981: 124). This began a concern with the sexual body, made
evident through nineteenth century literature concerning eugenics and
sexual medicine, that is at odds with the widespread view of the
Victorian bourgeoisie's repression of sexuality. In this sense,
Foucault claims that western societies went from a "symbolics of blood"
to an "analytics of sexuality" and the constant arousal of sexuality,
rather than its suppression (1981: 148).
Significantly, Foucault perceives 'the family' to have been a major 
component in the "deployment of sexuality",121 It is particularly 
interesting to note that this deployment of sexuality is, according to 
Foucault, formed on the basis of the Christian notion of the 'flesh', 
and remains concerned with "the problematic of the flesh", that is, "of 
the body, sensation, the nature of pleasure, the more secret forms of
- 235 -
enjoyment or acquiescence" (1981: 108). Such flesh, according to 
Foucault, has to be mastered by confession.
However, while Foucault states that the family searches for the 
slightest traces of sexuality within its midst, my informants suggest 
that the family wishes to ignore its every trace. This seeming myopia 
can be observed at a number of levels, ranging from the reluctance to 
acknowledge the sexual bodies of those who are 'close1 (the disturbing 
nature of the pubic hair), to the denial of certain 'family' members as 
sexually active, and the absence of any discourse of confession through 
which, according to Foucault, sexuality may come into being. It is 
preferable to regard 'family', particularly 'flesh and blood', as 
asexual and nowhere are informants' views clearer on this than in their 
attitudes towards incest.
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5,8.) Incest
In Western anthropological and legal definitions, incest can be 
understood as the intersection of three different sets, that is, a set 
of sexual behaviours, a set of kinship categories and a set of 
prohibitions. These three sets help to define incest, but emphasis on 
any one set and the way in which these sets combine will vary cross- 
culturally (Willner 1983). The meaning of incest, however, may vary not 
only between cultures but within any one culture. English law,for 
example, defines incest as sexual intercourse between certain members of 
a family, but non-genital sexual behaviour on the part of those who play 
a family role, while not legally incest, can still be interpreted as 
such by those who experience this behaviour (La Fontaine 1988). As 
Willner notes, "tilt is enough that the resonance of sex and kinship is 
present in at least one of the multiple definitions of a polysemic term" 
(1983:137).
Incest can also be seen as one of a set of categories, where it is 
the set as a whole that is analytically important rather than the single 
category (Leach 1976). However, different theorists have placed the 
category of incest in a number of different sets. Leach, for example, 
classifies incest with "bestiality, homosexuality, rape, adultery, 
fornication and so on" in a set of sexual sins (1976: 75).
Alternatively, others might place incest alongside rape, wife-battering 
and child abuse, a set which emphasises relations of power rather than 
sexual behaviour per se (Rich 1980). As Willner points out, there is a 
less than uniform cultural construction of the meaning of incest between 
individuals of different attributes and background within contemporary
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Anglo-American societies. These different understandings of incest may­
be linked to differences of class, gender, ethnicity, age or even 
personal experience of incest.
None of my informants volunteered information indicating any 
involvement in an incestuous relationship. Although all female and of 
similar age, informants were not apparently all of similar class 
background. Nonetheless there was a certain amount of agreement in their 
understandings of and attitudes towards incest. What was implicit in 
most informants' responses was that incest can be understood as one of a 
set of categories concerned with informants' personal ontologies, more 
specifically, with categories referring to self and other, incorporation 
and extrusion and the links between these.
Informants were asked about their attitudes towards incest without 
any elaboration of what this term might mean, or who it might involve. 
This was done with the hope of uncovering the more metaphysical meanings 
which sex might hold for informants, especially in relation to any moral 
system associated with kindred. It was also hoped that, in discussing 
attitudes towards sexual relationships specifically between children and 
adults, a clearer picture of the concept of a child would emerge.
Of sixteen informants asked "What is incest?", all stated that the 
term referred to sexual behaviour of some sort between members of the 
family - although one woman, a 28 year-old distribution assistant, was 
unsure whether incest referred to sexual intercourse specifically 
between a sister and brother, or to "a wife sleeping with somebody
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else". Seven women understood incest to primarily mean some sort of
sexual relationship between a parent and child, and the most common
understanding of this was that it was the father, rather than the
mother, who was involved. Of the rest, the defining feature of incest
was that it occurred between 'close' family. As we saw earlier, who
counted as 'close' family depended on the social rather than the
biological nature of any relationship. This was demonstrated by Katy,
for example, who would not dream of having a sexual relationship with
one of the cousins with whom she was 'raised'.
My three cousins are all men. I mean, I love them, but I love them 
as family. We laugh and joke. When I see them they kiss me hello,
put their arms round me and squeeze me, but its different. I mean,
my mum's sister's children! It would just be too close! Sa-y it was 
me and my cousin Bob...then it would mean my mum and my Auntie 
Maisie would have the same grandchildren! Bob I've been brought up 
with since a baby ~ it just wouldn't be right. Plus the blood 
thing. It wouldn't be right.
In addition to Katy, three informants stated that incest was wrong 
because of shared 'blood' and might result in damage or handicap among
any offspring. However, as before, 'blood' was not acknowledged on the
basis of genealogical links. Katy, for example, understood her mother's 
sister's three 'sons' as 'blood', but was less clear about how to 
classify her mother's brother's son by his first marriage. The 
important difference between these two groups of cousins does not 
concern their position on the genealogical map (or their genetic 
constitution), but the degree of 'closeness' that they shared with Katy. 
On a similar basis, five other informants saw sexual behaviour with 
affines as constituting incest, if these affines were 'close'. (As such 
they were included under the rubric of 'family'.) If the relationship
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was not 'close', then sex between these parties was not incest. It was, 
nonetheless, wrong.
All informants who discussed the issue initially replied that they found
the idea of incest to be abhorrent or 'disgusting'. On further
discussion, however, certain circumstances emerged in which incestuous
behaviour did not incur the same vehement disapproval. These can be
summarised as either where there was little disparity in age between'
those involved, or where both parties were adult.22 What was quite
unacceptable was an 'incestuous' relationship between a child and a
'close' adult. Notably, this did not have to be an explicitly sexual
relationship. What was unacceptable was any quasi-sexual behaviour
towards a child on the part of someone he or she was 'close* to, and
which, it was thought, would interfere with the level of care or
nurturance that the child was entitled to expect. For example, the
recruitment manager said;
I think there are some forms of incest where you don't necessarily 
have to, sort of, perform a sexual act to create incest. So I incest 
is] anything where, the actual relationship between the parent and 
the child isn't, sort of, a nurturing or fulfilling sort of 
relationship, [but] its a destructive one.
Similarly, the research scientist made it clear that it was not the
occurence of sex itself that was the problem, but
because it messes up everything else about the family. I don't
think of it as a filthy thing or anything like that.......... If it
was your father, I don't think you could look at your father in the 
same way. That would be the worst thing.
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For a number of reasons, incest involving sexual behaviour with a
young child was viewed as a far more heinous deed than the sexual abuse
of a child by a stranger. For example, it destroyed the trust that
should exist between family members, especially children and their
parents. As a 26 year-old woman, a public relations assistant, said
"It's not as if there's a stranger who's done this thing; you can't
blame an outside force. The force is actually within the family." This
same informant pointed out that, while a child who was abused by a
stranger could turn to his or her family for care afterwards, the child
subjected to abuse within the family had no-one to turn to. It was
thought that a child would not be able to publicly accuse a 'close'
family member of abuse, as the repercussions would be too disruptive.
On the other hand, the child would be permanently reminded of what had
happened by the continuing presence of the perpetrator. Finally, within
the idea that incest represented a breach of trust, was the sense that,
ideally, parents could be trusted to be asexual. As the health service
administrator put it:
I think you have defined roles in families and there are defined 
roles for a reason - for the protection of the family, if you like,
- and I just don't think those roles can be overstepped in a sexual 
context. You cannot see, say, a father as a father figure if 
there's this sexual role that comes into it as well.
One problem with incest then is that it undermines the concept of the
parent as an asexual being. While some informants made clear references
to additional ways of understanding incest (for example, as signifying
relations of power, more specifically male dominance), it was the focus
on 'closeness' and the asexual nature of those who give nurturance that
emerged most clearly.
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5,oV Flesh and blood1 as extended self
At this point I would like to return to the conclusions made in Chapter 
Four. It was suggested that, on the basis of attitudes to the body 
products of others, 'closeness' can be understood as a continuum; that, 
at one level, 'close' is an abbreviation for that which is close to 
being the same thing; one's children, especially when very young, can be 
conceived of as 'close' to the paint of being a part of the parent's 
being. This likeness-in-being appears similar to what Pitt-Rivers has 
described as "an extension of self" (1973). One model on which 
'closeness' seems to be based is that of the mother-child relationship 
in which the mother both bears and 'raises' the child. The mother and 
child can, for a time, be seen 'as one' in a way which parallels the 
traditional understanding of the husband and wife as one.23 'Sameness' 
and 'closeness* are epitomised in this instance by the act of 
breastfeeding (as opposed to sexual intercourse in marriage), with 
mother's milk emphasising both common substance and the nurturant 
quality of the relationship.
At the same time, 'closeness' and 'sameness' may be more loosely 
modeled on the the relationships subsumed under the category of 'flesh 
and blood'. Those included within this category, we saw earlier, 
generally understand themselves as the 'same'. This 'sameness' is to 
some extent represented by the sharing of common substance, namely 
'blood', although it has been shown (see section 5) that this is often 
not regarded as a physical substance. Despite the overlap between those 
of 'flesh and blood' and consanguineal relationships (particularly 
those between grandparents, parents and children), the main criterion
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for recognition as 'flesh and blood' is a social rather than biological 
one - namely being 'close'. As with the mother-child dyad, those of the 
same 'flesh and blood* have a mutual concern with 'upbringing', 
nurturance and protection; those of 'flesh and blood' are what Southwold 
(1971) has described as "cogeniates", in that they act in what is 
understood as a parental role (even though the child may be "the father 
of the man").
This raises the question of whether it is coincidence that the 
fundamental features of incest and those of 'flesh and blood' are one 
and the same, namely the relationship between a dependant and 'parent' 
who are to some varying degree, 'close' and the 'same'. If not, it 
would seem that, for my informants, the prohibition of incest is, 
essentially, the prohibition of sexual behaviour between those who are, 
to a large extent, the ' same' . • 23• 2S
In Chapters Three and Four we saw indications that, for my 
informants, the person is not necessarily a discrete entity but is, in 
certain circumstances, potentially 'open' to others who share a certain 
approximation. It emerges in this Chapter that those 'same' others with 
whom one is 'open' constitute a category regarded as sexually taboo; 
that there is a conflict between 'openness' and the bodily openness 
commonly assumed as central to a feminine heterosexual sexuality.
Perhaps more pertinent, sexual intercourse can be seen to be ideally 
concerned with otherness; Western attitudes towards homosexuality and 
masturbation, for example, appear to be premised on a model in which sex 
takes place with "the other". Therefore, where the self is extended to
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include those who are 'close' to being the same, it should not be
suprising if those identified as 'same' are also sexually taboo. This
is especially clear in the case of young children who have the closest
approximation of 'sameness' to those who 'raise' them.
This argument bears certain similarities to others in the debate
about incest. Schneider, for example, proposes that incest is
unacceptable behaviour in American culture because it
unifties] what is one to begin with by the device for unifying 
opposites..and failEs] to separate what was one into two, thereby 
directly inverting in one stroke both sides of the formula, that 
only different things can be divided by sexual intercourse and only 
united things made different (1980:40).
However, it was clear among my informants that incest did not
necessarily involve sexual intercourse, nor was it behaviour restricted
to biological parents and their children. Just as my informants appear
to have a more metaphysical understanding of 'blood* than the one
Schneider records for his American informants, so too is their
understanding of incest more abstract.
My informants* views appear closer to those of Heritier (1982), who 
has said that
[t]he symbolics of incest, based on the solid pillars of the 
identical and the different, has no necessary link with real, 
specifically genealogical, consanguinity (1982:176).
Heritier stresses that the criteria which are used to distinguish the
identical from the different will vary from society to society, with
each culture constructing its own "symbolics" around this issue. She
suggests that incest prohibitions can be understood in terms of the
avoidance of an excess of the identical, of the dread of carnal contact
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with one's own substance (1982: 175). Masturbation, Heritier states, is 
"an accumulation of the identical, perhaps the most perfect of all such 
accumulations" (1982: 176) and she notes parallels between beliefs 
concerning the outcome of masturbation and incestuous unions such as 
weakness or disease.
However, there are aspects of her argument with which I would 
disagree. For example, she suggests that "there exists at the very 
least a universal tendency to regulate sexual relations among those who 
are close" (1982: 152). To begin with, what she means by 'close' is not 
clear, but I would not wish to make any universal claims concerning 
incest prohibitions. Moreover, I disagree with Heritier*s assertion 
that incest prohibitions, after a primary concentration on heterosexual 
relations, are next concerned with those heterosexual relations that 
involve the risk of fertilisation. While homosexual incest is certainly 
widely overlooked, in English courts the strongest legal sanctions 
appear to be reserved for incestuous relationships which run no risk of 
being fertile ones.27'23
The relative's body
What has begun to emerge over this and the previous chapters is that 
'openness', 'sameness' and 'closeness' can all be seen as differently 
weighted expressions of a moral stance which is being represented in a 
bodily or physical idiom. This is made more explicit by the following 
section but will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
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Needham (1971) has noted that the English word 'incest' comes from 
the Latin castum, meaning chaste. Needham suggests that the idea 
underlying the English term is that incest is a transgression against 
purity and moral decency.23 Yet 'chaste', besides meaning purity, also 
implies virginity and, hence, bodily integrity30 (as may be imposed, for 
instance by a 'chastity belt'). The point was made in Chapter Four, 
following Jackson (1983), that bodily and moral integrity can be 
overlapping principles. Jackson has elaborated this by suggesting that 
bodily practices, such as not flinching or crying out during 
circumcision, can have a direct bearing on the personal realisation of 
social values, such as forebearance or the keeping of oaths. In other 
words, it is possible "to effect understanding through bodily 
techniques, to proceed through bodily awareness to verbal skills and 
ethical views" (1983: 337).
Jackson posits that the relationship between thought,language and 
activity is intrinsically closer in pre-literate societies than in 
modern literate ones; in the former, failure to uphold ethical 
expectations is more likely to be viewed in bodily terms. This view is 
not clearly supported by other writers, who suggest a link between the 
moral and the physical in western societies (cf. Sontag 1979, Homans 
1982, Kennen 1980). There is certainly some suggestion that my 
informants believe incest may lead to physical weakening and disease in 
any progeny from incestuous unions. If 'sameness' and 'closeness' 
denote an extension of self, a certain moral field, and sexual 
intercourse represents the fusion with self and other, it is arguable
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that incest prohibitions help establish an awareness of the physical and 
moral integrity of the extended self,
5,10) Conclusion
In terms of the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, it 
appears 'relatedness* is not necessarily a matter of genealogical 
connection, but a moral relationship described in spatial/physical 
terms. 'Relatedness' denotes a relationship that is based on an 
assumption of likeness of being, but the nature of this being is non- 
material. It is a metaphysical consubstantiality in which what is held 
in common may be shared in greater or lesser degree. Hence, a 
distinction is drawn between those of the same 'blood* and those of the 
same 'flesh and blood'.
The emphasis on the moral nature of 'relatedness' helps to cast 
further light on the meaning procreation holds for informants. At the 
same time, the relative insignificance which many informants give to 
genetic connection poses a number of questions with regard.to the 
development of new reproductive technologies. Both of these areas are 
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX 
REPRODUCTION AND PROCREATION
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Culture emphasises rather than overrides the natural tendencies. It 
remakes, with other elements, the family into the same pattern as we 
find in nature. Culture refuses to run riot. (Malinowski 1960: 217)
Introduct ion
It was suggested earlier (Chapter 5. 8) that the point of origin of a 
new family is not marriage but the arrival of children. While pregnancy 
and childbirth in western culture have been the focus of a variety of 
farms of analysis (regarding, for example, the social context or social 
relations of parturition), little attention has been given to the 
relationship of these processes to cultural understandings of 
procreation. In this chapter I suggest that 'procreative knowledge1 is 
difficult to ibie heqquqq it sqpp-R pore thqp pus king qf
worldview, referring both to a biomedical model of reproduction and to 
personal knowledge. At the same time, the nature of personal knowledge 
is such that it is difficult to articulate. The meaning procreation 
holds for informants is made more explicit by examining the reasons why 
people are thought to want children. This chapter also examines the 
methods informants said they would consider acceptable if they could not 
have the children they desired without the involvement of a third party 
(medical or non-medical). Surrogacy is given particular attention as a 
way of clarifying understandings of parenthood, especially motherhood; 
informants were given hypothetical situations to discuss concerning 
surrogacy in an attempt to discover the criteria of 'motherhood' and the 
kind of 'relatedness' that is signified by 'blood'.
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6.1) Reproduction and procreation
A distinction was drawn in Chapter One between 'reproduction' as the 
physiological processes of conception, pregnancy, birth and lactation as 
the foci of biomedicine, and 'procreation' as a symbolic construction 
which expresses certain ontological principles and social relations of a 
specific culture. It should, however, be stressed that this distinction 
is not a clear cut one. Pregnancy and birth, for example, have become 
widely recognised by anthropologists as biological processes that are 
shaped by the social and cultural context in which they occur1. Such 
shaping may come about in an number of ways. Cultural practices and 
social circumstances may, in themselves, modify pregnancy and birth: for 
example, the accepted age for marriage or sexual activity for women, 
type of marriage (monogamous, polyandrous, polygynous), residence 
patterns or breast feeding practices may all influence parturition 
(MacCormack 1982), Alternatively, while parturition is accompanied by a 
variety of social practices, cross-cultural evidence suggests it is 
commonly treated as a life-crisis event or rite of passage: in most
societies, birth and the past-partum period are treated as a time of 
vulnerability for both mother and child, if not for the entire family or 
wider community (Jordan 1983). Th-ls has led to the development of 
practices and beliefs which help to deal with the "existential 
uncertainty associated with birth" (Jordan 1983: 2) or "to facilitate 
the changing of condition without violent social disruptions" (van 
Gennep 1960: 48). Many traditional social practices and techniques 
associated with parturition have become subject to the influence of 
biomedicine (see, for example, MacCormack and Draper 1987). At the same 
time, western obstetricians are themselves under pressure to adapt to
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the views of lay people who have different understandings of 
reproductive processes (Jordan 1983). The biomedical model, for 
example, can be characterised as one which constructs parturition as 
pathological process (cf Davidson 1987) and opposed to a lay model which 
focuses on pregnancy and birth as 'natural' processes (Roberts 1984). 
Furthermore, a trend can be observed among some medical sociologists and 
birth activists in which those models of reproduction which emphasise 
its 'naturalness' are priviledged.32 Within this trend, what is 
'natural' is often left unexplored.
While it has been argued that 'nature' is a cultural construct 
(Schneider 1972), western ideas about 'nature' have often been concerned 
with our primate origins (MacCormack 1980), or the way the body 
functions (Jordanova 1980). It is assumed that 'nature' is 'the way of 
things', the unmiraculous, or what happens without human intervention.
On the basis that what is regarded as 'natural' is a cultural 
construction, it may be instructive to examine what is perceived to be 
'natural' about reproductive processes.
A number of informants suggested that 'nature' was something that 
should be unknowable or beyond grasp. One 27 year-old, Church of 
England manager thought, for example, that to bring about conception 
outside the body, as with in vitro fertilisation, was acceptable. 
However, ''if they start messing around with nature and develop clones - 
if it goes deeper than that - I think you have to draw the line'' (my 
emphasis). Katy's view of the 'natural' refers not only to the way
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things have always happened but, additionally, to the supernatural.
Signficantly, she regards the 'natural' processes of pregnancy and birth 
as 'mysterious' and 'magical'. For instance:
K: Amazing really, when you think about how you make a baby and how •
quickly it becomes a baby from when you conceive. You know, its
just a mass of cells and then it develops and you've got a baby! I 
think it's quite mysterious. Magical really.
J: Does it bother you that with in vitro fertilisation that you can see
(conception) happening, that it's outside the body?
K; Yes, because it's not natural when it happens outside. It's just
not done naturally. I don't know, I feel that something could go 
wrong as well, because it's kind of being touched isn't it, or 
tampered with, so for me, there'd be a fear that something could go 
wrong.
This perception of what is 'natural' as unknowable or beyond grasp - 
both physically and cognitively - appears to play an important part in 
many informants 'personal' knowledge concerning procreation (see 6.3).
The 'naturalness' of birth propounded by western birth activists
within the 'natural childbirth' movement shares similarities with this
view, in so far as understanding what is 'natural' as that which occurs
without medical intervention. It is, however, paradoxical that the
cause of 'natural* childbirth is championed by doctors such as Michel
□dent, among others, who have made 'natural childbirth' their specialty.
Moreover, as Martin has pointed out,
lilt is ironic that Odent's efforts to give birthing back to women 
occur at the cost of reasserting a view of women as animal-like, 
part of nature, not culture...we would do well to realise that his 
views share a lot with those nineteenth century writers who 
relegated women to the 'natural' realm of the domestic (1987:164).
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6.2) The social relations of reproduction
The western appositions that identify women with nature and men with 
culture have been evident in a further dichotomy which is said to have 
been constructed by the elite of the medical profession; a dichotomy of 
male strength versus female vulnerability (Jordanova 1980:45). The 
definition of women as biologically vulnerable (and thus unhealthy) has 
been viewed as instrumental in the subordination of women by men 
(Ehrenreich and English 1973), and in the evolution of women's health 
care, so that the control of ante-natal care and birth has shifted from 
women to doctors who are usually male (Oakley 1976; Versluysen 1981).3
Callaway (1978:173) argues that there is nothing unique about the 
male control of reproductive processes seen in western culture, 
referring to hierarchical systems of divination and healing in other 
cultures, where it is traditionally men who are called on when pregnancy 
and birth is less than straightforward -for example, with difficult 
births or instances of apparent infertility. Nonetheless, what is 
clearly occuring within western culture is a greater involvement of men 
in what have traditionally been regarded as female spheres, not only in
the management of pregnancy and labour, but in the sense of the
'couvade'.4- For example, more male partners seem to wish to be involved 
in the day-to-day experience of pregnancy as well as being present
during childbirth. One informant, a 24 year old manager, put this as
follows:
I think especially nowadays when (men) have become so involved in 
the pregnancy, their role is to help and support throughout the
pregnancy...being there at the birth and being made to feel that
they're carrying that child too, even though it's not in their body.
I think that their's is a joint, 50/50 role, (my emphasis)3
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The apparently increased emphasis on male involvement during 
pregnancy and childbirth is reflected in the suggestion that men should 
become more concious of their rights in relation to childbirth.3 Smart 
(1987) also finds increased demands by men for greater legal control 
over children are mirrored by shifts in policy that decrease the legal 
status of mothers. This increased emphasis on fatherhood has been seen 
to underlie the current development of reproductive technologies (see 
6.7 and 6.13 for further discussion). Moreover, many feminist writers 
have remarked on the number of photographs appearing in the media of 
'test-tube* babies in the arms of their mother's obstetrician, as 
apposed to the arms of their parents (see, for example, Pfeffer 1987; 
Direcks and Holmes 1986; Oakley 1987)7, seeing this as a new twist in 
medical paternalism.
Whether we are witnessing a new and more rampant form of 
appropriation of women's reproductive potential or whether it is merely 
a diversification of previous arrangements that is simply made possible 
by new technologies is an issue beyond the scope of this thesis. What 
is clear is that the social relations of reproduction are shifting. 
However, my principal concern is to explore a complex of nations or 
meanings associated with procreation that are indirectly linked to the 
social relations of reproduction.
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6.3) Procreation
Cultural perceptions of pregnancy and birth represent aspects of a much
wider complex that I shall refer to as 'procreation1. In this I partly
follow Delaney (1986) who uses the term to include understandings of the
way life comes into being, what the person is and how persons are
related to each other.3 Also useful here is the work of O'Brien (1981)
who argues that what is portrayed in textbooks of obstetrics and
gynaecology is much closer to what happens in male reproductive
experience, despite the fact that such texts are dealing with female
reproductive experience:
Vhat we find is the the whole process of reproduction is separated 
in arbitrary way from the historical, experienced reality of 
genderic relationships, of species continuity and of the social 
relations of reproduction. It becomes an abstract process, just as
paternity is essentially an abstract process. (1981: 46)
Instead of treating reproduction as a neat, unilinear process, O'Brien
proposes a different language to emphasise the dialectical nature of
reproduction and thus refers to the identifiable and important points in
reproductive process as 'moments'; the moments of menstruation,
ovulation, copulation, alienation, conception, gestation, labour, birth,
appropriation, and nurture3. The distinctions are important in that
most moments are involuntary, with copulation seen by O'Brien as a
"halfway house" in that it at least ought to be controlled by human
effort, Furthermore, alienation and appropriation are male moments,
copulation and nurture are moments shared by the sexes, while the rest
are "women's moments". These 'women's moments' are then further
differentiated:
Ovulation and conception are not tangible moments; they are not only 
involuntary, but are not immediately apprehended by
consciousness When we speak of voluntary and involuntary
moments, we have entered the realm of human will. When we speak of
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copulation and nurture, we speak of social relations. When we speak 
of appropriation, we speak of a relationship of dominance and 
control. Clearly, there is much more to reproduction than meets a 
narrow physiological eye (ibid:48).
O'Brien has suggested that reproductive processes are dialectical 
structures, instances of separation, unification and transformation and 
that this dialectical form is carried into the social relations that 
emerge from these processes. Hence "[rleproductive experience is 
differentiated at its most fundamental level in terms of gender: the 
opposition in question is the male/female opposition" (1981:44). Male 
reproductive consciousness is such that it is fragmented, discontinuous 
and premised on exteriority. In contrast, women's reproductive 
consciousness is characterised as continuous, integrative and founded on 
inferiority (1981: 59), Callaway makes a similar point when she says 
"Procreation for a man is momentary and external to him, while for a 
woman it lasts for a long period and is internal" (1978:165).
I would like to take O'Brien's concept of a reproductive 
consciousness a step further and propose a procreative consciousness. 
This too is a way of knowing and being that is informed by gender but it 
refers not only to the processes of reproduction and the social 
relationships that emerge from these but, in addition, to the breadth of 
issues covered by Delaney's definition of procreation. Moreover, I 
shall suggest that procreative consciousness is largely constituted by a 
form of knowledge that has been described by Polyani (1958) as 
'personal' or 'ineffable'.
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Polyani (1958) has used these terms to describe aspects of 
scientific knowledge, stating that western science is more dependent on 
perception, intuition and imagination than is generally acknowledged.
He suggests that, even though it is possible to explain separately the 
elements or particulars that constitute a whole, the relationship 
between those elements may escape description. Topographical anatomy 
provides a good example of this. Medical training begins with the 
learning of lists of bones, muscles, and organs which constitute a 
system. These parts of the body may be learnt relatively easily from 
diagramatic representations but the three-dimensional relationship 
between them as they are within the body cannot be adequately 
represented in this form. Even dissection, which directly reveals an 
anatomical part or region, cannot demonstrate more than one aspect of 
that region; it is left to the imagination to reconstruct from the 
experience of dissection the picture of the exposed area as it existed 
in the unopened body and to understand the relations of this area with 
neighbouring regions. The leap from representations of the body's parts 
to a knowledge of the spatial arrangement existing between these parts 
is what Polyani has described as "ineffable thought".10
In accordance with this view I suggest that, while informants may 
be able to describe elements of reproduction (such as the anatomical 
structures and processes, the role of the male or the female or even 
something of the nature of the resulting child), the relationships 
between these various elements - that is, the relationships which 
constitute them as a whole - are 'ineffable1.
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This is slightly different to the experiential knowledge that, for
example, Graham and Oakley (1981) have referred to and which is a
knowledge of one or more of the elements of procreation. Katy describes
this kind of experiential knowledge when she talks about her three
pregnancies in the following terms;
Your body's changing. With me especially, I'm really sick and then 
about the thirteenth week; its like magic. I know that by the 
thirteenth week that's going to ease. I don't think thats 
psychological. And then at sixteen weeks my waist goes - I mean 
your bust gets bigger and tender right from the beginning. Also 
with me, with all of them ther children], I've known. I've been 
pregnant before I've been two weeks late with my period. I know I'm 
pregnant even though I don't have any nausea. And then as soon as I 
hit fourteen days the nausea starts.
Katy describes this awareness of pregnancy as 'just a feeling that you
have'.
A more apt example of the intuitive or imaginative nature of Katy's
knowledge can be found within a discussion we had that began with a
request of Katy to explain her relationship with her mother. This was
an attempt to discover how mothers and daughters were understood to be
'related', rather than an enquiry into the personal dynamics existing
between Katy and her own mother. Katy began by answering "I'd explain
that I came from her. I came from inside her." It then transpired that
she would describe the relationship with her father in similar terms.
Really, you have been inside your father. You was his sperm, wasn't 
you .. .you need the sperm to make the egg. You've been inside your 
father and he's put you into...so you've been inside both your 
parents...He's put you inside of your mother and that's where you 
grow, .until you're ready to be born. That's how I would explain it 
to William and Sam - that they came from Daddy and Daddy gave them 
to me and I looked after them and grew them and then they were born.
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Here we see very clearly that Katy's model of procreation includes 
the idea that the male provides the basis of a new human being and this 
entity is then nurtured by the female. Katy additionally holds the view 
that a child's genetic substance is constituted equally by its father . 
and mother. For example, when Katy remarked on the similarity in 
appearance and mannerisms between all her children, and between her 
children and their father, I asked her how these similarities came 
about. She replied
Oh, I think just from the parents. I mean, all the sperm that 
Barry has must be kind of similar and all the eggs that I have must 
be similar, so I think that every time you make a baby it's a bit of 
you and a bit of him - and they do definitely look like their 
parents. 1 1 > 1 3:
However, as one of the few mothers in the study, Katy makes it
clear that, despite her evident recognition of male input in
procreation, she perceives that she has a greater link to her children 
than their father, saying "They're mine. Barry gets angry when I say 
that; he says "They're ours" ...I always say "my babies".
Significantly, the basis of Katy's 'stronger' ties with the children 
lies within the nurture she has given and continues to give them. For 
example:
J: So you think they (the children) are more yours than Barry's?
K: Definitely.,.if anything were to happen to Barry and me then they'd
be with me and stay with me Because they would be better with
me. I can give them so much more than Barry can in affection ways.
I don't know, I just think that children need their mother more. 
[Barry] couldn't look after the children the way I do.
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In reply to the question of whether carrying the children for nine
months contributed to her greater claim to the children, Katy replied
rather half-heartedly that she "supposetd] so". She added much more
confidently (despite searching for words),
I know fathers love their children, but there's a kind of a., how 
can I say this...I think there's a stronger kind of a bond with a 
mother and her children than with a father and his children. As 
much as I know Barry loves the kids, which he does - he idolises 
them - I still tend to worry about them more,,..it's hard to put 
into words what I mean.... I just feel that, God forbid, if anything 
was ever to happen to one of them, I think that [Barry] could cope 
with it better than I could, I mean, obviously he'd be devastated, 
but he could still cope with it better than I could. It's a strange 
feeling. Maybe as they get older.....
Thus the 'bond' Katy referred to implied a difference in the type 
and intensity of a child's relationship with his or her father and 
mother. Moreover, it bears some similarity to the 'closeness' Katy 
referred to between herself and her children during breastfeeding when 
"it's like they are you". She made this point again in a later 
conversation,
I could honestly say I'd do anything for my children, anything [but] 
I don't know what makes a person do it. I suppose [Jo's] a part of 
me....you can't put it into words. There is such a bond there. If 
someone were to hurt them it would be worse than if they hurt you - 
absolutely worse. You haven't got that bond with anyone else.
Katy understood 'bond' in terms of 'closeness'. For eaxmple, asked what
she would say about 'closeness' and her children, Katy replied
"extrememly close....Vhat frightens me, and it really does scare me, is
that something happens through the years to change that bonding."
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Katy's 'procreative consciousness' therefore seems to include not 
only a concept of how life comes into being but a sense of the 
continuing relationship between herself and her child, who initially is 
more or less the 'same' as herself but, with time, becomes more 'other' 
(this point will be examined further in Chapter Seven). O'Brien 
contrasts this kind of reproductive experience with that of the 
"alienation" characterisitic of male reproductive experience.13 Male 
reproductive consciousness is, according to O'Brien, a consciousness of 
discontinuity (1981: 53), a discontinuity which underlies the 
uncertainty of the genitor.1 ^
Signficantly, O'Brien does not refer to the genitor, only to 
'paternity', defining this as an abstract idea; "the conceptualisation 
of a cause and effect relationship, the relationship between copulation 
and childbirth" (1981: 30). Elsewhere, however, she states that 
paternity is "not a natural relationship to a child, but a right to a 
child" (1981: 54). In other words, O'Brien - like many other writers - 
uses * paternity' interchangably to refer to biological and socio-legal 
relationships. For the sake of clarity, I shall refer to a child's 
putative biological father as the genitor, while 'paternity' will refer 
to the legally recognised parental relationship between a man and a 
child.
O'Brien claims that, in resisting the alienation of their seed, men 
have claimed superior procreative potential for 'a sanctified sperm* 
(1981: 48). Since Aristotle there have been suggestions in western
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society that women contribute only 'material' while men contribute
spirit or soul or some other human essence. Hence the idea of 'potency'
goes far beyond the mere capacity to 'impregnante';
Potency is a masculine triumph over men's natural alienation from 
the process of reproduction...Potency is the name men have given to 
their historically-wrought success in mediating experienced 
contradictions in their reproductive consciousness. (O'Brien 1981;
49)
Not only does O' Brien suggest that the involuntary mechanics of 
ovulation and conception remain abstract in terms of male reproductive 
consciousness, but that 'masculine science and speculation* order the 
way these 'moments' are perceived according to masculine needs.
The work of Pfeffer (1985) is relevant here. She has argued, for 
example, that female fertility is measured by an event (a conception) 
which occurs in the presence of female passivity, whereas male fertility 
is conceptualised as a fertilising capacity, a potential (1985). 
Significantly, men's sperm are depicted as having agency. Pfeffer 
traces the idea that sperm are individual actors responsible for 
fertility back to Leeuwenhoek who in the seventeenth century was the 
first person to see and describe the male gamete. His observation led 
to a belief that each sperm contained the 'homunculus* which grew to 
maturity when placed in the uterus of the female. As Pfeffer points 
out, very similar assumptions appear to inform our perception of male 
fertility today. Medical texts imply the capacity of sperm for 
independent, purposeful existence despite findings by reproductive 
physiologists that it is probably the structural and mechanical features 
of the female reproductive system which directs the passage of 
spermatozoa to the ovum (1985: 39- 40).1S
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It is also relevant that many of the debates concerning 
reproduction focus on definitions and treatment concerning women 
(Pfeffer 1985). Pfeffer suggests that what has, for the most part, been 
ignored is an assumption within (and, often, I would add, without) the 
medical model of reproduction that the male reproductive system is 
vastly more efficient than the female. Such physiological efficiency is 
something of an illusion however; evidence of male pathology exists but 
is obscured as, for example, there is no medical specialty for diseases 
of the male reproductive system; the existence of these diseases is 
camouflaged by their incorporation into the specialty of urology. 
Moreover, the apparent simplicity of the male system may reflect little 
more than the lack of research that it has attracted (Pfeffer 1985 V  ^
This tendency to minimise the complexity of the male reproductive 
tract is also evident among my informants. Sixteeen informants' 
drawings of the masculine and feminine body (see Appendix: Drawing 
Series D and E) were discussed in Chapter Four (see Chapter 4.10).
These suggested that the masculine body is largely defined by informants 
through the external organs of sex and reproduction. In contrast, 
drawings of the male reproductive structures (see Appendix: Drawings 
Series C) made little reference to internal structures. Working on the 
basis that the penis and scrotum are 'external' but that the urethra or 
stored spermatozoa may be described as 'internal', I found that six 
women omitted all male internal structures from their drawings. Two of 
these informants left the page blank, saying, for example that "they 
hadn't a clue" what the male internal structures of reproduction were.
In contrast, the vast majority of informants drew a complex of female
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internal reproductive structures (see Appendix: Drawings Series B), but 
less often referred to external organs of sex and reproduction, such as 
the labia or clitoris (see Appendix: Drawings Series E). This trend 
reflects a bias (within, for example, family planning literature or 
school education) towards making only the female reproductive system 
evident and implictly problematic,
These findings concerning the potency and efficiency of male 
reproduction and the passivity and pathology of female reproduction 
support the argument that birth, as with other categories such as death 
or marriage, provides a focus for social strategies which both help 
define and reinforce the classifications of male and female (Callaway 
1978: 164). Moreover, to be female is to be immediately identified with 
biological reproduction: to bear a child is the most essentially female 
function while, in contrast, male identity is proclaimed predominantly 
through men's activities in the public sphere rather than through 
fatherhood (1978). The reproductive system is the only physiological 
system that is different between women and men and therefore lies at the 
centre of the debate about gender (Pfeffer 1985). Pfeffer argues that 
gender stereotypes are reproduced by assigning a passive role to the 
female and an active role to the male in conception. The view of 
procreation as echoing gender relations is evident among informants.
This was initially seen in Chapter Three in the context of a parallel 
between the male and female roles implicit in the Virgin Birth and in 
mundane reproduction (see Chapter 2.5 and 2.6). As reiterated in this 
chapter, it is suggested in Chapter Four that informants' drawings of 
male and female reproductive structures indicate that they uphold the
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multi-faceted model of procreation in which men initiate and women 
nurture (see Chapter 4.10). The following section presents further 
evidence within informant's drawings of the importance of gestation and 
nurturance, in the light of MacCormack and Draper's work.
MacCormack and Draper (1987) asked 268 Jamaican women to draw the 
female reproductive system as part of a study of the links between self 
affirmation of adulthood and sexuality and birth. They found that these 
women's drawings almost always showed the uterus as large (that is, 
taking up most of the abdominal space) while the vagina was shown to be 
relatively small. The authors suggest.that this emphasis on the uterus 
reflects the close association of women's social strength with the 
bearing and raising of children. In contrast, they found British and 
American university students emphasised the vagina (often drawing it in 
considerable detail) but depicted the other reproductive structures in a 
rather rudimentary fashion.
Unfortunately we are not given any details of these students. It 
is not clear, for example, if the students are male or female, or how 
closely they might identify with a biomedical model because of the 
nature of their studies. We know only that one Informant is a British 
medical student and one an anthropology student in America. It is 
therefore difficult to make any useful comment as to why these drawings 
should be different to those of my informants.
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Of these (see Appendix: Drawings Series B), many place a greater 
emphasis on the uterus, fallopian tubes and ovaries than on the vagina. 
For example, all sixteen informants make some reference to the uterus in 
their drawings while only seven make any unambiguous reference to the 
vagina. Three women make no reference at all to the vagina and a 
further three make no drawing of the vagina but label it nonetheless.
One woman draws a passage from the uterus to the outside of the body and 
labels this as the 'urethra' and another draws what appears to be pubic 
hair which she labels as 'vagina'.
These results may be influenced by the context in which the 
drawings were obtained; virtually all informants were attending a family 
planning clinic. The majority were therefore sexually active (or 
considering becoming so), and had not, however, experienced pregnancy.
It might be expected then that these women would emphasise the sexual 
rather than the reproductive aspect of the female body. However, not 
only was the vagina drawn less often or less emphatically than the other 
structures, but the external genitalia were not referred to by any 
informants (unless 'vagina* is used to denote the labia, as it appears 
to be on occasion). This stands in stark contrast to the emphasis on 
external organs in drawings of the male reproductive body and the 
absence of any elaboration of the male internal structures. This 
finding endorses the suggestion regarding the importance of exteriority 
attached to male procreation and of inferiority in the case of female 
procreation (see Callaway 1978; O'Brien 1981). It also suggests, along 
the lines of MacCormack and Draper's analysis (see 1987:146), that the 
carrying of a child plays an important part in attaining womanhood. 1 ^
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A range of data has been presented so far which suggests that 
gestation and nurturance represent signficant aspects of the female role 
in procreation, and that this role is more than the mere 'passivity' 
suggested by the Aristotelian model of male seed/female vessel. This 
finding supports the work of Rich (1977: 98) who describes women's 
1 inner space' not as a passive receptacle but "transformative, "active" 
or "powerful".13 The active nature of this role might be described as a 
female patency but of a different sort to that proposed by O'Brien, who 
says that pregnancy and menstruation are the visible signs of female 
potency, of the unity of potential and actual (1981:50). Her analysis 
refers to reproductive processes whereas I refer to procreative ones.
The signficance of gestation and nurture as a central tenet of 
informants' understandings of motherhood and their overall model of 
procreation will become clearer later, especially in the discussion of 
surrogate motherhood.
- 267 -
6.4) Motherhood
Chapter One described how, in western thought, women are widely 
perceived to be more closely linked to the 'natural' than men through 
their reproductive function (see, for example, Ortner 1974). Moreover, 
motherhood is assumed to be consistently central to the lives of women 
and that its universal characteristics play a significant role in 
determining other features of women's work and status (Lewin 1985). 
Firestone (1971), for example, perceives gender inequality (or "sex 
class") and the understanding of woman as 'other' to stem from women's 
role in reproduction. Equality for women can therefore only be brought 
about through the introduction of artificial reproduction controlled by 
women. Others, such as Chodorow (1974) identify women's "universal" 
secondary status with the role of mothering. Because women breastfeed 
babies, they are more readily available to provide other farms of care. 
The task of mothering is therefore allotted to women as a matter of 
convenience rather than necessity. For writers such as Chodorow, 
therefore, gender equality can be brought about through the 
reorganisation of parenting and the equal involvement of men and women.
The concept of 'mother' is not only formed by natural processes
such as pregnancy, birth and lactation but, as, for example, the
practice of adoption has long shown, is also a social, historical,
cultural and political construction1'3. However, this point seems to
have escaped many anthropologists, even though the institution of
'father', has been challenged. As Moore puts it,
In separating the father from the mother-child unit, contemporary 
anthropology has stressed the difference between motherhood and 
fatherhood, and has reinforced the Idea that 'mother' is the kin 
relationship most expressive of biological fact. The relationship
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between mother and child is particularly 'natural1 because of the 
indisputable fact that the woman in question has given birth to the 
child. (1988:24)
This is a strange admission in the context of the development of new 
reproductive technologies (see 6.7 and 6.12 below) which are causing 
many non-anthropologists to consider the 'naturalness' of the mother- 
child relationship and to query the very concept of 'mother'.30
The concept of 'mother' is not merely given in natural processes, 
nor is it simply a matter of cultural diversity in the way that women 
act as mothers - for example, whether a mother is ideally warm and 
loving or remote and authoritarian in any culture. As Moore argues, it 
is also a question of the extent to which the category of 'woman' in any 
culture is linked to perceived attributes of motherhood, such as 
nurturance (Moore 1988: 25). Indeed, in a large number of societies, 
the concept of 'woman' is not elaborated through ideas about motherhood, 
fertility, nurturance or reproduction (Collier and Rosaldo 1981).
W.es.tsra,..u.nd.ar.s.t.andiiiga-of motherhood
In western culture, the overlap between the categories of 'woman' and
'mother' is considerable. Ideas about women are strongly linked to
ideas about marriage, family, the domestic sphere and children so that
the definition of 'woman' comes to be highly dependent on the concept of
'mother' (Moore 1988:25). Antonis (1981) claims that motherhood is the
chief occupation for which girls are reared. As Rich has said,
Ve are seen primarily as mothers; all mothers are expected to 
experience motherhood unambiguously and in accord with patriarchal 
values and the "non-mothering" woman is seen as deviant. (1979:197)
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However, while it is assumed both in medical and popular ideologies that 
all women want to bear children, single women, lesbian women and 
disabled women are expected to forgo this experience in the interests of 
the child (Stanworth 1987b). To deliberately conceive a child outside 
of marriage is regarded as 'selfish', just as it is 'selfish' to 
deliberately avoid childbearing within marriage (Grundberg and Dowrick 
1980).
Macintyre (1976) wryly suggested that among health professionals, 
the 'selfishness' of the unmarried mother becomes transformed by 
marriage into 'maternal instinct'. Many health workers, she argues, 
assume that married women will want children and that pregnancy, when it 
occurs, will be a welcome state. Married women will therefore be 
unlikely to request a termination of pregnancy or to express ambivalence 
towards the prospect of bearing a child. At the same time, it is 
assumed that childlessness in married women is involuntary and that, in 
the absence of conception, married women will eventually seek clinical 
investigation. Unmarried women, however, are thought to have a less 
powerful 'maternal instinct'; they will not become pregnant, or if they 
do so, they will seek abortion. For such women to continue with a 
pregnancy and not offer the child for adoption represents selfish and 
aberrant behaviour. According to this presumption, suspected 
infertility in a woman without a longstanding heterosexual relationship 
does not warrant investigation. These contrasting assumptions suggest 
that the 'maternal instinct', although widely understood to be a 
'natural' phenomenon, is influenced by the social event of marriage. 
These assumptions should also be viewed in the light of the fact that,
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in England and Vales during 1985, almost one live birth in five occurred 
outside marriage (OPCS 1986).
Rothman observes that selfishness is the most hurtful accusation 
which can be hurled at mothers; women in general, but mothers in 
particular, are understood as 'good' in as much as they are prepared to 
be caring and giving; "[mien and women both learn that women's needs 
are less important, that women's needs, and especially mothers' needs, 
come second, if not at all" (1988:239).
Katy made this clear in a remark she made about her desire for a 
daughter. She believed that a daughter would be more a part of her, and 
would be more of a friend in adult life than a son.31 To want a 
daughter was, however, a selfish wish, as it was wanting something for 
herself. On the other hand, Katy believed that women who did not have 
children were selfish. However, this was not on the grounds elaborated 
by Grundberg and Dowrick (see above), but because women without children 
become selfish;
I think if you haven't got children you're very self-centred because 
you haven't really got anyone to think of but yourself.. I know 
quite a few people who haven't had children and they are...not so 
much when they're young but when they're older; I think it must be a 
build up of years of thinking just me, me, me.
Here Katy refers to 'people' without children, but the specific examples
she gave later were all women.
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As Oakley has remarked, femininity and motherhood are closely 
linked in western culture (1979). Mothers represent the feminine woman 
par excellencet not only through having their children obediently within 
marriage or through always subjugating their own needs to those of 
others; health promotion literature, at least on occasion, has portrayed 
the pregnant woman as having "reached the pinnacle of femininity"
(Graham 1977). Gynaecologists and obstetricians perceive themselves not 
only as experts in female pathology but in what is feminine (Scully and 
Bart 1973). Significantly, many of my informants associated womanhood 
more closely with becoming a mother than with other socio-physiological 
events, such as menarche or the loss of virginity.33
Vomen. mothers and nurturance
In a discussion of motherhood it is important to remember that there is
a clear distinction between the uniquely female processes of gestation
and childbirth on the one hand and 'mothering' - that is, nurturing and
caring for others - on the other; there is nothing to restrict
mothering to the female sex (Chodorow 1979; Dinnerstein 1987). Despite
the widespread belief in an innate 'maternal instinct' among women,
(that is, of an individualistic desire for childbearing and an inborn
ability for the care Df children), a woman who has no experience of
young children will not know how to feed and care for a newborn baby
(Antonis 1981). 'Mothering' is often assumed to be the exclusive
province of women but, as Shaw and Darling observe,
[blecause we would like tD believe in the sanctity of motherhood, we 
may be loath to admit that maternalism, as defined as caretaking 
behaviour, is not biologically programmed in the genes of the female 
(1985:13).
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They suggest that females among animals and humans take on the 
caretaking role simply because they are the ones who are there when a 
baby is born.
The children's nanny has been identified as an apt phenomenon to 
demonstrate the social nature of 'mothering* (Drummond 1978) and the 
relationship between the categories of 'woman' and 'mother* (Moore 
1988).33 Depending on the way 'mothering' is defined, a 'surrogate 
mother', such as a nanny, might be considered more of a 'mother' to the 
child in her charge than her mistress might be; it was the nanny who
was most readily available to play, to feed and clothe, to instruct, to
discipline and to comfort the child. Thus, according to Drummond (1978), 
there is a difference between the 'real* mother beloved by genealogists 
and the 'cultural unit* of mother. Drummond suggests the cultural unit 
in England during the heyday of the nanny incorporated a number of 
women, including women of very different class backgrounds. It now 
seems that, in the era of the new reproductive technologies, the 
cultural unit of 'mother' may again include two or more women, quite
possibly of very different socio-economic class (see section 7 for a
fuller discussion).
The employment of nannies by upper-class women was not seen as a 
dereliction of maternal duty in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. However, since the 1950's, the charge of neglect has, to a 
greater or lesser extent, been levelled against mothers needing or 
wishing to find work beyond the domestic sphere. The work of Bowlby 
(see, for example, 1951) has been viewed as instrumental in encouraging
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mothers to provide full-time child care or risk long term, detrimental 
effects on their child's psycho-social development. However, Riley 
(1979) has suggested that this focus on the mother-child relationship 
should be seen as part of a broader post-war social philosophy 
concerning the necessity to open up the family to intervention, and a 
part of the development of a welfare state. Such a 'benevolent' 
intrusion into what had previously been perceived as a private sphere 
was accomplished by targeting the housewife and mother as the 'heart' of 
the family and by emphasising her need for training in this central role 
(Riley 1979). Hence, as Drummond (1978) has said, it is necessary to 
ask "What is a mother in culture X?" in a way which locates the concept 
of 'mother' amid others, if a coherent picture is to be formed. With 
this in mind, it is relevant to consider what is meant by the concept of 
the child.
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6.5) Perceptions Qf._chHdran and childhood.
Just as mothers and mothering have been variously understood 
historically and cross-culturally, so too have children3 .^ While it is 
easy to assume that childhood is a category fixed by certain biological 
and psychological facts, it should be recognised as a largely social 
construct (Freeman 1983). The different notions of childhood throughout 
western history help to demonstrate this point but there is also some 
dispute among historians as to the nature of childhood through the 
ages. 3Si
According to Freeman (1983), the modern, western notion of the 
child associates him or her with all sorts of negative qualities, such 
as weakness, irrationality or pre-logicism and imbecility. Foucault 
has made the observation that "Cm3adness is childhood" (1967:252). 
Hughes (1988) puts this rather differently in stating that children 
today, along with others such as women, animals, ©laves, and the insane, 
belong to a certain class of being, the 'not men', and share a certain 
irrationality. This raises the possibility that the understanding of 
children as part of the extended self (see Chapter Five) may be an 
experience confined to women, Moreover, this may be a uniquely feminine 
experience for a number of reasons and not, that is, simply the 
consequence of a division of reproductive labour.
Freeman suggests that while childrearing is apparently now more 
permissive among all sections of the population than in the past, 
certain elements of earlier philosophies remain (1983). For example, 
the child is still understood more as property than as person, and the
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autonomy of parents (especially fathers) is emphasised (ibid).2e;
Overall posits that, if children are a commodity, it becomes important 
to obtain one's ovm. Children - that is, other people's children - 
cannot be appreciated for their own sake; it becomes important to 
possess one or more of one's own (1987). To be infertile therefore is 
not to lack the opportunity to spend time with children per se but to 
miss the chance to possess one. Ownership is interpreted in terms of 
genetic ties with the child (Overall 1987). This view, Overall 
believes, is more prevelant among men who especially cast children as 
the means to genetic continuity (see also Snowden et al 1983). Rothman 
(1986) has also suggested that, for men in particular, parenthood means 
genetic parenthood; fathers generally do so little parenting they have 
scant opportunity to become social fathers, hence they are more 
dependant on an assumed genetic relationship than mothers in defining 
their relationship with a child.
We should not lose sight of the fact that many writers have
referred to the negative value that is attributed to children. It has
been argued, for example, that contemporary ideas about childhood have
developed, not through contact between adults and children, but through
the lack of it (Farson 1978) and that western childhood is designed to
fit the needs of adults rather than children (Holt 1974). Greer
suggests that in western culture we do not like children:
[tlhe modern Western infant is wanted by fewer people than any 
infants in our long history - not only by fewer parents but by 
smaller groups of people (1984:2).
She supports this statement by painting to the lack of public facilities
for children, the isolation of those who care for them and the value
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placed on the female body in which the hips are narrow and the breasts 
are small - that is to say on the female body that denies fecundity. 
Overall (1987), however, refers to this kind of argument as 
'exaggeration*; failing to take into account the needs of children, she 
points out, cannot necessarily be interpreted as a hostility towards 
them. If it is indeed the case that children are not highly esteemed, 
the current emphasis on reproductive technology appears paradoxical. It 
might suggest that it is not children per se who are wanted, but that 
they represent the means of fulfilling some other desire.27 
Nonetheless, the status of children in English society has changed in 
the late part of the twentieth century in that the welfare of children 
for the first time begins to take precedence over the legal rights of 
parents (Smart 1987: 109).
Reasons for having a child
Why do people have children? The reasons people give for wanting to 
become parents or to have a child appear to vary tremendously. A 
couple's agreement to have a child together has been seen as an 
assumption underlying most marriages (Voollett 1985). Pfeffer and 
Voollett (1983) found among women they interviewed that women sometimes 
wanted a child who would be a reflection of themelves. Some women 
wanted to experience pregnancy and childbirth, to 'bear a child'. For 
some men and women having children represented a sense of achievement, 
although precisely what was achieved appeared to be understood 
differently according to sex. One man, for example, referred to a son 
as an extension of his own male power. Another saw a child to be proof 
that a man was a fully sexual person. In other words there was a
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conflation between fertility and sexuality. Among women, there was an 
explicit link between fertility and femininity - 'real* women were 
understood as fruitful. Motherhood was seen to confer new status, one 
that was female and adult. Some women saw a child as a tangible product 
of a couple's life together. One woman indicated the importance of 
giving birth herself as she said of her adopted daughter; "I wish she 
had come out of my body".
Those of my informants who wanted children found it difficult to 
articulate why they did so, but a number of suggestions were offered.
For example, children were seen as the bringers of love, happiness and 
pleasure. As the 32 year-old barmaid with a history of ectopic 
pregnancy said,
I always thought I didn't (want children) - all the way through my 
twenties I thought I could manage without them. But having seen how 
much pleasure my father has derived from having a new, young family 
(because I was an only child), I never actually realised what family 
life was like or could be like. I think if I don't have children 
that I'll be missing something.
Having children was also seen as an act of creation and continuity: 
A 26 year-old midwife stated, for instance, that "[children] keep the 
continuity going in a way....It's something that you've created, that 
you're giving to as well." A 27 year-old, married manager said "It's an 
extension of the family I suppose. I'd like to have something that's a 
part of myself and my husband, to have something that we've made 
together." One 37 year-old company director with two children observed 
that what was important about having children was "the fact that a 
child's a bit of him and a bit of me." But this dual aspect of the
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child does not necessarily refer to genetic constitution. For example, 
a 24 year-old manager thought "It would be nice to have something 
between us. To say 'a symbol of our love' sounds terribly crass...but 
it works."
An assumption that having children was central to marriage (or its
common law equivalent) was made explicit by a 26 year-old public
relations officer.
I'd feel actually very guilty not being able to conceive. I've 
thought about this especially because he wants children and I would 
feel that I wasn't worth as much if I couldn't conceive in our 
relationship together because I wouldn't be able to contribute a 
definite part of what we would be planning our life around together. 
If I couldn't deliver that, it would be a major upset and a major 
rethink of the whole relationship.
Other reasons included providing life with some purpose; having 
children meant having done something with one's life. Alternatively, 
having children, for one 30 year-old nurse, meant fulfilling the body's 
purpose in that, if she did not have children "I'd feel I'd missed out 
something as being a woman, [that] I hadn't used my body to its full 
extent."
Several informants referred to having children in terms of 
'closeness'. An administrative assistant of 21 years said "Of course I 
don't know what I'd be like if I did have children. It's something I've 
always wanted. I've always wanted to be close to someone - just us two 
and then make something else." Similarly a 28 year-old distribution 
assistant observed that "I think I just want children the same way any 
woman wants children...[for] the closeness of children. I wouldn't like
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to be an old lady without children." The theme of wanting children as a 
means of support in later life was a relatively common one. The 24 year- 
old manager said, for instance, "I know I look after Mum and Dad now and 
I like to think somebody's going to look after me when I get older. I 
mean, it's the fact of not being lonely."
As to why Katy wanted children, part of her answer was concerned
with long-term support. Vhile she had a desire for her own family, a
"little family within a family", she also recognised the benefits of a
younger generation of 'family' !
"I think for when I'm older as well. I think it will be lovely when 
I'm older. I’d hate to be like Joan [her widowed step-mother]. 
Really, she's got no-one. It’s nice to be ....to have your grown-up 
children and you know that you've got family there. Especially for 
me because I haven't got brothers and sisters. So to know that I've 
got three children - maybe four - would be lovely. Because they're 
always there should you need them. I've got this great thing 
about....you can always turn to your family. You know, touch wood, 
if our house burnt down and we were completely homeless, it would be 
someone in the family that took us in, nobody else, no matter how
cramped it would be And when I say this I'm talking about both
sides; I'm talking about Barry's family and mine. [Family] do 
things for you that other people just wouldn't want to do - apart 
from for their own family.
However, children were not only seen in terms of extending the 
network of support provided by family. As suggested in Chapter Five and 
earlier in this chapter (section 6.3), Katy clearly refers to her 
children not only as 'close' but as a part of herself, This sense of 
the child as self was hinted at by other informants. For example, the 
24 year-old manager said "I think sometimes children are a very self 
thing - it's very selfish - well it's not selfish but it's very much a 
personal reason for wanting to have them."
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The idea of the child initially as 'self' contradicts a comment by
Drummond who suggests
"[the birth of a child] is a dramatic intrusion by a non-cultural 
being into the heart of the domestic sphere. A woman, in nurturing 
and protecting that being, establishes a perilous conjunction 
between opposites: a fully human adult becomes intimate with a non- 
human, even anti-human, form (1978: 31).
Drummond not only suggests a set of dichotomies along the lines of
nature: culture:: child: woman,20 but additionally argues that these
dichotomies provide the basis for an ontological argument that the
mother-child relationship is a self-other opposition. However, while
the developing child may progressively learn to distinguish itself from
its mother (see informants understanding of the development of
personhood; Chapter 3.2), nothing in my informants' comments suggests
that mothers perceive their babies as 'other'. If anything, children
were portrayed as ambiguously part of self. This perception may, in
turn, be linked with other statements about parenthood, in which
children are considered in terms of the role a parent plays in 'raising'
them. As one 20 year-old student put it:
For me (wanting children) is just the thought of having something to 
bring up. I don't care if it's mine or not! I suppose it's because 
of the way I was brought up and I feel I want to do it myself.
Such links between the mother and child as an extended self and the
process of 'bringing up' a child will be explored in greater detail in
Chapter Seven.
Finally, one point that consistently arose when talking to 
informants about children was an assumption that most women strongly 
desire to have children - even if this was not the case for the 
informant herself?3 Moreover, it was understood that, among those
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women who had decided on parenthood, those who had difficulty in 
conceiving would become 'desperate'. For example, one 30 year-old nurse 
opined that "if you look at childless couples, they are so desperate to 
have a child that they'll go to any lengths."
Katy painted a similar picture of the infertile. While she had
reservations about the development of reproductive technology, she added
...but then, if you think about people who can't have children and 
are desperate and its affecting their whole life and they're so sad
and miserable, it's easy for me to sit back and say it shouldn't be
done,because I've got children. But I'm sure if I didn't have 
children 1 would try anything.
Desperation was therefore viewed as understandable and, in itself, 
provided strong justification for the development of reproductive 
technologies such as in vitro fertilisation. Desperateness was referred 
to more often as a raison d'etre for the technology than, for example, 
disrupting the transmission of inherited disease.
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6.6) Infertility
Infertility is a self-imposed definition in as much as there is no 
standard recognition of the normal length of time it takes to become 
pregnant. The point at which frustration is acknowledged will vary, as 
will the response to such frustration. Seeking medical advice is only 
one of a number of options which include, for example, applying to adopt 
a child or mourning the loss of a potential relationship (Voollett 
1985). The choice of options is influenced by the social perceptions 
attending a variety of factors such as age, marital status, class, and 
ethnic background, yet these social factors are rarely acknowledged in 
discussions about the needs of the infertile (Pfeffer 1987). Vhat is 
more, there is no evidence to suggest that those who choose to take 
their fertility problem to a doctor are more 'desperate' to have a child 
than those who pursue other solutions. Nor can the group that opts for 
medical intervention be seen as homogenous; not all women and men who 
attend infertility clinics are prepared to countenance all the 
investigations and techniques available there (1987), Pfeffer argues 
that such differences are not evidence that some clinic attenders have a 
stronger desire for parenthood than others, but that real social 
differences, such as in class, income or education, exist among those 
who are infertile.
The new reproductive technologies and the ethical isses they raise 
have drawn attention to the condition of infertility. At the same time, 
there has been little attempt to locate infertility within a social or 
historical context. Corea et al (1987) suggest that motherhood is 
presented as increasingly more important for women, pointing to the fact
- 283 -
that in Britain there have been periods when as many as 25% of women did 
not marry and have children. However, these authors do not address the 
issue of how these non-mothers were perceived. Moreover, the suggestion 
by Corea et al that motherhood is being increasingly emphasised is 
countered by other evidence, such as a study comparing 617 women born in 
1950 and 533 women born in 1935, This shows a significant increase in 
voluntary childlessness among the group of younger women (Johnson et al 
1987). The authors of this study believe that this increase possibly 
reflects the relatively recent availability of effective contraception, 
together with improved career opportunities for women. Signficantly, 
the study found no evidence of a change in the prevalence of involuntary 
childlessness, despite an increased demand for specialist referral.
The increased demand for subfertility investigation among those who 
have decided on parenthood is reflected in the change in attitude which 
has occured towards the technique of Artificial Insemination by Donor 
(AID).30 It has been suggested, for example, that negative attitudes 
towards AID - for instance, that the practice constitutes a threat to 
marriage and society - waned as AID increasingly came to be seen as a 
way of enhancing family life for the childless; it was childlessness 
itself that was becoming the problem; "Childlessness was in fact the 
very antithesis of the nuclear family ideal" (Smart 1987: 107).
Further, as Pfeffer (1987) observes, social factors such as 
nutritional status, environmental hazards or iatrogenic effects on 
fertility, such as hormonal contraception, are ignored; infertility is 
perceived as a spontaneous, idiopathic condition (see also Crowe 1987;
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Raymond 1984). The statistics of infertility are presented in a way 
that emphasises the failure of specific organs such as the ovary, 
testicle or pituitary gland, but there is little explanation as to which 
social groups are likely to become infertile. Nor is there any thought 
given to why people want children. Pfeffer argues that, as with other 
socially stigmatised conditions "tilt seems that once you find yourself 
involuntarily childless, all other identifying marks are swept away " 
(1987: 82).
In this context the 'desperation' attributed to the infertile 
suggests that what troubles them is not the absence of a child, but an 
emotional disorder which stems from this absence. Infertility is imbued 
with other negative associations. Beyond the image of selfishness that 
accompanies voluntary or involuntary childlessness (see 6.5), many 
people appear to identify infertility with sexual sin (Greer 1984:51). 
Raphael-Leff reports on the way the infertile themselves may attribute 
their childlessness to earlier sexual transgressions or view it as 
punishment for abortion, venereal disease or masturbation (1986:29). 
Laqueur (1989) records an assumption evident since the high Middle Ages, 
that prostitutes are 'barren' or unlikely to have children because they 
were 'public women' in whom "the semen of so many men was mixed" (1986: 
337), thus representing the antithesis of 'the family* as it is 
understood in modern England. This points to a paradox referred to 
earlier, that the ideal mother is an asexual creature, although with the 
exception of the Virgin Birth, she has traditionally only been able to 
attain motherhood through sexual intercourse,31
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While recognising that infertility is a very negative experience 
and that most infertile women and men will at times experience despair, 
Pfeffer disputes an inevitable and unremitting association between 
infertility and 'desperation* (1987), Such desperation she suggests may 
not be intrinsic to childlessness, but a product of the humiliating, and 
often perplexing, treatment that the childless receive from the very 
people who claim to be rescuing them from 'desperation'. Indeed, it 
appears to be primarily in the interests of doctors and embryologists 
working in the field of infertility to portray the infertile as 
'desperate'. Ironically, a study reported in 1979 found that those 
attending infertility clinics wanted better organised clinics and more 
psychological support, rather than new techniques (Owens and Read 1979). 
Yet it has been the same doctors perceived as unsympathetic in their 
administration of the basic methods of infertility investigation who are 
now involved in the deployment of new techniques, techniques justified 
on the grounds of alleviating the 'desperation' of the childless 
(Pfeffer 1987).
Reproductive medicine
The medical management of infertility was traditionally unpopular with 
gynaecologists, partly because of its uncomfortably intimate nature and 
because, prior to the development of new reproductive technologies, 
those treating infertility could claim little specialist knowledge or 
treatment (Pfeffer 1987:86). Investigations such as the 'post-coital 
test' have played a pivotal role in infertility investigations, but 
cannot claim to conform to the criteria of science; there is little 
uniformity in the way such tests are performed or how their results may
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be evaluated (Pepperell et al 1980: 112). In addition, those who 
treated infertility in the past had difficulty in claiming that 
pregnancy came about by their intervention alone. In contrast, new 
reproductive techniques have overcome many of these dissatisfactions in 
that they provide doctors with a high status area of research, together 
with complex and highly specialised techniques. When pregnancy does 
result from these techniques, it is clear who can take the credit 
(Pfeffer 1987:87). There are also greater financial incentives to 
employ the new techniques, particularly in the private sector. Indeed 
much of the new technology is only available beyond the National Health 
Service, notwithstanding the fact that the profit motive and the 
interests of the patient are often incompatible (Pfeffer 1987). 
Underlying the scepticism with which many writers regard the new 
technologies is an awareness that, while these new 'services' for the 
infertile are rapidly proliferating, there has been little accompanying 
research into the actual causes of infertility or the more basic 
investigation and treatment (Raymond 1984; Pfeffer 1987).
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6,7) New reproductive...technologies
The new reproductive technologies are not only informative about the 
priorities of biomedial practitioners. The male reproductive process 
has always been fragmented. Now the way in which new reproductive 
technologies fragment the female reproductive role into a number of 
distinct processes helps to deconstruct the notion of motherhood.
Reproductive technology is not new; methods of fertility control 
have been known of in some form for hundreds of years (McLaren 1984). 
Stanworth (1987a) has identified four different kinds of reproductive 
technology; those of fertility control, of the management of pregnancy 
and birth, of embryo and neonatal care (including the modification of 
innate 'defects'), and of conceptive technologies for the 'treatment' of 
infertility. Thus reproductive technologies are very different in 
purpose. They are also very different in kind; even within the category 
of conceptive technologies, often associated with highly complex 
processes, there are a number of techniques, such as AID, that are 
simple to perform and/or require no medical intervention. As a whole, 
these technologies are difficult to appraise; their value to any 
individual consumer will depend on personal circumstances and 
priorities. At the same time, such technologies cannot be understood 
without reference to a range of influences, such as understandings of 
gender role, the politics of health care, and the current legal system, 
which shape the way in which parenthood and 'the family' are understood 
(Stanworth 1987a).
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In this dissertation I concentrate on a small number of conceptive 
technologies, namely in vitro fertilisation (IVF), AID, and ’full’ or 
'partial' variants of surrogacy made possible by these techniques.
Other technologies exist within this category, such as GIFT (gamete 
intra-fallopian transfer), but these are not dealt with here, either 
because they were not widely in use at the time I did fieldwork or 
because they do not raise substantially different issues.32
The new reproductive technologies have been welcomed by many on the 
grounds that they offer new choice to many of those who would otherwise 
be unable to have their 'own* child. In addition the technology may, to 
some extent, determine the kind of child produced (for example, where 
AID is used to avoid transmiting an inherited disease). Many of those 
in favour of the new technologies are among the medical establishment, 
the infertile or 'carriers' for genetically determined disease.
Those counselling caution in the application of these technologies 
are generally less directly involved. The variety of arguments range 
from scepticism concerning the safety and effectiveness of the 
techniques to ethical concerns. In terms of technical effectiveness, it 
is pointed out, for example, that the techniques of IVF involve the 
risks of both surgery and hormone therapy (Spallone 1987: 173; Direcks 
and Holmes 1986), IVF babies show a relatively high incidence of 
congenital abnormalities such as spina bifida (Lancaster 1987).
Moreover, the 'success rate', that is the number of live births 
achieved, is low (Vines 1988). There is evidence to suggest IVF is 
associated with high pregnancy lasses at all stages of development and
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not only in association with multiple pregnancies; the incidence of pre­
term births in single pregnancies has been found to be three times that 
in comparable population based figures (Australian IVF Collaborative 
Group 1985) .
In ethical and legal discussions concerning new reproductive 
technologies the debate has been centred on the problems attending 
research and treatment, both now and in the future. Some arguments, 
for example, highlight the possiblility that increasing knowledge and 
manipulation of human reproduction mark 'a slippery slope' towards a 
'Brave New World', where techniques such as ectogenesis (that is, fetal 
development outside the uterus) will allow unparalleled and unethical 
intrusion by the state into individual lives (see, for example Corea 
1985; J. Gallagher 1987),
Even within the bounds of existing knowledge, reproductive
technologies pose a range of ethical problems. For example, the Church,
particularly the Roman Catholic Church, regards techniques such as IVF
to be against natural law and wrong in that they rupture the 'unitive'
and the 'procreative' aspects of heterosexual sexual intercourse (J.
Gallagher 1987).33 Reproductive technologies intersect with fundamental
values, such as the life of the human being brought into existence, the
nature of the transmission of life in marriage, and the unity of the
family (Spagnolo et al 1989). According to these authors
artificial procreation ....corrodes the unity of the human being and 
the unity of the body and spirit: the conjugal act, by which the 
couple mutually express the gift of themselves, at the same time 
expresses an opening to the gift of life; it is an act which is 
inseparably corporal and spiritual.... Reproductive technologies 
degrade and reduce the conjugal act to a technical act. And a
- 290 -
technical act constructs the object (the embryo) and the object 
remains ontologically non-homogenous compared to the subject, and 
the subject that constructed the object can dominate it. (1989: 23)
According to this view, not only do reproductive technologies degrade
sexual intercourse by turning it into a technical act but the unity of
the family is compromised by 1hererologous procreation' or the
introduction of a third party, whether they contribute sperm, ovum,
embryo or gestational environment (1989). IVF and artificial
insemination (A.I.) pose additional problems for the Catholic Church in
that they are dependent on masturbation, an act condemned by the Church
even though, in this instance, masturbation is not a matter of 'spilling
seed on the ground' but a means to procreation (Singer and Veils 1984).
Many writers have voiced concern over the conceptive technologies
in that they pose two kinds of ethical issues; those raised by the
potential for control of human germinal material outside the body (see,
for example Gallagher 1987), and those associated with the different
forms of parenthood made possible through reproductive technologies.
These new categories of parenthood did not exist as isolates before and
are therefore forcing a consideration of issues that were previously in
the realm of biological givens. Hence
[bly altering the boundaries between the biological and the social - 
by demanding human decision where previously there was biological 
destiny - the new technologies politicise issues concerning 
sexuality, reproduction, parenthood and the family (Stanworth 1987a: 
2).
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There is, however, a third sphere which has received less 
attention. As already noted, women not only bear children but are 
defined predominantly by their reproductive capacities (Stanworth 
1987a). Reproductive technologies are therefore bound to have some, if 
unknown, impact on most women's lives. Similarly, Spallone (1989) 
argues that both old and new reproductive technologies are based on a 
scientific approach which omits any reference to women as subjects of 
human reproduction. Hence medical and scientific 'experts’ refer to 
eggs, fetuses, uteri, body parts and biological processes, but not to 
women as whole human beings. Spallone is'unusual in that she refers to 
women's experiential knowledge of reproduction.3-* This experience, she 
claims, can shape women's self-concept and the way in which women relate 
to the world (1989: 17). Such experiential knowledge is generally 
considered 'unscientific' and is therefore largely ignored. Thus, she 
argues, there is no respect for 'women's integrity' in ethical 
judgements about invasive procedures on women's bodies (1989: 28)?s 
Similarly, Raymond (1987) has argued that those in favour and those 
against the use of new reproductive technologies use the language of 
embodiment. However, those in the first group ('the fetalists') refer 
to the body of a woman that is shared or inhabited by the husband, the 
fetus or even the state - hence women become 'body objects'. For the 
second group ('the feminists'), women are 'body subjects'; a woman is her 
body. 'Fetalists' and 'feminists' therefore use embodiment language in 
different ways; feminists are concerned less with the fetus than with 
the way the new reproductive technologies dissociate reproductive 
processes from women's bodies and experience.
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Other feminists argue that in the debates on ethics, women are not 
so much overlooked as expected to conform to an alien reality;
"[r]eproductive technology is a product of the male reality, The values 
expressed in the technology - objectification, domination - are typical 
of the male culture" (Corea 1986:4). According to this argument the 
social group of men control not only the choices open to women, but even 
determine women's responses to these. By opting for certain 
reproductive technologies3'7' or taking part in this kind of work, women 
are seen to collude with their oppressors (see, for example Corea 1986: 
3).
Not all feminists share this view but those who do appear in their 
vehemence to be initially indistinguishable from non-feminists, such as 
the 'pro-life' lobby or the 'new right', who also adopt a radical 
approach to the reproductive technologies. However these groups share 
the same platform for very different reasons; the feminists can be 
described as pro-woman, while 'pro-life' activists are essentially pro- 
embryo. This second group oppose new reproductive technologies on the 
grounds that the fertilised egg is a 'person' from conception and, as 
such, deserves full legal rights. Such 'fetalists' (see Raymond 1987) 
within the 'new right' reject the new technologies as they see them 
undermining the nuclear family. Conversely, certain feminists (see, for 
example, Arditti et al 1984) fear that IVF and its ilk will be used in 
ways to support the most conservative ideas about families. However, 
both groups would appear to agree that it is 'the family' and not simply 
reproduction that is at issue.
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Finally, in terns of ethical arguments, it has been suggested that,
although conceptive technologies are often justified in terms of the
increased choice they offer to those who would otherwise be infertile,
such technologies may actually reduce certain kinds of choice. It is
argued, for example, that new techniques such as IVF take the creative
processes of pregnancy and birth away from women and place them entirely
in the hands of male doctors or 'pharmocrats' (Corea 1986, and see
discussion below). Alternatively, the new conceptive technologies can
be seen to make infertility a tentative condition. Just as the use of
technology in pre-natal diagnosis has been seen to make the status of
pregnancy a tentative one (Rothman 1984), so the condition of
infertility is now 'chosen' if the ever-expanding range of techniques is
left unexplored, As Franklin notes
the new choices made possible by the advent of the new reproductive 
technologies now hang like unescapable question marks over the 
reproductive futures of women who cannot conceive (1990:5).
Vomen she interviewed who were attending an IVF clinic felt they had no
choice but to try this technology now that it was available,
This imperative to try everything is, of course, very different to 
the complete lack of choice that exists for those who are infertile and 
live in the 'Third World'. As Franklin points out, in the context of 
global inequality, it may be eugenic principles that are allowed to 
determine who shall have access to the technologies that enhance 
fertility and who shall only have the means by which to restrict their 
fertility (1990: 2). However, it is also worth considering who within 
western culture has the choice to use reproductive technologies. It has 
been suggested, for example, that the decision to employ new
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reproductive technologies rests with doctors rather than with hopeful 
parents (cf. Spallone 1989).
Medical paternalism
The attempt to replace ological destiny by human decision which is 
represented by the conceptive technologies has been interpreted by some 
as little more than an attempt to expand the empire of biomedicine. 
Guidance from the Royal College of Obstericians and Gynaecologists 
(RCDG) on IVF and related procedures, for example, makes it clear that 
doctors have the right to refuse treatment on social as well as medical 
grounds, and that they should have the final authority in decision­
making (RCOG 1983). The report further suggests that, as doctors will 
be playing a role in the formation of the embryo, they have a special 
responsibility for the welfare of any child so conceived. In other 
words, beyond the usurpation of women's creative reproductive potential 
feared by writers such as Corea (1986), reproductive technologies allow 
doctors a signficant degree of social control. For example, the report 
states that "most practitioners will intuitively feel that IVF (in vitro 
fertilisation) and ER (Embryo Replacement) should be performed in the 
most natural of family environments" (RCOG 1983:6). What is understood 
as a 'natural' family environment is clearly open to interpretation but, 
as many writers have argued, this is generally taken to be provided by a 
married or de facto married, heterosexual, cohabiting couple.33 .The 
role of doctors as social, moral and technical authorities is therefore 
extended by reproductive technologies, and the control over women that 
was initiated by the medicalisation of pregnancy is further strengthened 
(Spallone 1989:76).
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6,8) Art i f i c i a.l „ i Bse.nl nat i on,
'Artificial insemination' is a procedure where semen is inserted into a 
woman's reproductive tract by means other than sexual intercourse. The 
semen may be that of the woman's partner (AIH, where 'H' stands for 
husband) or from some other man known as the donor (AID). It is the 
particular issues raised by AID that concern us here. AID is most 
commonly used if a woman's male partner is infertile, if a heterosexual 
couple wish to avoid the possibility of transmitting an inherited 
disease, or if a single woman or lesbian couple want to have a child 
without the social or sexual involvement of a man (Achilles 1989).
The procedure was first used as a treatment for infertility in the 
1930s, although this was little publicised. Then, in 1945, a paper 
published in the British Medical Journal giving details of a number of 
AID cases (Barton, Walker and Wiesner 1945) prompted widespread debate 
and condemnation. For example, the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1948 
recommended that AID (but not AIH) should be made a criminal offense. 
The debate was reactivated in 1958 following a divorce case in which it 
was suggested that a woman who had undergone AID without her husband's 
consent had committed adultery (McLennan v McLennan 1958). This 
suggestion was not upheld by the court but it raises the issue that AID 
in some sense implies a sexual relationship between a woman and the AID 
donor. In the late 1950's the Feversham Committee was set up to enquire 
into the legal aspects of AID. It reported in 1960 and recommended that 
AID be discouraged as strongly as passible. The committee argued that 
AID and adultery have an important feature in common; in both 
circumstances the 'wife' receives the 'seed' of a person other than her
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husband (Feversham Report 1960: 37). Should the practice become more 
acceptable, it was thought that it might lead to an increase in the 
breaking of marriage vows through sexual intercourse with a third party 
(1960: 65). AID was therefore perceived to go against the essential 
nature of marriage, especially as a woman should seek as a husband a man 
she knows, loves and chooses "to beget children for her" (1960: 67).
The members of the Feversham Committee hoped to discourage this practice 
by recommending that the child born of AID should continue to be 
regarded in law as illegitimate.
Their report is interesting in that it provides evidence of the 
procreative model referred to earlier, which suggests that the male 
alone initiates or 'begets' pregnancy. Moreover, while adultery is 
deemed not to occur because there is no erotic liaison between the donor 
and the would-be mother, it appears that AID represents a form of 
synecdochism in that placing the donor's semen in the woman's vagina is 
understood as similar in some way to the donor entering her vagina. It 
also supports the suggestion that certain body products, such as milk 
(see Chapter 4,7) and perhaps semen, represent an extended self, and 
indicates a parallel between the act of breastfeeding and the act of 
penetrative heterosexual intercourse. Moreover, the fear that AID goes 
against 'the essential nature of marriage* appears to bear similarities 
to Laquer's (1989) observation, that the prostitute as a 'public' woman 
in whom the sperm of many men combine, is widely perceived as 'barren' 
and represents the antithesis to 'the family'.
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A change of attitude towards AID became apparent in 1973 when the 
British Medical Association recommended that an AID service should be 
available for the small number of couples for whom it was considered 
'appropriate'. Warnock (1985) subsequently found an increased 
acceptance of and demand for this procedure. However, the illegitimate 
status and the lack of parental rights or duties of the AID child's 
social father were clearly distressing to some of those who made 
submissions to the committee. The Warnock Report ultimately recommended 
that an AID child should be treated in law as the legitimate child of 
its mother and her husband (providing that he had agreed to the 
procedure), and that the donor should cease to have any parental rights 
or obligations in relation to the child. This recommendation was taken 
up by the Family Law Reform Act (1987); the AID child is now legitimate
in terms of the inheritance of property from the mother's husband, but
not in terms of the succession to any title.
As Pfeffer has pointed out (1987), one of the central social issues
concerning AID has been that of legitimacy, particularly in the early
days of AID use. Illegitimate births had increased since World War Two,
divorce had become more common, and it has appeared to many that the
institution of the family was under threat; the introduction of a
technique which intentionally produced an illegitimate child within
marriage was, at least in the 1950s, an anathema (1987). The Feversham
Report stated, for example,
Succession through blood descent is an important element of family 
life and as such it is the basis of our society. On it depends the
peerage and other titles of honour, and the Monarchy itself (1960:
49).33
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Today the social issue is no longer only about illegitimacy, 
although this remains important. In addition, the historical resistance 
towards AID is being interpreted by some as a recognition of the threat 
AID poses, not only to the family, but to male dominance; with AID, 
women could have children (virtually) without men (Corea 1985). Once 
men perceived the means of rebellion AID offered women, they were quick 
to limit the access women had to this procedure. Those who argue this 
cite, for example, the way in which AID has been claimed as a medical 
procedure, even though it requires little more than sperm and a syringe 
(Saffron 1986). The Warnock Report unequivocally calls for the social 
control of AID, recommending that it be made an offence to provide AID 
services without a license. At the same time, the Warnock Report 
suggests that "as a general rule it is better for children to be born 
into a two-parent family, with both father and mother" (1985; 11), 
although it is recognised that the stability of this kind of arrangement 
is no mare predictable than any other.AO Single women and lesbians are 
not totally ruled out as suitable mothers, as it is suggested that each 
person's case should be judged on its own merits. However, it is clear 
that it is ultimately gynaecologists who are to make such judgements (in 
discussion with other health professionals), even though the Report 
admits that this represents a social rather than a clinical evaluation 
(Warnock 1985:12).
This approach has not deterred some women who advocate 'self- 
insemination' as opposed to AID. 'Self-insemination', it has been 
argued, is about more than getting pregnant without sexual intercourse
- 299 -
or the aid of the medical establishment. Instead it represents a
radically different approach to parenthood: for example,
E i11 questions the values which, in western patriarchal society, 
define what a 'desirable' child is...It aims at creating a different 
value system for the women, for the children - and for the fathers 
(Klein 1984: 385).
With self-insemination, at least for some practitioners, the
conventional 'one child to one mother' relationship is exchanged for a
close inter-relationship of a group of women and children, a joint
motherhood that may extend beyond the dyad of the lesbian biological
mother and her lover to include a number of 'mothers' (biological or
not) in a self-insemination group (Klein 1984: 386-7).
As Achilles (1989) points out, AID helps to reveal the social 
meanings we attach not only to biological reproduction, but to cultural 
notions about what constititutes the family. She notes how the 
medicalisation of AID, the associated secrecy and the emphasis on 
anonymity all add up to a process that is more socially than technically 
complex. She believes current practice represents an attempt to conform 
to a particular image of the family, an increasingly mythological one of 
a heterosexual couple who rear their biologically-linked children until 
adulthood. The secrecy attached to AID is, for example, "an indication 
of the persistence and strength of mythologies and norms about what 
constitutes a family and what constitutes a 'real' parent " (1989: 110).
Barrett and McIntosh (1982) have referred to this as 'an ideology 
of familialism', to which greater weight is attached than to the family 
itself, According to the perspective these authors describe, the ideal
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situation far child-rearing is one based on the presence of two parents, 
be they biological or surrogate parents, rather than one in which the 
child is reared by its 'kin* (1982: 25-6). ■d-1
Given the intensity of the debate they aroused, it is interesting 
to find that my informants knew little about reproductive technologies 
and mostly appeared uninformed by the debates referred to above. Indeed 
the procedure of IVF was considered acceptable by the majority of 
informants, for others if not for themselves. This is perhaps not 
suprising in view of the way that reproductive techniques are 
represented in the media (Franklin 1990a) and the lack of awareness 
among informants of the complex nature of such technologies or their 
reliance on medical, if not surgical, intervention. A similar disparity 
between feminist thought and my informants' opinions also emerged in 
relation to AID: while it was noted above that many feminists would only 
consider AID (or, more specifically, 'self-insemination') out of the 
range of techniques available, AID was a less popular method among 
informants.
Informants views on artificial insemination by donor (AID)
Of nine women asked about artificial insemination, only two said that 
they would be unequivocally in favour of AID as a means of resolving 
reproductive difficulties they might experience. One of these 
informants would equally want to adopt. Three women were ambivalent 
about AID saying, for example, that they would consider it but would 
prefer to adopt, and four said that they would be unhappy about using 
AID.
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The main problem perceived with AID was that it created an
inequality between parents in terms of their genetic contribution to a
child. A 26 year-old midwife said, for example:
I would have thought in our situation it would be better to adopt a 
child because then both of us are put in the same setting. Whereas 
with AID -O.K., theres's half you there - but I can see [my partner] 
might resent the fact that I had half of a claim and he was left 
out.
A similar point was made by a young woman working in public relations;
I think I'd have to see how Cmy partner] felt about it. If it was 
O.K. by him I wouldn't particularly be worried; at least it's half 
your child rather than if you're adopting somebody. But then again 
it may be better to have somebody completely free of both of you to 
come in, rather than him thinking "It's her child, it's not my 
child"; maybe some unknown man in the background who nobody's ever 
seen who is the father. So it would really depend on what he felt 
about the situation.
This absence of the male partner from the child's conception may be
particularly important if, as earlier chapters suggest, the male is
understood to provide not merely half the genetic substance of a child,
but also the child's vital essence (see Chapter 2.5 and 2.6 for
example). In this light, where artificial insemination takes place, the
donor of sperm acquires a special significance. While 'mothering'
through gestation and nurturance is still available to the woman who
accepts a donated ovum, in the context of AID, 'fathering', in the sense
of begetting or initiating life, is taken on entirely by the donor of
sperm. The 32 year-old barmaid said, for example:
I think if it was at all possible I'd rather adopt, but adopting is 
hard isn't it? If it was going to be another man's sperm - not from 
my point of view so much - but I think it would probably upset him 
(partner) to think I had another man's baby growing inside me.
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There is then a distinction between the essentially complete baby, 
perceived to come from the donor, and the mother as nurturing body. 
Moreover, a number of informants implied that it was not the baby alone 
who dwelt within the mother; the donor was referred to rather in the 
manner of an unwanted guest and who, in some sense, possessed the 
m o t h e r . T h i s  was most evident where informants held the notion that, 
even when AID took place within a medical establishment, the donor 
himself introduced his semen through sexual intercourse. Signficiantly, 
most women did not speak in terms of how they would feel about the semen 
of another man (ie other than their partner) inside them. Instead they 
spoke of how their partners might feel about this.
Only a small number of informants were questioned about AID.
However, the concern that women had about possible implications for
their partner in terms of the spectre of the donor has been recorded
elsewhere. Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden (1983) interviewed fifty-seven
couples in England who had children following AID and found that,
although the social fathers had accepted their children, they were
confused about who was the child’s ’real’ father:
It was noticeable that in trying to explain their feelings about 
fatherhood, very many of the husbands referred to the donor as the 
'real* father, although they were in no doubt that the child was 
•their' child (1983: 91).
Presumably, these men's confusion was compounded by the legal situation
that existed at the time of interview, concerning the paternity of an
AID child, The husbands of women who had children via AID were ignored
as legal fathers and, if their names appeared as father of the child on
the birth certificate, this constituted breaking the law. However, it is
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feasible that confusion over the claim to legal fatherhood is not the 
only issue and that, perhaps, the fundamental confusion is an 
ontological one. Viewed in this light, it is interesting to compare 
attitudes towards AID with those towards IVF in which the parental 
relationship is clearer for the male.
6,9) I n  vi t r o  fert i LisafiQA.
In vitro fertilisation (IVF) is a form of external reproduction that now 
takes a number of forms. In the usual instance however, a number of ova 
are extracted from a woman following hormonal stimulation. , These ova 
are placed in a 'petri' dish together with sperm and a suitable culture 
medium. If fertilisation occurs, one or more canceptuses are placed in 
a woman's uterus in the hope that they will implant. The uterus may be 
that of the woman from whom the ova were extracted (embryo replacement) 
or that of another woman (embryo transfer).
Informants' attitudes towards in vitro fertilisation
Thirty-one informants were questioned in terms of their attitudes 
towards IVF, The vast majority of women (26) were in favour of this 
procedure although, of these, seven qualified their approval. For most 
of these seven women, IVF was acceptable provided it was concerned with 
alleviating the 'desperation' of the childless and was not used for 
other ends, such as genetic engineering. In most of these cases, it was 
considered that IVF should be available for those who wanted it, but it 
was not something that these informants would personally consider.
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A number of women in the larger group who supported the use of IVF 
were, at the same time, concerned that it must involve certain risks.
At the general level, there was concern that techniques might be 
developed or used without proper checks or safeguards. At a more 
individual level, two women referred to the possibility of harm to the 
mother or fetus. For example, a 37 year-old company director with two 
children said "I think the worry would be whether one was going to 
produce a normal child. I should have thought there would have been a 
higher risk (of abnormality) with a test tube baby." Alternatively, a 
24 year-old manager thought "Taking something from outside the body - 
it's just laid open to so many atmospheric diseases,..You just don't 
know what might happen." One woman, a 23 year-old secretary, was 
concerned that negligence might lead to the wrong embryo being 
implanted; "You could go too far and start freezing eggs and getting 
eggs muddled up and then giving someone else the egg." Indeed, freezing 
the eggs was a practice that was viewed with some ambivalence (see 
below).
Another informant, a 22 year-old chef, was concerned that some
unacceptable traits of the ovum donor might emerge in the child:
Do you know the history of the egg donator, would you know what sort 
of character they had, what sort of strains - nervous strains - they 
had? ,..to take sperm and eggs which are prototypes for this child 
you're creating - you've got to be careful. And isn't there 
something about you don't reveal the source? To my mind it's a 
problem. Perhaps to other people it's not; perhaps they feel they 
can overcame it by upbringing. I believe a lot of problems are 
hereditary.
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Two women felt that IVF might affect the subsequent 'closeness'
between the child and its mother or other members of the family. A 39
year-old, unmarried vision mixer, stated, for example:
It would be interesting to know whether people who had bothered to 
go through the problems of having a test-tube baby or have 
artificial insemination or all these other types of ways... it would 
be interesting to know in twenty years' time, how close those 
families had remained; how close the husband and wife had remained 
and the children.
Here it is possible she is referring only to IVF with a donated ovum, in 
which case this suggests that 'closeness' is, at least in part, a 
result of shared genetic information. Another informant, a 24 year-old 
Roman Catholic who worked as a manager, appears to refer to a science 
fiction scenario where the entire period of gestation takes place in 
vitro. However, her comments are nonetheless relevant in that they 
Indicate that 'closeness' is, at least in part, a result of the uterine 
environment:
Possibly (taking the processes out of the body) takes away some of 
the emotional security. I wonder if a child born in that respect 
has the same 'closeness' to the family as someone who's been borne 
within the mother's womb.
This statement underlines not only the importance of gestation in
establishing 'closeness', but also in creating this relationship with
other members of the family.
A further problem raised by IVF for women in this group was that 
conception should not occur outside the body. One aspect of this 
argument was that the manipulation of conception not only challenged the 
concept of God as creator of humankind (a concept not held by the 
majority of informants anyway) but was problematic in that it marked us 
apart from our antecedents. The same Roman Catholic informant said:
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.... I don't want to put too much emphasis on the God side - it's 
only a small part of what I think. ... I think it should be done 
within the womb and within the body and taking it out makes a 
mockery of the way we have been created over the ages really.
Finally, the vision mixer suggested that difficulty in conceiving had
its own meaning, and one that should not be ignored by embarking on IVF
treatment.
I'd tend to feel there's a reason why I'm not conceiving, why it's 
not happening between the two of us, and that to force the issue may 
be wrong. Time after time I see colleagues and friends who perhaps 
have had several miscarriages so the moment they're pregnant they're 
in hospital with their legs up for nine months and I really begin to 
wander whether nature isn't telling you something about the child. 
There seem to be so many children born these days with defects.
Overall, however, it is important to emphasise that this group of 
women, despite reservations, stated that they were in favour of IVF. 
Again, the technique was viewed in relation to the 'desperation' 
imagined to accompany involuntary childlessness. As one 23 year-old 
nurse said, "I think I would consider it. It depends how desperate you 
are and I should think I would be. I think you'd consider anything." 
Similarly a 21 year-old, administrative assistant remarked "I'd do 
anything to have a baby myself if I couldn't have a baby naturally." 
Others referred to IVF as "fantastic!" or "brilliant!".
Out of thirty-Dne informants questioned, four strongly disagreed 
with the use of IVF. One of these, a 28 year-old housewife with three 
children^ offered a number of reasons for her antipathy, mostly concerned 
with the freezing of gametes or embryos, reflecting a vague anxiety 
referred to even among those in overall favour of IVF. She said, for 
example:
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I don't like the idea of storing up the eggs and the idea "Oh we'll 
have one now", because they could be doing other things with them.
They might not just be going to humans. They could try to
experiment. They're still little eggs started off. They've still 
come from the woman. I know it's only a little egg but it's still a 
person, although it's got no ideas and that. It seems odd that it's 
frozen. How's that little girl going to be when she grows up; 
"That's my twin sister but she's eighteen months younger than me"!
I mean, how can she be her twin sister?"13
A further two informants thought that the use of IVF might be 
misused by eugenicists. One of these, a 31 year-old manager, said, for 
instance;
You're a stone's throw away from genetic engineering and I think 
it's very dangerous. In America they've developed this wonderful 
cloning of animals and this is the logical progression you go on 
when you start mucking around with people's genes - that everybody 
in the world's going to have fair hair or what have you. I mean, 
they've got a cow that can produce milk all day and all 
night.... they're tampering with nature. That's what Hitler wanted, 
wasn't it?
Another informant, a 25 year-old secretary, thought it strange that so 
much should be done to provide people with children, while at the same 
time, parents were being brought to trial for murdering their children.
Finally, the company director with two children demonstrated the 
complexity of the issue. She began by stating that she was in favour of 
IVF but concluded that she was not; "It doesn't feel right. If God 
meant us to be made in test tubes, He would have produced a science lab, 
wouldn't He? You're messing around with creation."
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In sum, most informants stated they were in favour of IVF, although 
it was not always sufficiently clear whether we were discussing IVF as a 
way of by-passing blocked fallopian tubes (that is, using a woman's own 
ovum), or referring to IVF using donated ova. Despite this flaw, the 
discussions were still useful in building a picture of the way in which 
the gestational aspect of motherhood is perceived. For example, what 
emerged from this particular question was a concern that conception 
(and, when possible gestation) occuring outside the body has long-term 
implications for the emotional development of the child or for the 
relationship between the child and its family. IVF was viewed 
favourably because it allowed women, or couples, to have their 'own' 
child, whether this referred to a genetic belonging or to a connection 
through gestation. However, a clearer picture of the significance of 
gestation and birth, in relation to genetic relationships, emerges from 
informants' attitudes towards adaption and surrogacy.
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6_.1D)_ Adoption
Adoption was discussed in an attempt to ascertain how important genetic links, 
gestation and giving birth were among informants in the establishment of a 
child-parent relationship.
Goody (1976) has defined adoption as an act which involves "the transfer 
of an individual from one filial relationship to another, from a 'natural' 
relationship to a fictional one, but one which is in most respects legally 
equivalent" (1976:69). He identifies three functions of adoption in western 
Europe; the provision of homes for children in need, to provide the childless 
with social progeny, and to provide an individual or couple with an heir to 
their property (1976).
Developments over the past twenty years have meant that the practice of 
adoption has declined rapidly. The introduction of the Abortion Act in 1967 
legalising abortion in certain circumstances, a softening in attitude towards 
unmarried mothers, better employment opportunities for women and greater 
welfare provision for single parents have all combined to reduce the number of 
babies available for adoption (Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden 1983). Thus the 
number of people accepting techniques such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) does 
not, of itself, indicate a preference for a child who is genetically or 
physically related to its parents. A study of 114 Australian women or their 
husbands attending a clinic for IVF found that 63% had been willing to accept 
adoption as an alternative route to parenthood (Singer and Wells 1984).
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Similarly, an American study undertaken in 1978 showed 57% would chose
adoption in preference to IVF (Harris Report 1979).
I do not intend to extrapolate from these studies, undertaken in different
cultural contexts and comparatively early on in the use of the new reproductive
technologies. However among my informants questioned on adoption (11), all
viewed it positively. Nine women stated they would consider adoption if they
found they could not have children biologically, although two women made it
clear that they might try other measures, such as IVF, first. These women were
not apposed to adoption in principle; much would depend on the circumstances at
the time they had to make a decision. Some informants showed a clear
preference for adaption in relation to A.I.D., preferring that each parent had an
equal - that is, non-existant - biological relationship to the child.
Significantly, some women in favour of adoption thought an adopted child could
be as much their 'own' child as one they had conceived and carried. A midwife
of twenty-six years said this was something that she had thought about a good
deal as her partner was "sterile":
I would be quite happy to adopt a child. It wouldn't really worry me if it
was mine or somebody else's. I think....your attitude towards a child....if
you adopt a child it can still be as much a part of you because of what
you give tD it and what you learn from each other.
However, this informant's partner would prefer aritificidl insemination so that
any child "would be 50% ours". This seems to provide further confirmation that
a genetic link is especially important for men. It appears that, where a
genetic link is impossible between a man and a child, he still wishes such a
link to exist between the child and its mother. Further work is necessary to
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tease out whether this preference has an ontological basis or is, for example, 
more concerned with the control of inheritance.
Clearly for some informants, the 'raising' of a child was as important as 
any sense of biological continuity, as the distribution assistant, a Roman 
Catholic, suggests
I: I think I probably would adapt. I would like to produce something
that's......
J: Yours?
I: Yes, more than anything. But I'd like to be able to bring up a child
that didn't have anyone to bring it up, if I was in a position to do
so.
Finally Katy suggested that, if she were to adopt a child after having 
three of her own, despite her good intentions, she would feel less far the new 
child:
I know what the feeling feels like to have your own so I think, as much as 
I might try to love the new baby or new child, I think I probably wouldn't 
show any difference but I imagine, in my heart, I'd feel a difference.
This difference was not entirely because the child would be genetically
different; Katy thought that an important element in her relationship with her
children was rooted in the fact that she had carried and given birth to them
(although she downplays these aspects of motherhood in some contexts - see
section 3). The signficance of gestation and birth is further endorsed by the
data on surrogacy.
- 312 -
6,11) Surrogate motherhood
Surrogate motherhood has been defined as an arrangement whereby one woman 
agrees to bear a child for another person (or persons) and to surrender it at 
birth (Varnock 1985: 42). Those who commission such a child are generally in 
involuntarily childless relationships, although individuals or couples otherwise 
unable to reproduce (for example, single men or women, homosexual couples) may 
also consider surrogacy, In the context of this dissertation, surrogate 
motherhood is a particularly interesting phenomenon in that it fragments 
parenthood - especially, but not exclusively, motherhood - into a number of 
different roles, and allows us to see the relationship of these roles, one to 
another. As Overall has suggested, surrogate motherhood raises questions about 
the use of human reproductive potential, about women's relationships to their 
bodies and about the inter-relationships of men and women (1987), As such, 
surrogacy can be seen as a 'test case* that helps to unravel broader procreative 
issues.
'Surrogate motherhood' is not an ideal term. On what basis, for example, 
might a woman who carries a child for another be called a 'mother', especially 
when - as in some circumstances - there is no genetic connection between the 
surrogate and the fetus? As Zipper and Sevenhuijsen have painted out, the 
language used to describe this kind of arrangement defines the relationships 
without questioning their meaning (1987), Some writers have offered alternative 
terms, but on the whole these have been equally unsatisfactory. Manion (1988), 
for example, has suggested 'contractual conception' but this term is inadequate 
in that it does not include instances of 'full surrogacy' where the surrogate is
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involved in the gestation, but not the conception of a fetus. In the absence of 
more suitable alternatives I shall use the standard terminology of ’surrogate 
mother* and 'commissioning father' where relevant. However, these might 
usefully be considered working terms, rather in the manner of 'p-structures'
(see Ardener 1978).
Clearly surrogate motherhood is not, in itself, new; as many writers on the 
subject have noted, it is referred to in the Bible between Sarai (as she was 
then known) and Hagar (Genesis Ch 16) and between Rachel and Bilhah, Leah and 
Zilpah (Genesis Chapter 30).^  Significantly, traditional surrogacy has always 
posed questions about the ’naturalness' of the mother-child bond."13 The fact • 
that these questions have rarely been made explicit until recently may be 
linked to the private nature of traditional surrogacy arrangements, which have 
not required the intervention of a fourth party. Recent forms of surrogacy are 
different in that they occur in the context of new reproductive technologies 
such as IVF; 'partial surrogacy' involves the sperm of the commissioning father 
and the ovum of the surrogate mother and 'full surrogacy' refers to an 
arrangement where the surrogate mother carries and gives birth to a baby with 
whom she has no genetic connection (Singer and Wells 1984).
As a British Medical Association report has said, with surrogate 
motherhood come:
many possible combinations of persons relevant to the child's conception 
and early development. At the most complicated, [the child] may have two 
genetic parents, two social parents, and a carrying mother. It will be seen 
from this that surrogacy arrangements involve considerable uncertainty as 
to the child's status and the rights and responsibilities of the adults
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involved, and thus raise important questions about the institution of the 
family and the concept of parenthood itself. (BMA 1987a)
Attitude's, towards surrogacy arrangements
In recent public debate on reproductive issues, there has been a varied response 
to the use of donated gametes, in contrast to more consistent disapproval of 
surrogacy:
The invention of reproductive technology seems to shake up all 'normal' 
arrangements and belief-systems about human reproduction. It is striking 
that surrogacy often arouses more attention, anger and calls for 
prohibition than developments in fertilisation itself (Zipper and 
Sevenhuijsen 1987:119).
The Warnock Report (1985: xii), for example, gave approval to the techniques of
IVF and AID, but disapproved of surrogacy, largely because of the passible
consequences to the child. In addition, it feared that surrogacy allows the
exploitation of one person by another and, in certain circumstances therefore,
may be morally objectionable. This is most clearly, but not exclusively, the
case where financial interests are concerned (1985: 46). The Warnock Report is
also useful as recording the scope of arguments for and against surrogacy that
it received in evidence from a wide range of interested groups and
individuals,"1'7
The arguments from those who opposed surrogacy fell into three main 
categories. The first of these rejects surrogacy on the grounds that it is 
inconsistent with human dignity. It permits a woman to use her uterus for 
financial gain. This argument has been expanded elsewhere. Overall, for 
example, suggests that, as with the selling of blood, gametes or organs,
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surrogacy represents a commercial transaction that may entail an extreme form 
of personal and bodily alienation (1987:126). Surrogate mothers became defined 
solely as gestators and, hence, are negated as persons (1987). Surrogacy 
further undermines human dignity by involving a third party in the process of 
procreation. While it might be argued that such intervention occurs with other 
forms of reproductive manipulation, surrogacy is perceived as more intrusive 
than, say, AID. Significantly, this is because the contribution of the carrying 
mother is perceived to be greater and more intimate that the contribution of a 
sperm donor.
Secondly, surrogacy is seen to distort the mother-child relationship, in 
that a woman deliberately becomes pregnant in order to give up her child or 
that commercial surrogacy transforms a child into a commodity."13 This line of 
reasoning also includes an argument that a child born of surrogacy will be 
traumatised because of strong bonds that exist between the fetus and the 
carrying mother.
The third category of argument is concerned with the position of the 
surrogate mother. It is suggested that no woman should have to face the risks 
of pregnancy far money, or that no woman should have to part with a child she 
has recently given birth to, against her will. The exploitation of the 
surrogate mother is a common concern in the feminist literature. It is hard to 
imagine that women other than those in financial need will resort to commercial 
surrogate motherhood (Corea 1986). Such women then become subject to the power 
of the necessarily wealthy, commissioning father and his lawyer (Overall 1987),
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and at risk of signing contracts which compromise their health and basic human 
rights (Ince 1984). For others, surrogate motherhood represents a new form of 
prostitution in that reproductive technologies in general and surrogacy in 
particular "make the womb extractable from the woman as a whole person in the 
same way the vagina <or sex) is now" (Dworkin 1983:181).
The Warnock Report ultimately rejects all forms of surrogacy, arguing 
against a limited, licensed and non-profitable surrogacy service on the grounds 
that the existence of such a service would, in itself, encourage the growth of 
surrogacy. Significantly, two members of the committee felt it' necessary to 
express their dissent on this point and to argue for the existence of such a 
service on the grounds that there are rare occasions when surrogacy could be 
beneficial to couples as a last resort. They believe that "Coin those occasions 
gynaecologists should not be denied the option of suggesting surrogacy to their 
patients." (1985: 87). Indeed, they suggest access to a licensed surrogacy 
agency should only be by referral from a consultant gynaecologist (1985: 88).
This approach, which might be interpreted as a further step in the 
medicalisation of reproduction, has recently found sympathy within the British 
Medical Association. This organisation now accepts that doctors may help 
infertile couples in non-commercial, full surrogacy arrangements (using IVF) as 
a "last resort" (BMA 1990), so overturning a previous ruling made in 1987 that 
the risks to children were so great that doctors should never be involved in 
surrogacy (Veitch 1987).
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In its original report an surrogacy, the BMA suggests that surrogate 
motherhood, is a controversial and emotive subject because it threatens the very 
nature of society, or rather of the family as "the basic unit of society"
(1987a). A similar view is taken in the Church of England report Personal 
Origins which argues that, because the bond between mother and child (and, at 
one remove, between father and child) begins in pregnancy, surrogacy endangers 
the "Christian institution of the family" (Board of Social Responsibility 1985).
One major reason why surrogacy can be seen as such a threat is because it 
questions certain definitions of family relationships. While, for example, we 
may be able to describe the protagonists in surrogacy scenarios as 'the 
genitor', the genetrix', 'the carrying mother' or 'the commissioning mother', who, 
at the end of the day, can be understood as the child's 'real' or even legal 
parents?
The Warnock Report recommended that the operation of all commercial 
surrogacy agencies should be made illegal, and this recommendation was carried 
out by the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985. On the other hand, the Warnock 
Committee was reluctant to recommend that private persons entering into 
surrogacy arrangements should be liable to prosecution, partly because of the 
taint of criminality that would attach to the children of such arrangements. It 
hoped to resolve this dilemma by recommending that all surrogacy arrangements 
should be made illegal and therefore unenforceable in the courts. This 
suggestion was also enacted in the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, which means that 
a surrogate mother is, for the moment, defined as the legal mother at birth -
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whether or not she has any genetic connection to the child. The commissioning 
parents, even if they have provided the embryo, can only become the child's 
legal parents by adoption. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (1989) 
currently under consideration by the House of Commons (Select Committee') 
suggests that the husband of a surrogate mother be regarded as the child's 
father at birth, provided he has consented to her 'treatment'. The implications 
of these points will be expanded on later (see 6.13).
It often appears that it is surrogacy as a commercial transaction which is 
disapproved of. However, while this particular kind of arrangement is clearly 
viewed with widespread concern, beneath this lies a further fear regarding all 
surrogacy, a condemnation of the woman who consciously decides to become 
pregnant and subsequently give up her child to another. As Zipper and 
Sevenhuijsen (1987) suggest, it is not the new reproductive technologies which 
are feared so much as the fate of a world in which the mother-child bond 
becomes more fragile. The general incomprehension that attends a woman's 
decision to become a surrogate mother is, however, over-ridden to some extent 
where the woman's motives are seen to be purely altruistic. This is clearest in 
the case of a woman who wishes to give her infertile sister the opportunity of 
parenthood.
Finally, despite the widespread unease prompted by surrogacy, there are 
some arguments made in its favour, For example, among the depositions made to 
the Warnock Committee were a number expressing concern that surrogacy might 
represent a couple's last chance of having a child that was genetically related
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to them (1985: 45-6). In particular, it might be the only option available to 
the husband of an infertile woman. It was thought that women should be able to 
enter into surrogacy arrangements if they wished, just as they had a right to 
use their bodies in other ways, if they so wished. Commercial surrogacy has 
been presented as an exercise of economic choice."1'3 It was suggested that 
those who felt surrogacy intruded into the marital relationship need not pursue 
this choice. These sorts of arguments in favour of surrogacy have, according 
to Warnock, been voiced only by a minority. The strength of feeling that 
Warnock reports against surrogacy was clearly evident among the women with 
whom I spoke.
Informants attitudes towards surrogacy
Interviews with informants took place at a time when surrogacy was much in the 
news. 'Baby Cotton', for example, was born in Britain during January 1985, the 
result of a commercial surrogacy arrangement. Informants were therefore well 
aware of some of the more sensational aspects of surrogacy, such as legal 
disputes aver custody, even if they were often less clear about how a surrogate 
pregnancy might occur.
Given this background, it is perhaps unsuprising that informants viewed 
surrogacy more negatively than any other means of becoming a parent. For 
example, in answer to what she would have done if she had found herself 
infertile, Katy initially replied she would have tried 'anything'. With further 
discussion, however, it emerged that, while she would have considered adoption, 
AID, and various reproductive techniques such as IVF, surrogacy was totally
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unacceptable. Of forty— three women spoken to on this issue, there was not one
who said she would personally consider surrogacy as an option if she could not
have children by other means. However, one or two informants voiced an
understanding of why some 'desperate' women might take such a step. A 25 year
old typist said, for example:
It's difficult. Providing the mum's quite happy to have it and give it 
away without any hassle at the end...if that child's going to go to two 
people who desperately want a baby and give it quite a good life, then 
fine. The baby won't know any different. It will just be bought by these 
two parents and know that, OK it was bought, but it was obviously bought 
for the right reasons and really wanted.
Significantly, informants views Dn surrogacy covered the first two 
categories outlined by Varnock (see above)* referring to the way in which 
surrogacy compromised human dignity and distorted the mother-child 
relationship. Not one informant voiced concern for the way surrogacy might 
exploit specific groups of women, such as economically disadvantaged or 'Third 
World' women, suggesting that the feminist debate on surrogacy, in addition to 
that on other reproductive technologies, has not had a wide impact.
All informants, even those who were slightly more in favour of surrogacy, 
were wary that commercial surrogacy carried certain risks, such as attracting 
women with the 'wrong' motives. While there was sympathy, for example, for 
sisters who might make a private and nan-financial surrogacy arrangement, the 
majority of informants thought it was morally wrong to deliberately become 
pregnant and 'give up' a child in order to gain money. For example, the 28 year 
old, Roman Catholic distribution assistant said:
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I can't really understand people being able to give up a child having 
carried it around with them for nine months....and take money for it. I 
haven't got that strong views but I certainly wouldn't da it and wouldn't 
like to know anybody who had. I wouldn't consider that person worth 
knowing.
Surrogacy for financial gain also implied that the body could be used as a
commodity. The 22 year-old lay chaplain/musician said, for example:
I get very uneasy when people are paid to be surrogate mothers. I think 
they're renting out something that isn't theirs to rent out ....1 don't know, 
it's like selling your kidneys. Yes, it's yours in a way but its, like, not 
yours. It’s my body but...I can't explain why. If it was done like marrow 
transplants - I think that sort of thing is very good. But I think I get 
uneasy when its payment because that somehow makes it different.30- 51
Whether or not money changed hands,' surrogacy was often felt to be wrong
because a child is deliberately conceived in order to be 'given up' after birth.
There was something very different about this use of the body and that where
pregnancy was accidental and resulted in adoption. Katy, for example, referred
to this difference in intention:
...children that are up for adoption are up for adoption for a certain 
reason anyway - like the mother didn't want them or what have you - and 
they're found a good home. But for somebody to deliberately have a baby 
that they don't want anyway.....!
If the body should not be made a commodity, neither, it appears, should 
the child. One problem perceived with financial surrogacy was that any 
resulting children, should they become aware of their origins, would be 
psychologically harmed by the knowledge that they were the outcome of a 
financial arrangement. For example, a 27 year-old scientist said "It wouldn't 
be very nice to find out your mother only had you for money."
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However, surrogacy was seen to bring other psychological ill effects for 
the child based on the premise that separation from the gestational mother, 
irrespective of any genetic connection, is harmful. Indeed informants perceived 
that the main problem posed by surrogacy was the possible development of a 
relationship between the surrogate mother and child during the pregnancy that 
was more than physiological. It is this uterine relationship that is perhaps 
the aspect of surrogacy most relevant to my thesis.
The relationship between the fetus and the carrying mother was thought to
act in two directions. On the one hand - and parallel to the relationship seen
to exist between an infant and surrogate breastfeeder - the surrogate mother
was perceived by some to have some influence on the developing fetus. For
example, the 26 year-old midwife said;
I wonder how much a mother's attitude in pregnancy affects the baby 
afterwards, because those mothers who are happy about the pregnancy to 
the most extent have laid-back babies, whereas if mothers aren't all that 
happy about it, I wonder how much that filters through to the baby in 
utero, If they're loved and cared about I'm sure they can pick that up.
Katy told me how once, when she was pregnant with her second son and having
difficulties with her first, that her grandmother and aunt had both told her
that the baby would be tense and upset when it was born as she had been in a
similar state while carrying him, Conversely, her midwife had informed her
that her youngest child was relaxed because Katy had been relaxed while he was
in utero. In addition, Katy felt she could act, to some extent, as a filter
between external influences and the fetus;
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I always felt 1 shouldn't really get a fright and jump, because I did feel 
you could startle the baby and make it jump. I had the sense when I was 
pregnant that I shouldn't really watch things ton television] that would 
make you jump out of your skin (my emphasis).
On the other hand, being pregnant was seen as having a tremendous effect
on the pregnant woman's emotions. The midwife referred to above was uneasy
about the practice of surrogacy as;
I think particularly in pregnancy, in labour and delivery there is too 
much emotion involved. You cannot actually be detached. I think there's 
an awful lot of difficulty involved in giving up that child.
Similarly the 32 year-old barmaid quoted earlier said
I could never da that. I would have thought to actually have something 
growing inside you for that length of time - I'd want to keep it even if I 
started off saying I didn't. I'm sure I'd feel a big attachment.
The 22 year-old chef thought that the fetus would be influenced by the
surrogate mother through "carrying it for nine months and feeding it from her
blood", but that this influence would probably be lost later through
'upbringing'; it would be the surrogate mother who would permanently experience
the effects of surrogacy and the loss of the child.
These statements have a significance that goes beyond the ways in which 
surrogacy is perceived. Time and again, informants referred to the period of 
gestation as important in terms of defining relatedness, or shaping the 
relationship between mother and child as opposed, for example, to genetic 
similarity. A 21 year-old, administrative assistant, commented, for instance;
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I'd rather adopt than have someone else carry it. It's wrong. I would 
either want to go through me being pregnant by my husband (or adopt). I 
couldn't stand to think that someone else has got a baby they're going to 
give over to me when they've had all the fun of being pregnant. I'd feel I 
was just going to be lumbered. I wouldn't feel it was mine.
The relationship that is understood to exist between the carrying mother and
the fetus, and the implictions this may have for the definition of motherhood,
are expanded upon in the next section.
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6.12.) Surrogacy, motherhood and relatedness
In order to grasp more clearly the relationship between the process of
gestation and relatedness, and the importance of gestation for the
concept of motherhood, thirty-two informants were presented with the
fallowing vignette to discuss:
A woman agrees to act for a married couple as a surrogate mother.
Her role is a purely gestational one; the embryo implanted in her 
uterus has resulted from IVF using the commissioning couple's ovum 
and sperm. The surrogate mother therefore contributes no genetic 
material to the embryo. In this situation, who is the mother at the 
time of birth - the woman who provides the genetic material or the 
woman who carries the child?
Deciding who should be understood as the mother was influenced by a 
range of factors. The 39 year-old vision mixer, for example, did not 
mention the role of gestation or genetics in the determination of 
motherhood, but saw the answer in the legal contract drawn up between 
the surrogate mother and the commissioning couple; "..if I had 
contracted to carry the pregnancy and I had agreed that I would give it 
back to that couple then, from my point of view, I am simply acting as 
an incubator!"
Moreover, taking informants' quotes out of context means that the 
difficulty these women experienced in making a decision fails to come 
across. A number of women changed their minds during the course of 
discussing this vignette. When this happened I have used their final 
answer. Of thirty-two women questioned, three could could come to no 
decision as to who should be regarded as the mother in the circumstances 
described.
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Nine informants thought that the woman who carried the child was 
its mother at the time of birth, regardless of the child's genetic 
origins, The reasoning is summed up by the three quotations which 
follow. The first is from a discussion with a 21 year-old secretary, 
who said:
Even, like, when the baby's just beginning, the mother and the baby 
has a definite bond. The mother who's carrying the child would have 
a definite bond with the baby no matter what egg it was or where it 
came from, so in a biological sense I would think that a mother who 
carried a baby would be the one to bring it up because the baby gets 
its signals from the mother; it's, that type of thing. ...The baby 
knows, I think, what's going on and who's carrying it, whatever.
This informant refers to the 'bond' in terms of the effect this has on
the child. Another secretary, this time aged thirty-one and married,
makes a similar point about the link that exists between the surrogate
and the fetus she carries, but this time presents it in terms of the
effects of this on the surrogate mother:
This is a very difficult one. Initially it's going to be the woman 
who produces the egg, but the other woman could be classified as the 
mother because she actually carries the child. She's going to have 
all the emotions of having actually borne the child and could 
therefore be classified as the mother.
A third informant, a 26 year-old, unmarried secretary said
Veil, I think the surrogate mother is the mother really. Because I 
think she is a lot closer to it. I think she's acting in more than 
a 'grow bag'capacity because she has direct links to it. She's 
providing all its nourishment and whatever she does directly affects
the baby; if she doesn’t eat properly the baby doesn't grow
properly, She has to take care of herself in order to bring up the
baby, so I think she's the mother really.
This statement suggests that motherhood is concerned (at least in 
part) with 'closeness' and, it was suggested in Chapter 5, that closeness 
refers to being close to the same thing, or an 'extension of self'. A 
'close' relationship, moreover, is premised on a moral stance. In
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Chapter 5 we saw how relationships were defined as 'blood* if 
1 closeness' obtained. In this chapter we find a suggestion that 
motherhood partly is defined by the existence of 'closeness*. This 
point will be discussed further in Chapter 7,
Ten informants thought that the woman who provided the egg was the 
mother, even though she had not carried the child. For example, the 37 
year-old company director said "In theory, yes, the (genetic) mother is 
the true one and the other one's just the conveyor belt to get it 
going." Significantly, although Informants were often expansive in 
describing why the carrying woman or surrogate should be understood as 
the mother, informants attributing motherhood to the woman who provided 
the genetic material made little elaboration of this point.
Nine informants thought that both women had to be recognised as 
mothers, as each woman's contribution represented elements of what was 
understood as motherhood. For example, a 29 year-old married student 
said:
...although the egg will have come from the would-be mother, you're 
still joined through your placenta and feed...the person's who's 
carrying the baby feeds the baby.,.so if I, for instance, was the 
surrogate mother, it would be my blood going to the baby even though 
it was actually composed of cells from two totally different people.
Blood and surrogacy
Following this statement suggesting an important relationship between 
the surrogate and the fetus based in some way on blood, twenty-three 
women were asked, in the case of full surrogacy, who did they consider 
to have a 'blood' relationship with a child at birth; the genetic
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'mother' or the surrogate 'mother1. Answers obviously depended to a 
large extent on the way in which the concept of 'blood' was understood 
and, as before (see Chapter 5.5), some informants perceived it as a 
fairly straightforward matter of genetics, while others understood 
'blood' to denote a tie that was principally emotional. A further group 
of women saw the fact that a surrogate mother physically 'shared' her 
blood with the fetus as an important consideration in deciding who had a 
'blood' relationship with the fetus.S3
In all, six women felt the carrying mother had the greater claim 
to a 'blood' relationship with the fetus. For example, a 26 year-old 
teacher said:
Veil, it's the fact that the embryo is feeding on her body to grow 
and to become a person, so yes, there's a tie. Vhether it's 'blood' 
or not I don't know. I suppose it is blood because the blood's 
going.,.oh, I don't know. Yes but it's the fact that you're feeding 
it - it's like adoption isn't it? I mean the child is your own 
because you're feeding it and giving it what it needs. If you adopt 
a child then you're giving it the care so it becomes yours.
Relatedness - being or becoming 'yours' - is for this and five other
informants predominantly premised on care and nurturance.
Conversely, seven informants thought the genetic mother had the
'blood' tie. The 39 year-old vision mixer said, far example:
Veil, technically, ...I was going to say the blood relationship is 
with the sperm and ovum; those are the chromosomes and the genes 
that actually make the child but on the other hand, the blood from 
the carrying mother has been crossing through the baby, through the 
placenta, so I don’t know. I suppose on the whole it's not the 
blood that gives you your characteristics, it's the genes, so 
therefore that must come from the ovum and s p e r m . c o s  you can have 
a complete blood transfusion and still be the same person.
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Clearly the issue was by no means straightforward. A 39 year-old
clerk commented that "I am aware of the fact that I'm contradicting
myself a bit, but it's that sort of issue." She was not alone. Even
where there was no contradiction within informants' arguments, there was
often hesitancy and uncertainty. The 26 year-old, married secretary
demonstrates the tentative nature of informants' views:
I'd say the woman who donated the egg (had the blood tie) although 
if the embryo's grown in the other woman it's been sort of growing 
in her...it shared her blood going through the body for nine months. 
But no, I'd say it was the woman who donated the egg.
Three women were unable to come to any decision. A further six
thought both women stood in a blood relationship to the child- arguing
that a 'blood tie' could be claimed on the grounds of genetic
contribution and the contribution made during pregnancy and birth. A 42
year-old houswife expanded on this point:
They [genetic and surrogate 'mothers'! probably both are blood 
relatives. Probably the child would be more like the woman who 
donated the egg in characteristics and whatever...if it were brought 
up by her. But on the other hand it could always think of the 
surrogate mother as being its mother. Depends what you mean by 
'mother' - is it the one who has the egg or who actually gives 
birth, that's the trouble, isn't it? They both are in fact. It's 
much more complicated, isn't it, than donating sperm. ..it's just 
sperm!
No-one saw the issues of 'blood' or 'motherhood* as 
straightforward ones and the difficulty of deciding on a single 'mother' 
in the context of surrogate arrangements appeared to be one reason for 
many informants' misgivings about the practice of surrogacy. All 
however were clear that the claims of the surrogate or genetic mother
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were overridden by those of the woman who 'raised* the child (see 
Chapter 7).
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6.13) Reproductive technologies and relatedness: a wider view.
This final section attempts to locate informants' views within a broader social 
context by looking briefly at medical and legal discourse concerning the 
reproductive technologies.
It has been suggested that the infertile generally resort to surrogacy 
because it offers not only the chance of parenthood but the opportunity for a 
genetic relationship with a child (cf Singer and Veils 1984: 112). Like IVF, 
the practice of surrogate motherhood appears to be founded on a particular, 
genetic view of parenthood and relatedness. This genetic view, however, appears 
particularly relevant to the nation of fatherhood: my data suggest that genetic
input is not necessarily understood as a prerequisite for establishing 
motherhood at the time of birth. Indeed, the role of gestation was perceived to 
be important and influential an the development of the fetus. This view is at 
odds with one expressed by Corea (1986: 221) or Broderibb (1989: 141), for 
example, that surrogacy emphasises the view of woman as a passive vessel.
My informants were not unique in believing that the process and conditions 
of pregnancy itself - as opposed to merely those of conception - inform 
understandings of m o t h e r h o o d F o r  example, despite the emphasis it places on 
descent by 'blood* (see 6.8), the Feversham Report states that the biological 
aspect of fatherhood, which involves only the moment of conception, is less 
significant than that of motherhood, which involves nine months of pregnancy 
followed by birth, Moreover, the report states that the child is more closely 
attached to the mother in the first few years of its life (1960: 44).
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Similarly, in 1987, the Annual Representatives Meeting of the BMA held a
debate on surrogacy which ultimately rejected the principle Df surrogacy.
In the course of this debate, the chairperson is quoted as saying:
By the time the baby is born there is a bond between the mother and the
child. With surrogacy you break that bond. You are depriving the child 
of one natural parent. Ve think that is wrong (Veitch 1987).
It is not clear whether this statement refers to partial or full surrogacy, or
whether the distinction in this instance is an important one. Nonetheless, the
importance of carrying a child is explicit in the following statement. It comes
from the discussion of a private members bill introduced by the Earl of
Halsbury to amend the Surrogacy Act of 1985, in which the Bishop of Rippon
said:
Vithin the Church, the argument has been that the strong bonding lies 
between the bearing mother and the social mother - that is to say, the 
mother who bears should surely be regarded in law as the mother.
Similarly, social scientists Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden have stated:
It is known that the developing relationship between mother and child
during pregnancy is of considerable importance for the future well-being 
of the child. To break this bond is traumatic for the mother also (1983: 
170-71).
In other words, there are indications of a widespread belief in the 
importance of the relationship between the pregnant woman and the fetus. The 
significance of this relationship is assumed; Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden 
(1983), for example, state that the importance of this relationship is 'known* 
without citing any evidence. Indeed, how can such a relationship be measured 
and known? These statements from individuals, some of whom have scientific 
training, do not present us with scientific 'facts'. Instead they offer glimpses
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□f the premises on which a cultural understanding of procreation are based, in 
which nurturance, in a variety of forms, plays a significant role. This 
particular view of procreation is, I suspect, a fragment of the ontogenetic 
model outlined in Chapter 2.5 and elaborated in this earlier part of this 
chapter (6.3).
Surrogacy, paternity and maternity
The assumption regarding the importance of the mother-child bond also appears 
implicit within more recent legislation. For example, if the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (1989) that is presently awaiting its final 
reading is passed, the woman who bears a child will be, in law, regarded as its 
mother, irrespective of her genetic connection to that child. Thus, with 
surrogacy the only way that the commissioning parents may become legal parents 
is through formal adoption (BMA 1990). We have already seen how the husband 
of a woman receiving AID is now regarded as the child's legal father (see 
section 8). Genetic connection, therefore, is overridden by other factors in the 
recognition of maternity and paternity. This situation is not new. Genetic 
connection appears to be an important principle in the recognition of paternity 
and patrimony in some contexts, as shown by the Feversham Report (1960). 
However, there also clear exceptions to this principle, adoption being one of 
these.
Vhat then overrides the principle of genetic connection? According
to Smart:
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It is marriage and not the blood tie (sic) that confers automatic 
paternity on men and creates a legal relationship between children and 
fathers. ...[Marriage] is no longer the only means [of doing so] but it 
remains the most important one. (1987:101)
She finds that the legal category of illegitimacy is crucial to understanding
the construction of paternity as it is here that biological fatherhood and legal
fatherhood come adrift (1987: 101). This point is important, Smart emphasises,
where there is an assumption that law should follow biology, and where it is
believed that the biological relationship between 'fathers' and children has
always been, and should remain, sacrosanct.
The construction of maternity has been such that, until now, biological and 
legal understandings have generally been less disjointed than in paternity. 
However, marital status has been known to overrule biology in that, before the 
nineteenth century, an illegitimate child was filius nullius or 'the child of no 
one'. Since then, illegitimacy has had no relevance to the construction of 
maternity, although marital, and perhaps other forms of social status or sexual 
identity, appear to be becoming more relevant with the new reproductive 
technologies (Smart 1987).Be' As Smart states, the English legal tradition has 
long been prepared to ignore biological relationships under certain 
circumstances. Indeed, legislation concerning the legal parentage of children 
born of reproductive technologies suggests that the greatest concern is to 
ensure that such children should be born within marriage. The issue of 
deciding who are the 'true' biological parents is therefore side-stepped.
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In as much as surrogacy creates very similar problems to those associated 
with AID, it is interesting that surrogacy, according to Corea (1985), has not 
been greeted by the same outcry that marked the introduction of AID. If this 
is indeed so, how much of the response to AID was due to its status as 
forerunner to other reproductive technologies, and how much for other, less 
obvious reasons, is difficult to surmise. According to Corea, the principle 
reason for different responses to AID and surrogate motherhood has been that 
surrogacy is not perceived to undermine men's claim to paternity (1986: 245),
On the contrary, "tilt is clear from contract and practice that the purchasing 
father is the key figure of the industry" (Ince 1984:112). Contracts require 
the delivery of the child to the commissioning father while the adoptive mother 
remains invisible or is only occasionally referred to, either as the "wife of 
the father" or "the potential step mother" (Ince 1984). On the other hand, AID 
is seen to allow women a certain autonomy in reproduction and, as such, 
threatens the institutions of fatherhood, marriage, the family and society (Ince 
1984).
According to this kind of analysis, surrogacy has to be understood 
primarily as an ideological devj.ce, reflecting patriarchal interests and based 
on a male consciousness of procreation. Its introduction has not required 
permanent or fundamental changes in the patriarchal order (Brodribb 1989: 140; 
154-55). Indeed, the concordance of surrogacy with patriarchal principles is 
made manifest in the way that "twlestern society has long glorified that pre­
eminent surrogate mother: the Virgin Mary" (1989: 141).
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However, it is not entirely true to say that surrogacy offers little threat 
to patriarchal values or the institution of paternity. Brodribb herself has 
noted in a different context that the possibility of surrogate arrangements 
between women would be very different in nature to those between women and men 
(1989). Such arrangements would allow women reproductive autonomy in much the 
same way that AID does once the problem of obtaining sperm is overcome. In 
addition, if the proposals of the Fertilisation and Embryology Bill (1989) are 
accepted, not only will the surrogate mother be recognised as the legal mother 
at birth, but her husband will be recognised as the child's father (provided 
that he consented to the surrogacy arrangement). In this instance the genitor 
appears to lose all rights to the child; he is not even an 'unmarried father' 
with the rights and responsibilities that this has entailed up to now. The 
very possibility of this occurrence indicates that the suggestion "Ctlo 
emphasise the genetic is to adopt a masculine consciousness of birth." (Brodribb 
1989: 141) is an oversimplification.
If the law reflects patriarchal values, as many have suggested, then 
genetic considerations are certainly not the only ones important to patriarchy. 
There are two trends in jurisprudence which come into conflict in the case of 
surrogacy and in certain other instances such as AID. The first is that claims 
to parenthood are based on genetic relationships regardless of other 
relationships, such as social ones. The second is the legal assumption that a 
woman's husband is the legal father of her child - pater is est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant, Proposals within the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
(1989) overturn the former in favour of the latter. There is then no new legal
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assumption, only a different emphasis, and an emphasis that remains consistent 
with patriarchal values. Over and above the principle of genetic connection is 
one that stresses marriage and 'the family'. This suggestion is compatible with 
that made by Barrett and McIntosh, for example, that it is the ideology of 
familialism which is important rather than the biological family itself (1982: 
25-26
Genetics versus '.the familv'
Ve have seen in this chapter that the new conceptive technologies are notable 
not least because they are capable of fragmenting certain aspects of parenthood 
that were previously understood as indivisible. There was always a potential 
disjunction between the male role of genitor and that of social father (see, for 
example Barnes 1973; O'Brien 1981).S3 The new conceptive technologies merely 
underscore the possibility of this disjunction and extend it so that, for the 
first time, the female role in reproduction may be similarly disassembled, 
Despite this, the conceptive technologies do nothing to challenge the ideal of 
the biological family. One of the main arguments for their use is that these 
techniques offer the possibility of 'one's own child', that is, a child that is 
constituted by the genetic material of at least one future parent. The fact of 
a genetic relationship between a parent and child is suggested to be not only 
one of the pillars of the biomedical model of reproduction, but one that is 
given increasing weight. According to Spallone, "scientific concepts of genetics 
and 'genetic identity' are swiftly becoming the most defining aspects of human 
relations and control of reproduction" (1989: 26). The conceptive technologies 
are viewed as central in this process, with techniques such as IVF promoting
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the ’superiority' of a genetic relationship. Similarly, when a genetic 
relationship is not possible, reproductive technologies provide a 'second best' 
alternative by matching the genetic traits of egg and sperm donors as far as 
possible, to provide the parents with a child who is, as far as possible, the 
'same1.60 The conceptive technologies therefore both uphold the ideology of 
familialism while threatening the assumption that the relationships which 
constitute 'the family' are natural entitites.
Ve have seen how 'the family' is socially constructed on the premise of
biological links (see, far example, the discussion of paternity and maternity in 
this section). In addition, it has been shown that 'blood' as an idiom of
relatedness between 'family' members may refer to a genetic or biological link,
but also implies a moral relationship that exists in the presence or absence of 
a genetic connection (Chapter 5:5). The meanings of 'the family' and 'blood' 
therefore slip beween a biological and a social pole. It might be argued that 
this constitutes slippage between a biomedical worldview and a lay Dne.
However, we have seen how, even amongst biomedical practitioners, the emphasis 
on biological relatedness is essentially ideological.
In this chapter we have seen indications that the religious and legal 
establishments regard birth within marriage to be more important than the 
existence of biological links between parent and child. In this they emphasise 
the gestational role of the carrying mother. Similarly, in their discussion of 
surrogacy vignettes, many of my informants suggest that the gestational rale is 
at least as important as the genetic role in defining 'motherhood'. Moreover,
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for many of these women a 'blood* relationship refers both to a genetic and a 
nurturing relationship.
6.14) Conclusion
During the course of this research I was often struck at the difficulty that 
informants (and others) appeared to experience in articulating their views on 
the reproductive technologies. This was not merely because the implications of 
these technologies were hard to envisage, but also because informants' 
perceptions regarding procreation are, I suspect, elusive. Moreover, they appear 
elusive for a number of reasons.
The first is to do with the kind of knowledge informants hold about 
procreation - what I have referred to earlier as 'ineffable knowledge' (see 6.3). 
The second reason is because of the complexity of informants' model of 
procreation. Some of its components have been glimpsed in this dissertation, 
such as a belief in the equal genetic contribution of the sexes alongside the 
very different roles of the male and female (with, for example, the man as 
'begetter' or 'inseminator' and the woman as nurturer). Third, the constituents 
of this model may not be entirely what they appear. For example, it is 
improbable that informants' understandings of the processes of genetic 
inheritance will precisely correspond with those informing the work of 
biogeneticists.
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Despite their elusiveness, however, informants' understandings of 
procreation and relatedness are not totally beyond grasp and it has been 
possible' to glimpse something of the way in which such ideas are constructed. 
These will be reviewed in the chapter that fallows. In addition I shall 
speculate about the way in which relatedness is perceived through an 
examination of spatial metaphors which appear to denote the moral relationships 
between those who are 'related'.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
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This study has had a number of aims. I have attempted to uncover 
something of the ontological basis of relatedness as perceived by informants, 
with a view to contributing towards the anthropological understanding of 
'English' kinship. Prompted by the work of Schneider (1972; 1980), I wished to 
learn more about the way in which 'substance' might be understood, and about 
the relation of this substance to the physical body, by looking at informants' 
notions of 'blood' and 'flesh and blood'. Moreover, I hoped to gain insight into 
the cultural construction of the body in order to better understand the way in 
which relationships between bodies are perceived by informants. In addition, as 
the work proceeded, it became clear that it was necessary to address the 
problem of why informants, given the way in which they tend to priviledge 
biomedical understandings of reproduction, apparently downplay the significance 
of biological connection in the recognition of relatedness;
I propose to summarise my findings under the headings of 'the ontological 
basis of relatedness' and 'the relation between lay and biomedical knowledge', 
assessing the extent to which the aims I refer to above have been met and 
suggesting a number of themes for future work which might build on this study. 
The theme I give greatest attention to - the usefulness of an analysis of 
'positional' metaphors - has already been hinted at in Chapter 1.2.
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7.1) The^ -ontological. basis .of relatedness
The ontological basis of relatedness has been approached by examining the 
following:
i) informants' understandings of procreation,
ii) their perceptions of the body and its boundary and the relation of 
these to personhood,
iii) the meanings attached to 'substance', described as 'flesh' and 'blood', 
that may be shared between individuals, and
iv) the preconditions governing the recognition of relatedness (the 
principles of 'sameness', 'openness' and 'closeness'.
The dissertion argues that it is important to consider broader 
metaphysical principles, such as the metaphysics of Christianity, which may 
influence relatedness. Following Delaney (1986), I find certain parallels 
between informants' understandings of, on the one hand, the roles of God and the 
Virgin Mary in the Virgin Birth and, on the other, the roles of male and female 
in the secular form of procreation. However, the model of procreation suggested 
by my data emerges as more complex than that described by Delaney. In 
addition to a perception of men sowing 'seed' which women then sustain, both 
men and women are seen to contribute equally to the substance of the child.
This substance is, at one level, 'genetically* determined. That is to say, the 
child will inherit certain characteristics in terms of appearance or character 
from each parent and their forebears. It appears that these shared 
characteristics are understood as resemblances or similarities rather than 
'sameness'. The substance wrought by procreation is ambiguous in a further
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respect, as demonstrated by the notion of 'flesh1 which can be understood as 
the 'meat* that covers the structure of the human skeleton but which also refers 
to the humanity, the mortality, the sexuality and the potential for moral and 
physical corruption that is associated with the 'person*.
Moreover, the data suggest that the body is ambiguous in ways beyond the 
equivocal nature of its substance. The body is perceived to be differently 
constituted for men and women, at the very least because the feminine body is 
more clearly premised on both its potential for 'openness' and its integrity. 
Attitudes towards the body and its products suggest a fusion of the bodily and 
the ethical but, at the same time, the boundaries of the physical feminine body 
are not necessarily isometric with those of the self. This is most clearly the 
case with a breastfeeding mother and her child, who appear to constitute a 
moral unity, an 'extended self (see Chapter 4:7). The 'close' relationship 
between a mother and child is signified by the relationship that exists between 
their bodies and by the way bodily substances are transferred between them; a 
child ingests its mother's milk and the mother treats the child's body products 
as her own (see Chapter 4:3).
Body products not only help to demonstrate the boundary of the self but, 
my data indicate, additionally help to indicate the degree of 'closeness' or 
'sameness' that exists. It is proposed that 'closeness' is a way of indicating 
'sameness'; the 'closer' someone is, the more they are perceived to be the 'same'. 
'Sameness* is epitomised, for example, by the breastfeeding mother and her young 
child. It is also indicated by the recognition of shared 'blood'. By and large,
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’blood* relationships are recognised between those who have some biological 
link. However, a 'blood* relationship may be denied where there is clearly a 
genetic relationship, if there is no 'closeness', and, conversely but less 
commonly, a 'blood' relationship may be recognised where there is no biological 
link. Such 'closeness' generally referred to a social intimacy based on a 
degree of emotional openness and expectations of support.1
The term 'flesh and blood* encompasses a specific, core group of 
relationships, again premised on 'closeness', but additionally associated with 
the process of 'upbringing'. On the whole, 'flesh and blood' relationships exist 
either between those adults who raised children and the children they raised or 
between those who were raised to adulthood together - providing 'closeness' is 
maintained. Significantly the study finds that, despite the association of 
'flesh' with sexuality, sex (whether as discourse or act) is taboo among those 
of the same 'flesh and blood'. By informants' definition, incest is a sexual act 
which involves 'close* 'family* members. However, the form of incest which 
brought most disapproval was that involving any kind of sexual or quasi-sexual 
behaviour between a 'close' adult and child. It has been suggested that the 
mother and breastfeeding child represent the greatest approximation of 
'sameness', but the extent to which a father and child can be considered 'the 
same' is not clear. It is possible however that the prohibition of incest is, 
in part, a prohibition of sex with that which is the 'same*. Moreover, the 
taboo concerning sex with those associated with 'upbringing' may help to give 
shape to the ethics associated with 'raising' a child to full personhood.
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What is suggested, therefore, is that informants have a multivalent 
understanding of relatedness premised on principles of 'sameness', 'closeness' 
and 'openness'. Moreover, this view of relatedness interweaves an understanding 
of physical connection drawn, in part, from biomedical genetics with a range of 
perceptions (influenced, for example, by the metaphysics of Christian tradition) 
which stress the importance of social and moral interconnectedness.
Limitations and possibilities,
The principal limitations of this analysis have, for the most part, been 
indicated in Chapter 1.4. For example, it is not clear to what extent the 
ontological model of procreation indicated by informants or, more specifically, 
the positive value attributed to nurturance, are more likely to be found among 
women than men. Perceptions of the body, such as its ambiguous integrity, are 
presented in the dissertation as specific to women, but there is no 
corresponding male view of either the masculine or the feminine body to weigh 
against this. In the same way, notions of 'sameness', 'closeness' and 'openness' 
may hold different meanings for men. Indeed, the analysis presented here, with 
its emphasis on the gender-specific nature of informants* perception of bodily 
integrity would suggest we might expect to find clear differences between male 
and female informants. Similarly, my informants are presented as if they 
represent a unified group; although they share a certain range of experiences 
(such as being sexually active, heterosexual women in their fertile years, whose 
need to control their fertility brings them into contact with biomedical 
knowledge and technologies), their varied experiences arising from different 
socio-economic or ethnic backgrounds have not been drawn out. Thus, this
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dissertation presents an understanding of procreation and relatedness which 
would no doubt become more ambiguous or more nuanced should such experiences 
be taken into account. It is suggested that one means of access to the 
potentially different identities (such as that of ’class’) which may exist under 
the umbrella of the category of 'Englishness' might be through a more detailed 
study of 'subtance' (see Chapter 1.4 for an elaboration of this point). Such a 
study, moreover, requires a different research setting; it is difficult to assess 
the extent to which gathering data within a clinical environment, as I did, 
influenced informants' comments and certainly this particular research setting 
imposed limitations on the methodologies that could be employed (see Chapter 
1.4). Other locations for future research might be found through community 
organisations, such as tenants' groups. Alternatively, working within the 
'family' networks of active members of a particular church might allow a more 
detailed analysis of the significance of Christian metaphysics for the 
understanding of relatedness.
A second theme for futher work, and linked to that of 'substance1, concerns 
the integrity of the person, particularly in relation to the transmission of 
body fluids between individuals. I have restated above the way in which the 
relationship between a mother and young child can be understood in terms of an 
'extension of self, particularly where breastfeeding occurs. Breastmilk, and in 
other contexts blood, appear to signify 'sameness', while other body products 
identified as 'waste' helped to mark difference. Informants' attitudes towards 
semen, ( a substance which is, I would think, unlikely to be regarded as 'waste') 
were not ascertained. However, a discussion of the practice of artificial
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insemination by donor raised the possibility of a parallel between breastfeeding 
and breastmilk on the one hand and heterosexual intercourse and semen on the 
other, with the transmission of semen also marking an extension of self which 
transcended the boundaries between two individuals (see Chapter 6.8). This 
suggestion is supported by the work by Wolfram on English kinship (1987). She 
has described, for example, the tradition within Christianity in which a man 
and woman become one upon marriage (provided the marriage is consummated).
This tradition, she argues, has - at least until recently - had major 
implications for the way in which affinal relations have been perceived (1987: 
197). This possibility of the 'collapse* of two persons into one is also 
significant in the light of literature on personhood, which has tended to assume 
that, in contrast to other cultures, the category of the person in the West is 
one of a discrete, substantially unchangable unit (see Chapter 3.2). From this 
it follows that a study which examines, for example, the meanings attached to 
marriage and sexual intercourse, together with male and female informants' 
perceptions of body products including semen and, additionally, compares affinal 
and consangulneal relationships might throw further light on the understanding 
of personhood and relatedness in western culture.
A third theme for future research suggested by this study arises from the 
possibilities certain metaphors offer for glimpsing informants' personal 
ontologies. It was suggested in Chapter One (section 2) that the moral domain 
might be approached through the study of metaphor. Here I would like to 
enlarge upon this suggestion and propose that the 'positional' metaphors used by 
informants' indicate something of the ways in which those categorised as 'blood'
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or 'flesh and blood' are perceived, and of the morality associated with these 
groupings. This part of the conclusion is speculative, but justified in that it 
raises interesting questions for further research into the ontological basis of 
relatedness.
Metaphor and morality
During the course of fieldwork I became aware of the way in which many 
informants made use of terms such as 'falling', 'standing' and 'raising' in the 
context of procreation. For example, women were said to 'fall' pregnant; the 
recognition of children as persons coincided with signs of their independence 
or 'standing on their own feet'; the process of bringing a child to adulthood 
was referred to as 'upbringing' or the 'raising a child' (see examples of these 
marked in bold emphasis throughout this dissertation). These expressions were 
all familiar to me. Vhat was unfamiliar was the consistent way in which these 
terms were used, a consistency which became clear only when I reviewed the 
data. How, then, should such terms be collectively understood? To answer this 
question, I propose to treat them as metaphors, bearing in mind the point made 
by Qvering (1985), that there is a fine line between literal and metaphorical 
utterances.2
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have referred to the kinds of tropes I found 
used by informants as orientational metaphors which are linked to the kinds of 
bodies we have and to the specific way our bodies function within any 
particular physical or cultural environment. Most pertinently, these authors
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refer to a range of 'up-dawn' orientational metaphors which indicate that health 
and life are associated with 'up' (we reach the 'peak1 of fitness, Lazarus 'rose' 
from the dead), while sickness and death are linked to 'down' (we 'fall' ill or 
'drop' dead). According to Lakoff and Johnson, this complex of metaphors has a 
physical basis in as much as serious illness forces people literally to lie 
down. Similarly, virtue is associated with 'up' (as with 'high' standards), 
while depravity is linked with 'down' (as in 'low' tricks). This group of 
orientation metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson suggest, is linked to our physical and 
social experience in the sense that, just as 'up' represents what is good for a 
person, it also represents what is good for society as a whole.
Lakoff and Johnson (19S0) suggest that most of our fundamental concepts 
are organised in terms of one or more spatialisation metaphors, each of which 
has an internal systematicity. For example, the association of health with 'up' 
represents a coherent system and not a number of random or isolated cases; 
there is no context in which "He is sinking" implies that a man's health is 
improving. Beyond this internal systematicity is an overall external coherence, 
so that the association of health with 'up' is matched by other states of well­
being (such as happiness) similarly associated with 'up'. However, it is 
suggested that "no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately 
represented independently of its experiential basis" <1980: 19).
For example, being vertical enters our experience in many different ways and 
therefore gives rise (so to speak) to many different spatialisation metaphors.
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However, Lakoff and Johnson place limits on the experiential basis of 
metaphor in that they believe "we typically conceptualise the non-physical in 
terms of the physical" (ibid: 59). They suggest that, because physical 
experience is more clearly delineated than other forms of experience, it offers 
greater possibilities far conceptualising the less concrete, such as emotion. 
Hence, "ttlhe essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of 
thing in terms of another (1980: 5) [my emphasis].
This is very different to an understanding of metaphor as a way of
revealing psycho-physical unity. Rather than defining metaphor as a way of
making a statement about something else, of showing the "thisness of that"
(with the implication that one part of the trope is made primary), metaphor can
be regarded as demonstrating the "thisness of this" (Jackson 1989: 142). By
way of example, Jackson refers to how we 'fall' or are 'thrown' when our
environment is disrupted. For instance, when we 'fall' in love or 'fall' ill,
there is a simultaneous disorientation of mind and body which refers to basic
ontological Being:
In this sense, uprightness of posture may be said to define a 
psychophysical relationship with the world, so that to lose this position, 
this 'standing', is simultaneously a bodily and intellectual loss of 
balance, a disturbance at the very centre and ground of our Being.
Metaphors of falling and disequilibrium disclose this integral connection 
of the psychic and the physical; they do not express a concept in terms of 
a bodily image" (1983: 329).3
Jackson has described how bodily praxis may induce or suggest ethical 
ideas (1983: 1989). By the same token, if one assumes there is psycho-physical 
integrity, metaphors referring to bodily praxis may similarly suggest ethical
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ideas. This dissertation is restricted in scope in that it concentrates on data 
arising from the spoken word and not from bodily praxis. I am therefore unable 
to comment on the relation between the ethics concerned with 'falling' pregnant, 
'standing on one's own feet* or 'raising' children and bodily praxis. What does 
seem apparent, however, is that the ethics of 'raising' children and the social 
relationships of those involved in this (those who are 'related') are expressed 
in terms of metaphors pertaining to bodily stance. It has been suggested that 
models of social space may offer a way of understanding the development and 
maintenance of social structures, such as alternative procedures for computing 
kinship distance (see, for example, Farber 1981). This study suggests that the 
metaphor of 'falling', and its antithesis of 'being raised', might be seen to 
indicate disequilibrium in the sense of representing movement or change within 
a particular kind of social or moral space. This 'space' appears to be 
constituted by the relationships between those of the same 'blood' or 'flesh and 
blood' and who have the responsibilty of recreating or renewing a sphere of 
moral order through 'raising' children to adulthood. The rest of this section 
will examine this suggestion in more detail.
Falling ..pregnant
Before beginning fieldwork I was aware of a number of expressions used among 
those of English culture to refer to the state of pregnancy, such as having 'a 
bun in the oven', being 'in the club', being 'knocked up' or 'falling' pregnant. 
These ways of referring to being or becoming pregnant were only explored in 
any depth with Katy, She understood the majority of these expressions as 
derogatory ways of referring to pregnant women that would only be used by
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men,*1 However, the expression 'to fall pregnant' was one that Katy herself
used. Initially she explained the term as fallows:
I think that if someone were to say "if I fall pregnant" it would mean if 
I were to fall pregnant by accident" whereas if you were trying to have a 
baby you wouldn't use that phrase 'to fall pregnant' because you were 
planning it.
Nonetheless, other discussions with Katy suggest that 'falling' pregnant is not 
simply a question of becoming pregnant by accident. She also states, far
example, that "You could say "I fall really easily"." In other words, 'falling'
pregnant appears to refer to becoming pregnant or the 'act' of conceiving 
irrespective of intention, Despite Katy's explanation of 'falling' as accident, 
subsequent discussions about her family show that Katy uses the expression to 
refer to her own pregnancies, which were all planned. Thus the expression 'to 
fall pregnant' conveys a sense of error, or of conception and pregnancy as 
processes beyond control. This is the case even though a specific pregnancy 
may not be viewed as a mistake,
One way of explaining this may be in terms of the ontological implications 
of pregnancy. Jackson's argument implies that 'falling pregnant* entails a 
disorientation of Being-in-the-world, a simultaneously physical and ontological 
jolt (1983). Certainly pregnancy has a number of physical and existential 
implications, irrespective of whether it occurs by intention. For example, 
pregnancy may come about despite the use of contraception, or may not occur in 
the absence of any contraceptive practice. Moreover, once established, a 
pregnancy will develop, to a large exent, independently of its mother. The
- 354 -
fetus draws its nourishment from the mother, irrespective of her own 
nutritional status. Similarly, the mother is aware of the independent movement 
of the fetus within her own body. In this sense, pregnancy exists beyond the 
mother's volition and, as such, poses certain ontological questions about what 
is self and other.
A further way of explaining the sense of error associated with 'falling 
pregnant' may be in terms of the cosmological implications of conception. 
According to the Christian tradition, with 'the Fall' came the alienation of 
human kind from God. This alienation is believed to be mitigated by the Virgin 
Birth, which represents a renewed intimacy between God and humans. However, 
unlike other mythologies which suggest that every human birth may be 
understood at some level to restate the intimacy between the divine and the 
secular, the Virgin Birth is a unique occurence (Warner 1985: 46). Thus, this 
moment of intimacy aside, Christians have seen themselves as continuing to 
participate in the tragedy of the Fall and the subsequent alienation from God 
(Warner: 1985). From this it can be argued that, if the Virgin Birth is a 
unique event representing the intimacy between God and humanity, other 
conceptions might represent the alienation of humankind from God. In other 
words, secular conception traditionally carries with it the sense of a 'fall 
from grace'.®
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'Falling pregnant* also needs to be understood in relation to the other 
orientational metaphors of 'standing* and 'raising'. It will be suggested in the 
fallowing section that these refer to the process of attaining adulthood as a 
certain psycho-physical position in the world and as a state of moral 
responsibility. A child is 'raised' and supported by its kindred (those of its 
'blood' and 'flesh and blood') to attain a position of 'standing' which 
incorporates a moral rectitude.
In 'falling pregnant' it is apparently the woman who 'falls', rather than 
the child or fetus she carries, as if in 'falling' for a particular child, women 
temporarily surrender a certain ontological position to be 'with child', Katy, 
for example, talks of when she 'fell' for Jack. However, we have seen that, in 
its early life, the child appears to be the 'same' as its mother, with mother 
and child constituting an extended self. In this sense it is possible to 
understand why - in addition to its physical recumbence, its position in the 
social hierarchy, and its 'irrationality', which are all expressed by a range of 
orientational metaphors emphasising the child's 'lowness* - the newly-born child 
might be seen to require 'raising*.
Standing/Raising
It was suggested in Chapters Four and Six that a mother and child are 
implicitly understood as being 'close', to the point of being 'the same'. This 
state of unity or extended self seems to continue until the child is recognised 
to have attained a degree of personhoad (see Chapter 3). Such personhood, for 
many informants, is marked by a degree of autonomy from the mother and is
- 356 -
referred to, for example, as the child 'standing on its own feet'. Those who are 
'close' to the child, his or her 'flesh and blood', continue to play a role in the 
child's 'upbringing' after these first indications of independence.®
The association between moral rectitude and physical erectness has been 
remarked on elsewhere. For example, in a study of selfhood and the experience 
of being embodied, Levin states that moral and physical uprightness are 
inseparable or ontologically intertwined, saying "a morally upright life begins 
with, and is inseparable from, a balanced, upright posture" (1985:270). Levin 
appears to talk in universal terms when he refers to the experience of Being. 
Others have confined themselves to demonstrating an historical association of 
posture and morality within western culture (see, for example,Vigarello 1989 and 
Schmitt 1989).
Informants indicate that becoming 'upright' is a continuing process, 
referred to most clearly as 'upbringing*. Moreover, it is through 'upbringing' 
that the notions of 'blood and 'flesh and blood' and the meaning of the 
relatedness they denote become more apparent. These notions, in turn, are 
paralleled by a further set of notions, those of 'openness', 'closeness' and 
'sameness'. In Chapter Five it was suggested that these- may be differently 
emphasised by informants but, taken together, indicate something of the 
morality associated with relatedness. This complex of personal ethics 
corresponds with a bodily idiom. Hence 'openness' may refer both to a physical 
and a psychological openness. Similarly 'sameness' suggests a physical and an 
ontological equivalence and 'closeness' both a physical and emotional proximity.
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The notion of 'closeness* was particularly stressed by informants. For 
example, there was a clearer parallel between the use of 'close* and the use of 
'blood' or 'flesh and blood' in the description of a relationship. Both those 
who were perceived as 'blood' (and especially those of the same 'flesh and 
blood') and those who were regarded as 'close' appeared to play a rale in 
individuals' 'uprightness' or 'standing'. This was indicated, for instance, by 
informants' explanations of 'closeness'; those who are 'close' will "always back 
you up*, "won't let you down*', and "will always be there''. Similarly, "You can 
always fall back on your parents...your parents are always there'1 and "they're 
always there to supporf
These expressions give a sense of those who are 'close' as forming a 
protective ring around the informant and preventing her from keeling away from 
an upright stance. It is therefore suggested that the positional metaphors used 
by informants indicate a 'morality of kinship', expressed in a bodily idiom and 
concerned with the attainment of ethical and existential status of those who 
are recognised as 'the same', or close to the same. Moreover, it appears that, 
through helping to maintain this uprightness, by remaining 'close', the 
recognition of 'sameness' is reinforced. This interpretation of the metaphors 
used by informants warants much greater attention, particularly in terms of 
verifying it with informants.
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7.2) The_relation between lay and biomedical knowledge
The previous section suggests that, to a large extent, relatedness is perceived 
by informants as a matter of social and moral relationships. This, to some 
extent, answers the problem raised at the beginning of this dissertation - 
namely, why should informants downplay the significance of biological 
connection, given the way in which, in many contexts, biomedical knowledge is 
apparently privileged? Many findings of this study - such as the existence of 
an 'ontogenetic* model of procreation, the significance of 'orientational' 
metaphors, the ambiguity of the body's 'substance' and integrity - have 
indicated a conflation of physical and metaphysical domains. In this light, it 
is not suprising that informants fail to privilege biological connection in 
their perceptions of relatedness; biomedical knowledge is only one of a range 
of influences on these perceptions. Thus the problem is not entirely solved but 
requires to be recast as follows; given the co-existence or even 
complementarity of lay and biomedical knowledge indicated by informants' 
understandings of procreation and relatedness, why do they privilege biomedical 
knowledge (as indicated, for example, by one woman's comments while completing 
the drawing exercise (see Chapter 1.7)?
Some research has already examined this problem in terms of the social 
relations implicit in the production and uptake of medical knowledge (cf Martin 
1987). There remains, however, an ambiguity concerning the relation between the 
ontologies underlying lay and biomedical knowledge. In the context of this 
research this is perhaps most noticable in the way that genetic relationships 
and genetic material are understood. For example, this study has not closely
- 359 -
examined informants' understandings of what genes are, how they are transmitted 
from one generation to another or the means by which they are expressed within 
any individual. What has been suggested is that informants invest genes with 
the capacity to pass on physical and perhaps emotional characteristics from 
parent to child. Even this perception however is not elaborated, in that it 
remains unclear why genes are not expressed identically for every child born of 
the same parents. I suspect, however, that informants' understandings of genes 
and genetic mechanisms vary widely from those of geneticists and this is 
because a) informants have an incomplete grasp of genetic theory and b) less 
obviously, the principles of genetic inheritance share a superficial similarity 
with certain principles arising from other spheres of knowledge that are 
available to informants. In this context it is useful to restate a point made 
by Wolfram (1987), that being similarly related to each parent is a feature of 
English kinship which predates the development of the field of biomedical 
genetics. Thus, the similar nature of the relationship existing between a child 
and each of his or her parents is, in part, a matter of deeply entrenched local 
categories <1987: 204-5). These categories may have been influenced or 
reinforced by informants' perceptions of genetics but it is unlikely that they 
can be be explained by biomedical genetics alone.
Just as informants' knowledge is composed of more than one element, the 
models employed by biomedical practitioners cannot be assumed to be purely the 
outcome of scientific knowledge (or even one particular form of scientific 
knowledge). In Chapter 1.3 it was suggested that biomedicine does not 
represent a homogeneity and that practitioners within this sphere employ a
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range of different kinds of knowledge according to different contexts (such as 
in formal debates in the literature; in medical education; in discussions with 
collegues or in consultations with patients). In addition, it was mooted that 
the personal cosmologies of medical practitioners may also co-exist with 
medical knowledge. This suggests the hypothesis that doctors of similar 
background to my informants may have an understanding of procreation and 
relatedness that is similar in many respects to that described in this 
dissertation, albeit that those aspects more compatible with biomedicine may be 
given greater stress. Indeed, future work arising from this research might 
usefully look for evidence of the ontogenetic model among doctors as one of a 
range that they employ, together with the extent to which the principles of 
'openness', 'closeness' and 'sameness' on which part of the model rests and made 
explicit by the nations of 'blood' and 'flesh and blood', inform the everyday 
practices of medical practitioners. For example, we have seen how these 
principles presuppose certain understandings of the 'person', of the relationship 
between 'persons', and of the relationship between the person and the physical 
body which are very different from those found in the texts of biomedical 
specialties such as obstetrics or psychiatry. The findings of this research 
therefore reinforce the need, identified at the beginning of the project, to look 
more closely at the ontological principles underlying medical practice.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. For an explanation of such biomedical terminology, see Appendix A.
2. I follow Barnes in using the term 'knowledge' with the sense of
'accepted belief', rather than 'correct belief (1974: ix) in
referring both to lay and biomedical thought. See alsoBarnard and 
Good 1984: 162).
3. As mentioned before, IVF is justified partly on the basis of the 
genetic link it offers between a parent and child. In addition, IVF 
allows the possibility of sex selection and the genetic manipulation 
of inherited characteristics.
4. In Chapter 5.1. I explain why I use the term 'relatedness', rather 
than the more usual anthropological expression of 'kinship'.
5. The term 'model is used with some caution. According to Holy and
Stuchlik (1981), a model is a construct, mental or otherwise, which
is built to represent something else. Alternatively, Kaplan (1964) 
prefers to reserve the term for those theories which can be 
understood as 'scientific metaphors' and which focus attention on 
certain resemblances between the theoretical entity and the subject 
matter. It is this analogy between the two domains that is seen to 
be of central importance. I do not use the term 'model' in either 
of these ways but as a way of referring to a matrix of beliefs or a 
collection of ideas which may not have been intentionally formulated 
and may not be at all systematic. The point has also been made by 
Eisenberg (1977) that models may be a way of imposing meaning onto 
the chaos of the phenomenal world, but they can be dangerous 
because, once constituted, they can become confused with reality. 
They tend to verify themselves because they exclude from 
consideration those phenomena outside their frame of reference; 
phenomena only become 'data' because of their relevance to a 
particular mode of thought.
6. This might be referred to as a culturally specific 'morality of 
kinship' (cf Overing 1985).
7. Here I use 'existential' in its phenomenological sense (see, for 
example Merleau-Ponty 1962) rather than as the existentialists, such 
as Sartre (1984) might. It is interesting to note that 
'existential' comes from the Latin existere, with sistere meaning
'to stand',
8. The emergence of science can be variously traced to the Renaissance 
in Europe, ancient Greece or Babylonia (Goody 1977), but it is 
widely conceptualised as following a pre-scientific period. The 
change in the mode of thought assumed to characterise the emergence 
of science has been represented as a move from pre-logical to 
rational mentality (Levy-Bruhl 1926), irrationality to rationality 
(Wilson 1970), wild to domesticated thought (Levi-Strauss 1966) or 
from a closed to open system (Horton 1970). However, in all these 
cases, different values are attached to each aspect of the dichotomy 
set up, so that the change from a closed to an open system, for 
example, is seen not simply as 'process, but progress.
9. This is described in the collections edited by Wilson (1970); Horton 
and Finnegan (1973); Hollis and Lukes (1982) and Overing (1985).
10. Kuhn (1977) has challenged the traditional understanding of the 
rational nature of science by arguing that the application of 
methodological criteria is mediated by a range of factors, including
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aspirations and beliefs drawn from the scientist’s culture, personal 
psychological idiosyncrasies, previous research experience and 
career prospects.
11. Barnes (1969: 97) has made a similar point.
12. See also Helman (1978) and Blaxter (1983).
13. Feyerabend (1975) has described.this view of merger as a "Swiss 
Cheese theory" of the history of ideas and one which he rejects on 
the grounds of incommensurability. He argues against the view that 
a cosmology (A) has sizeable lacunae which can be filled by elements 
of another cosmology (B), while leaving all other aspects of 
cosmology A unchanged (1975).
14. See, for example, Ward (1966) who describes how Chinese Boatpeople 
carry at least three different 'conscious models' simultaneously on 
what it means to be Chinese,
15. I use the term 'paradigm' very loosely in the sense described by 
Kuhn (1963) when he said
A paradigm is a fundamental scientific achievement, and one 
which includes both a theory and some exemplary applications to 
the results of experiment and observation. More important it is 
an open ended achievement, one which leaves all sorts of 
research still to be done. And finally it is an accepted 
achievement in the sense that it is received by a group whose 
members no longer try to rival it or to create alternatives for 
it. (1963: 358)
16. Interestingly, we share our embryonic origins and genetic identity 
with our placenta but do not consider this a part of us after birth. 
Nor is the placenta as a discrete biological entity recognised as an 
individual after birth; it is an 'afterbirth*.
17. Before this stage, in some cases, no embryo develops. While usually 
one embryo will develop, occassionally two or more do so to produce 
identical twins, triplets etc., if all survive. In some instances, 
however, two conceptuses in the same uterus may, at this early 
stage, combine to form a "chimera" - a single embryo of two 
geneticaly distinct papultions of cells. Up until this stage the 
conceptus may also still evolve into something non-human, such as a 
hydatiform mole,
18. The capacity of a fetus to survive from as early as twenty-two weeks 
of gestation has been unrecognised by law, which has until now taken 
twenty-eight weeks.of gestation to mark viability under the Infant 
Life Preservation Act of 1929. This definition of viability is 
likely to change when the Human Fertiliation and Embryology Bill 
(1989) receives its final reading,
19. The mother does not reject the 'other' within her because, through 
the manufacture of special antibodies that mask the signs of 
'other', the mother's immune surveillance system remains blind to 
the presence of the fetus, except in certain circumstances, such as 
Rhesus incompatibility.
20. In this study, motherhood and fatherhood are used as general terms. 
When it is necessary to be more specific, I use the following terms:
genetrix/genetic mother: the woman who provides the ovum for
conception;
carrying mother: the woman who bears the pregnancy and gives
birth;
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social mother: the woman who gives principal care or is 
otherwise recognised as mother after birth; 
maternity: the legal recognition of motherhood;
genitor/genetic father: the man who provides the sperm for 
conception;
social father: the man who gives principal care or is otherwise
recognised as father after birth;
paternity: the legal recognition of fatherhood.
21. At the time of fieldwork, the Bloomsbury Health Authority was an 
administrative body responsible for health services within 
approximately ten square miles of inner London, and for a population 
of roughly 150,000 (although the catchment area for some services, 
including family planning, extended beyond this).
22. For details of this clinic see Appendix B.
23. See also Cornwell (1984) on the embarrassment raised by class 
differences between researcher and informant.
24. All the names that are used to refer to Katy's family are 
fictitious.
25. The history of Kentish Town goes back to at least 1400, its name 
deriving from the Cetic ken for river, in this case referring to the 
river Fleet which pases through the area. Once a famous site of 
watercress beds, the river has, since 1860, been compressed into 
pipes and used as a sewer. In the 16th and 17th century, Kentish 
Town was little more than a cluster of inns for stage coaches. With 
the Industrial Revolution, it rapidly transformed from a suburban 
village surrounded by fields into the urban sprawl it is today. The 
mosb rapid change took place between 1840 and 1870, with hundreds of 
three-storey, terraced houses constructed for families and their 
servants. The chief local industries were the manufacture of 
furniture, pianos and organs. In the 1860's, due to the massive 
infiltration of the railways, Kentish Town became increasingly 
noisy, sooty and urban, causing its middle class inhabitants to move 
further afield. From then on the railway became the biggest, single 
influence on the development of Kentish Town, influencing the social 
class and occupation of its inhabitants (mainly railway employees). 
It became a working class district, although it was never to know 
the poverty of the East End or the south of London. Today the area 
is much more socially heterogeneous. There are still a large number 
of inhabitants who can trace their family' residence there for at 
least four generations (Tindall 1980).
26. Thus, for the majority of the time I have worked with Katy she has 
not been pregnant, but, in common with other informants, using a 
medically-supervised form of birth control.
27. Clearly, interviews with Katy and other informants ran concurrently 
for some of the fieldwork period, although discussions with Katy 
continued for some time after the official fieldwork period was 
over.
28. The reasons I find for this are included under section 1.8.
29. One informant agreed to an interview on the basis that it would not 
be recorded,
30. For the way in which fields of investigation were delineated, see 
Appendix E,
31. Significantly this resentment had not occurred in the case of my 
principal informant, who had been interviewed in a non-clinical
- 365 -
setting and with whom I had had mare opportunity to explain my 
motives and explore ways of approaching the topics in question.
What was nonetheless evident was an effort to replicate the 
biomedical model.
32. See also Cannon (1989) and Finch (1984), who refer to the useful
role that a researcher employing a conversational mode of interview 
can sometimes play for the informant.
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CHAPTER TWO
1. This view can be seen within an overall shift in emphasis concerning
the sacred, in which Durkheim's view that the sacred is a projection
or reflection of the social order is rejected. Instead, religious 
concepts are being given an autonomous rather than a derivative 
status, with the implication that the social is moulded by the 
religious (Stirrat 1986: 201).
2. See also, for instance, contributions to (eds) Bloch and Parry 
(1982) for examples of the way that reproductive processes and 
capacities may be used as powerful, if ambiguous, symbols which are 
manipulated in the management of discontinuity resulting from death.
3. See, for example, Chown (1987), for an explanation of this theory.
4. See Bal (1986) and Pagel (1989) who expand this view.
5. See Chalmers (1982) and Feyerabend (1975) for an elaboration of the 
power given to scientific belief,
6. The term 'patriarchy' is used in a general sense to refer to the 
social dominance of men (cf. Mackintosh 1981; Walby 1989).
7 See also Lloyd (1984) on the long-standing association between 
maleness and form, femaleness and matter.
8. For example, the term 'seminal', according to Chambers Twentieth 
Century Dictionary (1977) means "generative: notably creative or 
influential in future development". See also 'inseminate', 
'impregnate' and 'beget'.
9. Delaney draws attention, for example, to a quotation from 
Dinnerstein, referring to the father's role, in which she suggests 
"pre-natal fathering" includes "the initial planting of the seed" 
(1977: 149).
10. Additionally, within Roman Catholicism, the angels, Virgin Mary and 
saints are often regarded as quasi-divinities (Parsons 1966: xlvi).
11. Varner also suggests that the way in which God forms Adam from dust 
and breathes life into him (Genesis 2. 7) provides another example.
12. See, for example, this Chapter (2.5) and Chapter 6.3.
13. The importance of nurturance is further endorsed by data presented 
in Chapters 5 and 6.
14. The respective genetic contribution of men and women did not emerge 
clearly in discussions of the Virgin Birth. (See instead Chapter 
5.5. )
15. See Chapter 4.2, for example, and Chapter Five (sections 7 & 8).
16. The possible exception to this is represented by women who make use 
of certain of the new reproductive technologies; see Chapter Six.
17. See Leach (1966) and Spiro (1968), among others, on this point.
18. Pope Martin I declared Mary's perpetual virginity a dogma of the 
Church in 649 AD (Warner 1985: 66).
19. It is interesting that the 'leakage' of seminal fluid is overlooked 
in this view.
20. See Lloyd (1984) on the historical association of a distinction 
between maleness and femaleness and between Reason and its apposite.
21. Ve saw in section 2.3 that this interpretation appears of little 
interest to my informants. However, it was also stated that I had 
only a few, superficial discussions with informants on their 
understandings of the Fall. I would therefore be unwilling to
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suggest any discrepancy between my informants' views and those 
presented by, for example, Varner, concerning the implications of 
the Fall for women.
22. Craik (1979) draws attention to the intimacy that is emphasised in 
Pentacostalism, for example, where all members of the Church are 
represented in female imagery in terms of their relation to Christ 
and as potential receptacles for the Holy Spirit. See also Varner 
(1935) who interprets the Song of Songs in the Old Testament as an 
allegory for God's love and referring to Christ's relationship with 
the Christian Church, with each Christian soul and with the Virgin 
Mary. Similarly, Villiams observes that among her Carmelite nun 
informants, the Song of Songs was seen to depict something of the 
relationship between the human soul (the 'Bride') and Christ (the 
'Spouse') (1975: 123).
23. The Eucharist which transforms the recipient into the sacred through 
the ingestion of Christ's flesh and blood is mirrored by incest 
taboos which reject the 'ingestion' of those of the same 'flesh and 
blood' (see Chapter 5.8).
24. This suggestion would appear to argue against Douglas's assertion
(1973) that when the relationship with God is not seen to be 
mediated by priests, there is a change of medium used to express the 
sacred and that, instead of the outside of the body, the inside is 
exclusively honoured. Douglas implicitly suggests that the emphasis 
on the internal is a consequence of the relatively recent change in 
role of the priesthood. However, Camporesi (1989) and Bynum (1989), 
among others, have shown that through the Eucharist, God has been 
experienced very much as inside the body from as long ago as the 
Middle Ages.
25. The Christian Virgin Birth is not an example of parthenogenesis, as 
it is often described, as this term refers to reproduction by an 
unfertilised ovum. See Varner (1985: 43) for a further discussion 
of this phenomenon.
26. The emphasis an female virginity has been given a number of 
interpretations. For instance, it has been argued that the 
consecration of virginity in the Fourth century has to be seen in 
the context of a number of measures, such as the Church's invention 
of spiritual kinship, which, taken together, suggest a policy that 
promotes increased choice for women, such as the freedom not to 
marry. This argument is useful as a reminder of the possible role 
of the wider social context in shaping sexual ethics. However, it 
is not persuasive in accounting for an ethic of asceticism for both 
women and men.
27. Bottomley (1979) suggests that Paul has been widely misrepresented 
and his writings falsely used to support a contempt for the body 
that became prevalent in the Middle Ages.
28. This view can be seen as compatible with Douglas's assertion that 
western cosmology is characterised by, among other things, an idea 
that what is good is 'inside' and in need of protection from 
'outside* farces (1973: 140).
29. See, for example, Hershman (1977); Bloch (1982) and Middleton 
(1982).
30. Far example, for the Lugbara, parturition and the 'untamed* 
sexuality of women are associated with the wild, while the more 
general fertility identified with men (that is, their reproduction
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of the social order) is associated with the compound. Birth takes 
place outside the compound and the newborn child is then introduced 
into the social world by the male elders who represent legitimate 
fertility (Middleton 1982). See also Bloch and Guggenheim (1981) on 
the separation of sexuality and fertility made evident in Roman 
Catholic baptism.
31. In the Judeao-Christian instance, the ideal order can be seen as a 
return to the lost paradise of the Garden of Eden and the end of 
alienation from God.
32. This is suggested by the doctrine of Mary's Immaculate Conception 
and consequently her freedom from original sin.
33. The juxtaposition of motherhood and virginity is not only inherent 
in representations of the Virgin Mary, but also of the Catholic 
Church: the Church is both Mother and virginal through the chastity 
of its officials (Craik 1979).
34. Psychoanalytic theories are not considered here for reasons of 
space.
35. Other versions of the 'seed and field' model have been widely 
reported (cf Ngubane 1977).
36. See, for example, informants' attitudes towards the body products of 
family members in Chapter‘4.3, the indications of sexual silence in 
the family (Chapter 5.7) and views on incest (Chapter 5.8).
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CHAPTER THREE
1. This representation of South Asian 'personhood' should be viewed 
with caution. Parry (1989), for example, suggests that the picture 
Marriott presents of persons as constitutionally volatile is 
overdrawn. How, he asks, does the person of fluid substance square 
with Harriott's earlier writings on caste rankings premised on an 
equivalence between all members of the same caste, if each actor's 
substance-code is modified by the numerous exchanges in which he or 
she is uniquely involved?
2. See Chapter 5.3 for a more detailed discussion of Schneider's work 
on American kinship.
3. See instead, for example, the volume edited by Carrithers et al 
(1985).
4. This appears to stand in contrast to Foucault's view that the 
discourse of confession has played and important role in the 
construction of the self, whether as self-reflection or in speech 
(1981).
5. No informant mentioned the father's absence in determining 
i ndependence/personhood.
6. According to Parfit, in the "reductionist view", the transition from 
ovum to human being takes time and is a matter of degree, just as
transition from human being to person occurs impercetibly. Vhile a
distinction is rarely drawn between human beings and persons, it is 
nonetheless possible to make this distinction. It can be claimed 
that a human being only becomes a person when this human being 
becomes self-conscious. A fetus may become a human being before 
birth but a new born baby is not self-conscious. Personhood is 
acquired at some point after birth. Similarly, Parfit notes that 
according to this "reductionist view", a person can gradually cease 
to exist before his or her heart stops beating. There may be a 
living human body and, as such, a living human being, but no person.
7. See also the discussion of the importance of form: section 3.4.
8. This is reminicent of Parkin's (1985: 137) statement that what has
traditionally been referred to as 'Cartesian dualism' can more
accurately be described as a triad composed of mind, body and soul, 
with soul creeping into the equation because of the need to refer to 
the individual's transcendental link with God or, post- 
Enlightenment, to the link between individual and society.
9. At the same time it has been suggested that psychoanalysis is 
concerned with "the question of how people live through the 
situation of being a neotenous body, the strategies of being in a 
world of bodies and things, and their various consequenses" (Levin 
1988:109), which casts an interesting slant on what the 'soul' might 
be.
10. For a comparison of the western notions of 'soul* and those to be 
found within other traditions, including the attributing of several, 
distinct 'souls' to each person see, for example, Lienhardt (1985).
11. However, we saw above that emotion, awareness and morality do have 
some association with 'soul'.
12. See Zaleski (1987) on 'near-death' experiences.
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13. Several other informants who did not make definite statements about 
the origin of soul also made the same point about the development of 
the soul throughout life,
14. I use this term following Overall (1987) in the absence of a 
comprehensive expression which refers to pre-natal life at any stage 
of development,
15. For a concise overview of the abortion debate since 1967, including 
the variability of service provision, see Greenwood and King (1981). 
See also Birke et al (1990) for more recent debate.
16. See Chapter Six for relevant details of this committee's aims and 
recommendations.
17. 'LIFE' is an organisation representing part of the so-called 'pro­
life' or anti-abortion movement which defends the right to life of 
the embryo/fetus on the basis that personhood begins at conception.
18. See Chapter 1.3, and the discussion concerning the continual process 
of individuality within the biomedical model.
19. In addition to seven doctors, three members came from the legal 
field, one was a nurse, one a theologian, one a philosopher, two 
were social workers and one member's background was unspecified.
20 See also the point made in Chapter 6.7, concerning the creative role 
ascribed to doctors involved in reproductive technologies.
21. See, for example, Spallone (1989) or Bradish (1987) on the link 
between the new eugenics, research in human genetics and the new 
reproductive technologies
22. See Appendix A for an explanation of such terms and Chapter Six for 
further discussion of the new reproductive technologies.
23. See Lienhardt (1985) for an interesting comparison between western 
and African descriptions of the location of 'soul',
24. I was unaware of this trend until Katy's son, aged 5 years, made a 
drawing in which the bones of the legs were emphasised (see Series 
A: William).
25. See, for example, patents on new life forms created by genetic 
engineering (Connor 1987); an immortal cell line from a spleen 
sample (Lancet 1988); to say nothing of the issues of property 
raised by new reproductive technologies (see Chapter 6).
26. The significance of the issue of transplantation may be indicated by 
the drawings made by my informants. (See Drawings Series A and 
Chapter Four for a more general discussion of these drawings). In 
these sketches of the inside of the body, the heart is the most 
commonly drawn organ (included by 15 out of 16 informants), followed 
by the kidneys and lungs (13 informants in each case) and the liver 
(10). While the common depiction of the heart may be due to a 
concept of it as the seat of the emotions or the symbol of life, 
what it shares with the other most commonly represented organs is 
that they are all organs associated with transplant. Emphasis on 
these organs might be associated with an understanding of the body 
linked, for example, to a long tradition of Galenic medicine. 
Alternatively it may indicate something of the extent to which 
contemporary medical and quasi-medical disaurse (made available 
through the various channels of the media) helps to construct the 
way these women understand their bodies.
27. Instead of a progressive embodiment of self, Foucault sees the 
resistance to pastoral power dating from the Renaissance to
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represent a reappearance of the autonomy of the self, first evident 
in Greco-Roman times (1984: 370).
28. In l.Corintians 6: 9 -10, St Paul offers a list of sins, organised 
according to their degree of seriousness. The most heineous are 
sins against God and against human life. Following these are sins 
against the body, or 'sins of the flesh', a group further sub­
divided into the sins of prostitution and adultery, the molles or 
mollities (including masturbation and the delay of orgasm for the 
sake of pleasure) and homosexuality (Aries 1985).
29. "Stomach", in this instance, is used to refer to the abdomen.
30. See, for example, the 'coffee-table' books by Nilsson on the 
development of the fetus (1977) and on cellular activity in immune 
response (1987) and the television series on surgery, Your Life in 
Their Hands, For a discussion of the effects of making the fetus 
more visible, see Petchesky (1987) and McNeil (1990).
31. See also Keller and Grontkowski (1983) who suggest that the emphasis 
on the visual within an overall hierarchy of senses has the effect 
of debasing other forms of experience as modes of knowing. These 
authors also argue that vision (as opposed to sight) has a capacity 
to objectify what is visualised, thus creating a distance between 
the knower and the known.
32. See also Sontag (1973) on the link between the origins of
photography and positivism as an epistemology that understands
'reality' as empirical data removed from historical process or 
social relationships.
33. See Petchesky (1987) who elaborates on this point.
34. According to Emerson, doctors who carry out intimate procedures such 
as vaginal examinations do their best to ignore any meaning their 
actions hold for the patient; "The staff disattend the connection 
between a part of the body and some intangible self that is supposed 
to inhabit that body" (1971: 78).
35. Body boundary and identity are discussed more fully in Chapter 4.2.
36. 'Closeness' is examined in Chapter 5.3.
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CHAPTER FOUR
1. See Bourdieu (1977) on the relationship between bodily and social control 
and also Elias (1978). The latter seeks to understand the development in 
western culture of a psychical distance between the individual and his or 
her body as made evident through table manners, sleeping customs, bathing 
habits and, to a lesser extent, sexuality and aggression. Elias claims 
that the origin of a strong, internalised agency of behavioural control 
that is manifest in such 'etiquette* has to be seen in the context of the 
emergence of the modern state.
2. See, for example, Evans-Pritchard (1976); Sontag (1979); Glick (1967); 
Shostak (1981); Zola (1978) or C. Gallagher (1987).
3. See also Soulioti and Durward (1989), who report the reactions of hospital 
staff to their research involving cerebro-spinal fluid. This fluid, 
withdrawn by lumbar puncture to relieve hydrocephaly in a baby, was 
subsequently returned to the infant via the gastrointestinal tract (in 
order to replace vital electrolytes). However the strength of feeling 
among collegues about the second aspect of this procedure (indicated by 
statements such as "it's cannibalistic") was such that the study had to be 
discontinued.
4. See the discussion of these drawings in Chapter 1.7.
5. Thomas (1987), for example has suggested that the cervix acts as a
symbolic gatekeeper to the body.
6. See also 'Openness' and vaginal examinations in Chapter 3.9.
7. This is discussed more fully in Chapters Five and Six.
8. Different types of body products appear to promt different degrees of 
unease; those of waste (such as faeces) elicit more horror than those 
products which can revitalise (for example, blood and breast milk).
However, all body products seem to hold within them something of their 
person of origin.
9. See Gell (1979) for the origin of this question.
10. Martin compares this to descriptions of the stomach's lining which 
undergoes similar processes, but in medical discourse is referred to 
positively as 'renewal'.
11. However, see the difficulties of ascribing class to informants discussed in 
Chapter 1.4.
12. See, far example, La Fontaine (1972); Brattensani and Siverthorne (1978); 
Berry and McGuire (1972).
13. For a review of the anthropological literature on menstruation see Paige 
and Paige (1981), and Buckley and Gottlieb's introduction to the volume 
they edit (1988).
14. See also Skultans (1988), based on the same data.
15. Skultans makes the point that women tend to use 'key' words in relation to 
menstruation which are ambiguous and in some sense convey certain 
features of a woman's social position (1970). She suggests, for example, 
that coming to terms with heavy blood loss is analagous in some way to 
the acceptance of being a 'loser' in a much wider sense. Indeed, 
menstruation has often been been the focus of attention for
- 373 -
anthropologists seeking to understand the relationship that exists between 
the sexes in any one culture, with a correlation between the common 
concept of the polluting nature of menstrual blood and the relatively low 
status of women (Buckley and Gottlieb 1988). See also the work of Ortner
(1974) and Thompson (1985).
16. See, for example, Snowden and Christian (1983) and Martin (1987).
17. I began to ask a number of informants about how they understood the
menopause and how they might feel about its approach. As most women 
replied this was not something they had yet thought about, I discontinued 
this line of questioning. However, among the ten women I did discuss the 
menopause with, two briefly indicated that they thought this would be a 
difficult and sad time, a sign of their loss of fertility and of getting 
older. One further woman was apprehensive that physical changes would be 
accompanied by personality change.
18. See also the discussion concerning the association of femininity and 
motherhood in Chapter 6.5.
19. This is consistent with findings by Martin (1987).
20. Hence the expression 'The Curse' (Veideger 1978).
21. Additionally Douglas's early work (1966) which associates pollution with 
that which is liminal, has been challenged by studies showing that what is
liminal is not always polluting and may, on occasion, be viewed positively,
as sacred for example: see Tambiah (1969) and Douglas herself (1972).
22. This is evidenced, for example, by informants' dislike of 'pill'-induced
amenorrhoea, as this disrupted a cycle,
23. The highest incidence of breastfeeding was found among mothers of first 
babies (especially among those women who had their first baby over the 
age of 25 years), those in the higher social classes, those educated beyond 
the age of eighteen, and those living in London and the South East (Martin 
and Vhite 1988).
24. Significantly, such facilities very often take the form of an additional 
cubicle in women's lavatories.
25. See for example La Leche Leaguef 1981),
26. This expression refers to women who pose semi-naked for photographs which
appear within a certain tabloid newspaper,
27. , This is in contrast to the medical view in which, although breast milk is
recognised as superior to formula milk, breastfeeding is seen as no
better in establishing a good relationship between a mother and child than 
the practice of bottlefeeding.
28. Bowlby (1969) used concepts from ethology to describe the bond of
attachment between a mother and her child. This concept of attachment
has since been popularised as 'bonding'.
29. See also McGilvray (1982).
30. Breast milk may, of course, be expressed and given by bottle and by a 
third party.
31. See also Altorki (1980); Khatib-Chahidi (1981).
32. Katy made it clear that her husband's semen was a 'foreign' substance that
she did not object to within her body, although only via the vagina.
33. This point is developed further in Chapters 5.3 and 6.2.
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34.
35.
36.
37.
33.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
Espeland has suggested that the acute embarassment caused by loss of 
bodily continence can be understood as more fundamental loss of control 
that is incompatible with the 'dignity' of the body/person (1984).
See Chapter 5.5.
This is reminiscent of Christianity's regulation of the flesh (See Chapter 
2.9 and 2.10). Also see Turner (1984) and Bynum (1987). Fildes (1988), 
among others, has recorded the moral influence that western wet-nurses 
were thought to have on their charges through their milk.
As I did not collect material on the relationship between mothers who 
bottlefed and their babies, it is beyond the scope of this work to comment 
on whether these mothers have a fundamentally different relationship in 
terms of personal boundaries.
Relationships between fathers and children were not explored.
This is not to say that women have a natural morality or are necessarily 
more moral than men.
Chodorow (1974) has noted that women's biosocial experience of 
menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth all involve some challenge to body 
boundary. Thus the ambiguity that women experience between what is self
and not-self (for example, in relation to a man who penetrates her or a
child who was once part of her body) are instrinsically meaningful. See 
also the reference to Haraway in Chapter 1,3.
Male bodily experience is not dealt with here.
This is in line with Berger's observation that men act and women appear, 
that men look at women and women watch themselves being looked at (1977: 
46-7).
For instance, Henley (1977) has shown that it is considered acceptable for 
women to be touched in certain ways and circumstances that would be 
deemed unacceptable by men. In addition, women may be touched by some 
persons (notably men) whom they in turn are not at the same liberty to 
touch (see also Bartky 1988).
This view accords with the 'ontogenetic' model of procreation described in 
earlier chapters and discussed more fully in Chapter 6.3.
Women's perceptions of the female breast (as opposed to men's perceptions 
of the female breast) remain hazy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1. As Barnes (1973: 64) has observed, the use of 'biolgical' is
confusing in that it refers to a scientific specialty in the context
of describing phenomena which exist independently of efforts to 
study them. However, the alternatives, such as 'natural' are 
similarly contentious (see, for example, Collingwood 1940).
2. Harris (1981), however, has pointed out that these domains may not
be as clearly demarcated as has often been assumed.
3. See also Leach (1971:27); Rapp (1982); Collier et al (1982).
4. This is represented, for example, by the works of Gellner (1987) and 
Barnes (1973).
5. The relationships (B1 to B12) represented in Figure B were 
constructed retrospectively from transcripts.
6. For a critique of the 'classical' account of 'the family' as
separated from the wider world, characterised by intense emotional 
relationships, sharp gender role distinctions, and perceived by its 
members as a distinctive and sacrosanct unit, see Jamieson (1987).
7. It has been argued that, as such, its form has no simple mechanistic 
relationship with a specific type Df economy, such as capitalism 
(Collier et al, 1982; Stivens 1981).
8. See also Goody (1976); Bourdieu (1977).
9. Significantly, there is an expression, "her indoors", which is used
by men in East London to refer to their wives and is used, for
example, by 'Arthur Daley' in the television series Minder.
10. See, for example, the work of Bowlby (1951).
11. This may include the respondent's father, mother and any siblings, 
or her spouse and children.
12. See Bloch (1973), for example.
13. See, for example, Yanagisaka (1977).
14. See, far example, the use of the term 'blood' by geneticists,
exemplified by Berry (1972).
15. This is an interesting connection which parallels the discovery of 
the role of spermatozoa long after the cultural belief of male or 
seminal involvement in reproduction.
16. See also Chapter 6.10 on adoption.
17. According to the genetic model, where individuals share the same 
genes, these genes are found throughout the entire body, being 
replicated at the level of each cell, but constituting only a part 
of the overall composition of the cell. The genetic material in 
each cell is identical throughout the body, whether the cells are 
those of the blood, liver or other organs, with the exception of 
gametes, that is of spermatazo and ova. However, genetic material 
can never be entirely identical to that of other individuals, with 
the exception of monozygotic or "identical" twins. What is more, 
even in the case of identical twins, genetic material can, as a 
result of environmental influences, be expressed in different ways. 
Deoxyribonucleic acids (DNA) do not of themselves cause 
characteristics, but provide a code by which amino acids are 
ordered. If, say, a given amino acid is absent (because of dietary 
insufficiency, for example) there will be no phenotypic expression 
of the gene. Genetic mutations are also thought possible after
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conception, as research into the role of oncogenes in some cancers 
suggests (Macbeth 1989: 14).
18. This phrase is an interesting one in that it appears to refer to the 
transcendent role attributed to men in the ontogenetic model of 
procreation.
19. See, for example, Katy and Barry's responses to evidence of his 
parents' sexuality which was made explicit during the break-up of 
their marriage, as discussed below.
20. We did not discuss how she viewed her father as, at this point in 
the research, she had not seen him for several years. They did 
become reconciled during the research period, but not long before 
his death.
21. According to Foucault, the "deployment of sexuality" has, since the 
nineteenth century, developed through such strategies as "a 
hysterization of women's bodies" .(the integration into medical 
practices of a feminine body perceived as saturated with sexuality 
and intrinsically pathological) and "a pedagogization of children’s 
sex" (the management of the sexual potential of children - for 
example, the battle against onanism) (1981: 104).
22. This would not necessarily be termed 'incest'.
23. Informants made very little reference to the father-child 
relationship.
24. This would seem to link to Leach's (1964) argument that taboo 
applies to categories which are anomolous in that they are not 
distinct or entirely defined.
25. There would appear to be a parallel here between my informants' 
personal ontologies and, for example, the world view of the Umeda as 
described by Gell (1979). According to Gell, for the Umeda, taboo 
plays a role in the definition of the self and the articulation of 
the self into a social world. Umeda taboos are concerned with the 
avoidance of "eating" oneself either literally through ingesting 
one's awn body products, or through eating self-killed game. The 
verb tadv (to eat) also includes in its associations the verbs "to 
kill" and "to copulate" and it is the entire complex of associations 
included under tadv that are associated with prohibition. For 
example, Umeda men and women discuss their sexual experience in 
terms of fainting or dying, eating or being eaten. Prohibition 
would seem to represent the rejection of these states and the 
restoration of the self by reconstituting it as' a closed system.
26. Those who share 'flesh and blood' are also those who face the 
strongest prohibitions concerning sex. This raises the question of 
why at least one of the meanings of 'flesh' (that is, as the locus 
of sexuality) is transposed once it is enjoined with 'blood'? This 
question is not one that I can deal with adequately here, but it 
would make an interesting area for further research. What may be 
relevant, given the backdrop of Christian tradition in the West, is 
that with the Eucharist, through taking into the body the 'flesh' 
and 'blood' of Christ, members of the Church become one. There is 
then a tradition in which 'flesh' and 'blood' as metaphysical 
substances together act as a model for asexual reproduction, in the 
sense of creating and renewing a specific kind of unified identity, 
a body of individuals who understand themselves as one.
27. Personal communication with the Children's Legal Centre, London has 
suggested anecdotal evidence of this trend, with the exception of
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28.
29.
30.
extremely young children; it seems babies, for example, are thought 
to be too young to remember abuse and are therefore believed to be 
less emotionally traumatised by incest than rather older children.' 
Punishment of offenders appears therefore, if anthing, slightly more 
lenient in the case of babies.
I do not wish to suggest that incest is only to be understood as the 
sexual avoidance of the extended self. It can simultaneously hold 
other meanings, such as the abuse of power (Rich 1980), the 
appropriation of sexuality and personal space (Willner 1983) or the 
extension of "'normal* masculinities, violences and sexualities" 
(Hearn 1988: 542).
On the basis of a philological analysis, Ueedham argues that, cross- 
culturally, incest carries a range of meanings and that this variety 
runs counter to the possibility of an overall theory of incest.
See also the earlier discussions on physical and moral integrity 
(2.8; 3.9 and 4.9).
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CHAPTER SIX
1. See also Callaway (1978) and MacCormack (1982) for a detailed 
discussion of this point.
2. See, for example, sociologists Graham and Oakley 1981 who make this 
implicit comparison in their description of the conflicting 
paradigms of doctors and 'mothers' .
3. While such arguments point to a very real sense of alienation 
reported by women undergoing childbirth (cf. Kitzinger 1987), they 
gloss over the extent to which medical intervention may be welcomed, 
not only in terms of reducing the number of infant and maternal 
deaths (Callaway 1978), but by improving the birth experience of 
some women through the control of pain (Roberts 1984). Bor is the 
medical profession alone in associating pregnancy with illness; Van 
Gennep has drawn our attention to cross-cultural evidence suggesting 
that a pregnant woman is perceived to be physiologically abnormal.
He finds that "Cnlothing seems more natural than that she should be 
treated as if she were ill" (1960:41).
4. The couvade has been variously explained, for example, as an
affirmation of social paternity, that is, "to establish a social 
situation of close moral proximity between father and child" 
(Malinowski 1960: 215-6) I my emphasis], or as an acknowledgement of
the spouse's role in giving birth (Blackwood 1934).
5. During fieldwork I attended ante-natal classes which were run by the
latural Childbirth Trust and found that the male partners of 
pregnant women were being encouraged to think and act as if they too
were carrying the pregnancy.
6. See, for example, Richman et al (1975). See also the legal attempt
on behalf of a putative father to prevent the abortion of a fetus
carried by his former lover (C v S 1987).
7. Oakley (1987), for example, observes how a photograph in the
Guardian newspaper (21.1.1985) of Professor Ian Craft surrounded by
fifty-eight of the babies born as a result of his IVF programme, 
bears the caption "Fast Breeder".
8. See Chapter 2.4 and 2.5 for a more detailed examination of her work.
9. 'Alienation' is a technical term O'Brien uses to describe haw, for 
man,
the alienation of his seed separates him from natural, genetic 
continuity which he only therefore knows as an idea. To give
this idea substance, man needs praxis, a way of unifying what he
knows as real with an actual worldly reality. Man must 
therefore make, and he has made, artificial modes of continuity 
(1981: 53).
'Appropriation', according to O'Brien, is the assertion of a right 
to child which 'nature' has omitted to provide for male parents.
However, men claim more than the child, and no less than ownership
of women's reproductive labour power (1981: 58).
10. See also Barnes (1974:66) on scientific knowledge that cannot be 
verbalised.
11. Katy's explanation is also interesting in that it avoided a 
significant part of the question, namely how she accounts for the 
striking similarlity in appearance between her children and Barry, 
and the vague physical resemblance between herself and her children.
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12. It was also shown in Chapter Five that this model, inspired both by 
genetics and gender role, was evident among a number of other 
informants.
13. I take it that she refers only to western consciousness in this 
scheme.
14. D'Brien's statement has been overtaken by events in that, since she 
wrote, it has became possible to determine a child's genitor with' 
almost total certainty. Nonetheless, the status of genitor remains 
more nebulous than that of genetrix in most instances.
15. See also the work of Mittwock (1984) and Martin (1989), who have 
similarly argued for a reappraisal of perceptions of male and female 
physiological roles in reproduction.
16. See also Owens and Read (1984). Their study of patients' experience 
of infertility investigation and treatment found that the facilities 
for investigating male infertility were sparse compared with those 
available for female infertility.
17. It is possible that informants drawings were influenced by the 
method of contraception they were using. For example,, one 26 year- 
old waitress taking the oral contraceptive pill drew only the 
ovaries and uterus (see Series B: fig. 7). She understood the 
'pill' to prevent pregnancy by acting on both these structures in 
some way. Similarly, a 31 year-old married solicitor drew both the 
vagina and the uterus as large in relation to the rest of the body 
(see Series B: fig. 9). She used the 'diaphragm' as a method of 
contraception and understood this was effective through sealing off 
the opening of the uterus once placed in position within the vagina. 
(She had also previously used the oral contraceptive pill).
18. See also Millet (1977) on inner space,
19. See, for example, the work of de Beauvoir (1972); Rich (1979); Lewin 
(1985).
20. See, for example, the volume edited by Stanworth (1987).
21. See, for example, Chodorow (1974: 47) on the different relationships 
that mothers may have with their sons and their daughters.
22. One line of reasoning that may be drawn from this is that, if 
womanhood is associated with the potential for 'openess' and a 
blurring of the boundaries of self and other, pregnancy and giving 
birth can be seen as paramount instances where this physical/moral 
potential is realised.
23. Boon (1974) points to a centuries-long tradition of mother surrogacy 
in England before the nanny, through institutions such as wet 
nursing, fostering and apprenticeship.
24. See, for example, Aries (1973); Mead and Volfenstein (1955).
25. Aries (1973) suggests that childhood in western culture as a period 
of separateness from adults and marked, for example, by different 
clothes and diet, is a comparatively recent phenomenon and largely 
invented in the late 17th century. Others such as Pollock (1983) 
disagree and argue that the category of childhood originates in an 
earlier period than Aries suggests. Some historians have posited 
that children were treated with indifference in the past because 
infant mortality rates were so high (see, for example, Langer 1972) 
but Stone (1979) argues that the invention of childhood (and the 
accompanying expectation of a warm affective relationship between 
parent and child) precedes any significant decline in such rates. 
McLaren also suggests that in pre-industrial England children were
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highly valued (1984), while Freeman (1983) suggests that the 
relationship between the 'invention' of childhood and economic 
activities should not be overlooked.
26. This latter assertion is supported by reference to the Maria Colwell 
case but the more recent discourse concerning child abuse (see, for 
example Campbell (1988) on the Cleveland inquiry) would serve just 
as readily.
27. And that it is, perhaps, the means of reproduction that is desired 
rather than the products of reproduction; see, for example, 
Bettelheim (1968); Rich (1977); O'Brien (1981).
28. Drummond does not address the role of women in transforming the 
child into a cultural being (see Chapter 1.3).
29. While masculinity appeared to be premised to some extent on male 
fertility, informants did not refer to a similarly 'desperate' 
desire for children among men.
30. See Appendix A for an explanation of reproductive techniques.
31. See Chapters 2:9; 4:3 and 5.7 on the asexual family.
32 For an explanation concerning the nature of the different 
techniques, see Appendix A.
33. As Gallagher notes, sexuality and reproduction are to be kept safe 
from human intervention by the efforts of celibate male clerics 
(1987:197).
34. This statement has been criticised for suggesting a fixed or 
identifiable boundary between the biological and the social (cf 
McNeil 1990).
35. See the discussion of experiential knowledge earlier in this chapter 
(6.3) and O'Brien on 'reproductive consciousness' (1981: 27-30).
36. It is not clear if Spallone refers here to women's physical 
integrity or the kind of physical/moral integrity which I discuss in 
Chapter 4.9. for example.
37. AID*for instance, is seen in different terms (cf Klein (1984)).
38. See, for example; Hubbard (1984); Rothman (1984) and, more recently, 
the debate in the House of Commons of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Bill 1989, The proposed role of doctors in surrogacy 
arrangements is also of interest here (cf BMA 1990).
39. Here 'blood' is clearly being used to refer to strictly biological
relationships.
40. As Overall has argued, it is simply begging the question to claim, 
as some have, that it is better for children to be born into a two- 
parent family, with both mother and father (1987). For instance 
"It]he mere presence of a father in the home seems unlikely to 
protect a child from abuse, and in fact somewhat more fathers than 
mothers are responsible for physical violence directed against 
their children." (1989: 175-6).
41. 'Kin' in this context presumably means those with biological' links.
42. See also discussion of Feversham Report; section 6.8 above.
43. See Braidotti on the 'freezing out of time' now characteristic of
biomedical practice and epitomised by the new reproductive
technologies (1989: 153).
44. It is common in discussions of surrogacy which make this point to 
describe these Biblical examples of surrogacy as arrangements 
between women (see Singer and Veils, 1984, for example,) There is a 
school of thought, however, which regards contemporary surrogacy as 
an arrangment between the surrogate mother and the 'commissioning
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father' (cf Ince 1984). It is also possible to interpret the 
biblical examples in this light.
45. Zipper and Sevenhuijsen (1987) have called this traditional form the 
'coital model of surrogacy', for obvious reasons.
46. This same report lists the permutations of reproductive 
relationships possible within surrogacy arrangements as follows:
a) a surrogate mother may be 'impregnated' with sperm of her own 
partner,
b) a surrogate mother is 'impregnated' with the sperm of the 
commissioning male,
c) the surrogate mother is 'impregnanted* with the sperm of a donor,
d) an ovum from the commissioning female and 'fertilised' by her 
partner's sperm may be implanted in the surrogate's uterus,
e) an ovum from the commissioning female is 'fertilised' by a 
donor's sperm.
f) a donated ovum may be 'fertilised' by donated sperm and implanted 
in the surrogate's uterus,
g) a donated ovum may be 'fertilised' by the commissioning male's 
sperm and implanted in the surrogate's uterus.
47. The organisations submitting evidence included community health 
councils, religious bodies, adoption agencies, political groups, 
legal bodies, medical societies and research teams. In addition 
there were 695 submissions from the public. For full details, see 
the Report's Appendix.
48. See section 6.5 in this chapter, where is is suggested that the 
child is already viewed as a commodity.
49. See Overall <1987: 113-116) who expands on this 'free market model'.
50. see Chapter 3.6 for a similar unease about the selling of blood and 
the suggestion that the commodification of this body product may, in 
some sense, demean the self.
51. The implication that a person may not put their body to whatever use 
they please shares certain resonances with an argument put forward 
by Manion (1988). She suggests that, in challenging the assumption 
that women's bodies are the property of men, women have come to 
understand their body as their own private property. This may, she 
suggests, be preferable to it being controlled by someone else. 
However it runs the risk of promoting a "possessive individualism" 
rather than a more social or collective approach to understandings 
the body (1988:194).
52. A 'Grow Bag' is a commercial preparation which is used for growing 
plants where the usual soil conditions for growth do not exist.
53. This suggests certain parallels between bodily blood and breast 
milk; see Chapter 4: 7.
54. Social motherhood is considered later (see Chapter 7),
55. There was not, however, a large enough majority to overturn the 
previously established policy, namely an agreement with the 
principle of surrogate births in selected cases with careful 
controls.
56. The paint has been made, for example, that in future, working class 
or 'Third Vorld' women will act as surrogate mothers for wealthy 
American or European women (Corea 1986; Franklin 1990). It is 
already the case that unmarried women, including lesbians, are 
largely excluded from making use of new reproductive technologies 
(Doyal 1987; Dyer 1989). See Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden (1983)
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who demonstrate the sorts of arguments used to justify such 
exclusions.
57. Doane and Hodges similarly argue that the ’Baby M' surrogacy case in 
America provides an opportunity to study familialism (1989: 79).
See also Birke et al (1990: Chapter 9).
58. For example, the OPCS (1990) for England and Vales suggests that one 
child in four will be affected by the divorce of their parents by 
the age of 16.
59. Indeed one study in the south of England found that 30% of husbands 
studied could not have been the genitor of their wife's children 
(Phillip 1973).
60. This emphasis on genetic connection appears to be deep-seated, It 
may be questioned by those who deny the necessity of one's 'own' 
child (see, for example, Corea 1986; Overall 1987), but such 
writers can at times unintentionally acknowledge the importance of 
genetic linkages. For example, Corea forsees that not only the 
infertile but many other women may be exploited by reproductive 
technology in that
"Cm] any women -not just those with fertility problems - will 
raise test-tube babies to whom they bear no blood relationship, 
the egg fertilised in the laboratory having not been their own 
but that of a donor" (1986: 7).
One of the problems Corea identifies with conceptive technologies, 
therefore, is that they may be used to deny women the opportunity to 
bear their 'own' children.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
1. There are, it seems, certain parallels between the relationship of a 
mother and child and between those of the same 'blood'; all can be 
characterised by 'sameness, 'openness' and 'closeness', but 'blood' 
relationships appear to be more attenuated.
2. I do not propose to discuss the body of work on metaphor; this is
represented, for example, by contributors to the volume edited by
Ortony (1979) and by Overing (1985b), The debate on translation is 
also of interest here as represented, for example, by contributions 
to the volume edited by Wilson (1970) and by Overing (1983).
3. It is not clear if Jackson is stating that metaphors of
disequilibrium are found universally, and I would certainly be loath
to suggest this. Having said that, examples of these metaphors can 
be found elsewhere in western culture (as indicated by the Latin 
cadere which means to fall dead, hence our term 'cadaver') and 
beyond western culture. For instance, among the Balinese there is 
an illness primarily associated with children which is known as 
kesambet. Kesambet follows shock, fright or 'soul loss' which may 
be prompted by falling down, receiving bad news or being publicly 
humiliated (being 'put down') (Vikan 1989). However, the cross- 
cultural understanding of 'disequilibrium* and hence of Being-in- 
the-world is far beyond the scope of this thesis.
4. At first glance, 'falling' pregnant and being 'knocked up' pose a 
problem in that they appear unsystematic in their orientation; they 
appear to refer to the same event as both being 'up' and 'down' (cf 
Lakoff & Johnson 1980). However, 'being knocked up' appears to be 
different to 'falling pregnant' in at least two respects. One 
possible difference is that 'being knocked up' refers not only to 
'being made pregnant' but to the continuing state of being pregnant, 
In contrast, 'falling pregnant' refers only to the moment of 
becoming pregnant. A further difference, and one more relevant to 
this discussion, is that the term 'being knocked up' suggests that 
the woman is an object that is being or has been acted upon, while 
'to fall pregnant' describes becoming pregnant from a woman's 
subjective perspective, In other words, the two expressions suggest 
different experiential bases, which loosely correspond to the gender 
dimension of the ontogenetic model of procreation referred to 
earlier.
5. This negative view of conception stands in contrast to the Christian 
tradition in which the conception of children was the only 
acceptable premise for sexual intercourse. However, a pro-natalist 
tradition does not necessarily invalidate the suggestion that the 
ontological understanding of conception carries certain resonances 
of Eve's fall, although any futher work in this area would clearly 
need to examine this apparent paradox more closely.
6. The culturally specific nature of 'upbringing' or 'raising* in 
relation to a child's moral development becomes clear if contrasted 
with, for example, the way in which a child is understood to be 
'moulded' in Japan (Hendry 1986).
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AEF.EHDi.X-A,
TERMINQLQGY..ASSOCIATED WITH REPRQDUCTIVE TECHMQLQGIES 
Artificial insemination
A procedure by which sperm is deposited in a woman's vagina s close to 
the cervix as passible, or in some cases, within the cervical canal. AIH 
designates artificial insemination by donor sperm, and AIH indicates tht 
the sperm of thewoman's partner is used.
Artificial reproduction
This term describes all techniques which bring about conception without 
sexual intercourse. There are essentially two forms ; artificial 
insemination (where conception occurs within a woman's body) and 
external or in vitro fertilisation.
Embryo
The early stages of human development until approximately eight weeks 
from conception, and before recognisable features are formed.
Embryo/fetus
An expression used to refer to the developing human organanism 
throughout the pre-natal period.
Embryo r.g.pla.c&n.ent or embryo transfer:
A medical procedure in which an early embryo is introduced into a 
woman's womb. Embryo replacement refers to the situation in which the 
ovum and gestation are provided by the same woman. Embryo transfer 
indicates that an early embryo is implanted in the uterus of a woman who 
did not provide the original ovum,
Fetus (or foetus)
The developing embryo which has recognisable human features. This stage 
of development begins at approximately eight weeks after conception and 
ends with birth.
Gamete
A 'sex cell', either ovum or sperm, containing twenty three chromosomes 
(half the full set).
GIFT or Gamete Intrafaiiopian.Transfer.
A variation of IVF in which colected ovum and sperm are together 
injected into a woman's fallopian tube. Fertilisation, if it occurs, 
therefore takes place in the fallopian tube and not in vitro.
Gene
In medical discourse, a segment of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which 
carries genetic information. In human beings genes are to be found in 
chromosomes within the nuclei of cells. DNA also plays an important 
part in embryo development, growth and maintenance.
Genetics.
The science of inheritance, including theories of gene structure and 
function.
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IVF or In Vitro Fertilisation
Conception, or the fusion of ovum and sperm, brought about outside the 
body of a woman (in fact in glass petri dish) and achieved in 
conjunction with a number of other procedures, such as laparoscopy or 
hormonal stimulation of the ovaries.
The insertion of instruments, including a telescopic lens and light 
source, through two small incisions in the abdominal wall to allow 
visualisation and manipulation of the internal abdominal structures.
Pre-embryo
A term used, particularly by those in favour of research on embryos, for 
human development up until fourteen days from conception.
Ultrasound scanning
The use of high-frequency sound waves to show outlines of internal body 
structures which are displayed on a television screen. Also called 
ultrasonography and sonogram.
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THE CLINIC.
The family planning centre where secondary informants were 
recruited is situated in Soho, central London and is widely regarded as 
one of the world's largest and busiest family planning clinics,1 It 
offers a wide range of general services, such as birth control advice, 
pregnancy testing, breast screening, rubella screening and vaccination, 
and health education regarding, for example, smoking, sexually 
transmitted disease and AIDs. In addition, the clinic provides 
specialist services, such as the diagnosis and treatment of cervical 
pathology, psycho-sexual counselling, sub-fertility investigations, 
menopause counselling, male and female sterilisation and termination of 
pregnancy. Each week there are 49 well-women/family planning sessions 
and 23 specialist sessions. The Centre also trains approximately 1,400 
doctors and nurses each year. It employs 25 part-time doctors, 30 part- 
time nurses and 25 multi-disciplinary staff.
The women interviewed in this study were attending the centre's 
clinic for birth control. This caters for approximately 90% of the 
centre's clients and sees approximately 800 women a week. It is thought 
that only about 11% of the Centre's clients are resident within the 
boundaries of the Health Authority which manages the clinic. Because of 
the non-residential nature of the clinic's location, the range of 
services it offers and its good reputation, the clinic, at least at the 
time this study, was predominately attended by women from adjoining 
Health Districts and from all over the Home Counties who commuted to 
work in central London.12
EflQ.tao.taa.
1. This is suggested, for example, by the Report of the Bloomsbury
Health Authority's Community and Dental Services Unit of May 1989.
2. As the result of a reduction in the size of it budget, the Centre is
having to reduce its catchment area.
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PROCEDURE FOR RECRUITMENT
Recruitment and interviewing at the clinic described in Appendix B was 
carried out as follows:
The woman who had the longest wait before being seen by clinic staff 
(identified by the fact that her case-notes were at the bottom of the 
pile of those indicating women to be seen) was asked if she would be 
interested in helping with research. She was then informed that this 
would involve answering questions in connection with non-medical aspects 
of reproduction. If she agreed (and only one woman refused) I then took 
her to an unoccupied room, where I offered further details. I explained 
that I was a post-graduate student from the University of London, 
studying anthropology. I outlined the aims of the research, adding that 
I was covering a broad range of issues, some of which did not always 
appear to have a direct relevance to reproduction (such as questions on 
the family or incest). I pointed out that I was interested in 
informants' views and opinions rather than in testing them on their 
medical knowledge. I then explained to the volunteer that I had 
informed clinic staff so that they would know where to find her and she 
would not be delayed as a result of her co-operation. In almost all 
cases the interview either finished before staff came to look for the 
informant, or the informant volunteered to finish the interview after 
her clinical consultation. I chose to work this way rather than ask 
women on their way out of the clinic, as I suspected they would be 
interested to help while they had time on their hands, but would be 
rushing off to work afterwards. Many women stated they were only too 
happy to have some distraction while waiting for their appointment. All 
informants were asked if they were prepared to have their replies tape- 
recorded and all but two agreed. The majority of women appeared to 
largely forget the presence of the tape recorder. In the cases of those 
women who did not want to be tape recorded, I otherwise conducted the 
research in the same way and then made notes at the end of the 
discussion. As stipulated by the Health Authority’s Ethics Committee, 
informants were also given a consent form which affirmed that they might 
stop the discussion at any point, have the tape wiped clean at any 
point, or leave the study, all without prejudicing their medical 
treatment. Once this form was signed as read and understood by the 
volunteer, I turned on the tape-recorder and asked a few preliminary, 
background details. These also served as a "warm up" to the main 
discussion. The initial questions concerned date and place of birth, 
place of education, parents place of birth and education, number of 
years of full-time education, marital status, occupation, serious 
illness, the number and nature of any pregnancies, and whether or not 
volunteers saw themselves as English. (In those cases where volunteers 
turned out not to be English in terms of the research criteria, I 
conducted the interview, but omitted the data from the study.)
Informants were then invited to discuss a number of issues, as grouped 
in Appendix E, In this way the area of discussion was imposed upon 
informants, but within each discussion there was space for the informant 
to raise the issues she perceived as relevant. Hence the range of 
issues generally became more complex as the number of interviews within 
any group increased.
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OTHER PRINCIPAL INFORMANTS
Sheila was woman in her late twenties who was in the last weeks of 
her second pregnancy when I first met her, through her local health 
centre. She was a ready informant from a large local family but she was 
only in London temporarily for obstetric care and due to return to her 
home in Holland after the birth of her baby. I had initially hoped to 
continue working with the other members of her family on her return. 
However, it became clear that I was unable to explain to her mother in 
satisfactory terms what it was that I was doing and, on reflection, I 
believe she may have thought that I was making clandestine enquiries 
into the family's housing situation. Sheila's mother however would have 
been the initial 'gatekeeper' in terms of access to other family members 
and, in the face of her mistrust, it seemed impracticable and unethical 
to continue this line of enquiry.
Caroline was twelve weeks pregnant when I recruited her. She was 
unmarried and no longer in contact with the father of her child-to-be, 
Although she had no local family, Caroline stated she had a strong local 
network of friends who, for example, were to be involved in the birth 
and care of her child. However, it was not possible to trace this 
particular network, indeed it largely crumbled in the face of Caroline's 
pregnancy and the needs that accompanied this. For example, Caroline 
was asked to leave the collective household where she lived once she 
announced she was pregnant. She subsequently found a temporary home in 
a mother and baby hostel run by local social services. Thus I happened 
to meet Caroline when she was socially isolated, fearful for the future 
and in great need of support. Due to her particular circumstances, I 
often went with Caroline when she visisted ante-natal clinics and kept 
similar appointments. As I was interested at this time in the 
interaction between doctors and patients in the field of reproductive 
health, these visits were quite pertinent to my research. However, the 
different nature of our discussions, for example the emphasis on her 
obstetric care and her encounters with health workers, meant that it was 
difficult to use the information Caroline presented alongside that 
arising from other informants.
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The .nature of the interviews
Among secondary informants, the issues for discussion were divided into 
a number of groups. These groups can be outlined as follows:
1. ideas of masculinity and femininity and their relation to the 
use of contraception, the menarche, sexual experience and
ferti1ity.
2. 'kinship', understandings of 'blood' and 'flesh and blood', 
attitudes towards incest, attitudes towards the new reproductive 
technologies.
3. the meanings of Christian creation myths, understandings of 
'God', perceptions of the person and the soul.
4. Perceptions of body boundary and body products, the surrogate 
breastfeeding vignette.
5. further discussions of 'family', 'blood* and 'flesh and blood', 
children, reproductive technologies, including surrogacy 
vignettes.
6. drawings of general internal structures, reproductive 
structures, the masculine and feminine body.
On average I interviewed sixteen people on each group of topics.
Each interview was shaped by a number of questions that I wanted 
answered in relation to the particular topic under examination, but 
these questions were open-ended. The range of issues covered in any one 
interview and the depth in which they were covered varied greatly 
depending on my skills as an interviewer (which improved over the 
duration of the study), the degree to which volunteers had thought 
about the issues and the extent to which they initiated questions.
For details of informants, grouped according to the issues they 
discussed, see Appendix F.
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APPENDIX F
DETAILS QF INFORMANTS
Unless otherwise stated, all informants are single, describe themselves 
as 'English' and where born and educated in England, with parents also 
born and educated in England,
; L “  P d u t :  f \ a L I -■ t. I rnv> t.o 1 t~+ yir.i-iriv r a; o  *f ,
cd • :2: “ *' “ “ “ " I ~7 jsir^d 1 3  y  ^  ^  v* ai ir«f ,
: 3 — " " " " 41 •• " " I ‘3 v^ cl LT I y ,-^K V' <=; o f fTiQSf «“rtv\c1
toed * A  —  " 14 " “ 11 ■* t-o CiV'toY* :2". I y to;r*"pt?b. o f  <ikQe» ,
GPQUP ONE
1. 39 years, surveyor, "British", ed: 1, no religion,
2. 27 years, married cleaning manager, ed: 3, agnostic.
3. 39 years, promoter, ed: 1, Christian.
4. 35 years, married promoter, "British", ed: 1, no religion.
5. 30 years, clerk, "British", ed: 1, Roman Catholic.
6. 25 years, data processor, ed: 3, Church of England.
7. 26 years, secretary, ed: 1, agnostic.
8. 24 years, secretary, ed: 2, no religion.
9. 29 years, married, nurse, ed: 1, Christian,
10. 28 years, publican, ed: 1, agnostic.
11. 36 years, secretary, ed: 2, no religion.
12. 31 years, married advertising executive, "British", born in 
Singapore, ed: 3, Church of England.
13. 30 years, advertising researcher, ed: 3, no religion,
14. 26 years, television producer, parents educated abroad, ed: 3, 
no religion.
GRQ.UP_._im
1. 29 years, graphics designer, educated abroad, ed: 3, agnostic.
2. 20 years, manager, educated abroad, ed: 2, no religion.
3. 23 years, nurse, ed: 2, no religion.
4. 28 years, fingerprint officer, ed: 2, Church of England.
5. 26 years, midwife, father born and educated in Ireland, ed: 2,
Pentecostal.
6. 27 years, married, manager,ed: 2, Church of England,
7. 27 years, scientist, ed: 4, no religion.
8. 21 years, temporary secretary, ed: 1, agnostic.
9. 28 years, distribution assistant, mother educated in Brussels,
ed: 2, Roman Catholic.
10. 21 years, administrative assistant, ed: 1, no religion.
11. 32 years clerk/barmaid, ed: 1, Christian.
12. 26 years, public relations officer, parents born and educated in 
Ireland, ed: 4, no religion.
13. 32 years, journalist for Hansard, mother born in Austria, ed: 2, 
Jewish.
14. 20 years, student, continuing in education, no religion.
15. 24 years, manager, ed; 3, Roman Catholic.
16. 26 years, teacher, ed: 3, Christian.
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17, 37 years,
two child
18. 32 years,
19. 39 years,
20. 25 years,
GROUP THREE
1. 31 years,
2. 30 years,
3. 30 years.
4. 41 years,
5. 28 years,
6. 24 years,
7. 23 years,
ed: 2, Ch
8. 25 years,
9. 31 years,
10. 22 years,
11. 25 years,
12. 29 years,
13. 22 years,
14. 39 years,
15. 25 years,
16. 22 years,
17. 42 years,
18. 29 years,
journalist, "British", ed: 4, no religion, 
nurse, ed: 2, Christian.
married, secretary, "British", ed: 1, Church of England, 
divorced, housewife, ed: 1, Church of England, 
married, housewife, ed: 1, agnostic, three children, 
manager, ed; 2, agnostic.
secretary, father born and educated in Romania, 
ireh of England.
secretary, "British", ed: 4, no religion, 
manager, ed: 4, no religion.
married musician/lay chaplan, ed: 3, Church of England, 
secretary, ed: 2, no religion.
social services worker, ed: 2, lapsed Roman Catholic, 
computer operator, ed: 1, Church of England, 
co-habiting, clerk, ed: 2, Church of England, 
nurse, ed: 2, agnostic.
chef, "British", ed: 1, ex-Roman Catholic, 
married, housewife, ed: 4, Church of England, 
married, student, (previously chartered accountant) 
educated in Nigeria, father also educated in Nigeria, no religion.
GRQ.UE FJQUR.
1. 26 years, nurse, ed: 2, no religion.
2. 31 years, medical secretary, ed: 3, Church of England.
3. 24 years, nurse/art student, continuing her education, no religion.
4. 27 years, co-habiting sales representative, ed: 1, lapsed
Roman Catholic.
5. 20 years, clerk, "British", ed: 1, no religion.
6. 35 years, married, administrator, ed: 1, Christian, one child.
7. 28 years, nurse, ed: 1, Christian.
8. 39 years, married, accountant, ed: 1, no religion.
9. 26 years sales director, ed: 2, no religion.
10. 30 years, married, public relations director, born in Ghana, 
ed: 2, Church of England.
11. 24 years, advertising executive, educated in Europe, ed: 3,
no religion.
12. 25 years, married, personal secretary, born in Germany, ed: 2, 
Church of England.
13. 43 years, associate television producer, ed: 1, Church of England.
14. 27 years, telex operator, ed: 1, no religion.
15. 27 years, married, animator, ed: 4, no religion.
16. 26 years, separated, market researcher, ed: 2, Christian.
17. 26 years, designer, ed: 2, Buddhist.
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GROUP FIVE
1. 29 years
2. 26 years
3. 23 years
4, 31 years
5. 25 years
6. 27 years
7. 26 years
8. 37 years
9. 28 years
10. 34 years
11. 21 years
12. 21 years
co-habiting, television producer, ed: 2, agnostic.
secretary, ed: 1, no religion.
administrator, ed: 1, agnostic.
married, secretary, ed: 2, Church of England.
secretary, ed; 2, Roman Catholic.
married, secretary, ed: 1, Roman Catholic.
engaged, secretary,ed: 2, agnostic.
buyer, ed: 2, Christian,
illustrator, ed; 4, agnostic.
divorced, advertising executive, ed: 3, no religion, 
secretary, ed; 2, Church of England, 
chaperone for child actors, ed: 1, Christian.
GROUP SIX
1. 30 years,
(religion:
2. 31 years,
3. 29 years,
not asked)
4. 35 years,
(religion:
5. 33 years,
6. 26 years,
7. 26 years,
8. 31 years,
9. 31 years n
10. 30 years,
11. 27 years c
12. 38 years,
13. 30 years,
14. 23 years,
15. 20 years,
production manger, mother educated in India, ed: 4, 
not asked).
married, secretary, ed: 2, (religion: not asked), 
credit underwriter, "British", ed: 3, (religion:
separated, investor relations officer, "British", ed: 4, 
not asked). 
secretary, ed: 2, (religion: not asked), 
publishing, "British", ed: 3, Church of England, 
waitress, ed: 1, no religion, 
nurse, ed: 2, Church of England, 
larried, solicitor, ed: 4, no religion, 
journalist, ed: 3, Roman Catholic, 
omputer programmer, ed: 2, Church of England, 
divorced, student, continuing her education, no religion, 
married receptionist, "British", ed: 1, no religion, 
trainee journalist, ed: 2, Church of England, 
actress, ed: 1, Church of England.
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THE --QP-EN... BQD.X
Group One: Doubly-open
6.2) Age 31, married, educated to 18 years , secretary.
6.3) Age 29, single, educated to 21 years, credit underwriter.
6.9) Age 26, single, educated to 21 years, publishing.
6.12) Age 31, single, educated to 18 years, nurse.
6.13) Age 31, married , educated to 22 years , solicitor.
6.15) Age 27, single, educated to 17 years, computer programmer
6.18) Age 30, single, educated to 15 years, receptionist.
Group Two; Open
6.20) Age 26, single, educated to 16, singer/dancer.
Katy) Age 28, married, educated to 16, housewife.
Group Three; Locally open
6.1) Age 30
6.5) Age 33
6.11) Age 26
6.16) Age 38
6.19) Age 23
Group Four; Closed
6.14) Age 30, single, educated to 21, journalist.
6.4) Age 35, separated, educated to 25, investor relations (oil)
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